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William Clifford’s ‘The Ethics of Belief’ proposes an ‘evidence principle’: 
…it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon 
insufficient evidence (1877, 1879:186). 
Its universal, absolutist language seems to hide something fundamentally correct. 
We first argue for excluding prescriptive beliefs, and then consider further 
apparent counter-examples, culminating in more restricted, qualified wording: 
If anything is morally wrong, then it is morally wrong within the category of 
descriptive belief to believe anything knowingly or irresponsibly on 
insufficient evidence in the absence of any conflicting and overriding moral 
imperative except when the unjustified believing is outside the believer’s 
voluntary control. 
We test this against William James’s counter-claim for qualified legitimate over-
belief (‘The Will To Believe’, 1896, 2000), and suggest additional benefits of 
adopting an evidence principle in relation to the structured combinations of 
descriptive and prescriptive components common to religious belief. 
In search of criteria for ‘sufficient’ and ‘insufficient’ evidence we then consider an 
‘enriched’ Bayesianism within normative decision theory, which helps explain good 
doxastic practice under risk. ‘Lottery paradox’ cases however undermine the idea 
of an evidence threshold: we would say we justifiably believe one hypothesis while 
saying another, at the same credence level, is only very probably true. 
We consider approaches to ‘pragmatic encroachment’, suggesting a parallel 
between ‘practical interest’ and the ‘personal utility’ denominating the stakes of the 
imaginary gambles which Bayesian credences can be illustrated as. But personal 
utility seems inappropriately agent-relative for a moral principle. 
   5 
 
We return to Clifford’s conception of our shared responsibilities to our shared 
epistemic asset. This ‘practical interest we ought to have’ offers an explanation for 
our duty, as members of an epistemic community, to get and evaluate evidence; 
and for the ‘utility’ stakes of Bayesian imaginary gambles. Helped by Edward 
Craig’s (1990, 1999) ‘state-of-nature’ theory of knowledge it provides a minimum 
threshold to avoid insufficient evidence and suggests an aspirational criterion of 
sufficient evidence: 
 
Wherever possible, a level of evidence sufficient to support the level of 
justification required to be a good informant, whatever the particular 
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Summary 
 
In ‘The Ethics of Belief’ William Clifford proposes an ‘evidence principle’:  
 
…it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon 
insufficient evidence  (1877, 1879:186) 
 
The universal, absolutist terms in which it is expressed expose it to attacks which 
a more restricted, qualified principle might resist. This dissertation was therefore 
prompted by the suspicion that, despite its failings, Clifford’s principle had got 
something fundamentally right. Its aim was to tease out what that something might 
be. For example it questions whether a principle like Clifford’s can usefully apply 
to prescriptive beliefs, and concludes that attempting to do so seems fraught with 
obstacles, for little positive gain. 
 
Chapter 1 introduces Clifford’s principle and articulates his rationale for it. It then 
makes a prima facie case for an evidence principle less universally worded than 
Clifford’s. Like Clifford’s however our modified principle applies primarily to 
believing behaviour, and only secondarily to beliefs themselves. 
 
In Chapter 2 we give two reasons for excluding prescriptive beliefs. One is the 
challenge of explaining how evidence can support purely prescriptive beliefs. The 
other is that applying the principle to prescriptive beliefs seems incoherent – and 
not just because, as holding the principle would amount to holding a prescriptive 
belief, an evidence principle would have to presuppose itself in order to obey itself. 
 
Chapter 3 explores the idea of an evidence principle restricted to descriptive 
beliefs and considers apparent counter-examples. These lead to clarifications and 
qualifications, culminating in our final wording: 
 
If anything is morally wrong, then it is morally wrong within the category of 
descriptive belief to believe anything knowingly or irresponsibly on 
insufficient evidence in the absence of any conflicting and overriding moral 
imperative except when the unjustified believing is outside the believer’s 
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voluntary control. 
 
This makes explicit what Clifford left implicit: that it is a morally prescriptive 
principle. 
 
Chapter 4 then tests our principle against William James’s very different focus on 
the conditions for legitimate over-belief in general and religious over-belief in 
particular (in ‘The Will To Believe’, 1896, 2000). We also suggest a number of 
additional potential benefits, specifically in relation to religious belief, of adopting 
an evidence principle. These benefits all relate to the compound nature of much 
religious belief, consisting of structured combinations of descriptive and 
prescriptive components. 
 
Contrasting moral positions are however notoriously hard to secure or demolish. 
Complicating the case of James versus Clifford is a clash between two different 
existential perspectives and orientations. James prioritises individual liberty, 
whereas Clifford and our own principle both foreground the social and communal 
consequences of epistemic behaviour. If our principle does not conquer, it seems 
at least to survive unscathed. 
 
The final step, in Chapter 5, is to articulate a criterion of ‘sufficient’ evidence (and 
therefore of ‘insufficient’ evidence) which our evidence principle would require. 
The concept of the shared epistemic asset underpinning Clifford’s principle ends 
up doing much of the heavy lifting in relation to our own. But first we see how far 
we get by considering Bayesian accounts of the relation between evidence and 
belief. 
 
Bayesianism sees degree of belief as a personal probability which can be 
modelled as the betting rate an individual would accept as fair in an imaginary 
gamble. An initial challenge is the ‘problem of the priors’, to which our response is 
to consider only credences after at least one update cycle. We therefore assume a 
duty to get evidence and to take that evidence seriously. This makes sense if we 
adopt an ‘enriched’ Bayesianism considered within normative decision theory, 
which also explains both the normative aspect of Bayesianism (‘why be a 
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Bayesian?’) and the currency of personal utility which Bayesian imaginary 
gambles could be denominated in. 
 
Although evidential sufficiency and insufficiency are not strictly part of 
Bayesianism, this does not make Bayesianism irrelevant to our principle. 
Bayesianism goes a long way towards explaining ‘good practice’ in our doxastic 
behaviour in support of decision-making under risk, particularly in respect of the 
relation between degrees of belief and evidential support and the avoidance of 
doxastic fallacies. 
 
A key challenge though is to define sufficient evidence from a Bayesian 
foundation. We need a criterion of sufficient evidence short of conclusive 
evidence, as conclusive evidence needs no Bayesian explanation. 
 
We consider the idea of a threshold. But apart from the issue of deciding and 
agreeing its numerical level, the mere idea of a threshold seems unworkable on its 
own. ‘Lottery paradox’ cases show we could have two beliefs at the same 
personal probability, one we would say we justifiably believe (or even know), and 
the other we would say is only very probably true. 
 
To address this we consider two different approaches to ‘pragmatic 
encroachment’. This seems initially promising, and in line with our assumed 
‘enriched’ Bayesianism embedded in normative decision theory: the ‘practical 
interest’ motivating pragmatic encroachment seeming equivalent to the ‘personal 
utility’ representing the stakes of the imaginary gambles which Bayesian 
credences can be illustrated as. 
 
But a conception of practical interest restricted to personal utility seems 
inappropriately agent-relative for an evidence principle expressed in moral terms. 
This is particularly evident when relating our developing notion of evidential 
sufficiency to, for example, Clifford’s ship owner story. From the perspective of 
personal utility, the ship owner’s interest was served by believing as he did, not by 
withholding belief on insufficient evidence. 
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For our purposes therefore there seems every reason to incorporate Clifford’s dual 
conception of our shared epistemic asset and our shared responsibilities to that 
asset. This transforms the ‘practical interest’ in pragmatic encroachment into the 
‘practical interest we ought to have’, which then provides an explanation for our 
duty to get evidence and take evidence seriously, and for the ‘utility’ currency 
denominating the stakes of Bayesian imaginary gambles. It also removes the 
problematic agent-relativity, and allows us to formulate a criterion of evidential 
sufficiency for belief, with the help of Edward Craig’s (1990, 1999) ‘state-of-nature’ 
theory of knowledge: 
 
Wherever possible, a level of evidence sufficient to support the level of 
justification required to be a good informant, whatever the particular 
circumstances of the inquirer. 
 
The imperative to be a ‘good informant’ commits us to intersubjectivity, allowing us 
to navigate around radical scepticism and avoid consigning virtually all our beliefs 
to a black hole of solipsism. 
 
Chapter 6 then summarises what conclusions the overall dissertation can 
support, and examines what the status of our principle might be. 
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Chapter 1 | Introduction 
 
This chapter introduces William Clifford’s evidence principle,1 which we label ‘CP’ 
(‘Clifford’s Principle’). We then make an initial prima facie case for a modified 
principle based on CP, but restricted to descriptive beliefs. Like CP however our 
principle applies primarily to believing behaviour and only secondarily to the 
resultant beliefs themselves. To start to assess the universality of our principle, we 
pick an everyday descriptive belief and ask if our ordinary expectations regarding 
belief language would make a believer culpable if he2 acquired, held or asserted 
the belief without sufficient evidence. We sample recent literature to explore 
whether obligation is implicit in the conceptual structure of belief; epistemic versus 
moral appraisal of belief; and belief in its social context.  
 
1.1 William Clifford: ‘The Ethics of Belief’ 
 
In ‘The Ethics of Belief’ Clifford defends his evidence principle: 
 
CP …it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything 
upon insufficient evidence (1877, 1879:186). 
 
Below we unpack Clifford’s apparent intentions: that CP applies to all beliefs, 
including prescriptive beliefs; that ‘wrong’ means ‘morally wrong’;3 that CP applies 
primarily to believing behaviour; and that ‘always, everywhere and for anyone’ is 
meant literally. We also articulate what Clifford seems to take as true about people 
and their world, to warrant a principle like CP. 
 
                                                   
 
1 Clifford’s original principle, and any appropriate modification of it, will be referred to as ‘evidence’ 
principles rather than ‘evidentialist’ principles. This is to avoid the impression that the principles 
exactly correspond to any particular flavour of ‘evidentialism’ discussed in the literature, for example 
Adler’s ‘intrinsic’ evidentialism (2002:2), which he distinguishes from both ‘moderate’ evidentialism 
(‘Evidence should generally determine the strength of belief, but not always’ (2002:3)) and the 
‘traditional’ evidentialism of, say, Locke or Hume (‘the strength of one's belief ought to be 
proportional to the strength of one's reasons’ (2002:25). 
2 Alternate chapters will default to masculine and feminine pronouns. 
3 In much of the literature ‘ethics’ in ‘ethics of belief’ is not synonymous with ‘morality’, as the ‘ethics 
of belief’ could consider prudential or moral or epistemic norms, separately or in combination. See 
for example Chignell (2018: §2.1). For clarity we will generally use ‘moral’ and its cognates rather 
than ‘ethical’ when a specifically moral context is intended. 
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Clifford delineates what we may believe (positive permission) from what we may 
not believe (negative obligation), saying little about what we must believe (positive 
obligation) or do not have to believe (negative permission). We will also prioritise 
those first two categories. 
 
Sins of belief 
 
Clifford applies CP to both descriptive and prescriptive beliefs. For our purposes a 
descriptive belief is about what is (or is not) the case. A prescriptive (or 
normative4) belief is about what ought (or ought not) to be the case. Prescriptive 
beliefs include moral beliefs, but not all prescriptive beliefs are moral beliefs. 
Adopting CP would itself count as adopting a morally prescriptive belief alongside, 
say, ‘cheating is wrong’ and ‘thou shalt not kill’. We are not assuming all beliefs 
must be either descriptive or prescriptive. Aesthetic beliefs for example may 
qualify as neither.5 
 
Clifford applied CP to the prescriptive belief that it is wrong to ‘steal and tell lies’ 
(1877, 1879:188). However his keynote story of the passenger ship owner (1877, 
1879:177) features a purely descriptive belief. The owner suspects his ship might 
be unseaworthy, but manages to overcome his doubts: not by having her 
overhauled and refitted but by trusting in Providence. She sails and sinks in mid-
ocean. Is he guilty of the death of passengers and crew? Undoubtedly. He ‘did 
sincerely believe in the soundness of his ship’, but he had ‘acquired his belief not 
by honestly earning it in patient investigation, but by stifling his doubts’ (1877, 
1879:178). 
 
What if the ship had been sound all along? Clifford claims he would still have been 
guilty. Not of manslaughter of course, but of holding a belief he had no right to 
hold, its origin being faulty. He would still have endangered the lives on board.6 
 
                                                   
 
4 We will use either depending on context. No significant distinction is intended. 
5 See also p120. 
6 See also p125ff. 
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Clifford argues that guilt attaches to the unjustified belief (‘over-belief’7) itself, not 
just to action arising from it. This is because ‘it is not possible so to sever the 
belief from the action it suggests as to condemn the one without condemning the 
other’ (1877, 1879:181). No ‘real belief, however trifling and fragmentary it may 
seem, is ever truly insignificant’ (1877, 1879:181) or without effect in the world, if 
only because each over-belief makes the next one easier to acquire.8 Over-beliefs 
are insidiously corrupting because each  
 
prepares us to receive more of its like, confirms those which resembled it 
before, and weakens others; and so gradually it lays a stealthy train in our 
inmost thoughts, which may someday explode into overt action, and leave 
its stamp upon our character for ever. (1877, 1879:181-2) 
 
Clifford thinks it not just unsound, unwise or an epistemic failing but morally wrong 
to over-believe: 
 
We all suffer severely enough from the maintenance and support of false 
beliefs and the fatally wrong actions which they lead to, and the evil born 
when one such belief is entertained is great and wide. But a greater and 
wider evil arises when the credulous character is maintained and supported, 
when a habit of believing for unworthy reasons is fostered and made 
permanent. [Emphases added.] (1877, 1879:185) 
 
As with other moral failings both immediate and indirect consequences may 
ensue. If I steal money, the theft itself may be insignificant: my victim ‘may not feel 
the loss, or it may prevent him from using the money badly’. What ‘hurts society’ 
though is not so much the loss of property but the risk of becoming ‘a den of 
thieves, for then it must cease to be society’. Similarly, over-belief is wrong 
primarily because of its effects on the community. The direct impact of my 
individual over-belief may be insignificant, but 
 
                                                   
 
7 See James (1907, 2000:131).  
8 Examples of apparently harmless over-beliefs are discussed later: p121ff. 
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I cannot help doing this great wrong towards Man, that I make myself 
credulous. The danger to society is not merely that it should believe 
wrong things … but that it should become credulous, and lose the habit of 
testing things and inquiring into them; for then it must sink back into 
savagery. [Emphases added.] (1877, 1879:185-6) 
 
An individual’s credulity is no ‘private matter’ as belief is a shared social asset: 
 
Our lives are guided by that general conception of the course of things which 
has been created by society for social purposes. Our words, our phrases, 
our forms and processes and modes of thought, are common property, … 
an heirloom which every succeeding generation inherits as a precious 
deposit and a sacred trust to be handed on to the next one, not unchanged 
but enlarged and purified… Into this, for good or ill, is woven every belief of 
every man who has speech of his fellows. (1877, 1879:182) 
 
Because the wrong of over-belief is to society at large, Clifford sees us all 
obligated regardless of rank or role: 
 
… Every rustic who delivers in the village alehouse his slow, infrequent 
sentences, may help to kill or keep alive the fatal superstitions which clog his 
race. Every hard-worked wife of an artisan may transmit to her children 
beliefs which shall knit society together, or rend it in pieces. (1877, 
1879:183) 
 
We all share a moral duty to avoid over-belief and so prevent intellectually 
stultifying credulity. We should all therefore foster good habits of belief and avoid 
bad habits: 
 
Habitual want of care about what I believe leads to habitual want of care in 
others about the truth of what is told to me. (1877, 1879:186) 
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Voluntary and involuntary beliefs 
 
Clifford includes voluntary and involuntary beliefs. Taken literally CP covers ‘all 
beliefs’, regardless of how much volition is involved. But his presentation confers 
praise and blame paradigmatically on those aspects of belief-acquisition and 
belief-rejection which are (or could be, or should be) under voluntary control. 
Hence his claim that unjustified belief is insidiously corrupting: a ‘pestilence’ 
(1877, 1879:184). Within each individual, if we 
 
let ourselves believe for unworthy reasons, we weaken our powers of self-
control, of doubting, of judicially and fairly weighing evidence. (1877, 
1879:185) 
 
At the extreme our self-control and discernment could so atrophy that our gullibility 
is completely involuntary, until in theory we could claim innocence for any 
resultant over-belief. But we would be wrong to let ourselves get to this state. 
Compare a father so tired from partying every night that he loses patience with his 
toddler son over something trivial and causes an injury. Perhaps the more 
extreme the exhaustion the less responsible the father was for the injury itself, but 
the more culpable he is for letting exhaustion deplete his self-control. CP can 
similarly cover involuntarily acquired beliefs, if the methods and habits cultivated 
for belief acquisition9 result from voluntary choices and omissions. 
 
Clifford recognises cases of conscious volition exercised over beliefs. The ship-
owner ‘succeeded in overcoming [his] melancholy reflections’ on the state of his 
ship and ‘dismiss[ed] from his mind all ungenerous suspicions about the honesty 
of builders and contractors’. He ‘acquired his belief … by stifling his doubts’, so 
‘inasmuch as he had knowingly and willingly worked himself into that frame of 
mind, he must be held responsible for it’ (1877, 1879:177-8). 
 
An example of less direct control is the ‘agitating society’ accusing members of an 
unorthodox religion of misdemeanours. Yet ‘the evidence of their innocence was 
such as the agitators might easily have obtained, if they had attempted a fair 
                                                   
 
9 We will refer to these as ‘doxastic’ methods and habits. 
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inquiry’ (1877, 1879:179). The agitators’ beliefs resulted from their deliberate 
choices and omissions, but they did not necessarily intend having the beliefs they 
ended up holding. 
 
Still further towards the involuntary extreme is the man whose ‘belief is so fixed 
that he cannot think otherwise’. But even he 
 
still has a choice in regard to the action suggested by it, and so cannot 
escape the duty of investigating on the ground of the strength of his 
convictions (1877, 1879:180-1) 
 
Clifford interweaves voluntary and involuntary aspects of belief, within one 
individual and between individuals in the same community. Cultivating poor 
doxastic10 habits by voluntary choice and omission leads individuals and 
communities to ‘lose the habit of testing things and inquiring into them’, becoming 
more credulous and prone to wrongly formed involuntary beliefs. 
 
Rationale behind CP 
 
Clifford’s case for CP appears to incorporate or presuppose a number of 
descriptive, largely empirical, claims, not all spelled out. Below is an attempt to 
articulate them: 
 
(1.1.1) Our beliefs generally influence our actions. 
 
(1.1.2) Our actions generally have consequences for others. 
 
(1.1.3) We have limited control over the degree to which, and manner in 
which, our beliefs influence our actions. 
 
(1.1.4) We make inferences about people’s beliefs from their actions. 
 
(1.1.5) Beliefs supported by sufficient evidence are generally speaking more 
                                                   
 
10 See previous footnote. 
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likely to be true than those not so supported. 
 
(1.1.6) We generally take people’s beliefs to be supported by sufficient 
evidence, and therefore likely to be true. 
 
(1.1.7) Voluntary behaviour in relation to how conscientiously we ensure our 
beliefs are supported by evidence significantly influences our doxastic 
habits, and therefore our future voluntary and/or involuntary beliefs. 
 
(1.1.8) We have limited control over how our voluntary behaviour influences 
our doxastic habits: see (1.1.7). 
 
(1.1.9) As inter-communicating social beings our individual beliefs and 
doxastic habits inter-relate and exert a powerful aggregate influence at 
community level. This aggregate of beliefs and doxastic habits 
represents a shared social asset inherited from one generation to the 
next. 
 
(1.1.10) We have limited control over how our individual beliefs and doxastic 
habits impact that shared social asset (1.1.9). 
 
(1.1.11) Our survival and well-being, at both individual and community level, 
are generally speaking maximised when future states of affairs 
correspond with our expectations, including expectations about the 
results of our deliberate actions. 
 
(1.1.12) Our survival and well-being, at both individual and community level, 
are generally speaking maximised when beliefs guiding our 
expectations and deliberate actions are supported by sufficient 
evidence and therefore most likely to be true. The shared social asset 
(1.1.9) is accordingly most effective in promoting community survival, 
well-being and cohesion when its component beliefs are supported by 
sufficient evidence and therefore most likely to be true, and when our 
shared doxastic habits encourage the acquisition of such beliefs. 
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(1.1.13) Generally speaking we each do what we can to maximise our own 
individual survival and well-being. 
 
His case also incorporates or presupposes a generic prescriptive moral claim like: 
 
(1.2.1) Other things being equal we should each do what we can to maximise 
the survival and well-being of others, at both individual and community 
level. 
 
From (1.2.1) and the set of descriptive claims (1.1.1–13) can be derived a more 
specific prescriptive moral claim like: 
 
(1.2.2) Other things being equal we should each do what we can to develop 
and encourage doxastic habits in ourselves and others aimed at 
ensuring our beliefs are adequately supported by evidence. 
 
CP re-expresses the ‘positive obligation’ of (1.2.2) in terms of ‘negative 
obligation’.11 
 
Empirical (descriptive) claims can support moral (prescriptive) beliefs as long as 
there is at least one appropriately worded prescriptive statement – here (1.2.1) – 
to effect the is-to-ought transition.12 ‘Thou shalt not kill’ for example appears to 
presuppose the empirical truth that ‘humans are mortal’, which on its own does not 
entail the sixth commandment.13 
 
The empirical claims (1.1.1–13) appear at least plausible: if they were not broadly 
true a principle like CP would have little point. This dissertation will not investigate 
whether (1.1.1–13) are empirically true, but to what extent a principle like CP is 
conceptually sound. In general we will assume the psychological and sociological 
facts are broadly as in (1.1.1–13); and presuppose an overall meta-ethical position 
                                                   
 
11 See p13. 
12 See p134, where a similar point is discussed in a different context. 
13 Or count as evidence for it: see Chapter 2, particularly pp62–73. 
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incorporating a generic moral imperative like (1.2.1). The claim is therefore that 
someone who considers (1.1.1–13) substantially true and holds a generic moral 
belief like (1.2.1) should for consistency adopt a principle like CP. 
 
CP has been critiqued from various perspectives, including whether it involves 
what today would be called ‘voluntarism’, and therefore fails if voluntarism fails.14 
Future chapters will consider a range of objections, but in relation to a principle 
less universally worded than Clifford’s. The next section starts to sketch a principle 
which preserves the spirit of CP, shares the rationale articulated in (1.1.1–13) and 
(1.2.1), but should prove easier to defend. 
 
1.2 Drafting the principle 
 
Unlike CP our principle will only cover descriptive beliefs. But like CP it will be a 
moral principle, typically applying to descriptive beliefs acquired and/or held in 
contexts involving a degree of volition. Other things being equal the believer would 
be culpable insofar as he acquired and/or held the descriptive over-belief as a 
result of something he voluntarily did or refrained from doing.15 Like CP therefore it 
applies primarily to doxastic behaviour and only secondarily to the resultant 
beliefs. 
 
Relation to other moral principles 
 
The claim that over-belief (over-believing) in general, or any specific category of it, 
is morally wrong parallels the claim that (say) lying or deceiving are morally wrong. 
We are therefore assuming, rather than arguing for, a pre-existing notion of 
something being morally wrong.16 We are not questioning whether anything can 
be morally wrong. Our principle will incorporate this: 
 
EP1 {If anything is morally wrong, then} it is [morally] wrong [within the 
category of descriptive belief] to believe anything on insufficient 
evidence. 
                                                   
 
14 See p74ff. 
15 See also 3.1 Involuntary over-beliefs p74. 
16 This is in any case implicit in our presupposition of (1.2.1). 
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Curly brackets { } imply the clause is a contextual presupposition rather than an 
intrinsic component. Consider the same presupposition in relation to the principle 
that lying is wrong. A perfectly amoral universe with no concept of moral right or 
wrong would be one where ‘it is wrong to lie’ would not apply, because the 
conditions for its meaningful usage would not obtain. 
 
This does not make every over-belief as wrong as every lie or deception. After all 
every lie or deception is not equally wrong. But it means that assumptions and 
distinctions applicable to moral principles in general would, other things being 
equal, apply to EP1. CP speaks in universal terms, but it would be hard to argue it 
would be wrong ‘always, everywhere, and for anyone’ to do anything – lie, cheat, 
steal, or even kill. Morality is a domain of choices and moral imperatives. Taken 
literally CP says over-believing is the paramount sin: rather sacrifice your only son 
as a burnt offering than over-believe. But an evidence principle expressed in moral 
terms need only claim it is wrong to over-believe (as to lie, cheat or steal) in the 
absence of any conflicting and overriding moral imperative. Only a Kantian 
extremist would think it morally wrong to lie to the Gestapo about where a fellow 
maquisard was hiding. 
 
What is meant by ‘belief’? 
 
We have distinguished descriptive from prescriptive beliefs,17 but we also need a 
working definition of ‘belief’ itself. For now we will adopt Adler’s18 formula that our 
beliefs are what we regard as true: ‘what I believe is just how things are’ (2002:11) 
for me. This aligns with Williams’s claim that beliefs ‘aim at truth’: ‘…when 
somebody believes something, then he believes something which can be 
assessed as true or false’ (1973:136-7).19 
 
  
                                                   
 
17 See p14. 
18 See p24ff. 
19 We are therefore taking ‘I believe that p’ as a straightforward way of expressing p, and discounting 
usages where ‘I believe that p’ expresses mere faith, opinion, or a degree of uncertainty that p. 
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An everyday example 
 
We can envisage ostensibly immoral cases of over-belief: dismissing entire races 
as subhuman because of physical or cultural characteristics, or assuming 
someone is a terrorist from their appearance.20 But in view of EP1’s implicit 
universality we will pick a more banal example which in itself is not obviously an 
over-belief: 
 
(1.3) I believe you are taking recreational drugs. 
 
This could be understood as an assertion or as a true self-ascription. As an 
assertion it would be equivalent to asserting  
 
(1.3.1) You are taking recreational drugs 
 
rather than expressing a degree of uncertainty, which ‘I believe’ can suggest. 
 
In at least some everyday contexts asserting (1.3) or (1.3.1) without supporting 
evidence could make me guilty of something like deception. An audience could be 
justified in assuming I had evidence. If instead I had said: 
 
(1.3.2) I believe you are taking recreational drugs, but I have no supporting 
evidence, 
 
I would not be deceiving, but might still be blamed for making an unfounded 
statement or being deliberately mystifying. If (1.3) and (1.3.1) are equivalent, then 
asserting (1.3.2) is equivalent to asserting 
 
(1.3.3) You are taking recreational drugs, but I have no supporting evidence. 
 
Someone hearing this might struggle to understand what (1.3.2) or (1.3.3) are 
communicating, since (1.3) and (1.3.1) could be taken to imply the speaker did 
have evidence. Now consider: 
                                                   
 
20 See p295. 
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(1.3.4) I believe you are taking recreational drugs, and I have supporting 
evidence. 
 
(1.3.5) You are taking recreational drugs, and I have evidence that you are.  
 
These might be heard as making explicit what (1.3) and (1.3.1) leave implicit, and 
perhaps implying willingness to reveal that evidence. 
 
We are talking here about possible expectations on hearing beliefs expressed. 
This suggests obligations implicit in belief language itself, possibly supporting why 
a moral principle like EP1 could seem plausible in respect of our ordinary 
expectations on hearing everyday beliefs expressed. To help unpack these we will 
consider in some detail Adler’s (2002) ‘intrinsic’ approach to the ethics of belief, 
which would ostensibly be opposed to a moral principle like EP1. Our intention is 
not to incorporate Adler’s entire approach into our account, only to co-opt aspects 
of it to support EP1’s implicit universality. 
 
We then move to Haack’s (1997, 2001) survey of potential relationships between 
epistemic and moral appraisals of belief. We suggest an alternative: to see an 
epistemic evidentialism like Adler’s conceptual approach in the social context of 
belief behaviour, where in turn the conceptual doxastic norms which Adler 
identifies provide the context and conditions for the kind of moral normativity we 
see in Clifford. 
 
1.3 Clarifying the principle 
 
Jonathan Adler: Belief's Own Ethics 
 
For Adler questions like ‘What ought one to believe?’ and ‘What cannot one 
believe?’ should be answered conceptually (2002:xiii) rather than from a rational,21 
prudential or – as in EP1 – moral perspective. 
 
                                                   
 
21 See for example 5.4 Bayesian approaches p213ff. 
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His ‘intrinsic’ or ‘basic’ ethics of belief claims instead to be ‘imposed by the 
concept of belief itself’ (2002:2). He rejects the view that evidence ‘should 
generally determine the strength of belief, but not always’: excluding for example 
‘exciting’ beliefs like 
 
supernatural religious beliefs[;] … beliefs in the goodness or trustworthiness 
of others; beliefs in fundamental axioms or principles such as induction; 
[and] beliefs too basic to be supported by anything more certain or 
fundamental such as that there are external objects. (2002:4) 
 
His main objection to this ‘moderate evidentialism’ is that, if problematic and 
unproblematic beliefs have different evidential standards, the difference must be 
‘determined by factors external to belief’: for example, and in particular, rationality. 
But in respect of unproblematic beliefs the ‘demand for adequate reasons or 
evidence’ seems to come from belief itself, not from anything external to belief. If 
our beliefs are what we regard as true, then ‘when we attend to any of our beliefs, 
a claim is made on us for holding that the belief is true’. So belief itself is what 
demands ‘proportional reasons or evidence’, not any external requirement, for 
example to be rational in our beliefs. Adler does not see why problematic beliefs 
should make different demands just because their content is different. 
 
We could question though to what extent rationality is ‘external to belief’. Davidson 
for example sees rational (versus non-rational) animals possessing ‘propositional 
attitudes such as belief, desire, intention and shame’, which ‘come only as a 
matched set’ (1982:317-8). 
 
The issue for Adler would be whether his ‘conceptual structure of belief’ (2002:2) 
demanding ‘proportional reasons or evidence’ for itself (2002:5) can be 
understood without presupposing rationality: ‘it is part of the concept of a belief … 
that it tends to cause, and so explain, actions of certain sorts’ (Davidson, 
2001b:217). Whether or not the conceptual structure of belief presupposes 
rationality, or any aspect of rationality, is not crucial for us however as EP1 is in 
any case envisaged as a moral principle. 
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More immediately relevant to EP1 is Adler’s preferred ‘first-person methodology’ 
(2002:8), focusing on belief from a first-, rather than second- or third-person, 
perspective: 
 
From the first-person point of view, what I believe is just how things are [for 
me], not how I conceptualize, interpret, or theorize my experience (2002:11). 
 
Adler’s illustration is Jim, who believes he is handsome. Someone else could 
explain Jim’s belief by saying Jim would be depressed if he did not believe it.22 But 
this non-epistemic reason does not justify Jim’s belief the way an epistemic 
reason would. From his first-person perspective Jim could not acknowledge such 
a ‘disparity between what explains [his] believing and what justifies [his] belief’ 
(2002:5):23 
 
It would be contradictory for Jim to think that he believes that he is 
handsome; that his only reason to believe it is that it will lessen his 
depression; and that the lessened depression does not bear on the truth of 
whether he is handsome. (2002:9)24 
 
Adler contrasts this with the ‘dominant methodology’.25 This ‘asks what it is 
rational to believe’ (2002:9), which can only be answered from a third-person 
perspective: 
 
If Jim’s not believing that he is handsome will depress him, without 
compensating benefit, then it is rational for him to believe it. Yet, from a first-
person point of view, Jim cannot take himself to believe that he is handsome 
as a way to avoid depression. This “cannot” is conceptual. 
                                                   
 
22 See also p247ff. 
23 There are parallels with James on ‘questions concerning personal relations’ (1896, 2000:213) (see 
p110ff), although Jim’s ‘positive thinking’ involves an epistemically unjustified belief about himself 
rather than an epistemically unjustified belief about another. 
24 Adler’s example is a little awkward in that Jim’s belief that he is handsome could be seen as purely 
subjective, as could the beliefs of any of Jim’s other ‘beholders’. We might then dispute if there is 
any ‘truth of whether he is handsome’. To remove this difficulty we will take ‘handsome’ as 
equivalent to ‘generally considered handsome’ – which could then be objectively determined as true 
or false. 
25 Bayesianism? Adler is not explicit. See p213ff. 
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Jim’s (non-epistemic) desire to avoid depression is unrelated to the truth or falsity 
of the claim that he is handsome. So it cannot be ‘the condition of the truth’ of his 
belief that he is handsome. Although it may be rational (as viewed from a third-
person perspective) for Jim to believe he is handsome to avoid depression, this in 
itself would not make it rational for Jim himself, from his own first-person 
perspective, to see avoiding depression as a reason for thinking his belief is true. 
 
A key aspect of Adler’s first-person approach is his ‘condition of full awareness’, 
achieved when we ‘abstract from conditions that obscure the concept of belief’, 
and ‘bracket the normal unconscious workings of belief and the myriad influences 
on it’. This full awareness is not an unrealisable ideal but something common to 
everyday life: 
 
I openly believe both that I believe that it is raining outside and that I do so 
because I see the rain through the window. 
 
In other circumstances though we may find 
 
[t]he normal condition of believing is that of nonconscious influences and 
distraction. But when we want to discern what belief demands we should 
look at it without these interferences, which is accomplished by imposing the 
full awareness condition. (2002:34) 
 
This condition exposes a ‘far-reaching parallel between belief and assertion’ 
(2002:13): 
 
the requirement of the speech act of assertion is to state what is true, as it is 
the constitutive claim of belief that its content is true. 
 
Adler applies his approach to the kind of belief which anti-evidentialists see as 
unproblematic, for example: ‘I believe that God exists, but by my own lights, I am 
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not justified in believing that God exists’.26 To assess a claim like this, about a 
putative belief being unproblematic – if not legitimate – without requiring 
justification, Adler proposes a four-step ‘filtering’ (2002:12) process: 
 
Step one: Reserve questioning for the ‘privacy of thought’ (2002:10), rather than 
public debate. 
 
Step two: Substitute banal content like ‘Tony is in the ice cream parlor’ for (eg) 
‘God exists’.  
 
Step three: Ensure the example is a ‘straightforward belief’– simply what I regard 
as true ‘without qualification’ – where ‘I believe that p’ is equivalent to expressing 
p, rather than expressing an opinion or partial uncertainty that p (and therefore 
acknowledging a degree of doubt), or expressing faith or trust in p, both of which 
can have connotations of personal and/or moral integrity which we aim to ‘filter 
away’ (2002:10-11). 
 
Step four: Ask of the belief whether it is really coherent to believe – or assert – 
that, for example: 
 
(1.4) ‘Tony is in the ice cream parlor, but I lack sufficient evidence that it is 
true’ (2002:12). 
 
Adler calls this ‘an instance of Moore’s Paradox’. Both ‘Tony is in the ice cream 
parlor’ and ‘I lack sufficient evidence that Tony is in the ice cream parlor’ could be 
true. But for Adler asserting (1.4) is as incoherent as asserting ‘p, but I do not 
believe that p’: the paradigm case of Moore’s Paradox. 
 
Elsewhere Adler describes conjunctions like (1.4) less controversially as ‘Moore’s 
Paradox-like’ (2002:30). For example the ancient challenge to believe that 
 
(1.5) ‘The number of stars is even’ (Burnyeat, 1983:132) 
                                                   
 
26 Adler (2002:10) quoting Kornblith (1986:119). 
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cannot be met because this would be incoherent: 
 
(1.5.1) ‘The number of stars is even, but I lack sufficient evidence that the 




(1.5.2) ‘I believe that the number of stars is even. All that can secure for me 
the belief's claim of truth is adequate evidence (reason) of its truth. I 
lack adequate evidence. So I am not in a position to judge that the 
number of stars is even. So I do not judge it true. So I do not believe 
that the number of stars is even.’ (2002:30) 
 
We will now apply Adler’s four steps to a prosecution lawyer asserting or 
believing: 
 
(1.4.1) He did it. I know he did it. I just cannot prove it yet. 
 
One: perhaps the lawyer wants to convince his colleagues or impress on himself 
or others his determination not to rest until he wins the case; but in the ‘privacy of 
thought’ his ‘I know he did it’ could be closer to ‘I am sure he did it’. Two: could the 
lawyer’s professional reputation and/or the enormity of the crime disqualify the 
belief from being ‘unexciting’, ‘dull’ or ‘hardly disputable’? So we should substitute 
(say): ‘His birthday is 6 May (but I cannot prove it)’. Three: is the lawyer taking the 
content of ‘He did it’ (or ‘His birthday is 6 May’) as true ‘without qualification’?27 
Step four would then ask if it is ‘really coherent to believe’ that 
 
(1.4.2) His birthday is 6 May, but I lack sufficient evidence that his birthday is 
6 May. 
 
A critic could object that Adler’s method effectively rules out potential counter-
                                                   
 
27 If a detective rather than a prosecution lawyer asserted (1.4.1) we might suspect unprofessional 
confirmation bias. 
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examples like (1.4.1) by, crudely speaking, replacing difficult cases with easy 
ones. More generously however we could see the four steps as a useful way to 
reveal the core conceptual content which Adler claims is common to all belief. The 
first-person perspective is just ‘our point of view, …what I believe is just how 
things are, not how I conceptualize, interpret, or theorize my experience’: 
 
In belief’s everyday roles, prominently as guides to action, one sees through 
one’s attitude to the world without seeing that attitude. (2002:11) 
 
Similarly we should abstract assertion from ‘conversational expectations’ while 
‘understand[ing] it in its natural home of conversation’. This lets us ‘focus … on the 
heart of assertion as the presentation of a proposition as true’ – which ‘exactly 
parallels the import of belief’ (2002:14). 
 
‘Belief is not up to me’ (2002:14): Adler therefore opposes voluntarism. He agrees 
with Williams that we cannot see ourselves as holding beliefs because we choose 
to: 
 
I could not… in full consciousness, regard [something] as a belief of mine, 
i.e. something I take to be true, and also know that I acquired it at will. 
(Williams, 1973:148) 
 
This is ruled out by combining ‘one’s beliefs are what one regards as true’ (Adler, 
2002:4) with ‘[c]hoice cannot make the belief true’ (2002:15). 
 
But he denies that opposing voluntarism implies we are not responsible for our 
beliefs (2002:14): 
 
It is undeniable that we can induce a belief by attending to one-sided 
sources, biasing ourselves toward a sought-for opinion. On the positive side, 
we can develop dispositions or habits to be open to contrary evidence or 
criticism, and to evaluate that evidence fairly (2002:56). 
 
EP1, like CP, treats doxastic obligation as a moral obligation, so might 
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presuppose rather than oppose voluntarism. Adler’s ethics of belief is instead 
‘imposed by the concept of belief itself’ (2002:2), not by morality (or, subject to the 
Davidsonian caveat discussed earlier,28 rationality). Can these be reconciled? Do 
they need to be? It is time we considered possible relationships between 
epistemic and moral appraisal of belief. 
 
Susan Haack: “The Ethics of Belief” Reconsidered 
 
Haack (1997, 2001) offers several ‘serious options’ for how epistemic appraisal of 
belief (as in Adler’s intrinsic evidentialism) and ethical (moral) appraisal of belief 
could relate, and discusses three in detail. 
 
She thinks the ‘special-case thesis’29 that ‘epistemic appraisal is a subspecies of 
ethical appraisal’ is false (1997, 2001:21-3), because scenarios are possible 
where a person is epistemically unjustified but not morally at fault. He can only be 
morally at fault in believing that p if, like Clifford’s ship-owner, his belief is ‘willfully 
self-induced’ (1997, 2001:26). But even if his belief is not wilfully induced his 
evidence may still not be good enough. 
 
EP1 is not necessarily a version of Haack’s ‘special-case thesis’. Even if this 
thesis is false – because a person can believe something on insufficient evidence 
involuntarily and be morally blameless30 – that need not undermine a moral 
principle that, other things being equal, one should only believe on sufficient 
evidence.31 Aspects of involuntary over-belief will be discussed in Chapter 3,32 
leading us to adjust EP1. 
 
Next is the ‘correlation thesis’ (1997, 2001:21) – that positive or negative 
epistemic appraisal ‘is distinct from but invariably’ and ‘contingently’ associated 
with positive or negative moral appraisal. She offers three possible explanations 
                                                   
 
28 p25. 
29 Associated with Roderick Chisholm, eg (1991). 
30 For example person A believes that p (but without deliberately choosing to believe that p) on the 
testimony of person B, where A has good reason to trust B’s testimony and no reason to distrust it; 
but it later transpires that B’s testimony was false. 
31 By analogy, someone telling an untruth out of ignorance is not necessarily flouting the moral 
principle that one should not lie. 
32 p74ff. 
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for unjustified belief: ‘negligent incontinence’; ‘self-deception’; and ‘cognitive 
inadequacy’, either ‘personal’ or ‘cultural’. She sees either kind of cognitive 
inadequacy as fatal to the correlation thesis even in its weaker ‘prima facie’ form 
(‘whenever a person believes unjustifiedly, his so believing is always also subject 
to unfavorable moral appraisal prima facie’ (1997, 2001:24)): 
 
If a person has done the best he can, not only to find out whether p, but also 
to determine that he is competent to find out whether p, he is not morally 
culpable even if his belief in his competence and his belief that p are, by 
reason of cognitive inadequacy, unjustified. (1997, 2001:25) 
 
Haack herself favours the ‘overlap thesis’ (1997, 2001:21): that believing without 
justification can be, but is not always, a form of ‘morally culpable ignorance’. 
Ignorance itself could be agnosticism; mis-belief (‘the belief one has is false’); or 
over-belief. Of these it is over-belief which ‘constitutes culpable ignorance when, 
as it sometimes but not invariably is, it is both harmful and peccable’ (1997, 
2001:25-6). 
 
She claims Clifford does not distinguish epistemic from moral culpability, offers no 
arguments for identifying the two or for the special-case thesis, and just 
extrapolates his ship-owner story to a universal principle. Clifford’s arguments 
‘could, at most, establish the correlation thesis’ (1997, 2001:26). 
 
She lists reasons why the ship-owner’s ignorance is morally significant: 
 
The unjustified belief is false; the proposition concerned is of great practical 
importance; the person concerned is in a position of special responsibility; 
the false belief leads to dramatically harmful consequences; and the belief is 
willfully self-induced. (1997, 2001:26) 
 
For the correlation thesis to hold more broadly the ignorance would need to be 
‘morally culpable even if all these features were absent’, say in cases of 
‘apparently harmless unjustified belief’. Clifford claims that to count as a belief 
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there must be potential ‘influence upon the actions of him who holds it’33 (1877, 
1879:181) – which might then prove harmful. He claims over-belief involves ‘doing 
this great wrong towards Man, that I make myself credulous’ (1877, 1879:181) – 
which for Haack ‘carries, if not invariably a risk of harm, a risk of risk of harm’ 
(1997, 2001:27). But she thinks this too ‘remote’ for moral blame. Otherwise ‘not 
only drunken driving, but owning a car, would be morally culpable’. Also we are 
not always responsible for unjustified believing: sometimes the cause is cognitive 
inadequacy (1997, 2001:27).34 
 
The car-ownership analogy seems to miss Clifford’s point. His tirade against over-
belief covers all consequences: actual and potential; immediate and remote; direct 
and indirect. Particularly significant is that, like a ‘pestilence’ or ‘plague’ (1877, 
1879:184), over-belief generates more of itself. The immediate effect of an 
individual unit of unjustified belief may be harmless, but this is no guarantee that 
every future and/or indirect effect of every unit of unjustified belief which that 
original unit may have encouraged (at first, second, third etc remove) will be 
equally harmless. Car ownership may increase the risk of drunken driving in a 
statistical sense, in that increasing car ownership might lead to an increase in 
drunken driving, and dropping car ownership to zero might eliminate it completely. 
Access to a car is doubtless a necessary precondition of drunken driving. But in 
itself it does not encourage and/or generate drunken driving. Drinking and driving 
– short of drunken driving – is a better analogy though, supporting Clifford’s point. 
Fifty years ago drink driving was more prevalent in the UK, and prevalence 
normalised it. But ‘through firm laws, highly visible enforcement, and a sea-change 
in public attitudes … drink driving is now frowned upon by the vast majority of 
people’.35 
 
The strength of Haack’s second objection depends on whether CP implies both 
additions in square brackets below: 
 
                                                   
 
33 Compare Peirce (1878, 1998:144): ‘The essence of belief is the establishment of a habit’ – where 
‘habit’ is short for ‘rule of action’. 
34 We will attempt to immunise our own evidence principle from this kind of objection: see p75. 
35 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/92-of-people-feel-ashamed-to-drink-and-drive-as-50th-
anniversary-think-campaign-is-launched [retrieved 19 December 2017]. 
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CP1.1 It is [morally] wrong, always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe 
anything upon insufficient evidence, [even when the unjustified 
believing is outside the believer’s voluntary control]. 
 
As previously argued,36 Clifford’s language strongly suggests he did mean ‘morally 
wrong’. So it is plausible that he did not intend the second addition, and would 
more likely have accepted its converse: 
 
CP1.2 … [except when the unjustified believing is outside the believer’s 
voluntary control]. 
 
This is because once the moral domain is explicit, we can typically assume 
involuntary acts are excluded. The following seem to be cases of linguistic 
incomprehension: 
 
It is morally wrong to lie, except when you had every reason to think you 
were telling the truth or when talking in your sleep. 
 
It is morally wrong to deceive someone, except when the person had 
misinterpreted an act [statement] you had performed [made] in innocence. 
 
‘Lying’ typically excludes innocent untruths, and ‘deceiving’ typically excludes 
being misinterpreted. Haack agrees ‘bad habits’ of unjustified belief ‘may, if 
unchecked, become inveterate’, yet doubts if ‘indulgence in such habits is bound 
to encourage them in others’ (1997, 2001:27). But Clifford need not claim every 
over-belief is ‘bound to’ inch us into savagery, which is why his ‘plague theory’ 
(Gale, 1993:356) seems so apt. An HIV+ individual refusing to practise safe sex is 
not ‘bound to’ infect every partner, but this does not exonerate him. 
 
Haack’s list of ways epistemic and moral appraisal of belief could relate includes 
hierarchical (special case) and empirically discovered relationships (correlation 
and overlap); ‘independence’ (no relationship); and ‘analogy’. But even her 
                                                   
 
36 pp14–17. 
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favoured overlap thesis incorporates no account of how and why they may 
overlap. We now consider another option: that a conceptual (therefore epistemic) 
normativity like Adler’s may set the context and conditions for the kind of moral 
normativity Clifford identifies. 
 
Social context of belief: 1  
 
Adler sees violations of doxastic norms (like ‘p, but I lack adequate evidence that 
p’) as conceptually ‘incoherent’ (2002:3) rather than immoral or irrational.37 
 
Clifford stresses however that acquiring, holding, asserting and acting on beliefs 
are straightforwardly and inextricably social. Belief helps ‘bind men together’ and 
‘strengthen and direct their common action’ (1877, 1879:182-3).38 Chapter 339 will 
ask whether truly private and unvoiced beliefs are problematic for an evidence 
principle. But such beliefs aside (and for argument’s sake also restricting 
ourselves to beliefs surviving Adler’s ‘filtering’ process40) if doxastic norms 
legislate which conceptual moves may or may not be made when we believe, 
such norms will contribute to the context of expectations where socially 
contextualised belief can and will be morally assessed. 
 
As an analogy, shared understanding of arithmetic contributes to the context of 
expectations where examination results would be calculated, communicated and 
acted on. A student getting 25% might speak and behave as if he was ‘top of the 
class’ – because in his mind 25 was higher than 90. He might invite accusations of 
self-deception and/or stubborn denial and/or disrespect – particularly from 
colleagues who had laboured all year to improve their marks. 
 
The student ‘ought’ to see 25% is lower than another’s 90%. At the equivalent of 
Adler’s ‘basic’ (2002:3) level this is not a moral ought but a conceptual ought 
derived from the shared rules of arithmetic. But a moral ought can arise when 
evaluating social behaviour within the context of that conceptual normativity. We 
                                                   
 
37 Subject to Davidsonian caveat: p25. 
38 See also p210ff. 
39 See p122ff. 
40 p28. 
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would exonerate someone whose learning disability stopped him applying the 
rules of arithmetic. But we might blame someone who seems capable of 
understanding the rules but now apparently wants to violate them to bask in 
undeserved glory. 
 
Or consider truth and lying. Whether a statement is true or false, and what makes 
it true or false, are matters for (say) science or logic, not morality. But a 
statement’s capacity to be true or false makes lying and telling the truth possible, 
and these have moral significance. The conceptual evidentialism which Adler 
derives by analysing what having and expressing a belief involve is an 
epistemological, not a moral, thesis. But assuming Adler is correct, the 
interpersonal expectations grounded in shared assumptions about how beliefs, 
assertions and evidence interrelate conceptually can expose someone asserting ‘I 
believe you are taking recreational drugs’ (1.3) or ‘You are taking recreational 
drugs’ (1.3.1) without supporting evidence to a charge of deception.41 
 
Every descriptive over-belief will not have equally severe moral repercussions. But 
holding and asserting a descriptive over-belief can have moral repercussions – 
directly related to the lack or inadequacy of supporting evidence, against a 
background expectation that holding and/or asserting a belief typically implies the 
believer does have sufficient evidence. 
 
Below is an Adlerian analysis of (1.3.1):42 
 
If I believe and/or assert (1.3.1), then I regard (1.3.1) as true. When I attend 
to belief (1.3.1) a claim would be made on me for holding (1.3.1) as true 
(Adler, 2002:4). The link between the claim of the truth of (1.3.1) and the 
condition of the truth of (1.3.1) is whatever evidence I have for (1.3.1). If I 
fully believe that (1.3.1) I need adequate epistemic reasons – evidence – for 
thinking (1.3.1) is true. 
 
                                                   
 
41 This expands the point summarized in (1.1.6): p19 above. 
42 Following Adler we will take (1.3) (‘I believe you are taking recreational drugs’) and (1.3.1) (‘You 
are taking recreational drugs’) as equivalent. 
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As a parallel to Jim’s belief that he is handsome, someone else could explain my 
belief (1.3.1) that you are taking drugs by (say) my desire to shine at your 
expense by casting you as reckless and immature. But while this non-epistemic 
reason might explain my belief it cannot justify it. I cannot in ‘full awareness’43 take 
myself to be holding belief (1.3.1) as a way of shining at your expense – as Jim 
cannot take himself to believe he is handsome so as to avoid depression 
(2002:10). 
 
This ‘cannot’ is primarily a conceptual, not a practical or moral, constraint. Adler 
would see it as ‘contradictory’ for me to think that I believe you are taking drugs; 
and that my only reason for believing this is to shine at your expense; and that my 
elevated self-esteem has no bearing on the truth of whether you are taking drugs 
(2002:9). My intention or desire to shine cannot be ‘the condition of the truth’ 
(2002:5) of my belief that you are taking drugs. 
 
We could question whether it is exactly contradictory, but it is at least conceptually 
unstable. Reflecting on the belief and what could be the condition of its truth 
should lead the believer to discard the belief. 
 
Adler would say that asserting ‘(1.3.1), but I lack adequate evidence that (1.3.1)’44 
violates a conceptual doxastic norm and is therefore conceptually incoherent 
(2002:3). But the shared doxastic norms legislating which conceptual moves may 
or may not be made are part of the shared context of expectations within which 
social interaction – including assertion and reception of beliefs like (1.3.1), and 
behaviours resulting from those beliefs – might be morally assessed. It is that 
shared context of expectations and assumptions which makes asserting (1.3.1) 
without sufficient evidence equivalent (or close or akin) to deception, and 
therefore morally culpable. 
 
But even if conceptual normativity does provide a context for moral normativity, 
why is conceptual normativity not enough for an ethics of belief? Why do we need 
                                                   
 
43 See p38ff. 
44 Equivalent to: 
(1.3.3) You are taking recreational drugs, but I have no supporting evidence. 





Take Adler’s ‘full awareness’ – or Williams’s equivalent ‘full consciousness’ 
(1973:148). Saying this condition needs to be imposed or assumed implies a 
person could acquire or hold a belief without it, which in turn suggests (moral) 
choice: 
 
There is an ethical grounding to the condition of full awareness that 
supports this first-person methodology. If one is acting (believing) rightly, 
one can acknowledge it without guilt or shame. [Emphases added.] (Adler, 
2002:9). 
 
The person apprehending, describing, conceiving or evaluating the situation is the 
subject whose situation it is. In the context of (1.5.1) and (1.5.2) the person who is, 
or can be, aware of having insufficient evidence that the number of stars is even is 
the subject believing or asserting that the number of stars is even. If he also 
satisfies the condition of full awareness then he is taking personal responsibility 
for the implications of believing the number of stars is even and of knowing no 
evidence is available. The subject taking responsibility is then faced with the 
incoherence. A subject avoiding the condition of full awareness by not taking 
responsibility is not faced with the incoherence. Being aware or unaware of the 
incoherence would indicate whether or not one was meeting the condition of full 
awareness. The first-person perspective is not a matter of choice, but applying full 
awareness can be. Adler’s ‘ethical grounding’ equates to an implicit moral duty to 
be fully aware, or as aware as reasonably possible. 
 
From a third-person perspective there is no incoherence: 
 
(1.5.3) Fred believes the number of stars is even. 
 
(1.5.4) Fred has no evidence the number of stars is even. 
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Both statements could be true – although from a third-person perspective 
someone can appreciate the incoherence Fred is faced with. 
 
The first-person perspective and the condition of full awareness are also relevant 
to Adler’s third step: ensuring it is a ‘straightforward belief’ that p, rather than 
expressing faith in p, or an opinion or partial uncertainty that p (2002:10). A test of 
full awareness would be whether the subject, from the first-person perspective 
(with its implication of taking or not taking personal responsibility), can tell if his 
belief is a ‘straightforward belief’, in respect of which, as with an assertion, ‘a claim 
is made on us for holding that the belief is true’ (2002:4). This seems to be where 
the implicit moral duty comes in. 
 
We should avoid a potentially misleading implication though. A third-person 
perspective necessarily entails a social context since (for example) someone other 
than Jim is explaining Jim’s belief that he is handsome. A first-person perspective 
on the other hand might theoretically involve just the believer – Jim, say – with no 
implied social context. But believing is social behaviour (Clifford, 1877, 1879:182-
3) regardless of perspective. From what Adler calls the third-person perspective 
the focus is on interpretation and explanation: a third party speculates (say) about 
why Jim believes as he does, and suggests reasons which may be epistemic or 
non-epistemic. Any obligations Jim might acknowledge, or fail to acknowledge, 
have not necessarily entered the picture, unless the third party is also (morally or 
otherwise) evaluating the believer’s behaviour. 
 
The first-person perspective on the other hand necessarily involves the believer’s 
obligations. Under Adler’s condition of full awareness these obligations arise 
purely from the ‘conceptual structure of belief’ (2002:2). But the minute we 
acknowledge the social nexus within which doxastic behaviour operates, those 
conceptual obligations flesh out into moral obligations. This is why conceptual 
normativity is not enough for an ethics of belief: because believing is intrinsically 
social behaviour, the conceptual implications of what we assert or reveal about 
our beliefs will generate expectations which we can either honour or shirk. 
 
So our conclusion is that even if Adler’s ‘intrinsic’ ethics of belief applied 
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comprehensively and soundly to all categories of belief, it does not remove the 
rationale for a moral evaluation of belief in its social context. Clifford seems 
therefore to have got something fundamentally right. We may agree with Haack 
that Clifford does not clearly distinguish epistemic from moral culpability. But he 
does not conflate the two. He sees doxastic failings as moral failings, at least 
where a degree of volition is involved. But he does not offer a contextual analysis 
like the one just proposed, aimed at separating those aspects of belief with moral 
significance from those without. 
 
Epistemic obligation may not be a strict subset of moral obligation, as in Haack’s 
‘special-case thesis’. But epistemic and moral obligation do not just ‘correlate’ or 
‘overlap’ either. Some aspects of epistemic obligation appear decidedly moral and 
others might be more appropriately considered in purely conceptual terms. But in 
a social context they are inextricably linked, such that spelling out doxastic 
obligation as a guiding principle can require moral language. Adler’s approach 
does not remove the rationale for an evidence principle expressed in moral terms. 
 
This might therefore be a convenient place to address a potential objection that a 
moral principle like EP1 is by its very nature irrelevant to epistemology. We have 
said EP1 is primarily intended as a self-standing moral principle applying to an 
agent’s doxastic behaviour, and only secondarily to the resultant beliefs 
themselves.45 It is not furthermore separately intended as a comprehensive 
criterion of epistemic justification derived from moral considerations, if this implies 
a moral normativity which is ultimately a means to an end, that end being 
epistemic normativity. We would question though why this should make EP1 
irrelevant to epistemology, except on a deliberately and unnecessarily narrow 
definition of ‘epistemology’. Belief, believing, and believing language do not occur 
in a vacuum but within a social, and therefore potentially moral, context. This is 
what both CP and EP1 recognise. 
 
  
                                                   
 
45 See p21. 
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1.4 Reasons for holding an evidence principle 
 
An evidence principle expressed in moral terms lays on the believer a prima facie 
burden of justification for acquiring and/or holding descriptive beliefs. To justify a 
belief morally, the believer would need to demonstrate either that it is supported 
by evidence, or that by not believing he would breach a conflicting and overriding 
moral imperative.46 Without evidence, the content of the descriptive belief cannot 
be used to justify it. This has particular relevance for religious belief.47 
 
An evidence principle expressed in moral terms will inherit assumptions and 
distinctions applicable within ethics generally.48 It would therefore need to ‘fight its 
corner’ since an actual instance of over-belief could be exonerated by a conflicting 
and overriding moral imperative. The same applies to principles against cheating, 
lying, stealing – even killing. 
 
It might however be over-optimistic to expect a completely comprehensive 
justification for an evidence principle expressed in moral terms. Earlier49 we 
articulated a rationale for CP which EP1 would largely share, including a set of 
empirical claims (1.1.1–13) plus a generic moral claim (1.2.1) which, although 
ostensibly plausible, we could only presuppose rather than establish 
independently. With many if not all moral principles it seems possible to defend a 
counter-position – particularly if ‘thesis’ and ‘antithesis’ come from opposed meta-
ethical perspectives.50 
 
So perhaps the most we can hope for is that our principle makes sense as a moral 
principle; that it behaves like one and entails no contradictory or intuitively 
unacceptable consequences; and that it can be positioned in relation to the kinds 
of meta-ethical position it might be compatible or incompatible with. 
 
                                                   
 
46 See p22. 
47 See p137ff. 
48 See p22ff. 
49 pp18–21. 
50 For example Thrasymachus’s claim in Plato’s Republic that ‘justice or right is simply what is in the 
interest of the stronger party’ contradicts an intuitive notion of justice as fairness. (Plato, 1955, 1974 
(Revised)§338c p77). 
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1.5 Conclusions 
 
This introductory chapter illustrated how Clifford presents and promotes CP: as a 
moral principle, therefore prioritising voluntary rather than involuntary aspects of 
belief acquisition. He applies CP to both descriptive and prescriptive beliefs and 
his defence focuses on the direct and indirect social impact of obeying or 
disobeying it. 
 
We then made a prima facie case for a moral principle EP1 based on Clifford’s but 
restricted to descriptive beliefs. Like Clifford we focused on social context, but 
unlike Clifford we looked at how belief and evidence relate conceptually, by 
considering what our everyday expectations might be when using and 
encountering belief language. Adler’s (2002) ‘basic’ ethics of belief ostensibly 
eschews rational or moral grounds for evidentialism, so in theory might oppose a 
Clifford-style moral principle. Moving to Haack’s (1997, 2001) survey of how 
epistemic appraisal relates to moral appraisal, we broadly endorsed her ‘overlap’ 
thesis. 
 
Haack says little however to explain the overlap. We argued that even if Adler’s 
case is plausible, his ‘methodology’ involves an implicit moral stance; and when 
the social context of belief is acknowledged his conceptual epistemic normativity 
can supply the conditions for moral normativity. More importantly, a conceptual 
evidentialism like Adler’s renders a moral principle like EP1 neither invalid nor 
irrelevant. 
 
We ended by briefly positioning potential reasons for holding a moral principle 
requiring evidential support for descriptive beliefs. The next chapter argues why 
our principle should exclude prescriptive beliefs. 
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This chapter explores whether an evidence principle like CP can apply to 
prescriptive beliefs. It also introduces Clifford’s perhaps most celebrated 
opponent, William James. The distinction between descriptive and prescriptive 
beliefs is relevant to their debate for a number of reasons.  
 
First, both Clifford1 and James use examples of both. James’s initial examples 
come in a possibly ironic list: 
 
Here in this room, we all of us believe in molecules and the conservation of 
energy, in democracy and necessary progress, in Protestant Christianity and 
the duty of fighting for ‘the doctrine of the immortal Monroe’. (1896, 
2000:203) 
 
Belief in the ‘duty’ of fighting for the Monroe Doctrine is unambiguously 
prescriptive, while beliefs in ‘democracy’, ‘necessary progress’ and ‘Protestant 
Christianity’ could be either. 
 
Second, CP is itself prescriptive – indeed morally prescriptive in Clifford’s 
presentation. Even those who think CP more plausible as an epistemic than a 
moral principle would see holding it as holding a second-order prescriptive belief 
covering both prescriptive and descriptive first-order beliefs. 
 
Third, James doubts CP’s application to moral beliefs (1896, 2000:212ff). And 
finally religious beliefs, certainly as James defends them, typically have 
prescriptive components.2 This would be another reason to explore whether CP 
may apply less successfully to prescriptive than to descriptive beliefs. 
 
We have two potential conclusions in sight. The stronger is that a principle like CP 
                                                   
 
1 See p14 and also p52ff. 
2 See p131ff. 
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cannot apply to prescriptive beliefs. The weaker is that excluding prescriptive 
beliefs from a principle like CP is justifiable and not arbitrary, because significant 
issues arise when applying it to prescriptive beliefs which do not arise with 
descriptive beliefs. The weaker conclusion is sufficient for our purposes, because 
our aim is to see what Clifford has got fundamentally right, even if this means 
modifying his original scope. 
 
Chapter 1 defined a prescriptive belief as being about what ought (or ought not) 
to be the case.3 We should now be more specific. 
 
2.2 Hypothetical prescriptive beliefs 
 
We must distinguish categorical from hypothetical prescriptive beliefs. 
Hypothetical prescriptive beliefs should not be problematic for an evidence 
principle because they can generally be reworded as descriptive beliefs without 
significant loss of meaning. 
 
Clifford mentions for example the ‘Australian’ who insists on tying his hatchet 
blade to the side of the handle, despite the hole provided, because he has ‘sunk 
so low’ he cannot ‘call in question an established usage, and invent or learn 
something better’ (1877, 1879:203). The context is therefore prudential beliefs 
about right and wrong ways to do things: 
 
(2.1.1) You should fit the handle into the hole in the hatchet rather than tie the 
two together.  
 
Evidence supporting (2.1.1) is the success achieved when the handle is fitted into 
the hole rather than when the hatchet is tied to the side of the handle. If the 
evidence were different the belief would not be justified. 
 
But the evidence here supports underlying descriptive beliefs: that a hatchet can 
be struck harder and more accurately when the handle is fitted in the hole and 
                                                   
 
3 See p14. 
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gets detached from its handle if it is just tied. The apparently prescriptive belief 
(2.1.1) assumes an intention: 
 
(2.1.2) [If you want to chop wood with less effort and less risk of injury 
then] you should fit the handle into the hole in the hatchet, not just tie 
the two together. 
 
The evidence for (2.1.2) might be: 
 
(2.1.3) A hatchet can be struck harder and more accurately when the handle 
is fitted in the hole; and a hatchet gets detached from its handle if it is 
just tied on. 
 
But (2.1.3) only supports (2.1.1) given the intention in (2.1.2). If the intention was 
different (2.1.3) would not be supporting evidence: 
 
(2.1.4) [If you want to carry out the stage directions for the character you 
are playing then] you should fit the handle into the hole in the 
hatchet, not just tie the two together. 
 
The evidence for (2.1.4) might be the stage directions themselves, not (2.1.3). 
 
Hypothetical prescriptive beliefs like (2.1.2) and (2.1.4) can be reworded as 
equivalent descriptive beliefs: 
 
(2.1.2d) Fitting the handle into the hole in the hatchet rather than tying the two 
together will allow you to chop wood with less effort and less risk of 
injury. 
 
(2.1.4d) The stage directions say the character you are playing fits the handle 
into the hole in the hatchet rather than tying the two together. 
 
(2.1.1) is shorthand for an explicit hypothetical prudential belief like (2.1.2). If 
(2.1.1) was a truly standalone categorical prescriptive belief with no assumed 
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intention as in (2.1.2) or (2.1.4) then it is unclear what evidence could support it, 
as (2.1.2) and (2.1.4) require different evidence. 
 
From now on ‘prescriptive belief’ will always indicate a categorical prescriptive 
belief unless otherwise stated. 
 
2.3 Evidence and truth value 
 
Consider (categorical) prescriptive variants of (1.3) and (1.3.1):4 
 
(2.2) I believe you should not be taking recreational drugs. 
 
(2.2.1) You should not be taking recreational drugs. 
 
Again the context is where the speaker has no supporting evidence, so could 
have been more explicit: 
 
(2.2.2) I believe you should not be taking recreational drugs, but I have no 
supporting evidence. 
 
(2.2.3) You should not be taking recreational drugs, but I have no supporting 
evidence. 
 
We are taking (2.2) and (2.2.1–3) as purely prescriptive. We are assuming the 
person addressed is taking recreational drugs, and ignoring any existent or non-
existent evidence for related descriptive beliefs, for example about the effects of 
drug-taking. In such a context it appears less straightforward that we would blame 
someone for holding a prescriptive over-belief than for holding a descriptive over-




                                                   
 
4 See p23. 
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Reasons for a prescriptive belief 
 
Consider a variant of (2.2) about a specific drug D, where there is no evidence of 
any medical or psychological ill-effects, therefore sufficient evidence there are 
none. In spite of that balance of evidence it seems I could still say to someone, 
without sufficient evidence, 
 
(2.2.D) I believe you should not be taking D 
 
without being guilty of deception or of making an unfounded accusation. I could be 
considered judgmental, but this comes of voicing the prescriptive belief itself. It is 
unrelated to whether or not I have sufficient evidence for (2.2.D), assuming there 
could be any.  
 
I could have reasons for (2.2.D) which do not count as evidence. We have 
previously distinguished between epistemic and non-epistemic reasons in relation 
to descriptive beliefs.5 A non-epistemic reason for (2.2.D) might be that I dislike 
seeing other people enjoying themselves. Someone else could believe or assert 
this about me: 
 
(2.2.DR1-3) He believes you should not be taking D because he dislikes seeing 
other people enjoying themselves.  
 
In the third person (2.2.DR1-3) would be a legitimate and reasonable statement. 
But would equivalent propositional content fail Adler’s ‘first-person’ test, as it 
would if (2.2.D) was a descriptive belief? I myself could believe or assert: 
 
(2.2.DR1-1) I believe you should not be taking D because I dislike seeing other 
people enjoying themselves. 
 
Applying Adler’s formulation (2002:9): 
 
(2.2.DR1-1A1) It would be contradictory for me to think that I believe you should 
                                                   
 
5 See p26ff. 
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not be taking D; that my only reason to believe it is because I 
dislike seeing other people enjoying themselves; and that my 
disliking seeing other people enjoying themselves does not bear 
on the truth of whether you should not be taking D. 
 
Any ‘contradiction’ here is less obvious than with a descriptive belief – if only 
because of the challenge of interpreting ‘the truth of whether you should not be 
taking D’. In Adler’s descriptive belief example the gulf is between Jim’s subjective 
desire to avoid depression and the objective truth or falsity6 of his handsomeness. 
But it is not obvious that my judgment (2.2.D) can be objectively true or false. In 
the case of (2.2.DR1-1) it might be safer to see a gulf between the subjectivity of 
my disliking seeing other people enjoying themselves and the (perhaps implicit) 
universality of my moral judgment that you should not be taking D. My 
‘contradiction’ would be failing to see the incongruity of using a personal 
preference to justify a moral judgment. By comparison the unproblematic third-
person version (2.2.DR1-3) is telling a possibly true story about that failure. 
 
For a prescriptive belief like (2.2.D) a safer (because more evasive) formulation 
might be: 
 
(2.2.DR1-1A2) […] and that my disliking seeing other people enjoying 
themselves has no bearing on whether I am right that you should 
not be taking D. 
 
Now consider another possible reason: 
 
(2.2.DR2-1) I believe you should not be taking D because I think it wrong to 
nurture inauthentic behaviour [or to be self-indulgent, or to lose 
self-control] 
 
Applying our reformulated ‘Adler test’: 
 
                                                   
 
6 See footnote p26. 
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(2.2.DR2-1A1) It would not be contradictory for me to think that I believe you 
should not be taking D; that my only reason to believe it is 
because I think it wrong to nurture inauthentic behaviour [or …]; 
and that the wrongness of nurturing inauthentic behaviour [or …] 
does have a bearing on whether I am right that you should not 
be taking D. 
 
There is no ‘contradiction’ here because it is not incongruous to use one 
prescriptive belief (‘it is wrong to nurture inauthentic behaviour’) as a moral reason 
to justify another if they are appropriately related. But it is another question 
whether a moral reason qualifies as evidence (an epistemic reason) for (2.1.D). 
So although we have found a kind of reason which passes an amended version of 
Adler’s ‘first-person’ test we are no closer to understanding whether evidence can 
support a prescriptive belief. 
 
Truth value of a prescriptive belief 
 
We reworded Adler’s test to avoid unpacking ‘the truth of whether you should not 
be taking D’. But if evidence for a descriptive belief is a reason for thinking the 
belief is true, then we must ask if a (categorical) prescriptive belief is the kind of 
thing which can be true or false. If a prescriptive belief p cannot have a truth 
value7 then perhaps we can only have reasons for holding p which do not count as 
evidence because they cannot count as reasons for thinking p is true – because p 
is not the kind of thing which can be true. Opinions about inauthentic behaviour, 
self-indulgence or loss of self-control might then be (non-evidential) reasons for 
holding a prescriptive belief without being reasons for thinking the belief is true. 
We might for example think our prescriptive beliefs must be consistent with each 
other. 
 
But this jars with our working definition of ‘belief’.8 We accepted ‘when we attend 
to any of our beliefs, a claim is made on us for holding that the belief is true’ 
                                                   
 
7 We are not assuming that if something is a belief then it has a truth value. See discussion below 
about vague descriptive beliefs. 
8 p22. 
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(Adler, 2002:4); and ‘beliefs aim at truth … [so] when somebody believes 
something, then he believes something which can be assessed as true or false’ 
(Williams, 1973:136-7). [Emphases added.] Does our working definition only apply 
to descriptive beliefs? 
 
If Adler’s and Williams’s statements must apply for something to qualify as a 
belief, we cannot use ‘belief’ to refer to the content of just any statement 
employing the verb ‘believe’. Yet our discussion so far presupposes that 
‘prescriptive belief’ refers to something legitimate: that, for example, ‘I believe 
killing is wrong’ expresses a prescriptive belief that killing is wrong while ‘I believe 
the moon is made of green cheese’ expresses a corresponding descriptive belief. 
But if a prescriptive belief is not the kind of thing which can have a truth value then 
our Adler/Williams working definition would disqualify it from being a belief at all – 
because a belief by definition must have a truth value, whether we know it or not. 
 
It might appear uncontentious that descriptive beliefs have a truth value. But there 
are possible exceptions, for example vague descriptive beliefs.9 With prescriptive 
beliefs though we can ask if there might be general reasons for thinking no 
prescriptive belief has a truth value.10 It seems possible to acknowledge 
arguments on both sides: ones supporting the claim that, say, (i) the belief that 
killing is wrong does have a truth value; and ones supporting the opposing claim 
that (ii) the belief that killing is wrong does not have a truth value. Claim (i) might 
get support from a redundancy theory of truth, holding that ‘killing is wrong’ and ‘it 
is true that killing is wrong’ are equivalent. Claim (ii) might be supported by a 
verification theory of truth, holding that a proposition can only be true or false if it 
can be verified, and it is unclear whether ‘killing is wrong’ can be verified. 
 
For now we will continue assuming ‘prescriptive belief’ has legitimate reference, 
and note that our working definition may be too restrictive. 
 
But doubts about prescriptive beliefs having a truth value could make us question 
                                                   
 
9 An example might be the belief that Joaquin Phoenix is short. The actor is 1.73 metres. See 
previous footnote. 
10 Excluding explicit hypothetical prudential beliefs like (2.1.2) and (2.1.4). 
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whether applying an evidence principle like CP to prescriptive beliefs is coherent. 
Someone adopting CP would hold it as a prescriptive belief. But if prescriptive 
beliefs cannot have a truth value then we could not have reasons for holding it to 
be true. We might have reasons for holding a prescriptive belief – as for example 




(i) to hold CP is to hold a prescriptive belief; and 
 
(ii) a prescriptive belief cannot have a truth value; and therefore 
 
(iii) there cannot be a reason for thinking it is true; and therefore 
 




(v) CP applies to prescriptive beliefs; and therefore 
 




(viii) to hold CP is to hold a belief we have no right to hold. 
 
We could also ask if it is coherent to hold CP without holding it to be true. But we 
could ask the same about moral principles against lying or stealing. 
 
Chapter 1 made a prima facie case for moral culpability for holding and/or 
asserting at least some kinds of descriptive over-belief.12 We have not found an 
                                                   
 
11 Someone might of course see herself as having a reason for holding a prescriptive belief to be 
true because she believes (possibly wrongly) that a prescriptive belief can have a truth value. 
12 See p21ff. 
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equivalent prima facie culpability in the case of prescriptive beliefs. We could have 
reasons for holding a prescriptive belief which do not count as evidence. Or, if a 
prescriptive belief is not something which can have a truth value, and evidence is 
a reason for holding a belief to be true, then supporting evidence may not even be 
possible for prescriptive beliefs. Alternatively, even if prescriptive beliefs can have 
a truth value they still may not be the kind of thing which can have supporting 
evidence.13 
 
Clifford thought differently though. We should take a closer look at how he treated 
morally prescriptive beliefs in particular. 
 
2.4 Clifford on moral beliefs 
 
Clifford clearly applied CP to moral beliefs, talking of the ‘care and honesty’ with 
which ‘great principles, … most fitted for the guidance of life’, have been ‘tested’, 
thereby acquiring a ‘practical certainty’: 
 
The beliefs about right and wrong which guide our actions … never suffer 
from investigation; they can take care of themselves, without being propped 
up by “acts of faith”, the clamour of paid advocates, or the suppression of 
contrary evidence. (1877, 1879:188-9) 
 
He sees the ‘time-honoured tradition of the human race’ (1877, 1879:199) as a 
‘great fabric’ 
 
for the guidance of our thoughts, and through them of our actions… . In the 
moral world … it gives us the conceptions of right in general, of justice, of 
truth, of beneficence … . These are given as conceptions, not as statements 
or propositions; they answer to certain definite instincts, which are certainly 
within us, however they came there. (1877, 1879:201)  
 
                                                   
 
13 Appendix A2 (p281ff) argues that if a prescriptive belief is not something which can be supported 
by evidence, it may not be able to feature in ‘Bayesian updating’. 
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‘Conceptions’ which are not ‘statements or propositions’ may also be incapable of 
being true or false, and therefore not supportable by evidence. But what Clifford 
seems to see as subject to evidence is not the conceptions themselves but our 
understanding of how to apply them: for example how ‘right’ relates to 
‘beneficence’: 
 
That it is right to be beneficent is matter of immediate personal experience; 
for when a man retires within himself and there finds something, wider and 
more lasting than his solitary personality, which says, ‘I want to do right,’ as 
well as, ‘I want to do good to man,’ he can verify by direct observation that 
one instinct is founded upon and agrees fully with the other. 
 
Without using the word he does seem to be referring to beliefs: that wanting to do 
good to man is founded on wanting to do right and that doing good to man is a 
way of doing the right thing. 
 
He also shifts from ‘is’ to ‘ought’. If ‘direct observation’ reveals the connection 
between the instinct to do right and the instinct to do good to man, that implies 
‘doing good to man’ can be independently characterised in non-normative terms 
(say by quantifying maximum net happiness to human beings14) without ‘doing 
good to man’ necessarily being the ‘right’ thing to do. Otherwise there would be 
nothing to ‘observe’, as ‘doing good to man’ would necessarily be the right thing to 
do. Clifford seems to be saying that as a matter of fact 
 
(2.3.1) people have the instinct to ‘do right’; and  
 
(2.3.2) they have the instinct to ‘do good to man’; and  
 
(2.3.3) they observe a connection between (2.3.1) ‘doing right’ and (2.3.2) 
‘doing good to man’ – such that doing good to man is a way of doing 
the right thing. 
 
                                                   
 
14 Although see Appendix A1 p276ff for possible limits to Clifford’s utilitarianism. 
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(2.3.1–3) together are the evidence for believing ‘it is right to be beneficent’; or in 
other words: 
 
(2.4) We ought to be beneficent. 
 
But it is our ‘duty … to verify this and all similar statements’ (1877, 1879:202). So 
how do we respond if someone claims not to experience the connection, so does 
not have the same evidence? Assume my belief that we ought to be beneficent 
applies to people in general and not just myself. Someone could doubt I really 
have the evidence I claim for believing people in general should be beneficent. 
She may accept I have sufficient evidence for believing it feels right to be 
beneficent, or believing it is right for me to be beneficent. But if I have only 
subjective experience of (2.3.1–3) occurring together this seems insufficient 
evidence for believing it is right for people in general to be beneficent (2.4). In 
Clifford’s own language: how do I know the something I find within myself is ‘wider 
and more lasting than [my] solitary personality’?15 
 
A sociopath could claim not to experience any of (2.3.1–3). A religious 
fundamentalist might experience (2.3.1) but not (2.3.2) or (2.3.3) because for her 
‘doing right’ equals doing what her God commands, which may exclude ‘doing 
good to man’. 
 
But Clifford takes it as established that it is right to be beneficent (and/or just, 
and/or truthful) because our ‘moral sense founded on experience’ (1877, 
1879:202) provides sufficient evidence. He then asks how to know ‘true 
beneficence’ – how to be as practically beneficent as we can in our ‘definite place 
and time’. We are again in the domain of beliefs with possible truth values. In 
respect of beneficence, 
 
the great social heirloom consists of two parts: the instinct of beneficence, 
which makes a certain side of our nature, when predominant, wish to do 
good to men; and the intellectual conception of beneficence, which we can 
                                                   
 
15 See p226ff, on the need for evidence to be ‘objective’, or at least publicly available. Clifford 
elsewhere asks a related question about the ‘best conscience’: see Appendix A1 p276ff.  
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compare with any proposed course of conduct and ask, “Is this beneficent or 
not?” 
 
We therefore need a ‘further inquiry’ to determine how, say in utilitarian16 terms, to 
generate maximum net happiness. Clifford gives an example in his claim that re-
examining the evidence led to a rethink about the treatment of beggars: 
 
Until recently, the moral tradition… taught that it was beneficent to give 
money indiscriminately to beggars. But the questioning of this rule, and 
investigation into it, led men to see that true beneficence is that which helps 
a man to do the work which he is most fitted for, not that which keeps and 
encourages him in idleness; and that to neglect this distinction in the present 
is to prepare pauperism and misery for the future. 
 
This appears to reference a social policy shift reflected in English Poor Law 
legislation. The ‘before’ and ‘after’ beliefs could be summarised as, respectively:  
 
(2.5) We ought to give money indiscriminately to beggars. 
 
(2.6) We ought to help people do the work they are most fitted for, and not 
keep and encourage them in idleness. 
 
Both are morally prescriptive, and Clifford’s treatment identifies the instinct to ‘do 
right’ (2.3.1) as the ultimate source of their prescriptive element. As humans we 
experience ourselves as instinctively moral beings (2.3.1) and as instinctively 
beneficent beings (2.3.2); and we also experience how the two connect (2.3.3). 
Even if Clifford is right about this, and therefore right about our sense of obligation 
(2.3.1), this does not explain how the sense of obligation we happen to experience 
(‘is’) generates our actual obligation (‘ought’). Perhaps he sees them as identical? 
An earlier essay of his could be interpreted as a ‘social evolutionist’ approach to 
the emergence of morality, suggesting he saw moral evaluation as in principle like 
                                                   
 
16 But see p68ff. 
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finding the best way to build a bridge. If so this might in turn explain his application 
of CP to prescriptive beliefs. We explore this in Appendix A1.17 
 
Giving money indiscriminately to beggars (2.5) and helping people do the work 
they are most fitted for (2.6) are both potential ways of being beneficent. So (2.5) 
and (2.6) both presuppose a more generic (categorical) morally prescriptive belief: 
 
(2.4) We ought to be beneficent. 
 
For convenience we will interpret ‘beneficence’ using a descriptive utilitarian 
formula like maximising net happiness. In principle this could help identify the 
evidence to decide between (2.5) and (2.6) – as long as we agree the formula. But 
even if we can find utilitarian evidence favouring (2.6) over (2.5) or vice versa, this 
will not necessarily qualify as the kind of ‘evidence in support of a prescriptive 
belief’ we need. This is because if (2.5) and (2.6) presuppose categorical 
prescriptive belief (2.4), this allows us to interpret beneficence in non-normative 
terms, therefore to treat the ‘social policy’ content of (2.5) and (2.6) as purely 
prudential (so hypothetical) prescriptive beliefs:18 
 
(2.5h) [If we intend to be as beneficent as possible then] we ought to give 
money indiscriminately to beggars. 
 
(2.6h) [If we intend to be as beneficent as possible then] we ought to help 
people do the work they are most fitted for, and not keep and 
encourage them in idleness. 
 
We could reword these into descriptive beliefs without significant loss of meaning: 
 
(2.5d) Giving money indiscriminately to beggars would maximise 
beneficence. 
 
                                                   
 
17 See p276ff. 
18 See p44ff. 
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(2.6d) Helping people do the work they are most fitted for, rather than 
keeping and encouraging them in idleness, would maximise 
beneficence. 
 
Any balance of evidence allowing us to choose between (2.5d) and (2.6d) – 
therefore between (2.5h) and (2.6h); and therefore between (2.5) and (2.6) on the 
presupposition of categorical prescriptive belief (2.4) – would be evidence 
supporting descriptive, not prescriptive, beliefs. 
 
Clifford’s ‘social evolutionist’ utilitarian approach19 may explain his application of 
CP to prescriptive beliefs – if he saw moral evaluation as in principle like deciding 
how to build a bridge. But this does not explain how evidence could support a 
categorical prescriptive belief like (2.4). There may be evidence that the evolution 
of beneficence promotes the survival of the group which enjoys it but this can only 
be evidence that the group ought to be beneficent if there is also evidence that the 
group ought to survive. Nor though have we established that evidence cannot 
support a categorical prescriptive belief. 
 
We will now see what James’s more individualist perspective can offer. 
 
2.5 William James on prescriptive beliefs 
 
Moral beliefs are James’s first counter-example to CP, because they 
 
cannot wait for sensible proof. A moral question is a question not of what 
sensibly exists, but of what is good, or would be good if it did exist. Science 
can tell us what exists; but to compare the worths, both of what exists and of 
what does not exist, we must consult not science, but what Pascal calls our 
heart. (1896, 2000:212) 
 
The heart reference reflects a celebrated quotation a few paragraphs back: 
 
                                                   
 
19 See p276ff. 
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Human passions, however, are stronger than technical rules.20 “Le cœur a 
ses raisons,” as Pascal says, “que la raison ne connaît pas;”… (1896, 
2000:212) 
 
The quotation continues: 
 
423 The heart has its reasons of which reason knows nothing: we know 
this in countless ways. 
 
I say that it is natural for the heart to love the universal being or itself, 
according to its allegiance, and it hardens itself against either as it 
chooses. You have rejected one and kept the other. Is it reason that 
makes you love yourself? (277) 
 
424 It is the heart which perceives God and not the reason. That is what 
faith is: God perceived by the heart, not by the reason. (278) (Pascal, 
1966:154) 
 
If the Pascalian heart is something which ‘love[s] the universal being or itself, 
which ‘hardens itself against either as it chooses’, and ‘perceives God’, then not 
everyone would recognise that in their lives – in James’s 1890s at least. If, more 
broadly, it is something which loves either itself or something else which is not the 
self, then we seem to be talking about orientation: perhaps an aspect of the self 
which determines whether the self is self-oriented or oriented towards others (or 
towards the ‘other’; or the ‘not-self’; or ‘God’ – as an interpretation of ‘universal 
being’). If so, we can ask what comes first. We might see this kind of orientation 
as intrinsically a moral issue: selfishness bad; unconditional generosity good. But 
that would suggest the source of moral evaluation is the moral faculty, inviting 
Molière’s jibe about opium putting you to sleep on account of its soporific virtue.21  
But if the other way round, with the ‘heart’ as the real source of moral evaluation 
without circularity, can we understand this without assuming a ‘universal being’? 
 
                                                   
 
20 ‘Technical rules’ presumably include CP. 
21 Vertus dormitiva: see Molière (2003, 2012: Third Interlude). 
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With God in the equation, this seems to root morality in godliness. We can 
compare a self which loves God with one which loves itself, and see goodness 
only in the former. But a whiff of circularity remains. ‘God’ comes so packed with 
moral content it is hard to see how a ‘heart’ choosing to ‘love God’ is not, by its 
‘allegiance’, intrinsically choosing to be good. What, though, if we remove God? 
Something’s ‘worth’ is not necessarily a moral worth. It could be simply its value to 
oneself on any level – even just the fact that one wants it. James needs this ‘heart’ 
to be antecedent to moral evaluation, a faculty which is not ‘science’ or ‘reason’, 
can do moral evaluation (‘compare the worths’), but can also ‘love the universal 
being’, ‘harden itself against itself’ and ‘perceive God’. 
 
James is three-quarters through his essay, having already explored the role of the 
‘will’ (or ‘willing nature’) in belief-formation.22 So it is tempting to read ‘heart’ as not 
the ‘will’, otherwise James would have said ‘will’. But despite this ‘heart’ and ‘will’ 
do seem very close – particularly as he continues: 
 
The question of having moral beliefs at all or not having them is decided by 
our will. Are our moral preferences true or false, or are they only odd 
biological phenomena, making things good or bad for us, but in themselves 
indifferent? How can your pure intellect decide? If your heart does not want 
a world of moral reality, your head will assuredly never make you believe in 
one. (1896, 2000:212-3) 
 
James seems to be saying that for an individual to have moral beliefs at all 
presupposes a decision to have moral beliefs.23 This does not have to mean every 
individual with a moral belief has previously deliberately committed to having 
moral beliefs, but that having a moral belief involves committing to what having a 
moral belief entails. It would be possible not to commit, and instead remain 
outside the ‘world’ of morality. 
 
This seems plausible, which is not to claim everyone, or every moral being, must 
                                                   
 
22 Covered in Chapter 4, especially p140ff. 
23 ‘[T]here are no actual moral truths or laws … until we choose to play the [moral language-]game’ 
(Gale, 1999, 2007:47) 
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agree. A moral realist, in particular a naïve moral realist, might counter that moral 
principles are objective, universally binding and inescapable; that personal 
commitment to a ‘moral world’ is possible but irrelevant to ‘moral reality’. Someone 
with beliefs aligned to those objective, binding and inescapable moral principles 
would believe things which are true, regardless of whether she has made any 
commitment. But not everyone would subscribe to this either, and James’s 
position (as interpreted here) seems no less defensible. 
 
His coverage of moral belief (outside any moral implications of religious belief) 
concludes: 
 
Moral scepticism can no more be refuted or proved by logic than intellectual 
scepticism can. When we stick to it that there is truth (be it of either kind), we 
do so with our whole nature, and resolve to stand or fall by the results. The 
sceptic with his whole nature adopts the doubting attitude; but which of us is 
the wiser, Omniscience only knows. (1896, 2000:213) 
 
At first sight the parallel between moral and intellectual scepticism seems 
unconvincing. In the purely ‘intellectual’ domain the choice between embracing 
and not embracing scepticism may appear a ‘forced option’ (1896, 2000:199)24 
between two mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive positions. But to assume an 
equivalent forced option holds in the moral domain implies only two ‘hypotheses’ 
apply: 
 
(2.7.1) There is a moral truth: therefore our attempts to behave morally are 
attempts to align ourselves with and/or acknowledge that moral truth. 
 
(2.7.2) There is no moral truth: therefore we have no reason to be good or 
behave morally. 
 
But other alternatives exist, including: 
 
                                                   
 
24 See p142ff. 
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(2.7.3) The commitment to behave morally and/or see human behaviour 
(including our own) in moral terms is a commitment we make, and we 
give the commitment importance by making it. 
 
(2.7.3) neither proposes nor denies a moral ‘truth’ – so is distinct from both (2.7.1) 
and (2.7.2). It is also not vacuous, as an individual may not commit. But it could be 
argued that an equivalent to (2.7.3) can also apply in the ‘intellectual’ domain. 
Someone may decide to behave as if the world contained real objects and/or other 
minds independent of her. However this would seem to be an act of will, not 
another intellectual option. 
 
We cannot progress more without pre-empting much of Chapter 4. For now we 
will suggest the resolution could depend on what exactly James means by both 
‘scepticism’ and ‘stick to it’. 
 
This in turn means James is little help so far. He would exclude prescriptive beliefs 
from a principle like CP, but he might exclude other beliefs which we would want 
to include, because he would see little systematic difference between descriptive 
and (morally) prescriptive beliefs in terms of their susceptibility to evidence. My 
conviction that I am justified in believing you are taking drugs (1.3) because I have 
sufficient evidence presupposes rejecting scepticism. But if my rejecting 
scepticism is itself unjustified then all necessary links and continuities – between, 
say, the experiences which I believe constitute my evidence and what I take as my 
current experience of you – collapse. If moral scepticism and intellectual 
scepticism are equally incapable of being ‘refuted or proved by logic’ then I am 
equally justified, and equally unjustified, in believing (morally) prescriptive beliefs 
(‘moral preferences’) can be ‘true or false’ (and therefore in principle capable of 
being supported by evidence) and in rejecting intellectual scepticism – which I 
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2.6 Problems with Clifford’s principle applied to prescriptive 
beliefs 
 
We now return to the two rival morally prescriptive beliefs in Clifford’s beggar 
story:25 
 
(2.5) We ought to give money indiscriminately to beggars. 
 
(2.6) We ought to help people do the work they are most fitted for, and not 
keep and encourage them in idleness. 
 
Clifford favours (2.6) over (2.5) on the grounds that (2.6) is now supported by 
sufficient evidence (the ‘investigation’) whereas (2.5) is relatively unsupported. 
The question is still what would count as evidence for a prescriptive belief.26 
 
For present purposes we will assume a statement, s, counts as evidence for a 
belief that p if s is true and s provides objective reasons for thinking p is true or is 
likely to be true.27 
 
Consider what might count as evidence for or against the descriptive belief that 
the moon is made of green cheese. For: From the earth the moon resembles 
Sage Derby. Against: Spectrographic analysis of lunar light gives results more like 
reflections off rock than off cheese; Apollo 11 landed somewhere hard. This 
evidence is publicly available, at least in principle. It is also expressed in publicly 
understandable, publicly agreed and objective terms. There is little debate about 
what ‘cheese’, ‘spectrum’ and ‘manned spacecraft’ refer to. It should therefore be 
straightforward to understand how statements describing spectrographic results 
and Apollo 11 discoveries could be objectively expressed and determined to be 
true or false.28 
 
                                                   
 
25 See p55ff. 
26 See p46ff. 
27 We will return to this working definition: see p215. 
28 See however Appendix A3 p285. 
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(We should add a caveat. The concept of scientific evidence might be less clear-
cut than this implies. Particularly during scientific revolutions there may be 
disagreement about what counts as evidence and how evidence bears on 
theoretical claims. Scientific revolutions themselves could present a challenge for 
an evidence principle. These issues are outside our current scope.29) 
 
Now consider what might count as equivalent evidence for prescriptive belief (2.6). 




We will make a utilitarian assumption that belief (2.6) is equivalent to the belief 
that: 
 
(2.6.u) Helping people do the work they are most fitted for causes more net 
happiness than keeping and encouraging them in idleness. 
 
It might be possible in principle to quantify total net happiness (say, balance of 
pleasure over pain) resulting from each strategy. This should cover all people (or 
all sentient beings) currently living or who will ever live, and who would qualify as 
beneficiaries or implementers of, or as being in any way touched by, each 
strategy. 
 
The first level relates to whether quantification is practically achievable, not just in 
principle. If it is practically unachievable the evidence to support belief (2.6.u) 
would be unavailable – and therefore insufficient. Belief (2.6.u) would then fail CP. 
CP does not just say it is wrong to believe anything which could not in principle be 
supported by evidence, but that it is wrong to believe anything which is not in fact 
sufficiently supported by evidence, even if in principle it could be. 
 
But consider a starker contrast: 
 
                                                   
 
29 See Appendix A5 p293. 
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(2.8) We ought to help people whenever we can and act out of sympathy for 
their suffering, rather than do whatever we can to hurt or destroy them. 
 
Our utilitarian assumption makes (2.8) equivalent to: 
 
(2.8.u) Helping people whenever we can and acting out of sympathy for their 
suffering causes more net happiness than doing whatever we can to 
hurt or destroy them. 
 
Comparing resultant net happiness for the two strategies in (2.8.u) is almost trivial. 
It may still be practically impossible to calculate each total, but we only need 
relative sizes. We could be as confident in holding belief (2.8.u) on sufficient 
evidence as we would in believing every dropped object will fall to the ground 
because every object dropped so far has.30 
 
Our initial verdict on (2.6.u) was over-hasty. We only need enough evidence to 
support a comparison. If it is harder to find evidence for (2.6.u) than for (2.8.u) this 
could just indicate that belief (2.6.u) is less substantiated than (2.8.u), so we would 
have less right to believe it. It seems we could have sufficient evidence for (2.6.u) 
– although we may have a harder escape route for a more open-ended utilitarian 
belief: 
  




The second level of difficulty concerns the move from descriptive belief (2.6.u) to 
(categorical) prescriptive belief (2.6), which our utilitarian assumption underwrote.  
 
We have not yet seen how a (categorical) prescriptive belief could have evidence 
for or against it. If evidence is something which is true and provides objective 
reasons for thinking a belief is true or likely to be true, then we must be able to tell 
when the evidence and the belief are true. 
                                                   
 
30 But see p95ff. 
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We will assume relevant evidence statements (about levels of happiness 
experienced by sentient beings when people are helped do the work they are 
most fitted for – assuming we can identify this – and about levels of happiness 
experienced by sentient beings when people are kept and encouraged in idleness) 
can be identified as true when they are true. We will also assume the relevant 
descriptive belief statement (helping people do work they are most fitted for 
causes more overall happiness than keeping and encouraging them in idleness) 
can be identified as true when it is true. So we can see how the truth of the 
evidence statements supports the truth of the descriptive belief statement. 
 
It should be unproblematic to supply appropriate additional premises and/or 
definitions for descriptive belief statement (2.6.u) to entail an evidence statement 
like: 
 
(2.6.u.e1) Levels of happiness observed in an appropriate context as 
experienced by sentient beings when people are helped do the work 
they are most fitted for are higher than levels of happiness observed in 
the same context as experienced by sentient beings when people are 
kept and encouraged in idleness. 
 
Statement (2.6.u) entails one or more evidence statements. If these turn out true 
they would support (although not prove) the truth of (2.6.u). If the evidence 
statements were false they would falsify (2.6.u). So the converse belief statement 
 
(2.6.u.2) Helping people do the work they are most fitted for causes no more 
overall happiness than keeping and encouraging them in idleness 
 
would, with appropriate additional premises, entail an evidence statement like: 
 
(2.6.u.e2) Levels of happiness observed in an appropriate context as 
experienced by sentient beings when people are helped do the work 
they are most fitted for are no higher than levels of happiness 
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observed in the same context as experienced by sentient beings when 
people are kept and encouraged in idleness. 
 
Finding evidence statement (2.6.u.e2) false would entail that belief statement 
(2.6.u.2) is false. Which, in the current context, is close if not equivalent to 
entailing that original belief statement (2.6.u) is true.31 
 
So we can understand how evidence (the truth of one or more evidence 
statements) can support descriptive beliefs (the truth of descriptive belief 
statements). But if we replace the descriptive belief with a prescriptive belief the 
relationship is less clear. 
 
If the relationship were equivalent it would mean our (prescriptive) belief statement 
(2.6) would entail (descriptive) evidence statements of an equivalent form to 
(2.6.u.e1). But it does not, because an ‘ought’ statement like (2.6) can only entail 
another ‘ought’ statement like: 
 
(2.6.b.1) If Fred is most fitted for work of type X, then we ought to help Fred do 
work of type X, and not keep and encourage him in idleness. 
 
It is unclear how (2.6.b.1) can function as an evidence statement objectively 
verifiable as true or false. 
 
The second level of difficulty is therefore that applying CP to prescriptive beliefs 
needs a solution to the ‘is/ought problem’. We would first have to show the 
prescriptive belief is equivalent to one or more descriptive beliefs, or at least that 
there is enough conceptual connection between the two to allow evidence for the 
descriptive belief(s) to count as evidence for the prescriptive belief. If we could do 
this we could then ask if those descriptive beliefs are sufficiently supported by 
evidence. But that is a big if. 
 
                                                   
 
31 The context here is that both (2.6.u.2) and (2.6.u) are expressed as comparisons, and the 
equivalence applies because of the way they are worded. We are not making a more general claim 
that, for example. If putative evidence p for A turns out to be false, then it is evidence for not-A. 
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We are not claiming to have proven that CP cannot apply to (categorical) 
prescriptive beliefs. But in this subsection we have tried and failed to find a way to 
reduce prescriptive statements to descriptive statements. We are not claiming it is 
impossible, just that it is hard to see how it can be done, or that it can be done. 
Caution would therefore favour excluding prescriptive beliefs until we have a 
coherent account of how evidence supports them. 
 
A related issue is that a utilitarian justification for preferring one prescriptive belief 
to another by comparing the weight of supporting evidence requires not only 
accepting in principle a utilitarian transition from ‘is’ to ‘ought’, but also agreeing 
the appropriate domain the utilitarian calculus applies to: all actual people; all 
actual and potential people; all actual and potential sentient beings; etc. 
 
It could be countered that for a utilitarian or similar moral consequentialist 
prescriptive beliefs like (2.6) and (2.4) are formally equivalent to the kind of 
prudential belief which we established32 could be supported by evidence: 
  
(2.1.1) You should fit the handle into the hole in the hatchet rather than tie the 
two together. 
  
But identifying the right kind of evidence required treating (2.1.1) as a hypothetical 
belief with an assumed antecedent ‘[If you want to chop wood with less effort and 
less risk of injury then]…’ (2.1.2). This hypothetical prescriptive belief was 
equivalent to a descriptive belief which could be supported by relevant evidence. 
But a different assumed antecedent33 would need different evidence. 
 
We could try the same approach with (2.6): 
  
(2.6.1) [If we want to maximise net happiness then] we ought to help 
people do the work they are most fitted for, and not keep and 
encourage them in idleness. 
  
                                                   
 
32 p44ff. 
33 See (2.1.4) p45. 
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This is equivalent to a descriptive belief: 
  
(2.6.1d) Helping people do the work they are most fitted for, rather than 
keeping and encouraging them in idleness, will maximise net 
happiness. 
  
In principle we could identify evidence supporting (2.6.1d), and therefore (2.6.1).  
But we could assume a different antecedent: 
  
(2.6.2) [If we want to recreate 1940s social conditions then] we ought to 
help people do the work they are most fitted for, and not keep and 
encourage them in idleness. 
  
The equivalent descriptive belief might be: 
  
(2.6.2d) Helping people do the work they are most fitted for, rather than 
keeping and encouraging them in idleness, will recreate 1940s social 
conditions. 
  
(2.6.1d) and (2.6.1) call for different evidence to (2.6.2d) and (2.6.2). 
  
A utilitarian who believes (2.6) may also believe (2.6.1); and may believe (2.6) 
because she also believes (2.6.1). But believing (2.6.1) can only be a reason for 
believing (2.6) if she also believes the antecedent of (2.6.1): that we should 




We suggested an answer to the ‘is/ought problem’ could be a kind of utilitarianism. 
One utilitarian might say ‘good’ or ‘right’ just means ‘productive of the greatest net 
happiness’ – which is vulnerable to Moore’s ‘open question’ objection (1903, 
1922:§13). If ‘good’ or ‘right’ just means ‘productive of the greatest net happiness’, 
then (assuming Moore is right) the question ‘Is it true that producing the greatest 
net happiness is good?’ would be either meaningless or trivial. 
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What Moore said (or is said to have said) on this subject has generated 
considerable debate. Feldman sees Moore as insisting that  
 
you can’t derive substantive conclusions in axiology from claims about the 
synonymy of ‘good’ with some other expression (especially if the other 
expression was either naturalistic or complex). (2005:40) 
 
In Moore’s words: 
 
if I am right, then nobody can foist upon us such an axiom as that ‘Pleasure 
is the only good’ or that ‘The good is the desired’ on the pretence that this is 
‘the very meaning of the word.’ (1903, 1922:7) 
 
Adapting one of Feldman’s ‘Synonymy Argument’ (2005:39) schemas: 
 
(2.9.1) ‘x is good’ means ‘x is productive of the greatest net happiness’. 
 
(2.9.2) If ‘x is good’ means ‘x is productive of the greatest net happiness’, 
then something is good if and only if it is productive of the greatest net 
happiness. 
 
(2.9.3) If something is good if and only if it is productive of the greatest net 
happiness, then utilitarianism is true. 
 
(2.9.4) Therefore, utilitarianism is true. 
 
Feldman argues Moore was not claiming (in section 13 of Principia Ethica) the 
consequent of (2.9.2) is false; but that premise (2.9.1) is false and therefore 
conclusion (2.9.4) is not proven. Even if (2.9.1) is false, the consequent of premise 
(2.9.2) could still be true. ‘Something is water if and only if it is H2O’ can be true 
even though ‘water’ and ‘H2O’ are not synonymous. This seems sound. ‘Is it true 
that producing the greatest net happiness is good?’ and ‘Are water and H2O the 
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same thing?’ are not questions about word meanings like ‘Is a bachelor an 
unmarried man?’ 
 
But another utilitarian approach might express itself as a moral principle: not that 
‘good’ or ‘right’ means ‘productive of the greatest net happiness’, but that we 
(morally) ought to act to maximise net happiness. The consequent of premise 
(2.9.2) would then hold, but on the assumption that saying an action or choice is 
‘good’ is a morally prescriptive claim. 
 
This approach avoids the ‘naturalistic fallacy’ and legitimises the move from ‘is’ 
(2.6.u) to ‘ought’ (2.6) by supplying missing premise (2.6.m): 
 
(2.6.m) We ought to do what causes more net happiness. 
 
(2.6.u) Helping people do the work they are most fitted for causes more net 




(2.6) We ought to help people do the work they are most fitted for, and not 
keep and encourage them in idleness. 
 
But (2.6.m) is prescriptive. If CP covers prescriptive beliefs, it applies to (2.6.m). It 
is therefore only right to believe (2.6.m) on sufficient evidence. But we do not yet 
understand how evidence can support a prescriptive belief, without one or more 
additional premises to get us to an equivalent descriptive belief which evidence 
can support. This seems an infinite regress. 
 
But have we exhausted utilitarian approaches? We have considered ‘synonymy’ 
(2.9.1) and ‘moral principle’ (2.6.m). Is there a variant of (2.6.m) which is not itself 
prescriptive? This would also claim something is good (and therefore what we 
morally ought to do) if and only if it maximises net happiness, but as a descriptive, 
not a prescriptive claim. It would be a claim about the universe which, if true, 
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would sanction the move from an appropriate ‘is’ statement to a corresponding 
‘ought’ statement: 
 
(2.6.d) It is a fact about the universe that something is our duty if and only if it 
causes more net happiness than any other option. 
 
But even if (2.6.d) were tenable as a descriptive belief, it would still be subject to 
CP. It would only be right to believe (2.6.d) on sufficient evidence. Again it is hard 
to see what could count as evidence for (2.6.d): but not, ostensibly, because of the 
infinite regress we had with (2.6.m). (2.6.d) is by definition a descriptive belief, 
assuming it can be understood as such. 
  
Someone could perhaps claim that a reason for not believing (2.6.d) is that there 
are actions which cause more net happiness but which are clearly not good. A 
reason for believing (2.6.d) is false would be evidence against (2.6.d). Conversely 
an absence of such actions would be evidence supporting (2.6.d). But if that was 
the case then the very same actions would constitute evidence against 
prescriptive belief (2.6.m): the evidence would be that (2.6.m) leads to endorsing 
as good actions which are clearly not good. The problem is unpacking ‘clearly not 
good’. Clear to whom? Surely only to someone holding one or more prescriptive 
beliefs incompatible with (2.6.m). Those beliefs – ‘(2.6.not-m)’ – would be why she 
saw the actions as evidence against (2.6.d) or (2.6.m) or both. They would only 
count as evidence if (2.6.not-m) is true. What though would count as evidence for 
(2.6.not-m)? Not the same actions claimed as evidence against (2.6.d) or (2.6.m), 
as these presuppose the truth of (2.6.not-m). But if the evidence consists of other 
actions then these would only count as evidence if they are identifiable as good or 
bad (or neutral) from the viewpoint of one or more prescriptive beliefs – which may 
be, or include, (2.6.not-m). This seems another endless search. We will take the 
apparent unattainability of evidential support for (2.6.d) to indicate it is not a 
serious contender. 
  
The next level of difficulty relates to the implications of a principle like CP applying 
to itself when held as a belief. 
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Fourth level 
 
CP says it is wrong to believe anything on insufficient evidence. If CP covers 
prescriptive beliefs, then it would be wrong to believe CP on insufficient evidence. 
But we have not yet established how, or indeed whether, evidence can support a 
prescriptive belief. Until it is established that there can be sufficient evidence for 
CP, the belief that CP (‘bCP’) would invalidate itself. This problem does not arise if 




Consider the predicament faced by an agent deciding whether to adopt CP. We 
will assume we have not yet ruled out the possibility of evidence for prescriptive 
beliefs in general or, in particular, for bCP. 
 
We start with the agent in a state of indifference (Si), neither accepting nor 
rejecting bCP. A body of potential evidence E appears. Because of her 
indifference she has no reason to apply CP to bCP, therefore no reason to 
consider whether E supports CP. She could stay in state Si indefinitely. Or she 
could move to assumed acceptance of bCP (Sa) or assumed rejection of bCP (Sr). 
In state Sa she would have reason to consider whether E supports bCP, because 
her assumed acceptance of bCP would incline her to do this with any of her 
potential beliefs. She might find E does support bCP, which would then lead her to 
confirm her acceptance of bCP. 
 
But she could have moved to Sr, where she would have no reason to link E with 
bCP, so bCP would stay outside her set of beliefs. 
 
The issue is: why would she ‘bootstrap’ herself into believing CP, and what would 
justify her in doing this? Even assuming evidence could exist which supports bCP 
it seems she would only entertain bCP by presupposing its truth, which CP itself 
would stop her doing.34 
                                                   
 
34 Imagine a universe ruled by a God who has ordained a set of prescriptive rules which the 
inhabitants must obey. One of the rules is CP. The inhabitants know the God has ordained CP, but 




We have not proved CP cannot apply to prescriptive beliefs, which was our 
stronger potential conclusion.35 But significant issues arise when applying CP to 
prescriptive beliefs which do not arise with descriptive beliefs. This suggests a 
principle (EP1) excluding prescriptive beliefs would be more defensible than CP, 
and that excluding prescriptive beliefs is neither unsound nor arbitrary. This 
weaker conclusion is strong enough for our purposes. 
 
We are after all assuming EP1 is a moral principle which people could feasibly 
apply to their behaviour. If ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ it would seem unreasonable to 
expect people to support their prescriptive beliefs with evidence if we cannot 
explain how this is possible. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                             
 
also know its wording compels them to accept bCP only on sufficient evidence of its truth, not 
because the God has ordained it. But CP would forbid them applying bCP until they knew it was true 
by having sufficient evidence of its truth, and therefore of the truth of CP. 
35 p43. 
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Chapter 3 | Against an evidence principle 
 
Our principle is currently: 
 
EP1 {If anything is morally wrong, then} it is [morally] wrong [within the 
category of descriptive belief] to believe anything on insufficient 
evidence. 
 
This chapter will look for reasons for thinking EP1 cannot be right. It will consider 
apparent counter-examples, to identify instances of descriptive belief which might 
lead us to modify or rethink EP1 – perhaps by incorporating additional inclusions, 
exclusions or caveats – or help clarify the intention behind EP1. Its primary 
objective is not so much to build a positive case for EP1, as to see where more 
nuance may be needed and formulate sufficiently robust wording. 
 
3.1 Involuntary beliefs 
 
EP1 declares over-belief within its scope morally wrong. If this includes involuntary 
beliefs (assuming they are possible) we might be claiming it is morally wrong to 
acquire or hold an over-belief even if acquiring or holding it was out of our control. 
 
This seems counter-intuitive. Can it be morally wrong to say something untrue in 
your sleep, or hurt someone accidentally by tripping on a kerbstone? Nothing in 
Clifford’s essay suggests he would say yes, although he discusses voluntary acts 
and omissions which encourage or enable involuntary over-belief in oneself and 
others. The ship-owner ‘had knowingly and willingly worked himself’ into a state 
where he ‘felt so sure about it that he could not think otherwise’ (1877, 1879:178). 
 
Indeed concern about varying degrees of voluntary control (including no voluntary 
control) over belief could be why Clifford outlaws ostensibly harmless over-
beliefs:1 because they can ‘weaken our powers of self-control, of doubting, of 
judicially and fairly weighing evidence’ and replace ‘the habit of testing things and 
                                                   
 
1 See p121ff. 
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inquiring into them’ with one of ‘believing for unworthy reasons’ (1877, 1879:185-
6). Our self-control could dissipate, so we need vigilance over aspects of belief 
which are under our control, while they are.2 
 
We said earlier3 that, other things being equal, the believer would be morally 
wrong to the extent that he acquired or held the descriptive over-belief voluntarily. 
We should make this explicit: 
 
EP2 {If anything is morally wrong, then} it is [morally] wrong [within the 
category of descriptive belief] to believe anything on insufficient 
evidence [except when the unjustified believing is outside the 
believer’s voluntary control]. 
 
The addition is to remove doubt. When the moral domain is explicit excluding 
involuntary acts should be taken as read. However the clause applies whether we 
want to highlight the belief itself or its being an over-belief as involuntary: 
‘voluntary’ and ‘involuntary’ can apply at more than one point. EP2 would for 
example correctly exonerate over-belief resulting from cognitive inadequacy, to 
counter one of Haack’s (1997, 2001:25) worries about CP.4 
 
We are assuming involuntary beliefs are possible. Williams however doubts 
whether voluntary beliefs are possible: ‘if I could acquire a belief at will, I could 
acquire it whether it was true or not’ (1973:148). This would be problematic: if 
voluntary beliefs are impossible and involuntary beliefs are excluded, why have a 
principle which no beliefs fell under? Williams’s ‘Conceptual Impossibility Thesis’ 
(Feldman, 2001:79) has been critiqued by a number of writers (eg Winters 
(1979)), and seems to have little current support. However what Feldman calls 
Alston’s (1988) ‘Contingent Inability Thesis’ – ‘that as a contingent matter of fact, 
people are not able to acquire beliefs voluntarily’ (Feldman, 2001:80) could be an 
equivalent challenge. 
 
                                                   
 
2 See Voluntary and involuntary beliefs p17ff. 
3 p21 and p34. 
4 p32. 
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To neutralise these worries we must distinguish direct from indirect voluntary 
control. Following Clifford we are targeting voluntary aspects of belief acquisition, 
maintenance and rejection. ‘Doubting’, ‘judicially and fairly weighing evidence’, 
‘testing’ and ‘inquiring into’ our beliefs: these we decide to do or not do or 
remember or forget to do. We can generally exert direct control over these, even if 
they only indirectly control beliefs arising from or influenced by them. 
 
Should we then change ‘believe anything on insufficient evidence’ in EP2 to refer 
strictly to those voluntary behaviours which indirectly lead to over-belief? That 
seems gratuitous. A moral principle against causing unnecessary pain would still 
be breached by someone doing (or failing to do) something which (or the omission 
of which) only indirectly led to unnecessary pain, if he knew or should have known 
this was likely, whatever his intention. The principle aims to avoid unnecessary 
pain, making sense as a behavioural guideline even in, say, a medical context 
where many potential acts and omissions likely to influence whether someone 
suffers unnecessary pain operate only indirectly. 
 
We can explore this more systematically using Alston’s four ‘modes of voluntary 
control’ (1988:278):5 
 
I. Direct control. 
A. Basic control. 
B. Non-basic immediate control. 
II. Long-range control. 
III. Indirect influence. 
 
These represent different ‘strengths’ of doxastic voluntarism: one voluntarist might 
claim we have direct basic control (IA) over our beliefs; another that we have 
direct non-basic but immediate control (IB) over our beliefs; and so on. 
 
IA Direct basic control. The model here would be 
                                                   
 
5 Later analytic approaches are available. McHugh (2014) for example models doxastic freedom on 
freedom of intention rather than freedom of action, and argues that ‘if we had voluntary control of … 
doxastic states, this would actually undermine our freedom’ (2014:1). Alston’s analysis however is 
adequate for our purposes here. 
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the maximally direct control we have over the motions of our limbs and other 
parts of our body, the voluntary movements of which constitute “basic 
actions”, … things we “just do”, not “by” doing something else voluntarily. 
(1988:260) 
 
Few if any doxastic voluntarists think we can ‘believe at will’ like this. 
 
IB Non-basic immediate control. An example would be deliberately turning a light 
on, where success requires ‘one or more bodily movements’ and ‘more than a 
volition’ on my part (1988:269). Despite this I might be blamed for not turning on 
the light if I should have done. 
 
This also seems unlikely to apply to belief in any relevant way. I could voluntarily 
choose to gather evidence and as a result acquire a belief which that evidence 
would support. But at most that would indicate ‘immediate voluntary control over 
whether I take up some propositional attitude [like belief] toward some proposition’ 
(1988:271) relating to the evidence gathered. We can also ‘control our evidence 
and thereby control our beliefs’ (Feldman, 2001:83), for example by switching the 
lights on in order to believe the lights are on (2001:82). But this is also irrelevant to 
EP2. 
 
II Long-range control. This is ‘the capacity to bring about a state of affairs, C, by 
doing something (usually a number of different things) repeatedly over a 
considerable period of time’ (Alston, 1988:275). C could be losing weight or 
learning a language – or at least some of our beliefs: 
 
[P]eople do set out on long range projects to get themselves to believe a 
certain proposition, and sometimes they succeed … [for example by] 
selective exposure to evidence, selective attention to supporting 
considerations, seeking the company of believers and avoiding non-
believers, self-suggestion, and (possibly) more bizarre methods like 
hypnotism. (1988:275). 
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Interestingly Alston does not see this as ‘a kind of voluntary control that grounds 
deontological treatment’ – treatment like EP2 – because 
 
people could properly be held responsible for their attitudes toward 
propositions in a certain range only if those who set out to intentionally 
produce a certain attitude toward such a proposition, and made sufficient 
efforts, were frequently successful. ... [Otherwise, even] if I had done 
everything I could to produce [a certain result], I would have had little chance 
of success; so how could I rightly be blamed for its absence? (1988:275-6) 
 
Alston doubts that we have reliable long-range control over any of our beliefs, 
even religious or philosophical beliefs or beliefs about personal relationships. 
People may ‘sometimes’ succeed in getting themselves to believe or disbelieve 
something. But the success rate would not be ‘substantial’. 
 
We must be clear what this category is. It is where the agent ‘manages to believe 
something contrary to what seems to him to be the case or something concerning 
which he has no definite impression of truth or falsity’ (1988:277). It is not where 
an agent forms or retains beliefs ‘without adequate grounds, reasons, or 
justification’: where the belief itself would typically not be voluntary, because the 
relevant proposition ‘seems clearly true, however ill supported’ (for example 
prejudice where, say, ‘socialization’ has led to it seeming ‘clearly true’ that one 
race is superior to another). Category II is rather where the agent intends to 
believe that p, and succeeds in believing that p, by one or more voluntary actions 
or behaviours which execute that intention. 
 
It is not crucial to our case to decide whether this category II is conceptually 
impossible, contingently impossible, or just sparsely populated. What matters is 
that Alston’s first three categories, which treat ‘propositional attitude formation on 
the model of intentional action’ (1988:277), collectively fail to identify most of the 
beliefs and doxastic behaviours which EP2 targets. 
 
III Indirect influence. We can also be held responsible for a state of affairs even if 
we did not produce it intentionally, provided something we did but should have not 
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done (or did not do but should have done) was ‘a necessary condition (in the 
circumstances) of the realisation of that state of affairs’ (1988:278): provided, that 
is, the state of affairs would not have resulted had we not done something we 
should not have done (or done something we should have done). For example I 
may not be able to will myself to understand (or not understand) something, but if I 
deliberately choose not to read the relevant textbooks I am still responsible for not 
understanding the causes of WW1, if I (probably) would have done had I done my 
history homework.6 
 
Alston considers even this category provides no grounds for ‘a deontological 
conception of epistemic justification in terms of freedom from blame in taking up a 
certain propositional attitude’, and concludes we are ‘ill advised to think of 
epistemic justification in terms of freedom from blame for believing’ (1988:294). 
However EP2 is not intended as a comprehensive principle of epistemic 
justification derived from moral considerations, like for example Haack’s 
‘correlation thesis’,7 but as a self-standing moral principle applying to doxastic 
behaviour. For our purposes Alston’s category III indirect influences are the 
principal acts and omissions in EP2’s intended scope. 
 
We will now test this interpretation of where volition applies in acquiring and 
holding beliefs. First a belief resulting from brainwashing, assuming this is 
possible psychologically. By definition it would be acquired on insufficient 
evidence. Would its acquisition be immoral? If the brainwashing was involuntary, 
the belief would fall outside EP2, and possibly also CP. 
 
But what of voluntary hypnosis, to see if it was possible to acquire an over-belief 
involuntarily? As EP2 is currently worded it would be disallowed. Then if, having 
acquired through hypnosis a belief in (say) the existence of a supernatural being, 
the agent becomes aware of having the belief, EP2 would oblige him to test the 
belief against evidence and reject it if it fails. If there was something about the 
belief (or the way it was acquired) which made it impossible for him to become 
                                                   
 
6 We will have more to say about indirect influences on belief later in the context of Pascal’s Wager: 
p145ff. 
7 This is that positive or negative epistemic appraisal is ‘invariably’ and ‘contingently’ associated with 
positive or negative moral appraisal (1997, 2001:21): see p31ff. 
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aware of having the belief or to apply EP2 to it, then under EP2 he could correctly 
be blamed for voluntarily allowing this to happen. If this seems severe consider 
someone deliberately undergoing hypnosis to become irreversibly indoctrinated in 
Nazi ideology. 
 
Now for a subject undergoing voluntary hypnosis in pursuit of psychological 
enquiry, where (say) the desirable outcome of enhanced knowledge was 
considered more likely than the undesirable outcome of a fixed over-belief. As 
EP2 is a moral principle it can be assumed to include the implication that any 
particular instance of over-belief would only be morally wrong in the absence of 
any conflicting and overriding moral imperative8 – which in this case would be to 
further scientific knowledge. We will make this explicit: 
 
EP3 {If anything is morally wrong, then} it is [morally] wrong [within the 
category of descriptive belief] to believe anything on insufficient 
evidence {in the absence of any conflicting and overriding moral 
imperative} [except when the unjustified believing is outside the 
believer’s voluntary control]. 
 
This latest contextual presupposition9 should again be technically redundant as a 
potential context of conflicting moral imperatives should be assumed in the moral 
domain. EP3 is not claiming itself superior to any other moral principle, about 
which exactly the same could be said. 
 
The ‘conflicting and overriding moral imperative’ refers to the specific instance of 
(for example) actual or potential behaviour, not to the generic moral principle the 
instance may fall under. This is another commonplace of moral choice: an 
instance of behaviour could qualify as, say, both ‘telling the truth’ and ‘avoidably 
hurting an innocent person’, which is how moral conflict arises. The dilemma is in 
deciding whether in this particular instance the imperative to tell this truth 
overrides the imperative not to hurt this innocent person, or vice versa. EP3 has 
no privileged position in a hierarchy of principles. 
                                                   
 
8 See p22. 
9 See p22. 
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The broader question of voluntary versus involuntary aspects of belief therefore 
seems unproblematic for EP3. EP3 implicitly includes voluntary behaviour and 
explicitly excludes involuntary behaviour, relating to acquiring and/or holding 
beliefs. The inclusion and exclusion do not rob EP3 of its intended scope, and are 
not arbitrary, because the specified wrongness is moral wrongness. 
 
3.2 Foundational beliefs 
 
Some of the foregoing discussion will also apply to so-called ‘foundational’ or 
‘basic’ beliefs.10 If a belief is supported by evidence, that evidence would typically 
consist of beliefs, which in turn rest on other evidence, also typically in the form of 
beliefs. The chain must presumably end somewhere – perhaps in ‘foundational’ 
beliefs unsupported by other beliefs? Plantinga speaks of an  
 
apparent cleavage between those beliefs you accept on the evidential basis 
of other beliefs, and those you accept in the basic way—accept, but not on 
the evidential basis of other beliefs (1993:68) 
 
Would these basic beliefs be evidentially unsupported, and therefore over-beliefs? 
Such beliefs are considered problematic for some kinds of evidentialism, so we 
must assess their implications for EP3. 
 
Exploring the status and role of foundational beliefs has led to a range of views 
known as ‘foundationalism’. Plantinga is critical of foundationalism, but he offers a 
useful survey of candidate types of foundational beliefs, along with a terminology. 
For example ‘warrant’ is what ‘makes the difference between knowledge and mere 
true belief’ (1993:3): 
 
To say that a belief is warranted or justified for a person is to evaluate it or 
him (or both) positively; his holding that belief in his circumstances is right, 
or proper, or acceptable, or approvable, or up to standard. 
                                                   
 
10 We will use ‘foundational’ and ‘basic’ interchangeably. 
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Warrant is not however the same as justification (1993:46). For Plantinga a belief 
can be warranted without being evidentially supported. For example, both basic 
beliefs and ‘superstructure’ beliefs (beliefs derived from and/or supported by basic 
beliefs) can be warranted; and a warranted basic belief will count as ‘properly 
basic’: 
 
We could hold that a belief is properly basic for me only if it has so much 
warrant that it is certain for me (has the maximal degree of warrant for me); 
or … if it has enough warrant so that I know it (or have some special type of 
knowledge of it). Alternatively, we could say that it is properly basic for me if 
I am not irrational in accepting it, am justified in accepting it, am within my 
epistemic rights in accepting it… (1993:70) 
 
Different ‘foundationalists’ define ‘properly basic’ beliefs in different ways. 
Plantinga thinks Locke for example holds that ‘a belief—any belief—is properly 
basic for me only if it is either self-evident or appropriately about my own 
immediate experience’ (1993:71). But for a superstructure belief to be warranted it 
would have to be derived (immediately or ultimately, perhaps through chains of 
linking beliefs) from one or more ‘properly basic’ beliefs. A basic belief which was 
not warranted (so not ‘properly basic’) could not support any warranted 
superstructure beliefs. 
 
Plantinga (1981) and (1983) provide examples of beliefs which could be 
considered properly basic: 
 
(3.1.1) Simple, apparently self-evident, mathematical truths, eg ‘2 + 1 = 3’ 
(1981:41). 
 
(3.1.2) Simple, apparently self-evident, logical truths, eg ‘No man is both 
married and unmarried’ (1983:55). 
 
(3.1.3) Perceptual beliefs, eg ‘I see a tree’ (1981:47). 
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(3.1.4) Beliefs ascribing mental states to others, eg ‘that person is pleased’. 
 
(3.1.5) Memory beliefs, eg ‘I had breakfast over an hour ago’. 
 
All basic beliefs, therefore all properly basic beliefs, are relativised to the believer. 
So in one of Plantinga’s proposed wordings for a ‘fundamental principle of 
classical foundationalism’: 
 
(3.2) A proposition p is properly basic for a person S if and only if p is either 
self-evident to S or incorrigible for S or evident to the senses for S. 
(1983:59) 
 
This would apply not only to beliefs like (3.1.3–5) but also to ‘self-evident’ beliefs 
like (3.1.1–2). Plantinga sees properly basic beliefs as relativised both to the 
believer and to a set of conditions, which may or may not obtain: 
 
Very simple arithmetical truths will be self-evident to nearly all of us, but a 
truth like 17 + 18 = 35 may be self-evident only to some (1983:56). 
 
[A] belief is properly basic only in certain conditions; [which] are … the 
ground of its justification and, by extension, the ground of the belief itself. 
(1983:80) 
 
Beliefs like (3.1.3–5) though are all ‘relatively specific and concrete propositions’ 
(1981:47) rather than ‘more general and abstract’ propositions which they 
‘immediately and self-evidently entail’, for example, respectively: 
 
(3.3.3) There are trees. 
 
(3.3.4) There are other persons – and indeed other minds. 
 
(3.3.5) The world has existed for more than 5 minutes. 
 
But we can also ‘speak a bit loosely’ and call (3.3.3–5) properly basic. 
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For our purposes the precise extent and definition of ‘properly basic’ beliefs matter 
less than identifying a category of beliefs which we apparently regard as justified 
(or warranted) but which cannot coherently be considered supported by evidence 
(in the form of other justified beliefs) without infinite regress or circularity, because 
our other beliefs depend on them for their justification or warrant.11 Acknowledging 
such beliefs (which Plantinga accepts) does not mean committing to any flavour of 
‘foundationalism’ (which Plantinga rejects). 
 
Plantinga sees foundationalism as a ‘normative thesis … about how a system of 
beliefs ought to be structured, about the properties of a correct, or acceptable, or 
rightly structured system of beliefs’ (1993:72). This includes mandating that a 
‘proper [belief system] will have a foundation: a set of beliefs not accepted on the 
basis of other beliefs’ (1993:73). Plantinga accepts there are basic beliefs: 
 
a proposition is in the foundations of my [belief system] if and only if it is 
basic for me, and it is basic for me if and only if I don’t accept it on the 
evidential basis of other propositions. This much of foundationalism should 
be uncontroversial and accepted by all. (2000:75) 
 
However he denies the stipulations of foundationalism regarding the ‘conditions of 
proper basicality’, and therefore how a belief system ought to be structured. He 
rejects what he calls the ‘classical package: evidentialism, deontologism, and 
classical foundationalism’ (2000:79). ‘Deontologism’ refers to the prescriptivity of 
these stipulations: ‘duty, obligation, permission, being within your rights’ (2000:77). 
Evidentialism is 
 
the view that belief … is rationally justifiable or acceptable only if there is 
good evidence for it, where good evidence would be arguments from other 
propositions one knows (2000:64). 
 
Here ‘rationally justifiable or acceptable’ expresses the deontological element, and 
                                                   
 
11 But see Adler’s alternative approach p88ff. 
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the ‘other propositions one knows’ are either other evidentially supported beliefs 
or, ultimately, properly basic foundational beliefs – ‘properly basic’ being another 
normative concept. 
 
Plantinga sees ‘many forms of classical foundationalism’ as ‘self-referentially 
incoherent’ because of deontological stipulations such that 
 
a proposition A is acceptable for me if and only if it is either properly basic or 
believed on the evidential basis of propositions that are (1) properly basic, 
and (2) support A. But this proposition itself is not properly basic by this 
criterion: it is neither self-evident nor appropriately about someone's 
immediate experience, and … it is certainly hard to see that it is 
appropriately supported by propositions that do meet that condition. 
(1993:85) 
 
If foundationalism collapses, so does evidentialism – if foundationalism posits 
properly basic beliefs as the foundation a believer’s entire structure of evidentially 
supported beliefs depends on. 
 
What Plantinga sees as ‘uncontroversial and accepted by all’ may not however 
ring true for Adler, who sees evidentialism’s alleged vulnerability vis-à-vis 
foundationalism very differently: that evidentialism would be false not if 
foundationalism is false but if foundationalism is true: 
 
were evidentialism to require foundationalism, evidentialism would be self-
refuting, since the essence of foundationalism is that some beliefs are 
exempt from the demand for (noncircular) reason-backing. So the alleged 
dependency is really a way to deny evidentialism. (Adler, 2002:174) 
 
For now though we will assume foundational beliefs are conceptually sound and 
consider if they are an issue for EP3. 
 
One obvious defence would be that most of our foundational beliefs, most of the 
time, would be involuntary. We have said EP3 excludes involuntary behaviour 
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relating to acquiring and/or holding beliefs. This would typically apply both to 
‘specific and concrete’ beliefs like (3.1.1–5) and to ‘more general and abstract’ 
beliefs like (3.3.3–5), and therefore other everyday metaphysical assumptions like 
the belief that nature is uniform and will continue to be so. We could also include 
what James calls ‘common sense’ (1907, 2000:74): those ‘intellectual forms or 
categories of thought’ (1907, 2000:77) (like ‘thing’, ‘the same or different’, ‘kinds’, 
‘minds’, and ‘causal influences’): at least insofar as we could see them as beliefs, 
or as giving rise to beliefs.12 
 
To consider their implications for EP3, we should distinquish between (i) 
structures (categories, concepts) which, whatever their source, are part of the 
architecture of the mind and are preconditions for our kind of thinking; and (ii) 
metaphysical propositions believed and/or asserted as statements about the fabric 
of reality which (may) derive their content from those aspects of mental 
architecture (i). Take for example a potential foundational belief that causation is 
something real explaining instances of constant conjunction. This would be 
incompatible with an alternative belief that causation is an illusion resulting from 
observations of constant conjunction. Neither belief is supported by evidence, if 
the only available evidence is the constant conjunctions themselves. It might seem 
otiose to condemn, under EP3, a person’s over-belief in (say) any reality to 
‘causation’ over and above scientifically precise observations of constant 
conjunction, even where this belief has ceased to be involuntary. Yet if it is 
‘natural’ (say, in the sense of being part of evolved human nature) to believe 
causation is something real explaining constant conjunction (rather than just a way 
of labelling constant conjunction) then it might be equally ‘natural’ to infer from 
patterns in nature to the existence of agency in rivers, volcanoes and 
thunderstorms, when closer observation and/or more careful evaluation of 
evidence might cast doubt on such a ‘natural’ inference. 
 
For many people, for much of the time, many foundational beliefs would count as 
                                                   
 
12 Peirce has a similar conception: 
[N]ot man merely, but all animals derive by inheritance … two classes of ideas which adapt 
them to their environment[:] …notions … of force, matter, space, and time; and … notion[s] of 
what sort of objects their fellow-beings are, and of how they will act on given occasions. 
(1955:214-5) 
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involuntary, and so fall outside EP3. But the more stubbornly a believer persists in 
a ‘natural’ belief (that, say, agency exists in natural phenomena) by refusing to 
countenance alternative explanations and/or analytical evaluation of the evidence, 
the less it would count as involuntary. Analytical evaluation of the evidence may 
sometimes only justify rejecting the belief, not replacing it with a different one. It 
could justify the position that belief either way is inappropriate. An over-belief is 
not justified just because its only competition is other over-beliefs. 
 
Insisting on holding an over-belief because there is no counterevidence would 
qualify as ‘believing for unworthy reasons’ (Clifford, 1877, 1879:185) just as much 
as deliberately avoiding counterevidence. Nor is it obvious that a belief in the 
‘reality’ of causation or of deliberate agency within natural phenomena would 
count, or would need to count, as a ‘foundational’ belief upon which a believer’s 
other beliefs depend, unlike (say) beliefs in the existence of other minds or in the 
continued uniformity of nature.13 
 
The last two examples bring us to a second reason why (genuine) foundational 
beliefs need not be problematic for EP3. We have said many foundational beliefs 
would count as involuntary, but not all would. After all, a belief involuntarily 
acquired and/or held could transition into one we consciously and deliberately 
insist on, despite sceptical challenges. Our second reason is that EP3 as a moral 
principle presupposes a social context to belief. 
 
An immediate objection might be that some potential moral obligations, 
permissions and prohibitions just concern the individual: for example Kant’s case 
of the man whose misfortunes have 
 
mounted to the point of despair, but he is still so far in possession of his 
reason as to ask himself whether taking his own life may not be contrary to 
his duty to himself (2005:98). 
 
But even if this is correct in general it is not relevant to EP3, as the principal 
                                                   
 
13 We are including belief in the uniformity of nature here under the general category of foundational 
beliefs, but will also discuss it more specifically in the next section: p90ff. 
   88 
rationale behind EP3 as a moral principle is the social impact of either obeying or 
disobeying it. 
 
This presupposed social context means EP3 cannot disallow potential 
foundational over-beliefs in, say, the continued uniformity of nature or the 
existence of other minds if this would undermine that social context. Social life 
would be unthinkable without shared social projects, which must presuppose 
nature’s continued uniformity. EP3 would permit such ‘socially necessary’ 
foundational beliefs not only because of its implicit social context as a moral 
principle but also because of its explicit caveat ‘in the absence of any conflicting 
and overriding moral imperative’. 
 
Our third defence relates to Plantinga’s complaint that foundationalism is ‘self-
referentially incoherent’ (1993:85). Even if this holds for foundationalism there 
seems no reason to accept an equivalent argument against EP3, which is 
proposed not as a foundational belief itself but as a moral principle covering only 
descriptive beliefs. Holding EP3 would mean holding a prescriptive belief which 
does not apply to itself: therefore not ‘self-referentially incoherent’. 
 
These three defences presuppose what Plantinga takes as ‘uncontroversial and 
accepted by all’ (2000:75): that someone can hold basic beliefs not on the 
evidential basis of other beliefs but which are foundational to the rest of his belief 
system. Plantinga accepts this but rejects foundationalist prescriptions as to which 
basic beliefs count as ‘properly basic’ and can therefore be legitimate foundations. 
Adler takes the different line of ‘denying that there are basic beliefs’ (2002:163). 
 
There is only space to sketch a possible fourth defence based on Adler’s 
approach. He sees beliefs like (3.1.1–5) and (3.3.3–5)14 not as ‘basic’ beliefs 
which would be either ‘self-justified’ or ‘justified but not by further beliefs’ but as 
members of ‘our vast collection of well-founded background beliefs’. Beliefs like 
these can still do the ‘job ascribed to basic beliefs – to provide a foundation’ – but 
they 
                                                   
 
14 And his own examples like ‘ants do not study the calculus’ and ‘objects do not disappear when not 
perceived’. 
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cannot do the philosophical work of basic beliefs precisely because they are 
well founded, and well founded because massively confirmed. The 
confirmation is tacit, a by-product of many everyday day activities. 
 
We should bear in mind Adler’s insistence on the ‘modest ambitions of the ethics 
of belief’ (2002:17), for example ‘by ruling out radical skeptical alternatives and 
their surrogates’ (2002:7). So when he claims that 
 
the existence of other minds is tacitly confirmed, the key implication is that 
you would not in ordinary argument and discussion criticize someone who 
implied that he believed that there were other minds. (2002:185)  
 
An opponent could reject these ‘modest ambitions’ and challenge whether our 
background beliefs really do ‘receive massive tacit confirmation’ (2002:166). But 
tacit confirmation of background beliefs does not mean that, in Quine’s words, ‘no 
statement is immune from revision’ (1980:43). Adler thinks Quine does not 
‘distinguish … between falsification and revision’ (2002:165). Any statement, 
therefore any belief, can be falsified. But 
 
[r]evision, which presupposes falsification, enters the further claim that if we 
assign the value “false” (falsified) to a statement previously accepted (as 
true) then we can follow through with all related alterations of truth-value to 
yield a new, coherent, and simple system.  
 
Such revision is ‘not guaranteed to succeed’: 
 
If we falsify certain background beliefs like that the universe exists or that 
there is no all-powerful Evil Genius bent on deceiving us, which are 
empirical and contingent, we also might not know how to form a new, 
coherent, and simple system. For to assign “false” to beliefs that receive 
massive tacit confirmation is to undermine our reliance on any evidence or 
experience for inference. (2002:165-6) 
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It seems therefore that a defence of EP3 based on Adler’s concept of ‘well-
founded background beliefs’ as an alternative to foundational basic beliefs might 
also benefit from something like our second defence, depending on the 
presuppositions behind the envisaged attack. We could argue that social life 
would be untenable without ‘reliance on any evidence or experience for inference’. 
But in this case the social context presupposed by EP3 as a moral principle would 
legitimise beliefs in the existence of (say) the external world or other minds not as 
foundational over-beliefs but as tacitly confirmed background beliefs. We should 
acknowledge though that this approach may not succeed with the belief in the 
continued (and therefore future) uniformity of nature, which by its nature could 
never be considered tacitly confirmed, as confirmation can only be retrospective, 
and therefore inconclusive. 
 
In this section we have avoided committing to either ‘foundationalist’ or ‘anti-
foundationalist’ positions, and instead considered to what extent ‘basic’ or 
‘foundational’ (or in Adler’s case ‘background’) beliefs might undermine EP3. 
Following our brief survey we conclude that, with the possible exception of belief 
in the continued uniformity of nature, we have no reason to think EP3 as a moral 
principle (presupposing a social context) should disallow these beliefs, whether 
seen as foundational or as tacitly confirmed background beliefs. 
 
We will discuss belief in the continued uniformity of nature further in the next 
section. 
 
3.3 Past and future; testimony; uniformity of nature 
 
Belief in the uniformity of nature could correctly survive EP3 when it is involuntary, 
but it may not always be involuntary. It could also survive EP3 by qualifying as a 
‘foundational’ belief. But it features in other categories of potentially problematic 
beliefs: those about the past and, more obviously, about the future. Much of 
Clifford’s defence of CP consists of guidelines for avoiding excessive scepticism: 
on beliefs about the past (1877, 1879:208-9); about the future (1877, 1879:206-7); 
or on another’s authority or testimony (1877, 1879:188-199). Many such beliefs 
directly or indirectly presuppose the uniformity of nature, which might seem 
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problematic for CP and therefore perhaps for EP3. 
 
This section discusses dependencies within this cluster of notions, which will 
expand into the nature of belief in general, moral belief in particular, and moral life. 
We also foreshadow coverage in Chapter 5 of the shared social asset of 
knowledge and true belief.15 
 
Beliefs about the past 
 
Beliefs about the past do not divide neatly into personal memories and beliefs 
supported by testimony, as these overlap. It would be hard to imagine a 
testimony-based belief involving no personal memory: otherwise how was the 
belief acquired? The reverse overlap may be looser: remembering going upstairs 
five minutes ago may involve no significant ‘testimony’; but if my memory of 
hearing Handel’s Messiah last year goes beyond mere phenomenology it would 
have to incorporate some trusted cultural knowledge about Handel’s life and 
works. 
 
We have covered personal memories explicitly under foundational beliefs and 
implicitly under involuntary beliefs. So they should not be problematic for EP3. 
Beliefs based on testimony are another matter though. Few could be classed as 
either foundational or involuntary – the latter in the sense of beliefs we could not 
avoid holding or acquiring. Our earlier history homework story16 serves as a test 
case. The student assumes his books tell the truth about the causes of WW1, 
because he assumes their authors had good reason to believe their own original 
sources. But a sceptic might question whether the student had ‘sufficient 




Clifford asks if we are justified in believing Thucydides’ account of the siege of 
Syracuse (1877, 1879:208). And perhaps 
                                                   
 
15 For example p210ff. 
16 p79. 
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(1.3) I believe you are taking recreational drugs17 
 
because I was told this by person A, who I had heard was not exactly trustworthy. 
So I was unjustified in believing A’s testimony, and therefore unjustified in belief 
(1.3). But what if I had been misled about A, who had been telling the truth all 
along? 
 
Despite this layered testimony (1.3) still seems a case of over-belief (in the context 
sketched here), even if it turned out true. From the information I had at the time I 
should not have believed (1.3). We will incorporate this nuance: 
 
EP4 {If anything is morally wrong, then} it is [morally] wrong [within the 
category of descriptive belief] to believe anything [knowingly or 
irresponsibly] on insufficient evidence {in the absence of any 
conflicting and overriding moral imperative} [except when the 
unjustified believing is outside the believer’s voluntary control]. 
 
The ‘[knowingly or irresponsibly]’ includes cases where we are, or should have 
been, aware, or had good reason to believe, that our evidence was non-existent, 
insufficient or compromised, either in itself or in how we are taking it. This is not 
unique to testimony but it is clearly germane to it. 
 
There is an extensive literature on testimony, much of it a debate between 
‘reductionists’,18 who do not see testimony as an autonomous source of epistemic 
authority, and ‘anti-reductionists’,19 who typically see testimony as a source of 
warrant in itself, not reducible to, say, perception or memory (Adler, 2017). 
 
Previously20 we argued that if beliefs in the continued uniformity of nature or the 
existence of other minds qualify as foundational then our evidence principle 
                                                   
 
17 From p23. 
18 See for example Hume (1977 [1748]:74-5); Hume (1978 [1740]: Bk I part III section IV); Adler 
(2002:136-159); Fricker (1987); Fricker (1994); Fricker (1995); Fricker (2004); Fricker (2006). 
19 See for example Reid (1983:94–95); Audi (1997); Coady (1992); Burge (1993); Burge (1997). 
20 p88ff. 
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cannot disallow them if doing so would undermine the social context on which 
moral life, and therefore our evidence principle, depend. A similar (‘anti-
reductionist’) argument could apply to testimony in principle: social life would be 
unthinkable without shared social projects, which would be impossible if no 
testimony-based beliefs were allowed. Not believing anything another person tells 
me is tantamount to not trusting him; not believing anything anyone tells me 
means trusting no one. Shared social life and shared social projects rely not only 
on shared knowledge and belief, but on a threshold of trust between community 
members, extending to institutions and institutional artefacts like law and science. 
 
Not all testimony is trustworthy of course. The issue is knowing whom and when to 
trust and not trust. EP4 cannot force us to discount all testimony on principle if this 
would undermine the social and moral context which EP4 presupposes. But nor 
can we assume all testimony is true: testimonies sometimes contradict each other; 
and people can lie, cheat, mislead or be innocently mistaken. 
 
From the ‘reductionist’ side Adler argues that we trust testimony not only because 
we have no alternative but because ‘acceptance of testimony has strong empirical 
support’ from our ‘background beliefs’ (2002:136). Just because a ‘belief 
originates in testimony’ does not mean it is forever ‘sustained by it’ (2002:137), or 
at least not by its originating testimony. I may first hear of a serious crime from my 
neighbour, but ‘[a]lmost immediately there is verification from many other sources, 
in particular, newspaper and TV reports’ (2002:138). While each may involve its 
own testimonial chain, their ‘convergence corroborates … the report's accuracy, 
as well as my reasons for accepting it’. 
 
Adler questions not whether trust is involved or needed but whether, ‘where trust 
is needed, it is to compensate for a lack of knowledge (justification, or adequate 
reasons)’ (2002:139). He aims to ‘diminish the gap between our dependence on 
testimony and the fragile nature of testimonial trust’ (2002:141). His chosen 
context is the ‘null setting’, where 
 
the hearer has no specific information concerning his informant's reliability or 
trustworthiness[,] … [t]he costs of error from false testimony are not very 
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high, and seeking or acquiring the information offered through testimony in 
other ways is costly. Otherwise testimony loses its driving force as a device 
of economy (2002:142). 
 
He suggests three possible positions on whether it is correct to accept an 
informant’s testimony in this context: 
 
1. The neutral position: that trust or acceptance should be judged on a case 
by case basis. There is no presumption favoring or disfavoring acceptance 
of testimony. […] 
 
2. The negative-bias position: that one should always regard the word of 
another critically. It is suspect, until proved otherwise[.] 
 
3. The positive-bias (or default) position: that one ought simply to accept a 
speaker's testimony unless one has special reason against doing so. 
 
Adler thinks the positive-bias, default, position 
 
fits our testimonial practices … since it is not credible that we would remain 
so heavily dependent on testimony were it not able to secure for us 
overwhelmingly useful (true, relevant) information (2002:143). 
 
This position is a ‘practical necessity’ (2002:142) but also has ‘empirical backing’ 
(2002:144). First is the ‘enormous evidence, from our earliest years, of reliable 
testimony in its basic role of conveying information’ which we verify ‘simply by 
acting on it’ (2002:148). Second are the ‘powerful institutional and social 
constraints on us to speak truthfully and reliably–most prominently, reputation’ 
(2002:149). Third is our ‘knowledge of teaching and learning in regard to 
testimony in our community’ (2002:150). Fourth is our ‘background knowledge’ 
which grounds our 
 
judgments of prior plausibility because testimony, to be minimally 
acceptable, must not be dissonant with the hearer's beliefs (2002:151). 
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Lastly, we use testimony ‘largely under conditions that risk detection of error (or 
falsification)’ (2002:153). Our default positive-bias rule ‘reflects a resilient history 
of overwhelmingly reliable testimony’. 
 
The default rule’s ‘hold’ (2002:154) on us is not just evidential. Its ‘pull’ also 
derives from ‘social norms of civility and courtesy’. But ethical and evidential pull 
together:  
 
The practical economies secured by the default rule are respected because 
we have good reason to expect that the benefits are not purchased at the 
cost of incurring serious error. The central pillar of that rationale can reside 
only in our background knowledge. (2002:155) 
 
Adler concludes that our background beliefs provide ‘enormous empirical support 
for the acceptance of testimony’ (2002:159): except of course when we have good 
reason to override the default, which the positive-bias position allows for. 
 
Uniformity of nature 
 
Adler’s rationale is based on an inductive argument, which in turn presupposes 
belief that nature was uniform in the past and will continue uniform in the future. 
This is part of Clifford’s justification for accepting Thucydides’ account of the siege 
of Syracuse: 
 
Our experience is that manuscripts exist which are said to be and which call 
themselves manuscripts of the history of Thucydides; … We find also that 
men do not, as a rule, forge books and histories without a special motive; we 
assume that in this respect men in the past were like men in the present; 
and we observe that in this case no special motive was present. (1877, 
1879:208-9) 
 
It might seem counter-intuitive that testimony-based belief about the past 
presupposes belief in the future uniformity of nature. But we project forward by 
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necessity, because although ‘life must be understood backward … it must be lived 
forward’ (Kierkegaard, 2000:12). The positive-bias rule is applied to each new 
instance. The potential believer applies the rule, implicitly or explicitly, to each new 
case to decide whether to accept the testimony or not, and each time 
presupposes that nature will continue to be uniform. Otherwise we could only say 
we were right to accept what Thucydides wrote, not that we are right and will 
continue to be. We must at least assume all current evidence justifying our 
confidence in Thucydides’ account will continue to exist into the future. 
 
But if that is true of a belief about the past based on testimony, something similar 
applies to a belief based on personal memory. Most of the time we simply assume 
our memories are accurate. But we know they are not error-proof because people 
can remember the same event in different and incompatible ways. Despite this we 
implicitly or explicitly apply a default positive-bias rule to accept the truth of our 
personal memories. With rare exceptions we are rewarded by overwhelming 
confirmation that this rule is sound, justifying our continued application of it to each 
new memory-based belief. So even with memory-based beliefs about the past we 
assume nature will continue to be uniform, and that this overwhelming 
confirmation will continue. 
 
If every belief about the past is based on personal memory or testimony or (most 
likely) a combination of the two, then it seems a belief about the past is always 
implicitly a belief about the future, to the extent that a belief about the past 
contains within itself an assumption that the future will resemble the past. We will 
now turn to beliefs about the future themselves. 
 
Beliefs about the future 
 
Kate says her train will arrive at 5 pm, so Adler goes to meet her at 5 (2002:8). He 
asks if he knows Kate will be there at 5, but we could equally ask if he has 
sufficient evidence to believe this. In a sense he cannot know: there could be a rail 
strike; a sudden snowfall; she could miss her train; she or the station could auto-
destruct. Does that mean he cannot have sufficient evidence that she will be 
there? Applying EP4 he would then be morally wrong to believe she will be there. 
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But would he have sufficient evidence that any of these obstacles is likely enough 
to make him believe Kate would not be at the station at 5? Are the railways going 
through a bad patch? Snow or industrial action forecast? Does Kate have a history 
of unreliability? If not then his belief that Kate will be at the station at 5 is surely 
justified, because the contrary belief that Kate will not be at the station at 5 is 
unjustified? 
 
A third option is neither believe nor disbelieve. If there is insufficient evidence 
either way, would the (morally) right thing be to remain agnostic? 
 
We could argue that agnosticism only makes sense from a purist perspective. 5 
pm arrives, Kate is there and you meet her, despite neither believing nor 
disbelieving she would be there. Are you surprised by this ‘coincidence’? (Adler, 
2002:8) What if Kate had previously been unreliable, if snow was forecast, with 
threats of industrial unrest; and you still turned up at 5 – because you said you 
would, again neither believing nor disbelieving she would be there – would you be 
surprised if she was there or if she was not? 
 
We must separate a few strands. This is a belief about a future event which has 
not happened, but which in many significant respects is like events which have 
happened before. To that extent we could substitute an inorganic event like a 
solar eclipse. But it is also an event involving humans with free will; and possibly 
implicit or explicit promises and/or consciously shared expectations. 
 
The involvement of free will does not necessarily invalidate inductive inference. 
Adler feels justified in believing the mailman will greet him even though the 
mailman is free not to: 
 
Free will … excludes neither regularities governing nor … knowledge of 
human behavior (2002:140). 
 
This applies to Kate’s reliability and to collective human action on which we can 
base beliefs about predictability in rail services and the likelihood of strikes. Some 
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at least of the contingencies impacting Kate’s punctuality could themselves be 
inferred, in principle, from prior physical states and scientific laws presupposing 
the continued uniformity of nature: mechanical characteristics of rolling stock, 
seasonal weather patterns and so on. 
 
Earlier we offered reasons for considering belief in the continued uniformity of 
nature to be justified, either as foundational21 or as a presupposition22 for applying 
tacitly confirmed background beliefs. We also argued for adopting a default 
positive-bias rule for testimony in general,23 to include relevant aggregate 
knowledge relating to the physical systems which Adler hopes will bring Kate to 
the station by 5. If on balance he has no good reason to expect negative 
contingencies, then – for now excluding free will – he would seem justified in 
believing Kate will be at the station at 5. This is because the consequences of 
believing otherwise, including remaining agnostic, should be considered as if 
universalised across Adler’s entire community. Shared projects and social life in 
general would be impossible if no one felt justified in holding beliefs about the 
future based on inductive inference from collective past experience relating to the 
physical world. 
 
When we readmit free will we get a similar result, but for slightly different reasons. 
There is the aggregate effort by railway staff following established systems and 
procedures, plus Kate’s reliability record. There is no need to assume perfection, 
just past performance levels high enough to discount any positive reason for 
thinking Kate will not arrive by 5. To assess whether Adler would be justified in 
remaining agnostic we should again extrapolate the same policy across the whole 
community. 
 
In this thought experiment a putative justification for agnosticism is that Kate might 
possibly not be at the station at 5, but not because of unreliability on her part or an 
inefficient railway service. Nothing either Kate or any railway employee can do 
could remove the sceptic’s doubt. So if his doubt is justified so would anyone 
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else’s about any other planned outcome involving an element of free will. No 
person or group could do anything to create an effective reputation for reliability, 
because agnosticism would ignore track record. No matter how mild, peaceful, 
considerate and loving X had behaved in the past his acquaintances could still 
have insufficient reason for discounting the possibility that he, and indeed anyone 
else, could turn psychopathic the next instant. 
 
From EP4’s perspective we would argue there would be at least a ‘conflicting and 
overriding moral imperative’ not to undermine social life by insisting on 
agnosticism in principle, if not that the possibility of having legitimate expectations 
about people’s future behaviour would be a pre-requisite for moral life, and 
therefore for the EP4 condition ‘if anything is morally [right or] wrong’.24 
 
We will now see how Clifford treats inductive inference on the assumption of the 
uniformity of nature, as it leads to insights not just on social and moral life but on 
belief itself. 
 
Belief as a guide to action 
 
A critic could claim that believing in the continued uniformity of nature is to ‘believe 
… upon insufficient evidence’ and therefore breaches CP. We might have 
‘sufficient evidence’ that nature has been uniform. But to infer from this that nature 
will always be uniform would presuppose what we want to infer: that nature is and 
will be uniform. The classic source for this ‘problem of induction’ is Hume (1969: 
Book I, Part III, section VI); but Ayer offers a convenient summary:  
 
In [inductive] reasoning we make the assumption that there is a measure of 
uniformity in nature; … that the future will, in the appropriate respects, 
resemble the past. ... But, as Hume pointed out, this assumption is not 
demonstrable; the denial that nature is uniform … is not self-contradictory. 
Neither, as Hume also saw, is there any means of showing, without logical 
circularity, that the assumption is even probable. For the only way of 
                                                   
 
24 This particular belief might also qualify as a self-fulfilling belief, discussed in the next section: 
p110ff. 
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showing that it was probable would be to produce evidence which confirmed 
it, and it is only if there are fair samples in nature that any evidence can be 
confirmatory. But whether there are fair samples in nature is just the point at 
issue. (1956:72) 
 
Clifford claims however that it is ‘in the very nature of belief’ to go ‘beyond 
experience’, so the question is not ‘May we believe what goes beyond 
experience?’ but ‘How far and in what manner may we add to our experience in 
forming our beliefs?’ (1877, 1879:206). He offers not an inference but a ‘rule’ of 
‘extreme simplicity and vast practical importance’ (1877, 1879:205): 
 
We may believe what goes beyond our experience, only when it is inferred 
from that experience by the assumption that what we do not know is like 
what we know. (1877, 1879:210) 
 
For example spectroscopic evidence supports the belief that the sun contains 
hydrogen. This belief cannot be accepted as true, so cannot ‘help in the right 
guidance of human action’ if it is ‘accepted on unworthy grounds, and without 
some understanding of the process by which it is got at’ (1877, 1879:208). 
 
But when we understand this process as the ‘ground of the belief’ it becomes a 
‘very serious and practical matter’. If the sun contains no hydrogen then the 
spectroscope is an ‘uncertain guide’ for chemical analysis – so for consistency we 
should no longer trust spectroscopy generally, which up to now has ‘enriched us 
not only with new metals … but with new processes of investigation, which is 
vastly greater’ in value (1877, 1879:208). 
 
The nature of belief itself involves the ‘possibility of inference’ (1877, 1879:210), 
and so the assumption of uniformity in nature is implicit in all non-tautological 
beliefs that go beyond experience: 
 
No evidence … can justify us in believing the truth of a statement which is 
contrary to, or outside of, the uniformity of nature. If our experience is such 
that it cannot be filled up consistently with uniformity, all we have a right to 
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conclude is that there is something wrong somewhere; but the possibility of 
inference is taken away; we must rest in our experience, and not go beyond 
it at all. (1877, 1879:210) 
 
Inference would be impossible because inference relies on assuming nature is 
uniform. An event which was really outside the uniformity of nature would be one 
only ‘those whose actual experience it was’ would have the right to believe; and 
‘no inference worthy of belief could be founded upon it’ (1877, 1879:210). 
Although we can envisage someone witnessing an event which appeared to 
contradict the uniformity of nature, no one else could infer a legitimate belief from 
it (for example that they would also experience the same thing under the same 
circumstances), because the right to infer would presuppose the uniformity of 
nature in every other necessary respect.25 
 
Despite this though we are not ‘bound to believe’ – indeed we ‘have no right to 
believe’ – that ‘nature is absolutely and universally uniform’: 
 
The rule only tells us that in forming beliefs which go beyond our experience, 
we may make the assumption that nature is practically uniform so far as we 
are concerned. Within the range of human action and verification, we 
may form, by help of this assumption, actual beliefs; beyond it, only those 
hypotheses which serve for the more accurate asking of questions. 
[Emphases added.] (1877, 1879:210) 
 
The justification of this rule, including both its extent and its limitations 
(emphasised above) derives from the role belief plays in the ‘right guidance of 
human action’: 
 
…if [a belief] is to be used as a guide to action, as a hint of what the future is 
to be, it must assume something about that future, namely, that it will be 
                                                   
 
25 For example that people generally tell the truth and generally know when they are and are not 
doing so; that people’s memories generally persist reasonably accurately and when they do not we 
know this by comparison with other records and traces which persist unchanged; that deliberate 
physical records of events and contingent traces of their impact (ashes from fires, debris from 
explosions, puddles after showers etc) persist in known and reliable ways; and so on. 
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consistent with the supposition that [the event in question] really took place 
yesterday; which is going beyond experience. Even the fundamental ‘I am,’ 
which cannot be doubted, is no guide to action until it takes to itself ‘I shall 
be,’ which goes beyond experience. (1877, 1879:206) 
 
The assumption is not just that ‘the unknown fire of to-day is like the known fire of 
yesterday’, but that the future will behave such that the remembered and recorded 
past will persist as a single and unified past with continued connection to present 
and future. Believing ‘what goes beyond experience’ is ‘involved in the very nature 
of belief’, leaving no alternative but to ‘add to our experience on the assumption of 
a uniformity in nature’ (1877, 1879:206).26 Belief is thus intrinsically forward-
looking – which would extend our working definition of ‘belief’27 as ‘what we regard 
as true’. Clifford insists a belief has potential ‘influence upon the actions of him 
who holds it’ (1877, 1879:181). Peirce agrees, claiming the ‘essence of belief’ is 
the ‘establishment of a habit’ (1878, 1998:144) – ‘habit’ being short for ‘rule of 
action’ (1878, 1998:143) – which must presuppose there will be a future 
resembling the past. 
 
Belief as intrinsically forward-looking 
 
We should unpack the claim that belief is intrinsically forward-looking. Could 
someone not have a belief only about the past? The question seems to be 
whether we could separate a belief from anything which might be done with it: 
because whatever will be done with it will by definition be in the future. This in turn 
seems related to whether we can separate the belief from the believer whose 
belief it is. Could we for example see a belief as a ‘trace’ or record of an event, like 
a setting within a mechanical memory (or a snapshot, or an edge of wet sand after 
the tide has turned) but without any implication of any future event triggered by it? 
A true belief at least seems to share some features of this kind of trace. But a 
belief can also be false, and if only to reflect this possibility it is hard to see how 
we can remove the believer from the picture. For this trace to be something which 
                                                   
 
26 Also: …it is our duty to guide our beliefs by inference from experience on the assumption of 
uniformity of nature and consciousness in other men, and by this only. Only upon this moral basis 
can the foundations of the empirical method be justified. (Clifford, 1875, 1879:175) 
27 See p22. 
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could be either true or false it seems it must count as potential information, or at 
least something which could be put to use, by someone or something capable of 
putting it to use, even if just to infer some other belief or proposition. 
 
For a less abstract approach consider my belief that I walked upstairs five minutes 
ago. A belief is something I take to be true, so I take it to be true that I walked 
upstairs five minutes ago. Is part of taking this to be true that if someone asked 
me a minute from now whether I walked upstairs six minutes ago I would say yes? 
So taking it as true that I came upstairs five minutes ago implies I will continue to 
take it as true, so after a minute I will believe I walked upstairs six minutes ago? 
 
If yes, is this a characteristic of my belief or of myself as a believer? If I did not 
project my belief forward into the future would that be because it was not a 
genuine belief, or because it was not a genuine belief for me, or because I would 
not be behaving as a genuine or ‘normal’ believer? And if it was a characteristic of 
me as a believer, is this because, as the existentialists argue, I am ‘a being whose 
existence comes before its essence’; someone who is ‘nothing other than what he 
makes of himself’; something which ‘projects itself into a future, and is conscious 
of doing so’ (Sartre, 2007:22-3); because as ‘an existing individual’ I am 
‘constantly in the process of becoming’ (Kierkegaard, 1974:79)? 
 
It is hard to disentangle these questions, because it is hard to envisage a belief 
without a believer; or to envisage a believer except as someone whose life ‘must 
be lived forward’. So one question is whether it is possible to separate the belief 
from the believer. In the context of EP4 however we do not need to separate the 
two, as EP4 is a moral principle aimed at a believer’s behaviour in respect of his 
beliefs. 
 
A related question though is whether a belief can be separated from a believer’s 
other beliefs. We were trying to restrict ourselves to a belief with no future 
commitment. But we can ask if the belief that I came upstairs five minutes ago can 
really stand as an atomic belief independent of any related beliefs at least some of 
which do seem to have a forward-looking aspect. There are beliefs about what 
‘upstairs’ means in terms of hypothetical futures: that if I were to look out of the 
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window I would see I am higher up than when I looked out of the window 
downstairs, and that to go to the kitchen I will have to go back downstairs. A 
reason for thinking my ‘atomic belief’ cannot stand independent is that perhaps I 
only understand its propositional content because I have other beliefs about (say) 
the configuration of my house, at least some of which have implications for the 
future: that the house will stand secure and not collapse under its own weight; that 
the stairs are strong enough to bear my weight and the timber will not liquefy. 
Otherwise I would not have ventured upstairs: I may not have entered the house 
because it would have been unsafe. Included in my belief that I walked upstairs 
five minutes ago may be that I did it knowing I was safe and the staircase would 
not collapse and leave me stranded. If, when I believed I came upstairs five 
minutes ago, I was truly agnostic about the future awaiting me, then my belief 
would have been like a belief in a dream, when anything could happen next, and I 
could suddenly find myself on a mountaintop. Again it is hard to separate 
characteristics of my belief about coming upstairs five minutes ago (plus any 
related beliefs) from characteristics of myself as a believing agent. Certainly my 
conception of what a belief is does not seem independent of its being held by a 
believing agent, and again in the context of EP4 we can see the two as 
inseparable. 
 
Another way to interpret the intrinsically forward-looking nature of belief could be 
that at least some of our beliefs must be forward-looking, so it is intrinsic to belief 
that a belief can be forward-looking. For example we could ask: what would our 
beliefs be if we did not use at least some of them as guides to (future) action? If 
we still engaged in intentional behaviour but did not use our beliefs as guides, how 
would we translate our intentions into actions which carried out those intentions? 
How would we achieve anything? And if we must use at least some of our beliefs 
as guides to action then is it possible to have a belief which could not be used as 
a guide to action? If not, that would suggest that all our beliefs must be available 
for use as guides to action. And if something can be a guide to action, then surely 
it is a guide to action? 
 
The idea of belief as a guide to action (or at least enough of this idea as our 
current context needs) may actually be implicit in the idea of belief as ‘what we 
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regard as true’. It would be hard to understand how we can regard something as 
true without that ‘regard’ having persistence and practical consequence. Three 
ostensibly separate ideas seem interconnected, if not aspects of the same thing: 
 
(3.4.1) Belief as ‘what we regard as true’. 
 
(3.4.2) Belief as a guide to action. 
 
(3.4.3) Belief as presupposing continuity and shared features between past, 
present and future. 
 
To regard it as true (3.4.1) that I have one dog and he is white, that belief must be 
identifiable against a universe of alternative and potential beliefs. I must believe I 
know what a dog is, and what it is for a dog to be the colour he is and not another 
colour. I would have some idea about when a white dog entered my life, as this 
would be part of what it is to believe he is my dog. If I regard it as true that I have 
one dog and he is white then I would not recognise a black dog as my dog, as I 
would not regard it as true that I also have a black dog. Countless other 
dispositions, implications and possible scenarios are reflected in the idea of belief 
as a guide to action (3.4.2). For present purposes that is all (3.4.2) needs to 
contain. My claim to regard it as true that I had one dog and he was white would 
be viewed with suspicion if I seemed not to know what a dog was, as something 
that could be a particular colour; or if I seemed not to know when a white dog 
entered my life. These would be hard to articulate except by presupposing 
continuity and shared features between past, present and future (3.4.3).  
 
A critic could complain we have deliberately chosen a belief which only makes 
sense if (3.4.1–3) all apply together. But the challenge would be to find an 
example where (3.4.1) applies without (3.4.2) or (3.4.3). It would need enough of 
the relevant logical, phenomenological and epistemological features for (3.4.1) to 
apply, but without the practical and phenomenological features which (3.4.2) and 
(3.4.3) need. If the idea of belief as ‘what we regard as true’ (3.4.1) and as 
incorporating some sense of ‘guide to action’ (3.4.2) presupposes continuity and 
resemblance between past, present and future (3.4.3), then it seems we can 
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assume that ‘nature is practically uniform so far as we are concerned’ (Clifford, 
1877, 1879:210). 
 
The proposition that nature is, was and will be uniform must have the status of a 
rule or presupposition for an ‘evidentialist’ principle like CP because, as we will 
see, if it counts as a belief among other beliefs then this kind of evidentialism 
might lead to scepticism. Although we have argued CP is implicitly a moral 
principle, Clifford worded it in absolute, universal terms without caveats or 
qualifications. And while he gives a moral justification for CP in terms of the social 
consequences of obeying and disobeying it, he does not capitalise on the social 
preconditions for morality per se. The justification he claims for treating the 
uniformity of nature as a rule or presupposition rather than a belief is not on moral 
grounds but because it is implicit in the nature of belief. What he could have done, 
but did not do, was make this explicit in CP: ‘Assuming (contingent) belief to be 
possible at all, then it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe 
anything upon insufficient evidence’. 
 
But even this manoeuvre might not succeed. Whether the assumption of the 
uniformity of nature is implicit in the nature of belief or CP had an explicit 
assumption about the possibility of (contingent) belief, neither would necessarily 
legitimise the assumption of the uniformity of nature. This is because an 
alternative conclusion could be that if we adopt an evidentialist principle like CP 
then we should not believe anything except perhaps necessary truths. 
 
An ‘anti-evidentialist’ could for example claim that, if evidentialism is true, the idea 
of belief as a guide to action is illegitimate. If evidentialism presupposes that belief 
is intrinsically forward-looking and that there will be a future resembling the past, 
then so much the worse for evidentialism. Not that we cannot justify assuming the 
uniformity of nature without circularity, but that evidentialism requires us to justify 
assuming the uniformity of nature without circularity, and on the basis of evidence. 
For example: 
 
(3.5.1) According to evidentialism it is wrong to believe anything on 
insufficient evidence. 
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(3.5.2) A belief about the future or the past presupposes the future will 
resemble the past. 
 
(3.5.3) There is insufficient evidence that the future will resemble the past. 
 
(3.5.4) Therefore [from (3.5.1) and (3.5.3)] according to evidentialism it is 
wrong to believe the future will resemble the past. 
 
(3.5.5) Therefore [from (3.5.2) and (3.5.4)] according to evidentialism it is 
wrong to hold any belief about the future or the past. 
 
(3.5.6) Therefore [from (3.5.1) to (3.5.5)] evidentialism leads to scepticism 
about the future and the past. 
 
We could continue: 
 
(3.5.7) The idea of belief includes that of a guide to action. 
 
(3.5.8) The idea of belief as a guide to action presupposes there will be a 
future which will resemble the past. 
 
(3.5.9) But [from (3.5.5)] according to evidentialism it is wrong to hold any 
belief about the future or the past. 
 
(3.5.10) Therefore [from (3.5.8) and (3.5.9)] according to evidentialism it is 
wrong to hold any belief whatsoever. 
 
Clifford would be unlikely to accept this argument, although he would accept at 
least some of its premises. He would presumably accept (3.5.1) and – with a key 
reservation – possibly both (3.5.2) and (3.5.3). The reservation would either stop 
him accepting (3.5.4) or allow him to accept only a qualified version of it. 
 
The reservation is whether ‘the future’ and ‘the past’ in (3.5.2–4) refer respectively 
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to everything the future could bring across all reality and everything which has 
ever happened or existed across all reality, or only refer to aspects of reality 
relevant to the specific belief in question. He seems to draw this distinction when 
he claims we ‘have no right to believe’ that ‘nature is absolutely and universally 
uniform’ (1877, 1879:210) but that ‘we may make the assumption that nature is 
practically uniform as far as we are concerned’ and ‘[w]ithin the range of human 
action and verification, we may form, by help of this assumption, actual beliefs’. 
 
But Clifford does not give a justification for thinking (contingent) belief must be 
possible. His justification for CP is largely based on the moral impact of obeying or 
disobeying it in a social context. So he could have suggested a similar rationale to 
justify adopting the ‘rule’ that nature will continue to be uniform: because of the 
social and moral consequences of not adopting it. 
 
In the case of EP4 however we make this explicit. EP4 is expressed in moral, not 
epistemic terms. If the belief that the future will resemble the past qualifies as a 
descriptive belief, then it would be morally wrong to believe, without sufficient 
evidence, that the future will resemble the past. But the idea of deliberate action,28 
let alone social and moral life, presupposes the future will resemble the past. So if 
we say it is morally wrong to form beliefs on the assumption that the future will 
resemble the past because it is morally wrong to believe (on insufficient evidence) 
that the future will resemble the past, then we are saying it is morally wrong to 
hold any belief which presupposes there will be a future which resembles what we 
understand and remember as the past. It would be morally wrong to believe in the 
existence of other people and other minds with intentions, expectations, hopes 
and fears; morally wrong to believe we have any future, or any past which will 
continue to make sense to us in the future; morally wrong to believe anything the 
possibility of moral life depends on. 
 
But EP4 explicitly presupposes the moral domain is possible and exists: ‘{If 
anything is morally wrong, then…}’. The qualification ‘[except when the unjustified 
believing is outside the believer’s voluntary control]’ would admit an involuntary 
                                                   
 
28 Clifford’s “fundamental ‘I am’” (1877, 1879:206). 
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over-belief that the future will be like the past. And ‘{…in the absence of any 
conflicting and overriding moral imperative}’ would admit a voluntary over-belief 
that the future will be like the past, if that is a necessary condition for morality – 




We argue that expressing EP4 in explicitly moral terms (which Clifford left implicit) 
insulates it from radical-sceptic challenges like (3.5.1–10). Even if successful from 
a purely epistemic perspective, the sceptical alternative would reduce the domain 
of ‘justified belief’ to a vanishing point coextensive with the sceptic’s own domain 
of ‘certain knowledge’.29 A belief could not be a guide to action, because we could 
not legitimately predict the future or recollect the past. A belief could still be what 
we regard as true, but only things we know for certain would qualify: the Cartesian 
cogito, analytic truths etc – assuming these propositions still made sense in such 
a whittled-down world. But even if radical scepticism is impregnable as an 
epistemological stance, it can be defeated on moral grounds as a life option or 
orientation to the world, because if carried through consistently it would outlaw 
belief structures on which social and moral life depend. This is enough to save 
EP4. 
 
Our opponent might question why an anti-sceptical evidence principle allows us to 
dismiss agnosticism in the context of beliefs about the future but embrace it when 
it comes to (say) belief in God. Chapter 4 will discuss religious belief in general. 
For now we can say that with beliefs about the future the past evidence exists and 
future evidence will eventually exist. The issue is whether we are justified in 
assuming uniformity in nature. If not then all our beliefs might be doomed, 
certainly all beliefs containing an element of projection into the future, including 
those on which social and moral life depend. This has no parallel in respect of 
belief in God, even if our concept of God includes the belief that God is creator, 
maintainer and guarantor of reality. Our belief in the existence of reality is not 
dependent on the belief that God is its creator, maintainer and guarantor. That 
latter belief would be just another descriptive belief needing evidence. It would not 
                                                   
 
29 Picked up again in Chapter 5, especially p261ff. 
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be a precondition of (future-directed, contingent) belief per se, which assuming 
uniformity of nature is. Nor is it a precondition of social or moral life, as many 
stable communities function without belief in God. For now we conclude that the 
assumption of the uniformity of nature, and therefore any suitably qualified beliefs 
about the future and the past, would correctly survive EP4. Chapter 4 will address 
whether, and under what circumstances, belief in God would survive EP4. 
 
3.4 Personal relations and self-fulfilling beliefs 
 
Faith in a fact 
 
The previous section included Adler’s story about meeting Kate at the station.30 It 
did not consider whether Adler’s belief in Kate’s reliability influenced her behaviour 
in any way, which could make it another of James’s potential counter-examples to 
CP: ‘questions of fact … concerning personal relations, states of mind between 
one man and another’ (1896, 2000:213), where ‘faith in a fact can help create the 
fact’ (1896, 2000:214): 
 
Do you like me or not? ... Whether you do or not depends … on whether I 
meet you half-way, am willing to assume that you must like me, and show 
you trust and expectation. The previous faith on my part in your liking’s 
existence is in such cases what makes your liking come. But if I stand aloof, 
and refuse to budge an inch until I have objective evidence, … ten to one 
your liking never comes. (1896, 2000:213) 
 
Two separate but overlapping categories: beliefs specific to interpersonal 
relations, and ‘self-fulfilling’ beliefs. The belief that someone you have not yet met 
will like you could belong to both. Self-fulfilling beliefs may occur in the context of 
an interpersonal relationship or may involve only one person: 
 
Suppose … you are climbing a mountain and have worked yourself into a 
position from which the only escape is by a terrible leap. Have faith that you 
can successfully make it, and your feet are nerved to its accomplishment. 
                                                   
 
30 p96ff. 
   111 
But mistrust yourself, and think of all the sweet things you have heard the 
scientists say of maybes, and you will hesitate so long that, at last, all 
unstrung and trembling, and launching yourself in a moment of despair, you 
roll into the abyss. (James, 1897, 1912a:59)  
 
Are self-fulfilling beliefs another legitimate exclusion, like prescriptive beliefs? 
 
Closer examination suggests they could support rather than undermine EP4. 
James’s ‘questions of fact’ are beliefs about the future. In the first case, I would 
seem to have no evidence whether you will like me or not, because we have never 
met. But that is no reason for not acting as if you will like me, particularly if I have 
reason to think you are more likely to if I act as if I think you will. Observed human 
behaviour generally supports that assumption. So I might be correctly believing, 
on sufficient evidence, that you are more likely to like me if I act as if I think you 
will: 
 
The desire for a certain kind of truth here brings about that special truth’s 
existence; and so it is in innumerable cases of other sorts. [Emphasis 
added.] (James, 1896, 2000:213) 
 
‘Faith’, ‘trust’, ‘expectation’ and ‘desire’ are neither synonyms of nor inseparable 
from belief – although separating them may require ‘engag[ing] in some 
abstraction from the natural workings of belief’ which apply in social and 
conversational contexts where ‘truthfulness’ may be a lower aim than ‘tactfulness’ 
(Adler, 2002:14) – or indeed optimistic faith or generosity of spirit. 
 
Compare the scenario where Kate and the railway service are known to be 
reliable and good weather is forecast.31 Because EP4 presupposes a future 
resembling the past, we concluded Adler would be morally right to believe Kate 
would be at the station at 5 pm, and that any other option would be morally wrong 
if it meant ignoring the evidence. In this case we are assuming his belief did not 
influence Kate’s punctuality. 
                                                   
 
31 p96ff. 
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But believing someone I have never met will like me could influence the outcome. 
If I believe it is more likely than not that the person will like me, and I behave in a 
friendly and engaging way which makes it even more likely, then I am believing on 
the basis of the available evidence – ‘on the assumption of a uniformity in the 
characters of men’ (Clifford, 1877, 1879:209). James says Clifford would ‘stand 
aloof, and refuse to budge an inch’ until he has ‘objective evidence’ (1896, 
2000:213), sooner dying on the mountaintop than make a leap of faith: 
 
[S]uppose that, having just read the Ethics of Belief, I feel it would be sinful 
to act upon an assumption unverified by previous experience, why, then I 
shall hesitate so long that at last, exhausted and trembling, and launching 
myself in a moment of despair, I miss my foothold ... (James, 1897, 
1912b:96-7) 
 
But Clifford explicitly acknowledges those  
 
many cases in which it is our duty to act upon probabilities, although the 
evidence is not such as to justify present belief; because it is precisely by 
such action, …that evidence is got which may justify future belief. So that we 
have no reason to fear lest a habit of conscientious inquiry should paralyse 
the actions of our daily life. (1877, 1879:189) 
 
This may not be exactly how James would describe the same adventure, but there 
seems little difference in principle between James’s ‘hesitate so long’ and ‘despair’ 
and Clifford’s ‘paralyse the actions of our daily life’. 
 
We will now change the first story. What if most people I meet for the first time end 
up not liking me? Should we then argue that, other things being equal, I would be 
morally wrong to believe the next new person I meet would like me because I 
would be believing against the evidence? But other things may not be equal: it 
might be morally better to trust both of us to defy the odds to make an eventual 
good relationship more likely. 
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It is unsurprising that interpersonal relations are a realm where moral imperatives 
of (say) trust and generosity can outweigh those concerning over-belief. 
Conflicting moral imperatives are not counter-examples to EP4. Belief and trust 
are different, but in the quintessentially moral domain of interpersonal relations an 
instance of believing could also be an instance of trusting. (Lying to the Gestapo 
may also be an instance of courage and of loyalty.32) 
 
All these cases could qualify as ‘positive thinking’ – where, in either an 
interpersonal or solitary context, what might otherwise count as over-belief 
encourages a desirable outcome. We are currently assuming such beliefs are 
possible, which we will evaluate later.33 But it is worth revisiting Adler’s story in 
Chapter 1 about Jim,34 who ‘cannot take himself to believe that he is handsome 
as a way to avoid depression’ (however ‘rational’) because ‘the lessened 
depression does not bear on the truth of whether he is handsome’ (2002:10). As 
‘handsomeness’ can be in the eye of the beholder we will substitute a purely 
descriptive belief:  
 
(3.6) It would be contradictory for me to think that (i) I believe I have £1 
million in the bank; (ii) my only reason to believe I have £1 million in 
the bank is that it will make me happy; and (iii) my happiness has no 
bearing on the truth of whether I have £1 million in the bank. 
 
For Adler, my condition of ‘full awareness’ makes me conceptually unable to 
believe (i) if I believe that (ii) and (iii) are also true, which (3.6) assumes they 





(3.6.1) It would not be contradictory for me to think that (i) I believe I have £1 
million in the bank; (ii) my only reason to believe I have £1 million in 




34 See p26. 
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the bank is that my bank statement has a credit balance of £1 million; 
and (iii) the £1 million credit balance on my bank statement does have 
a bearing on the truth of whether I have £1 million in the bank. 
 
In (3.6.1) the credit balance ((ii), (iii)) is evidence for (i) my belief about having £1 
million in the bank. In (3.6), my happiness is not evidence for the same belief. 
 
We can now apply this to ‘Do you like me or not?’: 
 
(3.6.2) Would it be contradictory for me to think that (i) I believe you will like 
me; (ii) my only reason to believe you will like me is that it will tend to 
make you like me; and (iii) this eventual tendency for you to like me 
has a bearing on the truth of whether you will like me? 
 
This is less cut-and-dried, hence the question format. It seems coherent for me to 
believe you will like me, and therefore for me to think I believe you will like me. It 
also seems coherent to have, as my only reason for believing you will like me, that 
this will tend to make you like me.35 Could your eventual tendency to like me have 
a bearing on the truth of whether you will like me? Surely yes, although perhaps 
not in Adler’s original sense. Does your eventual tendency to like me qualify as 
evidence for my belief that you will like me? That is questionable. It would certainly 
count as evidence supporting a belief like: 
 
(3.6.3) I believe that if I believe (if, that is, I succeed in making myself believe) 
you will like me, then this will tend to make you like me. 
 
(3.6.3) seems a paradigm case of ‘faith in a fact’. The word though is ‘faith’ not 
‘belief’. Our scope does not warrant a detailed analysis of the difference between 
the two, beyond acknowledging that ‘faith’ seems intuitively appropriate for beliefs 
like these which, successful or otherwise – and assuming they are possible – are 
intended as self-fulfilling. 
 
                                                   
 
35 Scott Aikin calls these ‘doxastically efficacious’ beliefs (2014:85). 
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Applying EP4 to these cases yields ostensibly sound results. In (3.6) it could be 
morally wrong to believe without evidence that I have £1 million in the bank: I 
could act on that belief and impoverish my family by spending money I do not 
have. The equivalent belief in (3.6.1) passes EP4 because here I do have 
sufficient evidence. Belief (i) in (3.6.2) that you will like me arguably also passes 
EP4. In theory we could consider belief (i) outside (3.6.2), when it might seem to 
fail EP4. But moral principles like EP4 apply to acts and omissions in their context. 
So we cannot remove the belief from its context without falsifying what we are 
using EP4 to evaluate. Key to that context is my reason – (ii) in (3.6.2), and spelt 
out in (3.6.3). 
 
We are seeing (3.6.3) as a belief for which we could have sufficient evidence, 
generalising from observations of human nature. When discussing involuntary 
beliefs36 we stressed that our principle (now EP4) applies to aspects of doxastic 
behaviour under voluntary control, even if we have only indirect control over the 
beliefs themselves. We will therefore use ‘voluntary belief’ as a convenient label 
for anything we can voluntarily do to increase the likelihood of having a belief we 
might want to have, including behaving as if we hold that belief. This should shield 
us from objections like Williams’s ‘if I could acquire a belief at will, I could acquire 
it whether it was true or not’ (1973:148). Since (3.6.3) would be a belief supported 
by sufficient evidence, my ‘voluntary belief’ that you will like me – (i) in (3.6.2) – 
would be permitted by EP4: because it would not be believing ‘on insufficient 
evidence’. And even if my experience is that most people I meet for the first time 
end up not liking me, EP4 would still permit my ‘voluntary belief’ that you will like 
me if there is an overriding moral imperative to make an eventual good 
relationship more likely. 
 
Our conclusion is that so far ‘faith in a fact’ cases, in both individual and 
interpersonal contexts, seem unproblematic for EP4. Chapter 4 will look at 
James’s apparent attempt to extend ‘faith in a fact’ to religious belief.37 For now 
we will briefly consider a related category of beliefs arising in interpersonal 
contexts but without qualifying as ‘self-fulfilling’ because although there is an 
                                                   
 
36 p76. 
37 See p165. 
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element of intention the intended outcome is not exactly the truth of the belief. 
 
Meiland (1980) describes scenarios which he thinks violate the ‘normative 
principle that one should believe whatever is backed by sufficient evidence’.38 We 
will cover the first and introduce the second here, but will need to postpone further 
discussion until Chapter 5.39 
 
Smith and Jones 
 
Smith and Jones have been ‘business partners and exceptionally close friends’ for 
many years. Jones now discovers ‘evidence which is sufficient (in anyone’s eyes) 
to justify the belief’ that Smith has been embezzling. But to protect both 
partnership and friendship Jones ‘decides not to believe that Smith stole money 
from the firm. In fact … he decides that Smith did not steal money from the firm’ 
(1980:15). This would not be a ‘self-fulfilling’ belief because Jones is not believing 
in Smith’s innocence to make it true that Smith is innocent, however much Jones 
might want that to be true. In a non-magical world that would be impossible 
anyway, despite positive belief helping you leap a chasm. Meiland tells the story in 
terms of ‘positive obligation’ rather than negative obligation or positive 
permission.40 But we can recast it in line with EP4: 
 
(3.7) {If anything is morally wrong, then} it is [morally] wrong of Jones to 
believe [knowingly or irresponsibly] that Smith is innocent of 
embezzlement on insufficient evidence {in the absence of any 
conflicting and overriding moral imperative} [except if the unjustified 
believing is outside Jones’s voluntary control]. 
   
We are taking it that if Jones has sufficient evidence of Jones’s guilt, then he has 
insufficient evidence of his innocence. 
 
This scenario should not undermine EP4. Jones would not be morally wrong to 
                                                   
 
38 Meiland’s scenarios may also qualify for treatment as ‘moral encroachment’ cases, which are 
outside our scope. See p295. 
39 p246ff. 
40 See p13. 
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believe Smith is innocent if there is a ‘conflicting and overriding moral imperative’ 
to protect the business and the friendship. Jones must choose between mutually 
exclusive options. Under some circumstances turning that kind of blind eye would 
be both immoral and illegal. 
 
We are assuming again that whatever Jones does or does not do in deciding ‘not 
to believe that Smith stole money from the firm’ is actually possible; and that 
‘voluntary belief’ and ‘voluntary disbelief’ refer to anything Jones can voluntarily do 
to increase the chances of having the belief he wants to have and of not having 
the belief he does not want to have, including behaving as if he holds the belief he 
wants to hold and does not hold the belief he does not want to hold. 
 
Husband and wife 
 
In Meiland’s second story a wife finds what ‘everyone would agree’ is sufficient 
evidence of her husband’s affair. But she believes the marriage is ‘basically sound 
and can weather this storm’. Knowing she ‘cannot conceal her suspicions’ she 
‘decides to believe’ her husband is faithful. Her husband ‘eventually stops seeing 
the other woman, becomes more attentive to [her], and the marriage continues 
stronger than ever for many years’. Again Meiland does not think the wife should 
believe her husband was guilty just because there was sufficient evidence. As in 
the previous scenario believing against the evidence allows the believer to 
preserve ‘some very precious things—a strong friendship, a good marriage’ 
(1980:16). 
 
With appropriate substitutions (3.7) becomes: 
 
(3.7.1) {If anything is morally wrong, then} it is [morally] wrong of the wife to 
believe [knowingly or irresponsibly] that the husband is innocent of 
infidelity on insufficient evidence {in the absence of any conflicting and 
overriding moral imperative} [except if the unjustified believing is 
outside the wife’s voluntary control]. 
 
The ‘conflicting and overriding moral imperative’ condition is perhaps even more 
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pertinent here, as the wife could have more at stake than Jones. But different 
circumstances could bring a different balance of imperatives. Assume it is 
conceptually and psychologically possible for the wife to ‘decide to believe’ her 
husband’s innocence, then factor in the redemptive power of forgiveness. In 
Meiland’s story she has blocked this path because there is nothing to forgive. 
 
This is not a moral judgment. Her decision may be correct. But change some of 
the details and blocking the path to forgiveness might be the morally wrong thing 
to do, with the wrong of over-belief not trumped by another imperative. It is not 
that over-belief is only morally wrong if it blocks forgiveness, but that (following 
Clifford, minus his universality) over-belief is morally wrong in itself to at least 
some degree but, like all moral wrongs, can be trumped by other imperatives.41 
 
Compare Meiland’s own verdict: 
 
I believe that she has a duty to her husband, arising from their commitment 
to one another over a long period, to require a stronger basis for belief in his 
treachery than does, say, [a] private detective. … It is not a matter of her 
having much evidence to the contrary. Instead, it is a matter of obligation 
toward someone to whom she has been very close. (1980:21) 
 
It is understandable that because of the high stakes of their 15-year marriage it 
would be (morally) correct for her carefully to weigh up every consideration and 
conflicting imperative, leading to a decision to believe in his innocence. But in a 
different context it might lead to a decision to confront him, perhaps to establish 
the truth about their relationship. Her decision to believe in his innocence seems 
to amount to a decision to see the evidence in a particular light, to weigh it so as 
to support the belief she ‘decides’ to have. 
 
Talk of ‘stakes’ anticipates a discussion in Chapter 5 about whether such 
                                                   
 
41 ‘Think here of the spouse who, desperate to save a marriage, is willfully blind to all evidence of 
betrayal. Though belief in the straying spouse’s fidelity may be instrumental to keeping the marriage 
alive, self-deception of this sort seems hardly to be a cognitive virtue.’ (Taylor, 2007:151) 
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considerations can influence whether a belief is justified.42 We will therefore 
postpone further treatment until then, other than identifying another pertinent 
thread, that of the wife’s (also ‘high stakes’) priority to do what she can to ensure 
their ‘basically sound’ marriage will ‘weather this storm’: ‘her desire to continue the 
marriage turns out to be one of the factors that should influence what she does 
believe’ (1980:22). In this respect her situation seems broadly similar to Jones’s: 
intentionally doing whatever she can to increase the likelihood of having the belief 
she wants to have, including behaving as if she believes what she wants to 
believe. 
 
So far neither of Meiland’s cases seems problematic for EP4, principally because 
of its ‘conflicting and overriding moral imperative’ qualification. 
 
This chapter’s aim was to assess apparent objections to our principle, and if 
necessary modify it to accommodate them. We will resume discussion of religious 
belief and the criterion of sufficient evidence in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 
respectively, but apart from that we have covered what seem the major potential 
counter-examples, and finalised the wording of EP4. For completeness we will 
now briefly consider a few types of belief which seem to present less weighty 
challenges. The first two provide opportunities to clarify EP4’s scope. The rest are 
potential objections that principles like EP4 and CP are too strict. 
 
3.5 Personal preferences 
 
Haack’s critique of CP includes an ‘apparently harmless unjustified belief’ (1997, 
2001:27): ‘the apples I just selected are the best in the supermarket’ (1997, 
2001:24). 
 
If I take a bite from a red apple followed by a bite from a green apple and believe 
the red is better than the green, would I need ‘sufficient evidence’ to justify my 
belief? Perhaps I believed the ‘better’ apple ranked, or would rank, higher when 
tested against independently testable criteria. If so that could qualify as an 
                                                   
 
42 p240ff. See also p295. 
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‘apparently harmless over-belief’, discussed later.43 But we will assume ‘better’ 
and ‘best’ express purely personal preferences, regardless of any objective score 
or what anyone else thinks. It is not obvious how a belief like that can fall under 
EP4, or how it could possibly fail EP4, because in a purely personal preference it 
may be impossible to separate ‘evidence’ from ‘belief’. Preferring red to green is 
both ‘belief’ and ‘evidence’. 
 
If a purely personal preference counts as a belief it would also arguably count as 
‘prescriptive’: not morally prescriptive, but rationally or prudentially binding on my 
choices.44 It would be irrational for me to choose green over red, unless in 
obedience to an imperative which I or someone else saw as overriding – to deny 
myself pleasure, or save the better apples for another person. 
 
This kind of personal preference would not qualify as the kind of descriptive belief 
which is EP4’s intended scope. The same applies to the next category. 
 
3.6 Aesthetic beliefs 
 
As with personal preferences, and for similar reasons, EP4 should exclude 
evaluative aesthetic beliefs.45 This does not mean excluding all beliefs about art. 
The belief that Degas was influenced by Japanese prints is a straightforward 
descriptive belief supportable by evidence. 
 
But ‘Beethoven was the greatest composer of all time’ is not purely descriptive 
even though it might rest on one or more descriptive beliefs. Someone might 
believe Beethoven the greatest because of his orchestral ingenuity and his role in 
the transition from classical to romantic composition, both of which could be 
supported by evidence. But why this amounts to being the ‘greatest composer of 
all time’ is not something evidence could either support or falsify. 
 
Arthur, who believes Beethoven was the greatest, would not be contradicting 
                                                   
 
43 p121ff. 
44 This is different from a hypothetical prescriptive belief: see p44ff. 
45 As suggested earlier p14. 
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Beryl, who believes Wagner was. But Charles, who believes humans and 
chimpanzees last shared a common ancestor 4-6 million years ago, would be 
contradicting Diana, who does not believe humans and chimpanzees have a 
common ancestor. 
 
Aesthetic beliefs represent a clear category easily distinguishable from the kind of 
descriptive beliefs EP4 applies to. The exclusion is not arbitrary and EP4 loses 
nothing by it. We will not however take the same line with this chapter’s remaining 
beliefs. 
 
3.7 Apparently harmless over-beliefs 
 
We can tweak Haack’s ‘apparently harmless unjustified belief’ to make it purely 
descriptive: 
 
(3.8) The apples I just selected are the freshest in the supermarket. 
 
‘Freshest’ here does not express personal taste but refers purely to the elapsed 
time from when they were picked. It is therefore the belief that no other apples in 
the supermarket were picked later than the ones the customer selected. In some 
circumstances ‘there may be no great harm done by the mere belief’ (1877, 
1879:185). But in other circumstances there might be. A friend hearing me assert 
(3.8) and assuming I would not have believed this without adequate evidence46 
could be led to accuse the supermarket of misleading its customers, because he 
compared the date on my apples with the date on others I did not select. To count 
as a potential counter-example to EP4 the over-belief must be actually harmless, 
not just apparently harmless. Clifford does not think there are any such, however 
‘trifling and fragmentary’47 they may seem: 
 
Nor is that truly a belief at all which has not some influence upon the actions 
of him who holds it. (1877, 1879:181) 
 
                                                   
 
46 See p23. 
47 See p15. 
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In Chapter 1 we discussed Haack’s objection that the ‘risk of risk of harm’ (1997, 
2001:27) I run by making myself credulous is too remote for moral blame.48 We 
countered this with Clifford’s insistence that over-belief is insidious because like a 
‘plague’ (1877, 1879:184) it can generate more of itself. We cannot know how 
harmless an individual over-belief is until all its direct and indirect consequences 
have materialised. This could stretch into the indefinite future, hence ‘however 
seemingly trivial the belief, and however obscure the believer … we have no 
choice but to extend our judgment to all cases of belief whatever’ (1877, 
1879:182). 
 
So the category of apparently harmless over-beliefs does not seem to challenge 
EP4 because it is unlikely we could know in advance if an apparently harmless 
over-belief is really harmless. Adopting a principle like EP4 would therefore seem 
wise. If, in any concrete instance, we have reason to think it highly probable that a 
particular over-belief will prove harmless in the long run, then a ‘conflicting and 
overriding moral imperative’ could well tip the balance the other way. But this 
would not undermine EP4.49 
 
We will now consider potentially the most extreme variant of ‘apparently harmless 
belief’: where, assuming this is possible, the belief is completely private. 
 
3.8 Private over-beliefs 
 
For this category we must remove any risk to a third party. To succeed however I 
might have to make my every belief private, or follow different guidelines for 
private and what we will call ‘active’ beliefs. 
 
An ‘active’ belief need not be asserted or voiced, and the believer ‘may never 
have occasion to exhibit it in outward acts’ (Clifford, 1877, 1879:185); but it (or 
something about how it was acquired) would or could influence the believer’s 
behaviour (for example in the acquisition of other beliefs), which could then have 
                                                   
 
48 p33. 
49 We are also assuming throughout that voluntary belief is possible, in the sense that ‘voluntary 
belief’ refers to all our voluntary acts and omissions aimed at increasing the chances of having the 
particular belief. 
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some direct or indirect impact on others, perhaps by influencing their own doxastic 
behaviour. Clifford thinks all our beliefs are active in this sense: 
 
If a belief is not realized immediately in open deeds, it is stored up for the 
guidance of the future. It goes to make a part of that aggregate of beliefs 
which is the link between sensation and action at every moment of all our 
lives, and which is so organized and compacted together that no part of it 
can be isolated from the rest, but every new addition modifies the structure 
of the whole. (1877, 1879:181) 
 
No belief like this is 
 
a private matter which concerns [the believer] alone. Our lives are guided by 
that general conception of the course of things which has been created by 
society for social purposes. Our words, our phrases, our forms and 
processes and modes of thought, are common property, fashioned and 
perfected from age to age… (1877, 1879:181) 
 
A private over-belief by contrast must have no possible impact outside the believer 
himself. 
 
We will explore the options systematically to see if any meaningful category of 
private over-beliefs is problematic for EP4. 
 
First consider Robinson Crusoe on his island, but with no Friday and no possibility 
of rescue. We can discount this scenario as EP4 presupposes a context of social 
and moral life. 
 
In our second and third scenarios the agent lives within a community and has, 
respectively, either only private beliefs or a combination of private and active 
beliefs. The former would effectively exclude the agent from social interaction. He 
would be unable to communicate his beliefs, or communicate anything which 
derived directly or indirectly from his beliefs. Nor could anyone else know anything 
about any of his beliefs, about how he acquired them and what he based them on. 
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This would be another scenario ruled out by our assumed context of social and 
moral life. 
 
In the third scenario the agent has both private and active beliefs, but fleshing this 
out presents difficulties. Beliefs where I could relax EP4 would not only be private, 
but could have no role in supporting any active beliefs. I would need separate 
networks of beliefs, because individual beliefs rarely if ever stand alone but are 
supported by other beliefs, which are in turn supported by further beliefs, and so 
on.50 If an agent has a network of beliefs which he assumes are justified, and then 
finds one or more of his beliefs are unjustified, entire sections of the network could 
become suspect until the ‘damage’ is ‘repaired’ by removing and, if necessary, 
replacing the unjustified beliefs and/or restructuring the network. 
 
For private over-belief to represent a meaningful counter-example to, or legitimate 
exclusion from, EP4, the agent would need to have (and be aware of having, and 
be able to maintain), separate belief networks to ensure an active belief never 
depended on a private belief, and no private belief ever contaminated an active 
belief. 
 
But it is not just the private beliefs themselves which must not contaminate the 
active beliefs. Clifford’s principal target is the agent’s doxastic behaviour, the good 
or bad habits he cultivates as he acquires and sustains his beliefs. For private 
over-beliefs to evade EP4 the agent would need to apply consistently different 
criteria for acquiring and holding the two sets of beliefs. Even if this were possible, 
it is arguable whether the two sets of beliefs would qualify as the same kind of 
thing, which they would need to for private over-beliefs to represent a counter-
example to EP4. Otherwise one could argue they would be outside EP4’s 
intended domain of application because they are something significantly different. 
 
We should also remember EP4 is intended as a moral principle for agents to 
follow: something agents could reasonably apply in practical circumstances. It is 
hard to see how it could be practical for an agent to keep his private beliefs, and 
                                                   
 
50 See p81ff. 
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his criteria and methodologies for managing them, permanently insulated from all 
his other networked beliefs and doxastic behaviour. This requirement is imposed 
not by EP4 but by the attempt to articulate private over-beliefs as a counter-
example to EP4. 
 
The category of private beliefs was defined to evade Clifford’s arguments, which 
presuppose a context of socially interactive ‘normality’ where people have, share 
and assert beliefs among other interactions with different types and degrees of 
moral significance. Our conclusion is that, even assuming a possible mode of 
‘believing’ disconnected from the rest of social interaction, the category of private 
over-beliefs could claim at best a hollow victory. They would evade culpability only 
by being trapped inside a bubble of existence devoid of moral value. 
 
Chapter 4 will revisit private over-beliefs in the context of religious belief.51 The 
present chapter’s final category is of cases where although we have neglected our 
doxastic duties the resultant beliefs are actually true. 
 
3.9 Unjustified true beliefs 
 
We have already encountered this kind of belief under Testimony,52 and in a 
variant of Clifford’s opening parable:53 
 
[S]uppose that the ship was not unsound after all; that she made her voyage 
safely, and many others after it. Will that diminish the guilt of her owner? Not 
one jot. When an action is once done, it is right or wrong for ever; no 
accidental failure of its good or evil fruits can possibly alter that. The man 
would not have been innocent, he would only have been not found out. The 
question of right or wrong has to do with the origin of his belief, not the 
matter of it; … not whether it turned out to be true or false, but whether he 
had a right to believe on such evidence as was before him. (1877, 1879:178)  
 
                                                   
 
51 Eg p154. 
52 p91. 
53 p14. 
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Clifford’s ship-owner let himself ‘believe for unworthy reasons’, without ‘doubting’ 
or ‘judicially and fairly weighing evidence’. Although ostensibly what makes an 
over-belief undesirable is the consequences of its falsity if it is false, all a believer 
can control is cultivating good doxastic habits and avoiding bad ones – for their 
direct and indirect effects on himself and others. If he is sometimes lucky because, 
through no contribution or care on his part, his belief ‘may be true after all’ (1877, 
1879:185), that is irrelevant. He could apply the same policy in the future and 
sooner or later believe something false with unfortunate consequences. And he 
would be guilty, in however small a way, of ‘doing this great wrong towards Man, 
that I make myself credulous’. 
 
There is no obvious reason to regard these over-beliefs as problematic for EP4, or 
exempt them from it. We will revisit them in Chapter 4,54 as James considers them 




This chapter has discussed types of belief which, when an evidence principle is 
applied to them, could appear to give challenging results. Some, like involuntary 
and foundational beliefs, could threaten to derail the principle. Or if beliefs about 
the past or future, beliefs based on testimony, and ‘positive’ believing linked to 
personal or interpersonal aspiration are all ruled out, legitimate beliefs could shrink 
to a paltry residue. 
 
But far from threatening our principle, these challenges have helped clarify its 
scope and spirit, evolving it into its final version as EP4. In the process five key 
assumptions (3.9.1–5 below) have emerged or reappeared, helping to flesh out 
the intention behind EP4. We have used different combinations of these 
assumptions when dealing with most of the challenges. The exceptions are 
personal preferences and aesthetic beliefs, which we placed outside EP4’s 
intended scope. 
 
                                                   
 
54 Eg p143 footnote. 
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(3.9.1) EP4 is a moral principle. This is implicit in CP and explicit in how 
Clifford presents CP. EP4 is furthermore purely a self-standing moral 
principle applying to agents’ doxastic behaviour. It is not separately 
intended as a comprehensive criterion of epistemic justification derived 
from moral considerations. Assumptions (3.9.2–4) either follow from 
this or unpack more of how EP4 behaves as a moral principle. 
 
(3.9.2) EP4’s principal target is our voluntary acts and omissions relating to 
how we acquire, evaluate, hold and reject our beliefs, even if these 
only indirectly influence what beliefs we end up with. This also 
parallels how Clifford presents CP. 
 
(3.9.3) EP4 presupposes a moral context which is inherently social. This is 
also implicit in CP as Clifford’s principal rationale is the social and 
moral consequences of what he sees as good and bad doxastic 
habits. The strength of this assumption for EP4 is that beliefs and 
doxastic behaviours which social and moral life depend on cannot be 
illegitimate. 
 
(3.9.4) A moral principle like EP4 is not absolute in relation to other moral 
principles: at times it will be right to transgress EP4 if another 
imperative overrides it. We see this as implicit in what a moral principle 
is, although Clifford does not seem to share it. 
 
(3.9.5) Beliefs are not atomic but embedded in interconnected networks of 
other beliefs. This is clearly related to (3.9.1): EP4 primarily targets the 
agent’s doxastic behaviour, and it seems a fact about human believing 
that an agent’s beliefs are interconnected in networks rather than 
atomic. However (3.9.5) is identified as an independent assumption. 
 
In some of his anti-sceptical defences, for example when justifying ‘the 
assumption that nature is practically uniform as far as we are concerned’ Clifford 
employs the conception of belief as a guide to action: belief is ‘no guide to action 
until it takes to itself’ what ‘goes beyond experience’, which means ‘assuming that 
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what we do not know is like what we do know’ (1877, 1879:206). In respect of EP4 
we need not commit to an independent assumption that belief is a guide to action, 
although it would seem a plausible consequence of (3.9.3). Social and moral life 
would be impossible if beliefs could not serve as guides to action. 
 
In no belief category reviewed in this chapter have we yet found a reason to think 
EP4 unsound. It permits the beliefs we would expect it to permit and forbids the 
beliefs we would expect it to forbid. But we have not yet considered religious 
belief, a key battleground between Clifford and James. Even if Clifford does not 
use CP to undermine religious belief explicitly,55 James presents ‘The Will to 
Believe’ as a counterattacking ‘defence of our right to adopt a believing attitude in 
religious matters’ (1896, 2000:198). Reason enough to devote the entire next 
chapter. 
 
                                                   
 
55 It is worth noting however that Clifford originally presented ‘The Ethics of Belief’ (1877, 1879) in 
April 1876 as an address to the Metaphysical Society, of which he was a member. The context was 
an extended debate involving James Fitzjames Stephen, Thomas Huxley, Shadworth Hodgson and 
others about belief in miracles and other supernatural events (Madigan, 2009:73). The Metaphysical 
Society was originally set up out of a concern shared by many of its members (but not Clifford 
himself) that declining religious faith among the educated elite could lead to general deterioration in 
social morality (Madigan, 2009:1). 
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We have considered several challenges to an evidence principle covering 
descriptive beliefs. Most we rejected. A few caused us to adjust it towards its 
eventual form as EP4. Religious belief is different though. While James sees it as 
reason to reject an evidence principle, a freethinker might see it as what an 
evidence principle is there for.1 
 
This chapter has therefore two objectives. One is to see if anything in James’s 
defence of religious belief threatens EP4. There is no intention to reconcile 
James’s position with EP4, more to see if any of his arguments might persuade us 
that it would be more reasonable to allow a belief which EP4 might disallow. The 
other objective is to identify potential advantages, specifically in relation to 
religious belief, of adopting a principle like EP4. Pursuing both we will unpack 
ramifications of James’s ‘justification of faith’ (1896, 2000:198), both in themselves 
and in contrast with EP4. We aim to show that EP4 should survive any Jamesian 
counter-attack, and that if there is a sound Jamesian position on religious belief 
which is incompatible with EP4, then the choice between them is ultimately a 
moral one. 
 
We first evaluate the combined descriptive and prescriptive content of a typical 
religious belief against EP42 (introducing the first potential benefit of EP43) and 
then review James’s conceptual framework,4 including his treatment of Pascal’s 
Wager.5 Next we analyse James’s own ‘religious hypothesis’ (1896, 2000:214)6 
into descriptive and prescriptive components. Taken together these construct a 
‘genuine option’7 which James sees each individual having the right to decide for 
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herself according to her own risk appetite for ‘knowing the truth’ versus ‘avoiding 
error’.8 
 
We then elicit further potential negative consequences of the kind of religious 
over-belief James would allow,9 and consider if the risk of these can at least 
sometimes (as James would insist) or never (as Clifford would maintain) impact 
just the believer herself. EP4 does not outlaw religious over-belief completely. It 
permits it if it is the only route to a net moral good; but it would then be obligatory. 
James though allows someone either to believe or disbelieve an undecidable 
hypothesis within a ‘genuine option’. We ask if this would permit someone to cede 
her moral sovereignty to God,10 and whether this could contradict James’s own 
ethic of tolerance. 
  
We then offer a rather more generous interpretation of James’s overall position11 
and suggest two ‘Jamesian’ moral principles as potential alternatives to EP4.12 A 
Jamesian and a proponent of EP4 might well make similar judgments in practice;13 
but a difference of principle still remains, reflecting Jamesian liberalism versus 
Cliffordian social protectionism, although these may prove difficult to disentangle 
in practice. 
 
We conclude that EP4 has little to fear from James’s ‘justification of faith’.14 At 
most it offers a contrasting moral individualism which seems hard to justify as a 
reason for rejecting EP4. 
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4.2 Compound structure of religious belief 
 
EP4 and prescriptive beliefs 
 
Chapter 2 concluded that applying an evidence principle to prescriptive beliefs 
seems problematic. That might suggest EP4 would permit any prescriptive belief. 
But other constraints apply. Combinations of prescriptive and descriptive beliefs 
should be consistent, so it would be incoherent to believe you must spin straw into 
gold if your descriptive beliefs say this is impossible. 
 
Our prescriptive beliefs should also be mutually consistent. It would be wrong to 
believe ‘you should not lie’ and ‘you need not tell the truth’ simultaneously. So 
although EP4 only covers descriptive beliefs that does not make it powerless 
against every prescriptive belief. As EP4 is itself prescriptive it cannot be held 
alongside another incompatible prescriptive belief. Holding EP4 would for example 
rule out thinking one should believe God exists even without sufficient evidence or 
a conflicting and overriding moral imperative. As this is a plausible reading of the 
First Commandment, EP4 would conflict with at least some imperatives 
associated with religious belief, and we would be faced with a moral choice as to 
which to adopt. With all this in mind, we will now consider the structure of religious 
belief. 
 
Descriptive and prescriptive components 
 
This chapter will eventually articulate three potential benefits, specifically in 
relation to religious belief, of adopting a principle like EP4.15 All three relate to how 
components of religious belief can link together. Below is a familiar kind of 
compound religious belief which James would seem to allow, CP would probably 
disallow, and EP4 would only permit under strict conditions. It has both descriptive 
and prescriptive content: 
 
(4.1.1) God exists. [Descriptive.] 
 
                                                   
 
15 See p137, p178 and p181 respectively. 
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(4.1.2) God is the source of morality. [Descriptive, strictly speaking, if only as 
a facet of ‘God is the creator of all things’.16 It could however be 
considered to have a prescriptive implication, separated out as (4.1.3) 
below.] 
 
(4.1.3) What God commands must be obeyed. [Prescriptive.] 
 
This might seem the obvious point that for many people religious belief is 
associated with specific moral views. But its very obviousness can disguise the 
unique ways these components can link together, which are significant for a 
principle like EP4. 
 
On the face of it the purely descriptive content – ostensibly the only part relevant 
to EP4 – appears harmless. Why should someone’s belief in God’s existence 
(4.1.1) matter? Even James saw the ‘debate between materialism and theism’ as 
‘idle and insignificant’ (1907, 2000:47) – when we look backwards: 
 
It makes not a single jot of difference so far as the past of the world goes, 
whether we deem it to have been the work of matter or … a divine spirit[.] 
(1907, 2000:45) 
 
It is only when we ask ‘what does the world promise?’ (1907, 2000:48) that theism 
and materialism point to ‘wholly different outlooks of experience’ (1907, 2000:49). 
For James belief in God satisfies the need for an ‘eternal moral order’ (1907, 
2000:50), which we can choose whether or not to align ourselves to by ‘getting 
upon the winning side’ (1896, 2000:216). What matters is the impact on 
behaviour; and the prescriptive content of religious belief is what directs people’s 
actions and shapes how they treat each other. 
 
Believing (4.1.1) does not necessarily mean believing (4.1.2) and/or (4.1.3).17 Kant 
for example thought the route to the moral law was conceptually independent of 
religious belief but that faith in God represents a ‘need of reason in its practical 
                                                   
 
16 See p135. 
17 See however ‘Reading (ii)’ below. 
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use’ to ‘presuppose the existence of God not only if we want to judge, but because 
we have to judge’ (1786:12). But Kant notwithstanding, (4.1.2–3) together 
describe a frequent and familiar divine attribute. If you believe a God exists (4.1.1) 
whose imperatives (4.1.2) must be obeyed (4.1.3) then you believe something 
about what is and something about what ought to be. The parts appear logically 
distinct, but someone holding compound belief (4.1.1–3) cannot stop believing one 




(4.1.1BJ) Boris Johnson is the UK prime minister. 
 
(4.1.2BJ) We should take seriously everything Boris Johnson says. 
 
(4.1.1BJ) and (4.1.2BJ) can be believed or disbelieved independently of each 
other. But believing (4.1.1) without (4.1.2–3) would be believing in a different kind 
of God than someone who believed all of (4.1.1–3) would believe in. And 
someone believing (4.1.3) without (4.1.1) – assuming this were possible – would 
not be bound the way someone believing all of (4.1.1–3) would be. 
 
There are also multiple ways of believing (4.1.1–3), which to an extent reflect 
different perceived distributions of contingent and necessary relationships 
between their various components. Consider for example two readings of Exodus. 
Reading (i)18 sees God as a character in an account which could be either 
historical or fictional. In a sequence of purely contingent story elements God 
speaks to Moses, inflicts plagues on Egypt, then gives Moses tablets of stone on 
Mount Sinai. In theory God could have chosen not to deliver the Commandments, 
or picked a different time and place. Reading (ii) by contrast sees the time-
structured Exodus narrative as an imperfect attempt at articulating God’s timeless 
features: the Decalogue’s prescriptivity would be an essential aspect of what 
                                                   
 
18 We will be considering a number of sets of options, each with its own labeling: readings (i) and (ii); 
believers A and B; and views α, β, γ and δ. This is to indicate that they are separate sets, although 
some will overlap: for example believer B may have view δ. 
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someone who believes in God believes is true of God, including God’s role in how 
morality enters the world. 
 
Now consider extremes of belief in relation to each reading. Believer A subscribes 
to (i) and not (ii). She also believes the Exodus events actually happened, that 
God existed then and exists now (4.1.1). Her belief involves specific moral 
imperatives, and the way those imperatives connect with her belief in God (4.1.1) 
can be broken into steps. She believes her God is the God who spoke to Moses, 
and she has decided (implicitly or explicitly) to obey this God. She sees herself 
bound by the Ten Commandments (4.1.3) because her God gave them to Moses 
(4.1.2). 
 
Believer B subscribes to reading (ii) and not (i). She sees the Exodus story as an 
allegory which is literally false. Key to her conception of God is that the descriptive 
aspects – (4.1.1), (4.1.2?) – and prescriptive aspects – (4.1.2?), (4.1.3) – are 
inseparable. She believes God’s role as the source of morality and the binding 
nature of God’s commandments are necessary attributes of God. She believes 
God exists, either necessarily or contingently.19 
 
We will now consider different views of how (4.1.2) and (4.1.3) relate together. 
 
View α might see (4.1.2–3) as equivalent to: 
 
(4.1.2) God is the source of morality… [Premise] 
 
(4.1.5) …therefore God’s commands must be obeyed. [Conclusion] 
 
View β though might think a step is missing between (4.1.2) and (4.1.5): 
 
(4.1.4) If X is the source of morality, then whatever X commands must be 
obeyed. [Additional premise] 
 
                                                   
 
19 Whether B believes God’s existence is necessary or contingent is not relevant in this context. 
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View α would see (4.1.4) as self-evident and redundant. Perhaps α thinks that if 
God is omniscient and omnipotent and the creator of all things, therefore God 
created morality, because ‘all things’ must include morality. Therefore God is the 
source of morality. Therefore God’s commands must be obeyed. This gets from 
an ‘is’ to an ‘ought’ apparently seamlessly. 
 
The step β thinks is missing (and needing independent assent) is where you place 
yourself in God’s thrall (4.1.4). Just because God is omnipotent and the creator of 
all things does not mean you must be in God’s power. Or β might reject the idea of 
an external ‘creator of morality’, because if morality is something you must obey, it 
cannot be something an entity independent of you can create. 
 
View γ might however be that (4.1.2–3) together indicate an ‘institutional’ context 
similar to that of ‘promising’ in Searle’s (1964:44) attempt to derive an ‘ought’ from 
an ‘is’. This could be summarised as: 
 
(4.2.1) Jones promised to pay Smith 5 dollars. [Searle’s original (2)] 
 
(4.2.3) [Therefore] Jones ought to pay Smith 5 dollars. [Searle’s original (5)] 
 
Searle adds a number of intervening premises, but the key one, equivalent to 
(4.1.4), is ‘tautological’ and added ‘for the purpose of formal neatness’ (1964:46): 
 
(4.2.2) All promises are acts of placing oneself under (undertaking) an 
obligation to do the thing promised. [Searle’s original (2a)] 
 
The institution of promising (4.2.2) legitimises the move from ‘is’ (4.2.1) to ‘ought’ 
(4.2.3). Jones and Smith are interacting within a social context where promising is 
an available transaction. On that assumption (among others), because Jones 
promised to pay Smith $5 (4.2.1) we can derive the prescription (4.2.3) that Jones 
ought to pay Smith $5. 
 
View γ might therefore see God as an entity playing a quasi-‘institutional’ role in 
relation to other entities (particularly conscious ones with free will). But, assuming 
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(4.1.2–3) alone do not imply the God’s existence, then (4.1.2–3) confer no 
obligation either, as without (4.1.1) the God, with its role and its powers, remains 
just a possibility. Like (4.2.1), (4.1.1) calls the obligation into existence. Combined 
with the assumed is-to-ought transition of (4.1.2–3), (4.1.1) generates binding 
prescriptive content from the descriptive assertion that a specifically defined entity 
exists. Sincerely asserting (or believing) the God exists (4.1.1), where ‘God’ 
incorporates the content of (4.1.2–3), is a commitment which parallels the 
commitment Jones makes in (4.2.1), and with similar implications for obligation. 
 
But just as lying to the Gestapo can be simultaneously an instance of lying, of 
courage, and of loyalty,20 believing a God exists (4.1.1) – with ‘God’ characterised 
by (4.1.2–3) – can be both a belief about what is the case and a commitment 
implying obligation. 
 
Yet another view (δ) about how (4.1.2) and (4.1.3) relate could be that of believer 
B, for whom the kind of analysis just offered is anathema as it falsifies the essence 
of the God she believes exists (4.1.1). View δ might see both (4.1.2) and (4.1.3) 
contained within, and therefore entailed by, (4.1.1). How true or even coherent 
such a view might be is less important than whether there are people who hold it 
(apparently yes); and whether it qualifies for the kind of defence James will 
provide. 
 
There are doubtless other views – perhaps as many as there are believers holding 
versions of (4.1.1–3). Whatever their individual differences, the structured 
combination of (4.1.1–3) can have significant practical and moral consequences. 
Adding content about what the God forbids and demands – that, say, believers 
should cede their moral sovereignty to the God and persecute blasphemers – can 
lead to repression. On its own the belief that the God demands persecution of 
blasphemers would be descriptive, but combined with (4.1.1–3) generates the 
prescriptive belief that blasphemers should be persecuted. 
 
                                                   
 
20 See p113. 
   137 
This brings us to the first potential benefit of a principle like EP4 in relation to 
religious belief: that it usefully delegitimises the kind of religious belief which 
includes repressive content and is logically structured to make it binding, 
regardless of whether the believer herself is aware of this. It need only target the 
descriptive component, because that is where the problem lies. The issue is not 
the different prescriptive beliefs which different people and communities hold, but 
the descriptive beliefs about the existence of entities which ordain those 
imperatives and make them binding. 
 
This might seem counter-intuitive, as the commandment to persecute 
blasphemers is what is repressive. Without that being held and acted on 
blasphemers will escape persecution. But the danger is not just of holding an 
imperative which others might condemn. Moral persuasion will be appropriate and 
necessary as long as societies survive. The specific danger is of holding the 
imperative as an ineluctable commandment from a being believed to be uniquely 
responsible for creating and sustaining all there is, including those so blind they do 
not share the belief. Moral persuasion can struggle against beliefs about such 
‘great cosmical matters’ (James, 1896, 2000:214). 
 
This would be a reason to advocate an evidence principle applied to descriptive 
beliefs,21 demanding evidence that the God-as-source-of-moral-law exists. In the 
absence of evidence, or of any conflicting and overriding moral imperatives, it 
would be morally wrong to believe the God exists. The God could not itself be the 
source of those other imperatives, at least in respect of the moral choice 
concerning the descriptive belief in its existence. Even if the God existed and was 
the source of all moral imperatives, EP4 would withhold the right to believe, 
without sufficient evidence, either in its existence or that it was the source of all 
moral imperatives.22 
 
                                                   
 
21 See p41. 
22 If God did exist, and was the source of all moral imperatives, then assuming EP4 was itself a 
sound moral imperative, God would be its source. It could be considered illogical for a God to have 
ordained EP4. If so, then the existence of God as source of moral imperatives might rule out EP4. 
But we do not need to know the source of a moral imperative in order to apply it or consider 
ourselves bound by it. So if we have no reason to reject EP4 and no evidence for God’s existence, 
we would be free to hold EP4. 
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The promotion of EP4 here in respect of religious belief is therefore supported by 
empirical claims. These include the more general ones Clifford uses to support 
CP, articulated earlier as (1.1.1–13).23 In the case of EP4 and religious belief we 
would add further claims relating to our understanding of pertinent is–ought 
transitions, and our observation of them in practice. Above we sketched a number 
of different views (α–δ) as to how the transition from descriptive belief (4.1.1–2) to 
prescriptive belief (4.1.3) proceeds. Which if any of these is ‘correct’ is less 
important than the fact that a variety of such views are actually held; and none 
seems obviously incoherent at first sight, especially given the particular content of 
descriptive religious belief, rich in superlatives, universals and supernatural 
elements: 
 
A religious community can be defined in terms of the grip of imaginings that 
sprinkle fairy dust on the transition between “is” and “ought,” ensuring 
communal support for whatever transition has become salient, enforcing 
uniformity, and making dissent difficult or impossible. (Blackburn, 2007:189) 
 
A critic might now remind us of ‘sophisticated’ religious believers for whom, say, 
God cannot ordain immoral commands, or for whom God provides the motivation 
and/or obligation to adhere to moral imperatives, but not necessarily those moral 
imperatives themselves – or at least not single-handedly. While an 
unsophisticated believer may cling to commandments from ancient texts and/or 
disseminated by priests claiming a direct line to their shared God, a sophisticated 
believer might see the imperative of working out what God commands as both far 
more difficult and far more important. 
 
But the sophisticated believer is still answerable to Clifford’s charge about the 
‘greater and wider evil’ which ‘arises when the credulous character is maintained 
and supported’, the risk to society being that it should ‘become credulous, and 
lose the habit of testing things and inquiring into them; for then it must sink back 
into savagery’ (1877, 1879:185-6).24 In a social context sophisticated over-belief 
risks encouraging unsophisticated over-belief, and the content of sophisticated 
                                                   
 
23 See pp18–21. 
24 See pp14–17. 
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over-belief cannot exculpate it – unless that content is such that the intended 
result of the over-belief provides the kind of conflicting and overriding moral 
imperative which EP4 accommodates.25 
 
In this section we have made a case for EP4 specifically in relation to religious 
belief by arguing as follows: 
 
(i) Religious belief typically contains both descriptive and prescriptive 
content. 
 
(ii) The two types of content are linked in ways particularly significant for 
an evidence principle like EP4: 
 
(a) The descriptive beliefs make the prescriptive beliefs binding. 
Delegitimising the descriptive beliefs would undermine the 
prescriptive beliefs. 
 
This assumes the believer holds the entire relevant set of 
descriptive and prescriptive beliefs. A further feature of the 
coupling between the two types of component can make this 
more likely: 
 
(b) The cosmic and/or cosmological content of some of the 
descriptive claims can obscure the transition between descriptive 
and prescriptive components,26 articulated here as (4.1.1–3). 
The transition can then lend itself to a variety of interpretations, 
including direct entailment. 
 
(iii) In view of the combined descriptive and prescriptive components and 
the coupling between them, a principle like EP4 targeting the 
                                                   
 
25 We will eventually (p185ff) make a similar point in relation to James, whose own ‘religious 
hypothesis’ can be analysed into descriptive and prescriptive content (p166ff). 
26 See also p176ff. 
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descriptive content would be beneficial against potential negative 
consequences of the prescriptive content.  
 
Conclusion (iii) does not outlaw religious belief entirely. In a specific context 
believing in a God might, not necessarily for Kantian reasons,27 bring otherwise 
unachievable net moral benefits. It would then be morally right (therefore 
permissible) to believe in the God because this would trump the wrong of over-
belief. But the onus would be on the believer to establish independently that this 
was so. The God’s commandments could not justify her decision. 
 
With all this in place we will now evaluate James’s counterattack against CP in 
relation to EP4. We will see if he can legitimise religious over-belief even in the 
absence of independent moral justification, and whether his own ‘religious 
hypothesis’ avoids the negative consequences we have begun to identify. We 
start by discussing his belief framework, including his treatment of Pascal’s 
Wager. 
 
4.3 James’s belief framework 
 
Contrast with Clifford 
 
The central thesis of James’s ‘The Will to Believe’ is that 
 
W2B Our passional nature not only lawfully may, but must, decide an option 
between propositions, whenever it is a genuine option that cannot 
by its nature be decided on intellectual grounds; for to say, under 
such circumstances, “Do not decide, but leave the question open,” is 
itself a passional decision,–just like deciding yes or no,–and is 
attended with the same risk of losing the truth. [Emphasis added] 
(1896, 2000:205) 
 
Although W2B covers any ‘genuine option’, religious belief is James’s main focus. 
In W2B we see an ethics of belief in clear conflict with CP and EP4, as there are 
                                                   
 
27 p132. 
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kinds of belief which both would outlaw but James would permit. As previously 
mentioned however28 we aim to show that if there is a sound Jamesian position on 
religious belief which is incompatible with EP4, any choice between them would 
ultimately be a moral one. 
 
Clifford and EP4 would deem an individual morally wrong, other things being 
equal, to hold a descriptive religious belief without evidence. But James would 
allow her either to believe or disbelieve, although she must do one or the other. 
Clifford and James would agree a third option exists, in theory: to leave the 
question open. But for James leaving the question open and deciding not to 
believe are for practical purposes identical. So where there is no evidence either 
way, if it is legitimate to incur the practical consequences of non-belief (by 
disbelieving or by avoiding the decision), then incurring the practical 
consequences of belief is also legitimate. 
 
We should note the following contrast. For Clifford: 
 
(4.3.1) X is permitted to believe that p if she has sufficient evidence that p. 
 
Clifford is not saying X must believe that p if she has sufficient evidence that p. 
But if she has insufficient evidence that ~p (which would be so if she has sufficient 
evidence for p) then she should not believe that ~p. So if she has sufficient 
evidence that p, although she is permitted not to believe either p or ~p, she is only 
permitted to believe that p. 
 
James would accept (4.3.1) but add, from W2B: 
 
(4.3.2) X is permitted to believe that p or that ~p if her belief proceeds from a 
‘genuine option’ which cannot be decided on intellectual grounds. 
 
We can reasonably assume James’s ‘intellectual grounds’ include or are identical 
with ‘evidential grounds’, as he is arguing against CP which talks of ‘insufficient 
                                                   
 
28 See p129. 
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evidence’. So to understand what is at issue between James and Clifford we must 




James’s ‘genuine option’ rests on ‘some technical distinctions’ (1896, 2000:198). 
These form part of his purely descriptive analysis of belief, which underpins his 
more normative claims.29 
 
According to James a ‘hypothesis’ is ‘anything that may be proposed to our belief’ 
(1896, 2000:199), and may be either ‘live’ or ‘dead’. A live hypothesis ‘appeals as 
a real possibility to him to whom it is proposed’ and makes an ‘electric connection 
with your nature’, while a dead hypothesis ‘refuses to scintillate with any credibility 
at all’.30 The same hypothesis may be live for one person but dead for another. 
 
An ‘option’ is a ‘decision between two hypotheses’, and may be: 
 
(i) Living or dead 
 
(ii) Forced or avoidable 
 
(iii) Momentous or trivial 
 
A living option (i) is a choice between two live hypotheses. James suggests 
theosophy versus Islam as a dead option for his lecture audience, whereas 
agnosticism versus Christianity might be living. (He does not explicitly allow an 
option between more than two hypotheses, but it seems reasonable to assume his 
schema permits it.) 
 
A ‘forced option’ (ii) is a ‘dilemma based on a complete logical disjunction, with no 
possibility of not choosing’: for example ‘Either accept this truth or go without it’ 
(1896, 2000:199). An option is not forced if it can be avoided by not choosing. 
                                                   
 
29 The ‘normative’ discussion begins on p160. 
30 See however Sequence of believing, p144ff. 
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‘Either call my theory true or call it false’ is avoidable by not judging either way. 
James speaks as if the forced/avoidable distinction, unlike the live/dead 
distinction, is intrinsic to the option, not relative to the individual. ‘[N]o standing 
place outside of the alternative’ (1896, 2000:199) suggests it applies to everyone. 
But we will question the practical significance of this later.31 
 
A unique, once-in-a-lifetime opportunity would be momentous (iii). His paradigm 
case is whether or not to believe the ‘religious hypothesis’ (1896, 2000:215), 
which could represent one’s ‘sole chance in life of getting upon the winning side’ 
(1896, 2000:216).32 Trivial options however ‘abound in the scientific life’ and are 
‘when the opportunity is not unique, when the stake is insignificant, or when the 
decision is reversible if it later prove unwise’ (1896, 2000:200). We could 
reasonably assume momentousness versus triviality is also relative to the 
individual: one might see a stake as significant which another thinks insignificant.33 
 
James’s examples of momentous options are mostly actions or opportunities 
rather than beliefs. His key secular example is choosing to decline or accept an 
invitation to join Nansen’s polar expedition, which 
 
would either exclude you from the North Pole sort of immortality altogether 
or put at least the chance of it into your hands. (1896, 2000:200) 
 
Someone turning this ‘unique opportunity’ down ‘loses the prize as surely as if he 
tried and failed’. This is hard to construe in terms of hypotheses ‘proposed to our 
belief’. The slide between ‘belief’ and ‘action’ is not unique to the 
momentous/trivial dichotomy. Avoidable options include ‘Choose between going 
out with your umbrella or without it’ and ‘Either love me or hate me’ (1896, 
2000:199). Others have both belief and behavioural dimensions: being Muslim or 
Christian is partly about what you believe and partly about what you do. 
                                                   
 
31 p168ff. 
32 When and if the believer gets to that ‘winning side’ her belief would presumably be revealed as 
having previously been an ‘unjustified true belief’: see p125ff. 
33 In theory uniqueness and irreversibility might seem objective rather than subjective criteria but in 
practice they would contribute little to the ‘momentousness’ of an option in the absence of 
significance. They might also be subject to agent-relative criteria as to what counts as unique or as 
irreversible. 
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The indistinct boundary may be a by-product of James’s pragmatism,34 or merely 
indicate that genuine options can involve both potential beliefs and potential 
actions. In either context a genuine option is forced, living and momentous. 
 
Sequence of believing 
 
If a ‘hypothesis’ is ‘anything that may be proposed to our belief’ then it precedes 
the belief, as a candidate belief. It can be a hypothesis before being a belief, 
because its liveness for an individual is a precondition for her believing it. James is 
not claiming the liveness justifies the belief, but that it plays a part in giving rise to 
the belief.35 He seems to claim it as an independent contingent psychological fact 
that a hypothesis can and must be live for someone before she can believe it,36 
with the liveness accounting for why she even considers believing it. (This would 
qualify as an empirical claim, like those we identified behind Clifford’s case for 
CP.37) 
 
James introduces ‘hypothesis’ in terms of belief, not vice versa. If a belief starts as 
a hypothesis, the hypothesis must have been live. Could someone see or hear 
something and immediately form a belief? There seems no need to interpolate a 
‘hypothesis’ into this sequence unless it was obviously there, and we have no 
reason to think James would disagree. So the notion of a ‘live hypothesis’ may be 
needed to explain some but not all beliefs. His exception (4.3.2) would then only 
apply to hypotheses we in some way choose to believe (assuming this is 
possible), but not to involuntary beliefs (assuming they are possible). 
 
The paradigm case of over-belief James exculpates is therefore a voluntary 
choice between live hypotheses constituting an undecidable genuine option. He 
says nothing about permitting an over-belief acquired outside a genuine option, so 
perhaps more passively and involuntarily. EP4 on the other hand, following 
                                                   
 
34 See Pascal’s Wager p147 and 4.4 James’s case for religious belief p167ff. 
35 There could be a parallel between James’s ‘live hypothesis’ and the Bayesian notion of non-zero 
personal probability: see p213ff. 
36 But see next paragraph. 
37 p18. 
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Clifford, applies the voluntary/involuntary distinction primarily in relation to doxastic 
habits:38 the more the over-belief results (even indirectly) from (voluntary) doxastic 
negligence the more culpable the believer is; whereas the more the over-belief is 
outside the believer’s voluntary control, and therefore involuntarily acquired and/or 
held, the less culpable she is. We are not claiming James would either agree or 
disagree, just that his focus is a category of voluntary over-beliefs he thinks we 
are entitled to hold. 
 
Before defending his own position James discusses Pascal’s Wager (Pascal, 
1966:149ff) to consider how belief can involve both ‘will’ – ‘our passional and 
volitional nature’ (1896, 2000:200) – and ‘intellect’. Although James’s defence of 
religious belief also involves a ‘live hypothesis’, he first uses it to augment 
Pascal’s rather different stance. This will be an opportunity to deepen our 
understanding of James’s ‘live hypothesis’, and test EP4 against his interpretation 




While James claims religious over-belief is permissible, ostensibly on moral 
grounds, Pascal sees it as obligatory, on rational, pragmatic grounds. EP4 by 
comparison judges religious over-belief impermissible, other things being equal, 
on moral grounds. So Pascal’s Wager, either with or without James’s help, could 
challenge EP4. 
 
Pascal applies decision theory to argue that believing a God exists is in an 
individual’s best interests. Assume the individual is convinced that if she decides 
to believe she could win an infinite benefit (if the God exists) or incur a finite loss 
(if not); whereas if she decides not to believe she could win a finite benefit (if the 
God does not exist) or incur an infinite loss (if it does).39 As long as she assumes 
a non-zero probability that the God exists, then the ‘expected value’ (value of 
outcome times probability) of the combination ‘believe in the God’s existence’ plus 
                                                   
 
38 See p74ff. 
39 We are assuming that if God does exist but the punter wagers not to believe, she will then, as one 
of the ‘damned’, suffer a ‘wretchedness’ to parallel the ‘infinity of infinitely happy life to be won’ if she 
had wagered to believe (Pascal, 1966:149-151). 
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‘the God exists’ outweighs the expected value of any other possible combination. 
Her rational choice is therefore to believe the God exists. 
 
One potential problem is the leap from being convinced that acting in a certain 
way is in your best interests (where ‘acting’ includes believing) to being convinced 
that something is true. Surely pragmatic reasons cannot bear on the truth of a 
hypothesis? Pascal acknowledges this doubt, advising someone convinced that 
believing in God is the right thing to do but ‘so made that [she] cannot believe’, to 
 
learn from those who … have been cured of the affliction of which you wish 
to be cured… They behaved just as if they did believe, taking holy water, 





Pascal ... accepts as a piece of human nature that belief is catching[41]... 
The two possible acts are not, “Believe in God” and “Do not believe.” One 
cannot decide to believe in God. One can decide to act so that one will very 
probably come to believe in God. Pascal calls that the wager that God is. To 
wager that He is not is to stop bothering about such things. (1972:188) 
 
Franklin adds that Pascal 
 
does not even believe one could come to believe in God through having 
perfect evidence, let alone through a desire to believe. Faith … is a free and 
undeserved gift of God[:] …what the Wager motivates is not belief, but 
action, ‘saying masses and the rest’, which will then dispose the seeker to 
receive God’s grace. (1998:110)  
 
                                                   
 
40 This reads like Alston’s category III (if not category II) doxastic voluntarism: see p77ff. 
41 Clifford would agree: ‘pestilence’; ‘plague’ (1877, 1879:184). 
   147 
On this understanding, Pascal’s argument provides a reason to hold a prescriptive 
rather than descriptive belief.42 Persuading someone to behave in a particular way 
can involve persuading her she ought to behave like that. This ‘ought’ need not be 
a moral ought. The Wager’s payoff matrix appeals to an individual’s interest in 
maximising personal utility, so if successful would result in a purely prudential 
‘ought’. We will revisit this later.43  
 
If the outcome of a pragmatic argument is a prescriptive belief, then acquiring it 
falls outside EP4. But the prescriptive belief here promotes behaviour likely to 
facilitate acquiring a descriptive over-belief. While EP4 might not stop you 
adopting, on pragmatic rather than evidential grounds, a prescriptive belief (that 
you should indulge in masses and holy water), it would stop you acting on it if, as 
Pascal maintains, it could facilitate acquiring a descriptive over-belief. Behaviour 
Pascal advocates as prudentially obligatory EP4 would consider morally wrong.44 
 
So even if Pascal aimed to persuade us to undertake a particular course of action, 
it is clear that the intended result of his Wager is a descriptive belief in a God’s 
existence. We will therefore continue to see the Wager as providing an argument 
for a descriptive belief, remembering this is an abbreviated way of talking about all 
the steps meant to induce belief that Pascal describes. 
 
James on Pascal 
 
James describes the Wager as an attempt to ‘force us into Christianity by 
reasoning as if our concern with truth resembled our concern with the stakes in a 
game of chance’45 (1896, 2000:200-201). He thinks a decision to believe in God 
‘adopted wilfully after such a mechanical calculation’ lacks the ‘inner soul of faith’s 
reality’ (1896, 2000:201): 
 
                                                   
 
42 See p14. 
43 See p153. 
44 Whether someone finds it psychologically possible to believe something, directly or indirectly, on 
the basis of a pragmatic argument is distinct from whether she would be justified in doing so. Our 
concern is with the latter. 
45 He could be describing Bayesianism: see p213ff. 
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unless there be some pre-existing tendency to believe in masses and holy 
water, the option offered to the will by Pascal is not a living option. 
 
This suggests that whatever makes something a living or dead option for us, it is 
not volition (‘will’). The existence of God (specifically the Catholic God) must have 
been a live hypothesis for the individual to be persuaded to try masses and holy 
water. 
 
There is not space to do full justice to Pascal’s arguments, but we should assess 
James’s claim that to be convincing the Wager needs buttressing with a prior live 
hypothesis to defend it against the ‘many Gods’ objection.46 
 
The Wager assumes the God, if it exists, provides most of the benefits and costs: 
rewarding believers with infinite bliss and non-believers with infinite wretchedness. 
As long as the individual has only the live hypothesis that a specific God exists 
plus the live hypothesis that that God does not exist, the Wager can claim to 
provide a compelling pragmatic reason for choosing to act so as to maximise the 
probability of believing in that God rather than choosing not to. But if she has 
simultaneous live hypotheses about the existence of Gods X, Y and Z, the Wager 
cannot provide a compelling pragmatic reason for (acting so as to facilitate) 
believing in God X, as she might then risk infinite misery from God Y and/or God Z 
– one of which could even be a ‘Perverse God’ who 
 
rewards those who believe only what can be established on the basis of 
objectively compelling evidence and argument… [and] whose wrath is 
reserved for those who … would bring the canons of practical rationality to 
bear on epistemological matters. (Rosen, Undated) 
 
It seems the live hypothesis idea can be incorporated into Wager scenarios which 
evade this ‘many Gods’ objection. James claims the Wager would only convince 
someone with a single prior living option concerning the God in question. If the 
                                                   
 
46 This objection dates back to Diderot at least: ‘An Imam could reason just as well this way’ (Diderot, 
1875-1877:167), (Hacking, 1972:188); which James also alludes to: ‘As well might the Mahdi write to 
us …’ (1896, 2000:201). 
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individual has no other living option concerning another God then, for that 
individual, the ‘many Gods’ objection falls away, as there would be no need to 
choose between Gods. But even if the ‘many Gods’ objection is evaded the 
‘Wager God’ needs other key attributes. It must be able and willing, indeed 
guaranteed, to operate as the Wager prescribes. 
 
James himself doubts whether a God guaranteed to reward a believer only 
convinced of its existence by ‘mechanical calculation’ would be a God someone 
encountering the Wager might have a prior live hypothesis about: ‘if we were 
ourselves in the place of the Deity, we should probably take particular pleasure in 
cutting off believers of this pattern from their infinite reward’ (James, 1896, 2000: 
201). To take the Wager seriously as a wager it seems reasonable to envisage 
someone accepting it willingly without fearing her willingness would disqualify her 
from winning, even if accepting it only meant deliberately acting so as to make 
receiving a God’s grace more likely. 
 
But perhaps this misrepresents Pascal’s intention. We typically accept a wager 
voluntarily. Pascal however describes it as something we are engaged in anyway: 
 
…but you must wager. There is no choice, you are already committed. 





When reason cannot answer, a sensible man can say that he will not play 
the game. But in our case, by the mere fact of living, we are engaged in 
play. We either believe in God, or we do not. [Emphasis added.] (1972:188) 
 
James also interprets Pascal as seeing the aspirant’s quandary not as being, but 
as being like, a gambler’s: 
 
[Pascal is] reasoning as if our concern with truth resembled our concern 
with the stakes in a game of chance [Emphases added.] (1896, 2000: 201) 
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Ordinarily you choose to accept a gamble or not, so it would not be a Jamesian 
forced option. But if the Wager is something we are engaged in anyway as well as 
something we could consciously and voluntarily engage in, then perhaps it is not 
introducing us to previously unimagined choices but explicating the risks we 
already undertake by choosing to live one way rather than another. 
 
A paid-up Jansenist invented the Wager however, not an agnostic or atheist 
speculating about belief. There is a tension between the idea of a wager we 
consciously and voluntarily engage in and one we are ‘already committed’ to ‘by 
the mere fact of living’ because we have ‘no choice’. The former could explain the 
Wager’s exceptionalism: why belief in God, why God, why this God? Pascal 
constructed a wager around a specific deity whose existence he already accepted. 
It must be a specific wager, because we cannot consciously and voluntarily 
entertain an infinity of wagers. But if we, most likely with none of Pascal’s 
background, are ‘already committed’, having ‘no choice’, to a wager on the 
existence of a Jansenist God we may be unaware of, then we must be already 
committed ‘by the mere fact of living’ to an infinity of other wagers, like: 
 
(4.4AW1) At some time in the future but before your death a letter will arrive 
measuring 8 inches by 5 inches written in English in blue ink on yellow 
paper promising you eternal life. To accept the wager you must send a 
postal order for £10 by first class post to 23 Railway Cuttings, East 
Cheam. This must be done in advance, before the letter arrives. 
 
(4.4AW2) As (4.4AW1), but the letter measures 7.9 inches by 5 inches. 
 
(4.4AW3) As (4.4AW1), but the payment must be £11. 
 
(4.4AW4…n) …and so on, each with minor changes to one or more parameters. 
 
If we ‘must necessarily play’ Pascal’s concocted Wager about a supernatural 
character familiar around the European Counter-Reformation then we are also 
‘already committed’ by the ‘mere fact of living’ to wagers (4.4AW1…n) and 
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countless others. Anyone could be seen as having chosen to live either in 
acceptance of (4.4AW1) or in explicit or implicit rejection of (4.4AW1), with 
ignorance counting as implicit rejection. Ditto for (4.4AW2), (4.4AW3) etc. The lack 
of anything ‘moral’ or ‘spiritual’ about accepting, rejecting or ignoring these wagers 
is irrelevant. Pascal uses moral language to describe the Wager’s behavioural 
outcome: one who accepts it 
 
will be faithful, honest, humble, grateful, full of good works, a sincere, true 
friend…. It is true you will not enjoy noxious pleasures, glory and good living, 
but will you not have others? (1966:153) 
 
But this content follows from Pascal’s conception of his Wager God. There is 
nothing necessary about this aspect to any particular wager. If we ‘must 
necessarily play’ Pascal’s Wager then we must also ‘necessarily play’ (4.4AW1), 
(4.4AW2) etc. But we would not have live hypotheses in respect of many of them. 
 
So enlisting James’s live hypothesis to evade the ‘many Gods’ objection jars with 
the idea of a Wager we ‘must necessarily play’. Perhaps we must play if we have 
the appropriate living option. So if we take the description of the Wager seriously 
we may find we are forced to play. But there is no necessity about taking the 
description of the Wager seriously and having the appropriate living option. So it is 
not true that we ‘must wager’, that there is ‘no choice’, that we are ‘already 
committed’ (Pascal, 1966:150) and ‘engaged in play’ (Hacking, 1972:188) by ‘the 
mere fact of living’. Instead we can only see it as something we consciously and 
voluntarily engage in, or are at least committed to by virtue of a live hypothesis we 
might have but might not have had, in respect of a single specifically described 
deity. Pascal might think we all ‘must necessarily play’ but there is no reason to 
assume we share his ontological world-view. 
 
This weakens, but does not eradicate, the threat to EP4. To evade the ‘many 
Gods’ objection the Wager needs something like James’s ‘live hypothesis’, which 
means losing the universality and necessity Pascal claimed for it. So any threat to 
EP4 would need to be at the level of an individual explicitly or implicitly using 
Wager logic to decide on a course of action likely to result in an evidentially 
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unjustified belief in a God’s existence. The challenge would then be to justify why 
EP4 would judge this decision illegitimate. To address this we need a potentially 
troublesome case. For clarification we will first consider a scenario which does not 
qualify. 
 
In this first scenario individual A persuades herself to discount all other 
possibilities and entertain only two live hypotheses: (i) The Wager God exists; and 
(ii) The Wager God does not exist. She takes the Wager seriously, so understands 
she can only bet on one specific God. As this requirement cannot be forced on 
her, James claims that if she accepts the Wager, then the idea of a (single, prior) 
live hypothesis is needed to explain why she would find it compelling. She 
concludes though that the Wager God’s necessary attributes include what to her 
seem counter-intuitive ones about rewarding a believer who only ended up 
believing by following a ‘mechanical calculation’, and punishing an individual who 
thought its attributes made it unworthy of worship and belief.47 These attributes 
prevent her entertaining a live hypothesis about it. Hypothesis (i) is no longer live 
for her. She may have a live hypothesis about a God, but not about the Wager 
God. 
 
She cannot vacillate between the Wager God and one she considers more worthy, 
because she can only wager on one God. She also wants her God to love and 
accept her if she just believed, not because she believed by accepting the terms 
of a wager. To commit to believing in the existence of a supremely worthy God, 
outside Pascal’s Wager – perhaps from a conviction that doing so would achieve 
an otherwise unachievable moral benefit – might count as a Kierkegaardian leap 
of faith. But this would be believing in spite of the Wager, not because of it. In this 
scenario Pascal’s Wager itself does not threaten EP4. 
 
If we could see the Wager as something we are engaged in implicitly ‘by the mere 
fact of living’ whether we like it or not, then we might see its rationality from the 
outside. I might see someone else doing the rational thing by believing, because I 
see her betting on the existence of a specific God, which may or may not exist. 
                                                   
 
47 ‘…Pascal’s wager presupposes that God is a complete moral idiot’ (Belzer, 2007:99). 
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But believer A cannot see that rationality herself, and cannot justify it in terms of 
probability calculations and decision theory, without seeing herself as actually 
engaged in the Wager, and therefore running the risk of seeing the Wager God as 
one unworthy of worship. In this scenario Pascal’s Wager as a pragmatic 
argument risks corrupting the sincerity of belief it aims to promote. 
 
Now for the potentially troublesome scenario. Individual B also persuades herself 
to discount every other possibility and consider only the two live hypotheses (i) 
and (ii).48 But although B may be as aware as A of what the Wager God’s 
attributes imply, she does not think the God unworthy of belief. She accepts the 
Wager, deciding a course of action likely to facilitate over-belief. 
 
This may not be straightforward. Pascal advises someone intent on being ‘cured 
of unbelief’ not to go it alone but ‘learn from those who were once bound like you’ 
(1966:152). She is more likely to succeed by engaging with other believers in a 
shared God. Masses are communal and artefacts like holy water need a context of 
‘imitation and partisanship’ and ‘circumpressure of … caste and set’ (James, 
1896, 2000:203). The shared God could be the Catholic God or Vishnu or 
Yahweh, not one abstractly concocted from Wager attributes. But we will assume 
we can navigate this. Perhaps she takes the shared Catholic God’s existence to 
be a live hypothesis, takes the Wager’s cost-benefit analysis to be consistent with 
her understanding of that God, and thinks coming to believe in this way is 
conceptually consistent with her faith since she believes it will open her up to that 
God’s grace. 
 
EP4’s final verdict on B would depend on case details. Other things being equal 
EP4 would judge any voluntary action to facilitate over-belief morally wrong 
because of insufficient evidence, and therefore in a social context could 
encourage further gullibility49 (and, in the case of religious over-belief, possibly 
cruel and repressive behaviour50) in the believer and/or her community. B’s 
potential prize cannot mitigate this, as the Wager’s stake is a pragmatic, not a 
                                                   
 
48 See also p159ff. 
49 See pp18–21: ‘encourage gullibility’ is here shorthand for behaviour which impedes the aims and 
benefits articulated in (1.1.1–13) and (1.2.1). 
50 See p136. 
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moral benefit.51 The winner maximises her personal utility (eternal life in paradise) 
rather than, say, net happiness in her community or universe. According to the 
Wager this is the individual’s reason for accepting. The behaviour the individual 
commits to in accepting the Wager can have moral consequences: ‘faithful, 
honest, humble, grateful, full of good works’ (Pascal, 1966:153), which although 
strictly speaking outside the terms of the Wager, could be included in mitigation 
and then qualify as a potential ‘conflicting and overriding moral imperative’. So if 
there were moral benefits these might exculpate B’s over-belief, but if not EP4 
would rule the over-belief morally wrong, other things being equal. None of this 
undermines EP4 as a proposed moral principle, or that an over-belief arrived at 
via Pascal’s Wager represents any new threat to EP4. 
 
Could there however be a threat to EP4 relating to B’s putative right to ‘choose to 
believe’ in accordance with Pascal’s Wager to get the chance of eternal life in 
paradise? This would resemble a right which, under certain conditions, James 
asserts against CP: to 
 
refuse obedience to the scientist’s command to imitate his kind of option, in 
a case where my own stake is important enough to give me the right to 
choose my own form of risk (1896, 2000: 215)  
 
Consider again the case where the over-belief itself does not provide, or does not 
clearly provide, any moral benefit. (We can discount as unproblematic cases 
which EP4’s ‘conflicting and overriding moral imperative’ caveat would exculpate.) 
The over-belief could not count as ‘private’,52 if only because of behavioural 
manifestations like masses and holy water. It must however be ‘apparently 
harmless’,53 otherwise we could argue the potential negative consequences 
already identified, for over-belief in general54 or religious over-belief in particular,55 
would override the individual’s putative ‘right to choose’. In Chapter 356 we 
suggested we cannot know how harmless an individual over-belief is until every 
                                                   
 
51 See p147. 
52 See p122. 
53 p121. 
54 See pp14–17. 
55 See pp131–140. 
56 p122. 
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eventual consequence has materialised, hence Clifford’s ‘however seemingly 
trivial the belief … we have no choice but to extend our judgment to all cases of 
belief whatever’ (1877, 1879:182). We allowed that in an individual case we may 
have reason to think the over-belief would prove harmless in the long run, so a 
‘conflicting and overriding moral imperative’ could legitimise it. Yet here the over-
belief provides no moral benefit: does that rule out the conflicting and overriding 
moral imperative? 
 
Not necessarily. We are asking if B has any right to win the chance of eternal 
paradise by accepting Pascal’s Wager and choosing to believe. We are stipulating 
there are no moral benefits but at the same time that any other consequences are 
as innocuous as possible. So if she claims a right which EP4 infringes that 
suggests a conflicting and overriding moral imperative to protect that right. The 
over-belief does not have to have a moral benefit for this condition to apply. It 
could also apply to avoid a net moral cost. 
 
In the context of Pascal’s Wager and EP4 there would need to be a powerful 
moral argument in favour of honouring an individual’s right to over-believe, in 
highly exceptional circumstances, to achieve a pragmatic benefit for herself rather 
than a socially contextualised moral benefit. This right could plausibly be regarded 
as a facet of a more general right to individual liberty, where no harm, or minimal 
harm, is likely to be incurred by a third party.57 The over-belief would need to be 
free of any trace of ‘pestilence’ against which Clifford promotes CP, including 
potential repression58 which religion can foster. But EP4 does not rule it out on 
principle, although it would rule out any blanket right to over-believe to achieve a 
pragmatic benefit for the believer rather than a socially contextualised moral 
benefit. 
 
Our conclusion is therefore that we have not yet found a reason why Pascal’s 
Wager should threaten EP4. Something like James’s ‘live hypothesis’ seems 
necessary to protect the Wager from the ‘many Gods’ objection, but at the price of 
                                                   
 
57 We will revisit this later (p195ff) when comparing EP4 with alternative potential principles in the 
context of religious belief. 
58 p136. 
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the universality and necessity Pascal claimed for it. Because of the role live 
hypotheses play in James’s own account of what belief is permissible, we must 
now see if ‘the will’ can influence whether a hypothesis is live and, specifically, if 
we can voluntarily act so as to have the ‘live hypothesis’ we want to have. 
 
This matters in our defence of EP4 since if we can will ourselves to have the live 
hypothesis we want, this could introduce circularity into James’s argument for 
doxastic permissiveness. 
 
Belief and the will 
 
When James applies his framework to ‘the actual psychology of human opinion’ 
(1896, 2000:200) he rejects the idea of deciding to believe something purely by 
willing it; and, in at least some circumstances, 
 
talk of believing by our volition … is worse than silly, it is vile. (1896, 
2000:201-202) 
 
Yet he does not think we believe just by ‘intellectual insight’ or ‘pure reason’ 
(1896, 2000:203) either, particularly in a context like religious belief. 
 
According to James: 
 
(4.5.1) My will can only choose a hypothesis if it is already live for me. 
 
Now if it was also true that 
 
(4.5.2) I can make a hypothesis live for myself by an act of will, 
 
then (4.5.1) would be trivial. I could always will to choose a hypothesis as long as I 
had already willed it into life. For (4.5.1) to be material, (4.5.2) must be false, 
indeed ‘preposterous’ (1896, 2000:200). Yet James also sees a role for ‘our willing 
nature’ in determining what are live and dead hypotheses for us: 
 
   157 
When I say ‘willing nature,’ I do not mean only such deliberate volitions as 
may have set up habits of belief that we cannot now escape from,–I mean all 
such factors of belief as fear and hope, prejudice and passion, imitation and 
partisanship, the circumpressure of our caste and set… that make 
hypotheses possible or impossible for us, alive or dead. [Emphasis 
added.] (1896, 2000:203) 
 
While some are ‘deliberate volitions’, others we have only partial or indirect 
voluntary control over. But they all count as non-rational sources, in contrast with 
the rational intellect. We can have some control over what we ‘fear and hope’; we 
can nurture or dissolve our prejudices, and partially control whom or what we 
imitate or are partisan with, and the ‘set’ whose ‘circumpressure’ may influence us. 
But none of this implies we can voluntarily make a hypothesis live or dead directly, 
although we may choose to live in ways which make it more or less likely that 
some hypotheses will be live for us and others dead. 
 
James’s ‘willing nature’ is not therefore an exact synonym of ‘conscious volition’ or 
‘voluntary control’. But we can ask whether, from his pastry cart of ‘influences’, he 
is trying to have his cake and eat it:59 our willing nature appears to be a faculty 
where we both do and do not exercise conscious and deliberate control. Willing is 
typically a matter of conscious and deliberate volition. But fear can reduce 
effective volition. Without fear I could freely choose P or Q. But fearing P’s 
potential consequences could make choosing P harder than choosing Q, so I 
cannot choose P as freely as Q. Something equivalent applies to at least some of 
his other ‘influences’. 
 
Nor are we slaves to fear, prejudice and passion. We can learn about what 
influences us and do something about it. James’s list includes phenomena where 
will is both exercised and constrained or compromised, but all are aspects of our 
‘willing nature’.60 
                                                   
 
59 Gale (1999, 2007:4) thinks James wants ‘to have it all’. 
60 Gale (1999, 2007:235) identifies an ‘aporia’ running ‘throughout James’s general account of belief. 
On the one hand, his sentiment of rationality doctrine stresses that our beliefs are determined by our 
emotions and passions, which renders them non-intentional. On the other hand, his Promethean will-
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We can also ask how long does (can, must) a hypothesis stay ‘possible or 
impossible for us, alive or dead’, following the influence of one or more ‘factors of 
belief’. The next moment a new factor (a deliberate volition; or a fear, hope, or 
passion) could change the settings of what is ‘possible or impossible…, alive or 
dead’ for me. So even if we accept James’s framework, we can question the 
ultimate significance of his distinction between live and dead hypotheses. Saying it 
is ‘only our already dead hypotheses that our willing nature is unable to bring to 
life again’ (1896, 2000:203) suggests that once a hypothesis is dead it can never 
be live again; so permanence seems part of the description and significance of the 
distinction between ‘live’ and ‘dead’. But if a new ‘factor’ can change the settings 
of what is live or dead for me, then an aspect of our ‘willing nature’ can bring an 
already dead hypothesis to life again, so the setting is not permanent. 
 
This matters for his treatment of Pascal’s Wager. If the Wager option is ‘act so you 
will probably come to believe in God’ versus ‘do not so act’,61 then James’s 
demand for a prior live hypothesis could fall away. Choosing ‘masses and holy 
water’ over getting ‘yoked together with unbelievers’62 could count as ‘action[s] of 
our willing nature’ (particularly ‘imitation and partisanship’ or ‘circumpressure of 
our caste and set’) which ‘make hypotheses possible or impossible for us, alive or 
dead’. They would then be legitimate enablers of live hypotheses in their own 
right, needing no ‘pre-existing tendency to believe’ (1896, 2000:201). 
 
The overall line of argument in the Wager context displays either circularity or 
redundancy. We will take what James says about live hypotheses at face value, 
and also the Hacking/Franklin line (which is probably Pascal’s and also James’s 
line) that ‘what the Wager motivates is not belief, but action’ (Franklin, 1998:110). 
James says the individual needs a single prior live hypothesis about a God’s 
existence to be swayed by the Wager. But if she is swayed, the outcome will be at 
most a decision to act so as to facilitate acquiring, and perhaps reinforcing but 
without confirming, that same live hypothesis. Hence perhaps why James calls the 
                                                                                                                                             
 
to-believe doctrine requires that we be able to choose our beliefs at will, something we accomplish 
by making the intentional effort to concentrate our attention in a certain way…’. 
61 p145ff. 
62 2 Corinthians 6:14 (New International Version). 
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Wager ‘a last desperate snatch at a weapon against the hardness of the 
unbelieving heart’ (1896, 2000:201). 
 
More generally however the suggestion that we can choose to do something to 
influence, however indirectly, the live hypotheses we end up with exposes the ‘live 
hypothesis’ idea to a more critical light. 
 
We might associate duties of responsible inquiry63 more with Clifford, whose 
opening chapter is ‘The Duty of Inquiry’ (1877, 1879:177). But James also calls us 
‘would-be knowers’64 (1896, 2000:209). If we are seekers after truth, why should 
our possession of H1 as a live hypothesis give us the right to believe H1, as long 
as the other W2B conditions are met? What is special about H1 other than our 
entertaining it? Alternatively, if we assume the right to have (or keep) H1 as a live 
hypothesis, should we not have some rationale justifying why H1 is live for us but 
H2–n are not live for us, over and above the contingent fact that H1 happens to be 
live and H2–n happen not to be? Although a plausible duty of responsible inquiry 
cannot insist we investigate everything all the time (implying an infinite and 
therefore impossible task), it might entail that if our objective is to ‘find out whether 
X’ then we should make a reasonable effort to consider potential truths about X, 
and not rest content with the ones we currently happen to have in our heads. 
 
This in turn suggests James’s ‘live hypothesis’ may give Pascal’s Wager a less 
effective defence than originally appeared: if you insist on sticking with the God 
you happen to have in your head or it does not occur to you that there could be 
more than one possible God, can you claim to be addressing the question 
seriously? 
 
Individual B65 was the nearest to a Wager scenario threatening EP4. Whether or 
not she qualifies as the ‘responsible inquirer’ EP4 presupposes might turn on how 
she persuades herself to ‘discount every other possibility’ leaving herself with one 
living option. 
                                                   
 
63 May also be of relevance to ‘moral encroachment’, which is outside our scope: see p295. 
64 See p163ff. 
65 p153ff. 
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We raise this doubt not only in connection with James’s reinterpretation of 
Pascal’s Wager but because of its significance when we discuss whether his own 
‘religious hypothesis’ represents a plausible threat to a principle like EP4.66 
 
Our passional nature 
 
We concluded above67 that the Wager, with or without James’s help, seems no 
threat to EP4. But outside the Wager context, and discounting for now the doubt 
we have just raised, James’s ‘live hypothesis’ seems straightforward enough for 
the job he recruited it for.68 Before getting into his own treatment of religious belief, 
though, we should review a few remaining aspects of his framework. Following his 
own sequence we now consider his more normative remarks about how we 
decide what to believe. 
 
The psychology of belief, says James, is 
 
evidently far from simple; and pure insight and logic, whatever they might do 
ideally, are not the only things that really do produce our creeds. (1896, 
2000:205) 
 
He asks if this ‘mixed-up state of affairs’ is a ‘normal element in making up our 
minds’ what to believe or ‘simply reprehensible and pathological’. It could of 
course be both. ‘Normal’ has both descriptive and normative connotations, so he 
could be saying either: 
 
(i) That is how we are, so we should resign ourselves to its wrongness 
and treat it as ‘normal’ [normal but wrong]; 
 
or: 
                                                   
 
66 See p171. 
67 p155. 
68 It also resonates with the Bayesian notion of ‘personal probability’ to be discussed later: p213ff. It 
may be that only descriptive live hypotheses can qualify as Bayesian personal probabilities, and not 
prescriptive (normative) live hypotheses. 
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(ii) If that is how we are then it must be ‘normal’ and cannot be 
‘reprehensible and pathological’ [normal therefore not wrong.] 
 
We will assume his intention is more (ii) than (i), as this is where he states his 
central thesis: 
 
W2B Our passional nature not only lawfully may, but must, decide an option 
between propositions, whenever it is a genuine option that cannot by 
its nature be decided on intellectual grounds; for to say, under such 
circumstances, “Do not decide, but leave the question open,” is itself a 
passional decision,–just like deciding yes or no,–and is attended with 
the same risk of losing the truth. (1896, 2000:205)69 
 
Empiricism, absolutism and objective evidence 
 
James assumes we are eschewing ‘systematic philosophical scepticism’ (1896, 
2000:205)70 and instead holding as an article of ‘faith’ that ‘truth exists, and that 
our minds can find it’. We can do this in either an ‘absolutist’ or an ‘empiricist’ way. 
An absolutist says ‘we not only can attain to knowing truth, but we can know when 
we have attained to knowing it’; whereas for an empiricist ‘although we may attain 
it, we cannot infallibly know when’. 
 
James sees a distinguishing feature of absolutism in the ‘absolutist conviction in a 
doctrine … of objective evidence’ (1896, 2000:206). Superficially this reads like a 
requirement of CP or EP4 but James has a stronger doctrine in mind, in that 
‘objective evidence’ necessarily guarantees (‘infallibly’ supports) certainty 
(‘bottom-certitude’): 
 
If … I am unable to doubt that I now exist before you, that two is less than 
three, or that if all men are mortal then I am mortal too, it is because these 
                                                   
 
69 Repeated from p140. 
70 This does not imply that an individual faced with a specific option and choosing to ‘not decide, but 
leave the question open’ is thereby embracing ‘systematic philosophical scepticism’. 
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things illumine my intellect irresistibly. The final ground of this objective 
evidence possessed by certain propositions is the [‘agreement of our 
intellect with the thing known’]. The certitude it brings involves an [‘aptitude 
for extorting a certain assent from our intellect’] on the part of the truth 
envisaged, and on the side of the subject a [‘quiet rest in knowledge’], when 
once the object is mentally received, that leaves no possibility of doubt 
behind;… [Emphases added and translations substituted for original Latin.] 
(1896, 2000:206) 
 
This sense of ‘objective’ seems close to ‘conclusive’. To a modern ear, conclusive 
evidence may need to be objective, but not vice versa. I could claim subjective 
evidence that it will rain tomorrow, by feeling it in my bones or having a private 
visitation from a weather god. Or I could have objective evidence in the form of 
meteorological data about an approaching cold front. But although I believe it will 
rain tomorrow based on objective rather than subjective evidence, I am not 
‘unable to doubt’ my belief. So we should rather speak of conclusive evidence, a 
doctrine James clearly contrasts with his own fallibilism: 
 
I am … myself a complete empiricist so far as my theory of human 
knowledge goes. I live … by the practical faith that we must go on 
experiencing and thinking over our experience, for only thus can our 
opinions grow more true; but to hold any one of them–I absolutely do not 
care which–as if it never could be reinterpretable or corrigible, I believe to be 
a tremendously mistaken attitude…  (1896, 2000:207) 
 
This could be Clifford though, reminding us that ‘no greater service can be 
rendered to science than the purification of accepted results from the errors which 
may have crept into them’ (1877, 1879:197), and that ‘our bounden duty’ is that of 
‘testing and inquiring into things’ (1877, 1879:199) and ‘purifying and enlarging … 
to the utmost of our power’ (1877, 1879:205) the ‘precious deposit’ inherited from 
our forebears. James however counts Clifford among the ‘absolutists’: 
 
When the Cliffords tell us how sinful it is to be Christians on such ‘insufficient 
evidence,’ insufficiency is really the last thing they have in mind. For them 
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the evidence is absolutely sufficient, only it makes the other way. (1896, 
2000:206) 
 
There seems little justification for equating Clifford’s ‘sufficient evidence’ with 
James’s ‘objective’, hence conclusive, evidence. James could however accuse 
Clifford of failing to define ‘sufficient evidence’. As Hall summarises: 
 
With respect to evidential sufficiency, nowhere does Clifford specify … an 
infallible mark by which one could know that it has been reached; he only 
assumes that there is one. For James … the quest for that criterion is a 
fool’s errand. (2011:82) 
 
Chapter 5 will address this challenge on behalf of EP4. If the certainty of 
conclusive evidence must be our criterion of evidential sufficiency then EP4 would 
outlaw the vast majority of beliefs we successfully live by, however 
‘reinterpretable’ and ‘corrigible’ they may ultimately be (and however aware of this 
we may be). 
 
Knowing the truth and avoiding error 
 
James’s last ‘preliminary’ is his ‘two ways of looking at our duty in the matter of 
opinion’, two ‘first and great commandments as would-be knowers’: ‘We must 
know the truth; and we must avoid error’ (1896, 2000:209). These are ‘not two 
ways of stating an identical commandment’ but ‘two separable… [and] materially 
different laws’. Hall (2011:82) calls them the ‘counsel of hope’ and the ‘counsel of 
fear’ respectively, and James caricatures Clifford in terms of the latter: 
 
Believe nothing, he tells us, keep your mind in suspense forever, rather than 
by closing it on insufficient evidence incur the awful risk of believing lies. 
 
… [This] merely shows his own preponderant private horror of becoming a 
dupe (1896, 2000:209-210). 
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James’s distinction is understood to be about inductive risk. The more liberal your 
policy for accepting a hypothesis on the basis of evidence the more likely you are 
to accept truths but the more you risk accepting falsehoods. The more stringent 
your policy the more likely you are to avoid falsehoods but the more you risk 
rejecting truths. 
 
For example a 99% reliable medical test comes back positive. If you believe on 
this basis, and adopt a general strategy of believing the results of tests which are 
>=99% reliable, you will gain many true beliefs but probably some false beliefs 
too. If you only accept the results of 100% reliable tests you will avoid false beliefs 
but lose many truths. 
 
Given this interpretation we would need EP4 to encourage a reasonable balance 
of inductive (and, more generally, doxastic and/or epistemic) risk rather than 
insisting our only priority is to ‘avoid error’ as this could mean disbelieving many 
truths. Indeed EP4 explicitly outlaws believing ‘irresponsibly’ on insufficient 
evidence, so would accommodate believing ‘responsibly’ on the basis of evidence 
which is less than ‘conclusive’. However a more satisfactory defence of EP4 
needs that adequate criterion of ‘sufficient evidence’ which Hall calls for. Chapter 
5 will address inductive risk in more detail, but in the meantime it is not difficult to 
see where James and Clifford diverge. 
 
In the context of much scientific and everyday belief they seem fairly aligned. 
Clifford talks of the 
 
many cases in which it is our duty to act upon probabilities, although the 
evidence is not such as to justify present belief[.] (1877, 1879:189)71 
 
He seems to withhold the commitment of belief proper in such cases. James also 
allows that in both ‘scientific questions’ and ‘human affairs in general’ scenarios 
exist where ‘the option between losing truth and gaining it is not momentous’ and 
 
                                                   
 
71 See p112. 
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we can throw the chance of gaining truth away, and… save ourselves from 
any chance of believing falsehood, by not making up our minds at all till 
objective evidence has come. … Throughout the breadth of physical nature 
facts are what they are quite independently of us[.] … The questions here 
are always trivial options, the hypotheses are hardly living (at any rate not 
living for us spectators), the choice between believing truth or falsehood is 
seldom forced. The attitude of sceptical balance is therefore the absolutely 
wise one if we would escape mistakes. (1896, 2000:210-211) 
 
James and Clifford differ though in contexts where James sees belief as legitimate 
despite ‘insufficient evidence’, because we ‘may be interested at least as much in 
positively gaining truth as in merely escaping dupery’ and therefore cannot ‘wait 
with impunity’ for ‘coercive evidence’. 
 
James identifies three such ‘forced options in our speculative questions’ (1896, 
2000:212). We have already covered ‘moral beliefs’72 and ‘questions concerning 
personal relations’.73 The third is ‘the religious hypothesis’ (1896, 2000:212-214), 
the subject of this chapter. 
 
We have discussed why James thinks Pascal’s Wager is vulnerable without his 
‘live hypothesis’ idea. We then touched on further elements of James’s belief 
framework which will feature in his own defence of religious belief: the role of our 
‘passional nature’ in belief formation; epistemic fallibility; and the tension between 
‘know the truth’ and ‘avoid error’. We are now ready to see if his defence threatens 
EP4. 
 
4.4 James’s case for religious belief 
 
James’s defence of religious belief has both a specific and a general aspect. He 
articulates his own ‘religious hypothesis’, but also offers his W2B thesis74 as a 
more general ‘defence of our right to adopt a believing attitude in religious matters’ 
                                                   
 
72 See p57ff. 
73 See p110ff. 
74 See p140. 
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(1896, 2000:198). W2B therefore applies not only to his own religious hypothesis 
but to any hypothesis forming part of a ‘genuine option that cannot by its nature be 
decided on intellectual grounds’. His own religious hypothesis is one example, but 
someone else’s, different, religious hypothesis could be another. 
 
James’s religious hypothesis 
 
James’s religious hypothesis (‘JRH’) may not encapsulate the common essence of 
all religious beliefs, assuming that exists. But it shares an important structural 
feature with most. While science ‘says things are’ and morality ‘says some things 
are better than other things’, religion says 
 
the best things are the more eternal things, the overlapping things, the 
things in the universe that throw the last stone, so to speak, and say the final 
word. “Perfection is eternal” …seems a good way of putting this first 
affirmation of religion, an affirmation which obviously cannot yet be verified 
scientifically at all. 
 
The second affirmation of religion is that we are better off even now if we 
believe her first affirmation to be true. (1896, 2000:214-5) 
 
Also for ‘most of us’, 
 
[t]he more perfect and more eternal aspect of the universe is represented in 
our religions as having personal form. The universe is no longer a mere It to 
us, but a Thou, if we are religious; and any relation that may be possible 
from person to person might be possible here. (1896, 2000:216) 
 
These three components combine descriptive beliefs about how things are with 
prescriptive beliefs about how things should be. The two kinds of belief are also 
connected, similar to our (4.1.1–3).75 It is a necessary structural feature (of at least 
this kind – our kind and James’s kind) of religious belief that they are connected. 
 
                                                   
 
75 See p131. 
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Descriptive content includes: 
 
(4.6.1.1) The universe has ‘more eternal’ and ‘overlapping’ things which ‘throw 
the last stone’ and ‘say the final word’.76 
 
(4.6.1.2) There is a link between what is ‘more eternal’ and what is ‘more 
perfect’. 
 
(4.6.1.3) ‘The more perfect and more eternal aspect of the universe’ has at 
least some features of a person. 
 
Prescriptive content includes: 
 
(4.6.2.1) We ought to believe (4.6.1.1) and (4.6.1.2). 
 
(4.6.2.2) We ought to believe and behave in accordance with (4.6.1.3), because 
‘by obstinately believing that there are gods’ (‘more perfect and more 
eternal’ aspects of the universe with at least some features of a 
person) ‘we are doing the universe the deepest service we can’ (1896, 
2000:216). 
 
(4.6.2.3) We should behave in accordance with the ‘religious hypothesis’: there 
are kinds of ‘action required or inspired by the religious hypothesis’ 
which are different from (and, by implication, potentially better than) 
what is ‘dictated by the naturalistic hypothesis’ (1896, 2000:217 
footnote). 
 
Religious belief as a genuine option 
 
In view of the inseparably compound nature of religious belief, exemplified by 
4.6.1.1–4.6.2.3 above (and by 4.1.1–377), it is perhaps unsurprising that James’s 
                                                   
 
76 Hall reads ‘the best things are the more eternal things’ as ‘good will out’ (2011:84): sub specie 
aeternitatis goodness will triumph. 
77 p131ff. 
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‘options’ include choices both between potential beliefs and between potential 
actions.78 As one of the ‘great cosmical matters’  (1896, 2000:214), religious belief 
combines decisions about what to believe about how things are with decisions 
about what to do, since a belief about what should be is, in a personal and moral 
context, tantamount to a decision about what is to be done, and therefore what to 
do.79 
 
This compound nature could also be why James insists the religious belief option 
is ‘genuine’. For someone faced with the decision it is a living option. James 
would call it forced, because if a religious hypothesis is a candidate truth, the 
dilemma is ‘Either accept this truth or go without it’ (1896, 2000:199). Someone 
saying ‘yes’ could see the option as forced, for example between having and not 
having God in her life; and therefore see the practical (emotional, spiritual, 
psychological, existential, behavioural etc) consequences of saying ‘no’ equivalent 
to those of not deciding. But someone saying ‘no’ or ‘don’t know’ or nothing might 
instead have more reason to see the option in terms of, say, morality or integrity, 
so might see ‘no’ and ‘don’t know’ as distinct both from each other and from no 
response at all. An atheist rejecting a God hypothesis because of its potential 
moral harm could still be plagued by doubt, and envy one agnostic who discounts 
it on grounds of insufficient evidence and another who cares too little either way. 
 
This could undermine James’s claim that religious belief arising from a ‘genuine 
option’ is permissible. Can I be faced with a forced option just because I see 
myself faced with a forced option? For James, 
 
if I say, “Either accept this truth or go without it,” I put on you a forced option, 
for there is no standing place outside of the alternative. Every dilemma 
based on a complete logical disjunction, with no possibility of not choosing, 
is an option of this forced kind. (1896, 2000:199) 
 
                                                   
 
78 See p143. 
79 Cf discussion whether Pascal’s Wager is about believing something is true or deciding to act in a 
certain way p146ff. 
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‘Either accept this truth or go without it’ certainly reads like a forced option. We 
could question though how significant that reading is in respect of a purely 
descriptive ‘truth’. James does not elucidate what ‘Either accept this truth or go 
without it’ means in practice, as it is not immediately obvious. 
 
Compare ‘Either accept this cake or go without it’. Here you implicitly agree that 
‘this cake’ refers to a specific cake which you either accept or not. But you cannot 
refer to a specific hypothesis as ‘this truth’ without implicitly accepting it as true, 
because if you did not accept it as true you would not recognise it as something 
which could be described as a ‘truth’. You cannot simultaneously recognise 
hypothesis H as ‘this truth’ and ‘go without’ H as a ‘truth’. 
 
This suggests we should interpret James’s forced option as ‘Either accept this as 
truth or go without it’. But being confronted with this does not seem wildly different 
in practice from being confronted with ‘Either call my theory true or call it false’ 
(1896, 2000:199), which for James is avoidable, because one could also express 
no opinion either way. There is also more than one alternative to ‘accept H as 
truth’, because there is more than one way to ‘go without H’. You could think H is 
false or have no opinion about H. 
 
This suggests that an individual happy to entertain ‘Either accept H as truth or go 
without H’ literally as the forced option it is worded as must also be happy to 
discount any differences between alternative ways of ‘going without H’. But that 
seems odd in respect of a purely descriptive hypothesis. Why would someone 
agree to, say, ‘Either accept the hypothesis that gold’s atomic number is 79 as 
truth or go without this hypothesis’ if that meant discounting any difference 
between, say, believing gold has an atomic number but not knowing what it is; 
sincerely believing gold’s atomic number is not 79 but 75; not knowing what an 
atomic number is; not knowing what gold is; etc? A Jamesian explanation could be 
because the option is also momentous since, like the decision to join Nansen’s 
expedition it would involve a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity with life-changing 
consequences. But the Nansen option is about deciding what to do, not what to 
believe. 
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On hearing the speaker’s words the addressee may accept it as a forced option: 
either believe gold’s atomic number is 79 or take any other course of action (or 
inaction) logically incompatible with believing gold’s atomic number is 79. But the 
addressee could instead see herself faced with a choice between, say, (i) 
believing gold’s atomic number is 79; (ii) believing it is not 79 but another value; 
(iii) believing it may be 79 but needing further proof it actually is 79; (iv) remaining 
ignorant as to what an atomic number is, and/or what gold is; … and so on. 
 
In the case of a purely descriptive hypothesis about gold’s atomic number the 
decision seems in practice more like one we ‘may decline to offer any judgment’ 
about, like ‘Either call my theory true or call it false’. There seems nothing in the 
hypothesis itself to force an individual to see it as part of a complete logical 
disjunction, and therefore as part of a forced option. 
 
Compare this with the decision whether or not to have God in your life. Assuming 
you only have one life, then that fact would make it a forced option: have God in 
your life or do not have God in your life. This is different from a decision purely 
whether to believe a God exists, which in itself does not have to be part of a 
forced option. But an individual could chose to see it as equivalent to, say, a 
decision about having or not having God in her life, which would present itself as a 
forced option to anyone with only one life. 
 
So it is perhaps easier to understand why an individual might choose to see a 
hypothesis about the existence of a God as part of a forced option. It is easier to 
see how a decision with potential behavioural and/or existential implications can 
be forced for an individual, for example in relation to religion, where we are 
‘supposed to gain … by our belief, and to lose by our non-belief, a certain vital 
good’ (1896, 2000:215). But the challenge is to understand how religion can be ‘a 
forced option, so far as that good goes’ which can be ‘put on’ one person by 
another. This is so as to understand whether and, if so, how something which 
appears a forced option to one individual must appear forced to anyone else: 
 
We cannot escape the issue by remaining sceptical and waiting for more 
light, because, although we do avoid error in that way if religion be untrue, 
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we lose the good, if it be true, just as certainly as if we positively chose to 
disbelieve. (1896, 2000:215) 
 
Considering this quotation in isolation, the first person plural suggests James sees 
a forced option as applicable to anyone. But James has just said he is only 
addressing those for whom ‘the religious hypothesis in both its branches’ is a live 
hypothesis: 
 
If we are to discuss the question at all, it must involve a living option. If for 
any of you religion be a hypothesis that cannot, by any living possibility be 
true, then you need go no farther. I speak to the ‘saving remnant’ alone. 
 
It is unclear how someone can ‘put on [me] a forced option’ if I am outside that 
‘saving remnant’, do not see myself faced with a forced option, but instead see 
myself free to ‘escape the issue’. A checkmated chess player has the forced 
option between conceding defeat or losing her king. But she was not forced to 
play. 
 
If an option is only forced for me if I accept it as a forced option, while someone 
else can avoid it by not accepting it as a forced option, this would seem to reduce 
the significance of its ‘forced’ nature, and therefore weaken the claim that belief is 
permissible in respect of an option which is forced (among other conditions), as 
the following discussion will try to explain. 
 
To say an option may be (or appear) forced for me while not everyone need see 
themselves faced with that same forced option does not imply I am consciously 
and/or voluntarily choosing to see myself faced with a forced option. In James’s 
framework my options derive from the hypotheses which are live for me, which I 
have not necessarily chosen to have. But we have established80 that whether or 
not a hypothesis is live for me can indirectly result from an action of my ‘willing 
nature’. As a member of James’s ‘saving remnant’ (an ‘insider’) I may see myself 
faced with a forced option between (i) believing a religious hypothesis and thereby 
                                                   
 
80 p158. 
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gaining a ‘vital good’ if religion is true, or (ii) potentially losing that vital good, again 
if religion is true, by either (iia) ‘remaining sceptical and waiting for more light’ or 
(iib) ‘positively [choosing] to disbelieve’. Someone else however, even another 
‘insider’, could have that same religious hypothesis, or another one, as a live 
hypothesis, but not see herself faced with a forced option – because she has a 
different mix of live and dead hypotheses from the ones I have. 
 
So, even as an insider, I do have another alternative, which I am free to choose 
whether or not to take. That is (iii) to behave in ways which might directly or 
indirectly facilitate my having different live hypotheses, and therefore different 
options, from the ones I currently have or think I have.81 
 
James could of course argue that (iii) is actually (iic): another variant of his 
scepticism/positive disbelief route. But he cannot have it both ways, which he 
seems to be trying to do by holding these three positions simultaneously: 
 
(4.7.1) basing an agent’s right to let her ‘passional nature’ decide what to 
believe in respect of a ‘genuine option that cannot by its nature be 
decided on intellectual grounds’ (1896, 2000:205) on her individual 
and contingent mix of live and dead hypotheses and her individual and 
contingent evaluation of what options are forced and momentous for 
her; 
 
(4.7.2) insisting that that same ‘passional nature’ is at least a partial 
determinant of what these genuine options are; and 
 
(4.7.3) describing our ‘actual psychology’ such that we can voluntarily act in 
ways which might directly or indirectly influence that same ‘passional 
nature’. 
 
                                                   
 
81 We are not claiming there are no forced options which are forced for everyone, just that the option 
to believe or disbelieve a religious hypothesis does not seem to be one of them. 
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We may or may not be able to change our ‘passional nature’ on any particular 
occasion, but this does not exempt us from trying, if we have reason (including 
‘intellectual grounds’) for thinking this a wise course of action. 
 
James’s W2B doctrine on the other hand would let an individual believe an 
evidentially unsupported hypothesis as long as, in that particular moment, (i) it 
was live for her; (ii) its negation was also live and evidentially unsupported; and 
(iii) it appeared to her as part of a forced and momentous option. In its unqualified 
state W2B imposes no duty to question whether one’s current set of live and dead 
hypotheses are sound, and whether any of the decisions one currently sees as 
forced options can be recast as avoidable. 
 
A critic could complain that we are misinterpreting James, and that his point about 
forced options is purely about inductive risk: either accept this claim and the 
potential benefits and harms that might come with it or do not and lose those 
benefits or harms. Consider a secular hypothesis like: 
 
(4.8.1) Vaccine X prevents disease Y. 
 
The practical effects of not believing (4.8.1) either way might be the same as 
believing its negation.82 But here again what generates the forced option is a fact 
about the world in relation to a potential decision. A public health officer cannot 
both administer vaccine X and not administer vaccine X, regardless of how her 
eventual decision got made. She must decide what to do. But this in itself does not 
compel her to see descriptive hypothesis (4.8.1) as part of a forced option, as she 
could continue not to believe either way (perhaps her understanding of the clinical 
trials to date leads her to conclude its effectiveness is not 100% proven) even 
though she knows she must make a decision under risk and decides to administer 
the vaccine. Her ‘passional nature’ may be instrumental in forcing her to a 
decision about what to do before it is too late, but her professionalism may also 
constrain her to submit her mix of relevant live and dead medical hypotheses to 
regular evaluation. 
                                                   
 
82 There is a parallel here with the choice between prioritising the imperative to ‘know the truth’ and 
prioritising the imperative to ‘avoid error‘ (James, 1896, 2000:209): see pp163–165. 
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The key point is that the officer may or may not see descriptive hypothesis (4.8.1) 
as part of a forced option, regardless of the fact that 
 
(4.8.2) Administer vaccine X or do not administer vaccine X 
 
cannot but be a forced option. In practical terms the truly unavoidable decision 
under risk is: either carry out this action and realise the potential benefits and 
harms that might come with it or do not and lose those benefits or harms.83 
 
The officer’s forced option (4.8.2) would also be what James calls momentous, as 
the religious belief dilemma is for an insider like himself: 
 
If religion be true and the evidence for it be still insufficient, I do not wish, by 
putting [Clifford’s] extinguisher upon my nature ... to forfeit my sole chance in 
life of getting upon the winning side (1896, 2000:215-6). 
 
The option would be momentous by being potentially life-changing for the 
individual faced with it and, in the case of vaccine X, potentially for an entire 
population. In an individual with free will the option whether or not to believe a 
‘God hypothesis’ could be momentous if, for her, it is inextricably linked to 
decisions about how to live the rest of her life, including the decision whether or 
not to live the rest of her life with the hypothesised God in her life. It would be 
forced because she has only one life. There is ‘no standing place outside’ the two 
alternatives ‘live the rest of your life with God in your life’ and ‘live the rest of your 
life without God in your life’. 
 
Again compare ‘Either accept this cake or go without it’. This is forced because it 
is about what to do. There are not multiple ways of ‘going without’ a cake, unlike 
the multiple ways of ‘going without’ a descriptive hypothesis. But going without 
cake is trivial, not momentous. 
 
                                                   
 
83 A somewhat different perspective on cases similar to these will be discussed in Chapter 5 under 
the heading of ‘pragmatic encroachment’: see p240ff. 
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The challenge now is to understand how a purely descriptive ‘God hypothesis’ can 
be part of a forced and momentous option. If we focus purely on the descriptive 
content and ignore any implications belief in a God’s existence might have for how 
the individual lives her life, an option involving a ‘God hypothesis’ would no more 
need to be forced than any other option involving descriptive hypotheses, if only 
because ‘atheism’ and ‘agnosticism’ represent two different and distinct 
alternatives to belief, broadly equivalent to the alternatives available to someone 
reluctant to ‘call my theory true’. To ensure the relevant hypotheses are purely 
descriptive we must exclude any behavioural implications of ‘living without God in 
your life’, either while entertaining the possibility that God may exist or because 
you believe God does not exist and therefore cannot be in your life. 
 
We have two distinctions in mind, separate but overlapping. One is between a 
descriptive hypothesis (that something is the case) and a prescriptive hypothesis 
(that something ought to be the case). The other is between a descriptive 
hypothesis and a decision (or potential decision) to do something. Although James 
introduces ‘option’ as a ‘decision between two hypotheses’, many of his examples 
are decisions between two potential actions (or between doing something and not 
doing it).84 
 
These two distinctions overlap in that a prescriptive belief (that something ought or 
ought not to be the case) is typically a belief that something is or is not to be done, 
so in the context of personal voluntary decision-making it is a decision to do 
something or not do it. (The ‘ought’ is not necessarily a moral ought.) This is 
particularly evident in a religious context, where a personal decision to adopt a 
particular religion is typically a decision to live a particular kind of life and behave 
in particular ways, because this is considered the right thing to do – either morally 
right or pragmatically right or a combination of the two. It is plausible that a 
decision whether or not to live a particular kind of life, especially with the holistic 
implications typically associated with religion, can appear both forced and 
momentous to someone faced with the option: forced because it is a mutually 
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exclusive either/or (you have only one life, which you either live this way or not); 
momentous because it can be life-changing – in this world and perhaps the next. 
 
But it is harder to understand how a decision about a purely descriptive hypothesis 
can be either as forced or as momentous, even where the descriptive hypothesis 
is about whether such-and-such omniscient and omnipotent entity exists and is 
the creator of all reality. Indeed it is hard to imagine how a purely descriptive 
hypothesis about an omniscient and omnipotent creator of reality can in practice 
stay free from prescriptive accretions. If you think it is true, or you think it could be 
true, you might understandably start thinking about possible consequences for 
yourself and what, at the very least, you should do to preserve your well-being. 
 
Descriptive content (‘is’) may not generate prescriptive content (‘ought’) all by 
itself. But descriptive content can account for why the prescriptive content arose, 
in the sense that if the descriptive content had not existed then the prescriptive 
content would not have arisen in response. 
 
Take this pair of connected beliefs: 
 
(4.9.1) There is an eternal, omnipresent, omnipotent, omniscient and 
judgmental God responsible for creating and maintaining all there is, 
and which knows everything about you including your innermost 
thoughts. 
 
(4.9.2) Therefore you should do everything in your power to appease this 
God. 
 
The ‘Therefore’ in (4.9.2) represents not logical entailment but an understandable 
pragmatic response. In this sense we can say (4.9.1) accounts for (4.9.2). 
 
If a ‘religious hypothesis’ was only about what is the case – for example (4.9.1) 
with no trace of (4.9.2) – it would seem less likely that the insider would see it as 
part of a forced option, and perhaps also with less justification. A purely 
descriptive hypothesis might have no implications for the individual’s present or 
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future life: the option whether or not to believe being more like ‘Either call my 
[metaphysical] theory true or call it false’, and therefore avoidable. 
 
But for a believer it could be the practical consequences for action and orientation, 
arising from component hypotheses about what ought to be (what is to be done, 
and therefore what to do), which help make it part of a forced option. Her ‘sole 
chance in life of getting upon the winning side’ would depend both on what she 
believes and on what she does. The structured combination of beliefs about what 
is and what ought to be (and so how to live her life) would also help make it 
momentous. She only has one life, to be lived either running ‘the risk of acting as if 
[her] passional need of taking the world religiously might be prophetic and right’ 
(1896, 2000:216), or not. 
 
James’s W2B permissiveness seems then to have an intriguing potential 
consequence in the context of religious belief. Even for an insider a purely 
descriptive religious hypothesis does not have to appear as part of a ‘genuine 
option’. This is because for the individual to see the hypothesis as part of a 
momentous and/or forced option there would need to be implications for how she 
lives her life, guided by prescriptive content about what she should do. It would 
then be that prescriptive content which the descriptive content is bound to which 
makes the resultant nexus part of a living, forced and momentous option, and 
therefore yield for James a legitimate over-belief. However, as previously 
argued,85 in the context of much religious belief the descriptive component is what 
makes the prescriptive component binding. This may not qualify as viciously 
circular reasoning. But it is worth identifying a potential scenario which James’s 
W2B doctrine seems to allow. To avoid misunderstanding, we will refer to both 
prescriptive content about what ought to be and decisions about what to do as 
‘nondescriptive’ content.86 
 
James derives the right to believe an evidentially unsupported live hypothesis from 
its being part of a forced and momentous option. An individual sees the decision 
whether or not to believe a religious hypothesis as a forced and momentous 
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option. The option is forced and momentous for her because of the nondescriptive 
content of the religious hypothesis, not because of its purely descriptive content. 
However in this scenario it was the descriptive content which accounted for the 
nondescriptive content: see (4.9.1–2) above. She then exercises the Jamesian 
right to believe the hypothesis, a right which covers both its descriptive and 
nondescriptive content. The descriptive content makes the nondescriptive content 
binding on her:87 if the God does not exist then its commandments fall away. But 
her right to believe both the descriptive and the nondescriptive content derives 
from the option being forced and momentous, and it is only forced and 
momentous because of its nondescriptive content. If there was only descriptive 
content the option would not have been forced and momentous. 
 




















It is possible of course that James himself might see nothing untoward in a 
sequence of steps like this.88 But anyone who does may see a second major 
benefit in a principle like EP4, which would require an independent evidential 
justification for the descriptive content of a belief. Like the first89 it follows from the 
                                                   
 
87 See p136.  
88 He might indeed reject the distinction between the descriptive and nondescriptive content of a 
hypothesis. 
89 p137. 
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combined descriptive plus prescriptive content of religious belief – although in this 
case the direction of travel is from ought to is rather than is to ought. 
 
Person to person 
 
The conjoined is/ought nature of religious belief90 is a concern with James’s 
overall position: including the implications of W2B in the hands of someone 
without James’s radical-empiricist leanings. And as already argued,91 the issue is 
the conjuring power of its descriptive component. 
 
In the case of a  religious hypothesis like James’s JRH92 the descriptive 
component includes belief in the personal nature of divinity: ‘The universe is no 
longer a mere It to us, but a Thou… (1896, 2000:216).93 If the God is a person, 
and therefore the relation between believer and God is between two persons, then 
we are in a realm where belief proper can slide into faith and trust. For example, 
by adapting (3.6.3)94 we could get, as an address to a God who is assumed to 
exist: 
 
(4.10.1) I believe that if I (succeed in making myself) believe that you will love 
me, this will tend to make you love me. 
 
James maintains that in the context of such ‘living options which the intellect … 
cannot by itself resolve’ we have a ‘right to believe at our own risk any hypothesis 
that is live enough to tempt our will’ (1896, 2000:217). In theory this could mean a 
yet more pre-emptively creative ‘faith in a fact’  (1896, 2000:213-4):95 
 
(4.10.2) I believe that if I (succeed in making myself) believe that you exist for 
me as a person, this will tend to make you exist for me as a person. 
 
                                                   
 
90 See 4.2 Compound structure of religious belief p131. 
91 See p136ff. 
92 p166ff. 
93 See (4.6.1.3) p167. 
94 p114. 
95 See p110. 
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‘Exist as a person’ is convenient wording to distinguish it from, say, ‘exist as a 
force of nature’ or ‘exist as an inanimate object’; and to accommodate James’s 
characterisation that ‘any relation that may be possible from person to person 
might be possible here’ (1896, 2000:216) – which would include perceived duties 
and obligations. 
 
The issue is that, depending on how we interpret the relevant parts of James’s 
framework, I could end up with a legitimate belief that a God exists as a person. 
This is significant because, as argued in Chapter 3,96 an interpersonal context can 
introduce additional ‘faith in a fact’ imperatives like those of trust and generosity 
which could exonerate instances of over-belief.  
 
The context of (4.10.1) is that we are assuming the God exists and is a person (‘If 
the God is a person…’). But if there are circumstances where we can legitimately 
believe the God exists and is a person, then under those circumstances 
assumption is unnecessary. Our working definition of belief is that ‘our beliefs are 
what we regard as true’ and ‘what I believe is just how things are for me’. So if I 
(legitimately) believe that H, then H is (legitimately) what is true for me. James 
identifies circumstances where we can legitimately believe a hypothesis which is 
unsupported by evidence but forms part of a genuine option. Consider where H = 
‘God exists and is a person’ and assume our working definition of belief. Now, if 
there are circumstances where I can legitimately believe that ‘God exists and is a 
person’ then in those circumstances ‘God exists and is a person’ will be a 
legitimate statement of how things are for me. So if I legitimately believe the God 
exists as a person, this means the God exists as a person for me. 
 
If the God is a person for me, that means I would (should) relate to the God as 
one moral agent to another, and would have additional moral duties which I would 
not have were the God an impersonal object. As examples from Chapter 3 
illustrate (‘Faith in a fact’,97 ‘Smith and Jones’,98 ‘Husband and wife’99), these 
include additional doxastic duties, tending to favour belief over doubt. In the 
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context of EP4 these additional duties would be subsumed under the ‘conflicting 
and overriding moral imperative’ condition.  
 
Correctly applied however EP4 would disallow from inception any over-beliefs in 
the existence and personhood of God. This is therefore a third reason for adopting 
EP4 in respect of religious belief. 
 
We must remember however that James speaks of our right to believe ‘at our own 
risk’ (1896, 2000:217). It is time to unpack this. 
 
At our own risk 
 
James sees religious belief as a purely private affair: 
 
No one of us ought to issue vetoes to the other, nor should we bandy words 
of abuse. We ought, on the contrary, delicately and profoundly to respect 
one another’s mental freedom: … then only shall we live and let live, in 
speculative as well as in practical things. (1896, 2000:218) 
 
This aligns with his discussion elsewhere of ‘over-beliefs’ being ‘absolutely 
indispensable’ to an ‘individual’s religion’, and which 
 
we should treat … with tenderness and tolerance so long as they are not 
intolerant themselves. (1902, 1960:489-90) 
 
If an individual’s religious over-belief is purely private, only that individual bears 
the ‘risk’. If James assumes this, then the right to believe at our own risk would 
equate to the right to believe, which in the context of religious belief is purely at 
our own risk. 
 
If so it is not an assumption Clifford would share, with his ‘credulous’ societies 
reverting to ‘savagery’. James could however stipulate that ‘at our own risk’ 
acknowledges and explicitly excludes scenarios where the effects of religious 
belief extend beyond the individual believer. In that case the quarrel between 
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Clifford and James would only apply in theory with no practical consequences.100 
At a practical level Clifford could allow the ‘right to believe at our own risk’ 
because he sees no hypotheses (i) which could be believed despite insufficient 
evidence, and (ii) where the potential net negative consequences would only 
impact the over-believer herself. 
 
A Jamesian could counter that (ii), which would require evaluating the 
consequences of belief beyond the believer herself, itself represents a ‘genuine 
option’ involving how to balance the risk of consequential harm (to others) from 
the believer’s credulity against the loss of consequential good (to others) from the 
potential believer’s failure to believe. The Jamesian could say we have no unique, 
external criterion to decide for us, so we remain in the realm of choice, where 
‘[o]ur passional nature not only lawfully may, but must, decide’ (1896, 2000:205). 
 
On behalf of EP4 we would agree we are in the moral domain – where moral 
positives and negatives net against each other. Clifford and EP4 see credulity as a 
bad thing, because of its corrupting influence. The total consequential harm from 
an individual act of over-belief may be major or minor, but will be non-zero – 
discounting any potential benefit of that same over-belief, which we must factor in. 
James sees a kind of benefit which can only accrue from religious over-belief: 
 
Since belief is measured by action, he who forbids us to believe religion to 
be true, necessarily also forbids us to act as we should if we did believe it to 
be true. The whole defence of religious faith hinges upon action. If the action 
required or inspired by the religious hypothesis is in no way different from 
that dictated by the naturalistic hypothesis, then religious faith is a pure 
superfluity, better pruned away… (1896, 2000:217 footnote) 
 
James seems to claim a necessary connection between religious belief and a 
particular kind of (desirable) behaviour. But do we have good reason to think such 
behaviour impossible without religious belief? 
 
                                                   
 
100 We will pick this up later p198ff. 
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There are, say, Christians and Jews who do not believe in the literal existence of 
their God as an entity inside, outside or in any way related to the universe, but are 
Christians or Jews by subscribing to their understanding of the Christian or Jewish 
way of life, without over-beliefs. A subset of these will be morally good individuals 
because of conforming to the Christian or Jewish way of life. Other Christians 
and/or Jews will have over-beliefs about the literal existence of their God and be 
morally good because of those over-beliefs. 
 
But James’s case rests on this last group having no other option, because of 
something about religious belief. Given the actual and potential negative 
outcomes from over-belief, if James claims a general right to over-belief in a 
religious context because an ‘action required or inspired by the religious 
hypothesis’ could be ‘different from that dictated by the naturalistic hypothesis’ 
(‘different’ implying ‘possibly superior as a result of that difference’) he must 
identify something unique about religious over-belief which can make someone 
morally good in a way otherwise unachievable. We could grant this might be true 
for an individual: that for whatever reason she can only be as morally good as she 
is because of her over-beliefs. If so, then it would be morally right for her to over-
believe. That is how moral decision-making goes. It would not undermine EP4. But 
to claim a general right to religious over-belief needs something universally unique 
about religious over-belief. This is what the footnote passage (1896, 2000:217) 
seems to claim. There is no quarrel if James is only comparing ‘religious 
hypothesis’ action with ‘naturalistic hypothesis’ action for an individual. Sometimes 
it is right to lie; sometimes even to kill. 
 
James’s position relies on there being a distinct category of beliefs where applying 
a principle like CP or EP4 would systematically result in a net loss of good. But all 
he seems to offer in support are (i) his belief in his own version of the religious 
hypothesis (JRH); (ii) his belief that his belief in JRH provides him with otherwise 
unachievable moral benefits; and (iii) his belief that his belief in JRH provides him 
access to an otherwise unachievable truth. These beliefs are no doubt sincerely 
held. But they are hardly enough to convince anyone outside James’s own belief 
system that any of it justifies rejecting a principle like EP4. 
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James could retort that he is not offering objectively compelling reasons for 
everyone, just claiming more modestly that such belief is sometimes permissible. 
But then there is no conflict. EP4 ‘permits’ individual instances of over-belief, 
where the over-belief is justifiably intended to achieve some other moral good 
which overrides the wrong of over-belief. If that is all James is claiming, then his 
permissiveness is ‘compatible’ with EP4 – as the moral rightness of lying to the 
Gestapo is ‘compatible’ with the otherwise general moral principle that lying is 
wrong. 
 
Indeed, if the individual’s circumstance was exactly that – that over-belief was the 
only way to achieve that net moral good – then she would morally obliged to over-
believe, not just permitted. James is saying however that because the genuine 
option cannot be decided on intellectual grounds, the non-rational willing nature is 
obliged to choose, but permitted to choose either hypothesis. There is no 
obligation to choose one hypothesis over another. But in our extreme scenario 
where over-belief is permitted, it is permitted despite EP4, and is obligatory – 
because of one or more other moral principles.101 
 
Otherwise we are merely acknowledging that the moral realm is one of choice and 
at times we face moral dilemmas because our principles give conflicting guidance. 
Do we have a uniquely correct way to resolve such dilemmas, for example rules 
about how to apply our principles together? We might posit a shared conception of 
the good, perhaps a utilitarian formula. But we may not agree this as a principle, 
or agree the formula. Despite our best intentions and ingenuity we may conclude 
that unresolvable moral dilemmas will always remain; and if so how do we decide 
what to do? What else can we employ (a Jamesian might ask) but ‘our passional 
and volitional nature’ (1896, 2000:217)? 
 
This rejoinder may be problematic for Clifford, but not for EP4. If we face a moral 
dilemma because the available options need us to choose between principles 
which in a specific context conflict, then any rationale we use to decide would at 
                                                   
 
101 We will have more to say about this later: p200. 
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most qualify as a prescriptive belief. It would be subject to CP, but not to EP4, 
which excludes prescriptive beliefs, and is itself a moral belief.  
 
Although EP4 is a moral principle, it cannot resolve dilemmas arising from 
conflicting moral principles, including itself. A conflict between ‘it is wrong to lie’ 
and ‘it is wrong to harm an innocent person’ cannot be resolved using either 
principle: if it could there would be no dilemma. 
 
But if it is a genuine moral dilemma (a Jamesian might then respond), this could 
be precisely where reason runs out and our ‘passional nature’ must take over. If 
so then there might be little distance between James and EP4, with the difference 
only one of emphasis: EP4, like Clifford, emphasising the potential social 
implications of encouraged and ingrained habits of over-belief; James assuming 
these can be ignored in the apparent privacy of religious belief.102 
 
Depending how we interpret James however there is one way of resolving a moral 
dilemma which he would apparently permit but which EP4 would disallow. This we 




We have stressed that one reason religious belief is such a significant test case is 
its compound descriptive/prescriptive structure. A key aspect of this is the 
consequences for the believer’s moral sovereignty. There may be restrictions over 
the kind of religious belief James’s model would allow, depending on what ‘at our 
own risk’ means exactly. 
 
James’s W2B doctrine licenses the individual to believe any hypothesis forming 
part of a genuine option which cannot be decided on intellectual (including 
evidential) grounds. A hypothesis must be live for our will to choose it – and we 
have established103 that whether or not a hypothesis is live for us can indirectly 
result from an ‘action of our willing nature’.  
                                                   
 
102 See later p195ff where we discuss another potential rapprochement between James and EP4. 
103 pp156–160. 
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Take this ‘living option’: 
 
Hypothesis (4.11.1) = the combination of (4.1.1) ‘God exists’ + (4.1.2) ‘God 
is the source of morality, in that what God commands must be obeyed’ 
 
Hypothesis (4.11.2) = ‘hypothesis (4.11.1) is false’ 
 
W2B would allow someone to have (4.11.1) plus (4.11.2) as a living option, even if 
(4.11.1) only became live for her as an indirect result of mixing with adherents who 
believed (4.11.1). W2B would let her believe either (4.11.1) or (4.11.2). 
 
We will now expand (4.11.1) to include commandments to persecute non-
believers and cede her moral sovereignty to God. The latter would mean a 
commandment she believes is from her God takes priority over any conflicting 
imperative from her own conscience. 
 
But where does that leave James’s injunction to tolerate each other’s over-beliefs 
‘so long as they are not intolerant themselves’? If the tolerance imperative takes 
precedence, there are versions of the expanded (4.11.1) which James would not 
allow – particularly those including the imperative to cede one’s moral sovereignty 
to God. So the individual’s own moral position (were she to follow James’s ethic of 
tolerance) would in this case trump an imperative from God. But this sits uneasily 
with James’s ‘The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life’ (1891, 2000): 
 
Our attitude towards concrete evils is entirely different in a world where we 
believe there are none but finite demanders, from what it is in one where we 
joyously face tragedy for an infinite demander’s sake… 
 
It … is my final conclusion …that the stable and systematic moral universe 
for which the ethical philosopher asks is fully possible only in a world where 
there is a divine thinker with all-enveloping demands. [Emphases 
added.] (1891, 2000:262) 
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How would James respond to the option whether or not to cede his own ‘finite’ 
moral sovereignty to God? His position seems to lead to what we might call a 
‘sovereignty dilemma’, as it is unclear what sort of God would remain if we 
ourselves supply, or at least vet, its commandments. Either: (i) James permits 
belief in the existence of a God which countermands his own moral sovereignty 
and issues demands which might conflict with his own principles, perhaps forcing 
him to change his principles as those of a mere ‘finite demander’; or (ii) the only 
prescriptions James would allow the God to impose would be ones compatible 
with his own principles. But where does that leave those ‘eternal’ and ‘overlapping 
... things in the universe that throw the last stone’; that ‘Thou’ who is the ‘more 
perfect and more eternal aspect of the universe’? 
 
James could perhaps respond that surely all reflective believers think there is work 
to be done in deciding right from wrong according to their religious and/or moral 
principles. But the issue is precisely what status these other principles have. He 
seems to allow two incompatible positions: (i) the believer’s moral sovereignty, so 
any other principles she has, could end up subordinate to her God; and (ii) the 
believer’s moral sovereignty stays paramount, so one or more of her other moral 
principles can take priority over imperatives she believes are from her God. 
 
In the here and now (ii) seems to hold sway: ‘There is but one unconditional 
commandment, which is that we should seek incessantly, with fear and trembling, 
so to vote and to act as to bring about the very largest total universe of good 
which we can see’ (1891, 2000:259). But projecting forward, James gets closer to 
(i): 
 
In the interests of our own ideal of systematically unified moral truth … we … 
must postulate a divine thinker, and pray for the victory of the religious 
cause. 
 
Were this divine thinker to exist, 
 
his way of subordinating [his ‘all-enveloping’] demands to one another would 
be the finally valid casuistic scale; his claims would be the most appealing; 
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his ideal universe would be the most inclusive realizable whole (1891, 
2000:262). 
 
James then tacks back towards (ii): 
 
…exactly what the thought of the infinite thinker may be is hidden from us 
even were we sure of his existence; so that our postulation of him after all 
serves only to let loose in us the strenuous mood (1891, 2000:262) 
 
– a mood which, among other things, 
 
makes us quite indifferent to present ill, if only the greater ideal be attained 
(1891, 2000:260). 
 
In his own case, agnosticism about what the God’s imperatives would be protects 
him from dogmatic and potentially repressive consequences. But his W2B doctrine 
in isolation is intended as a general ‘defence of our right to adopt a believing 
attitude in religious matters’ (1891, 2000:198), without stipulating that others must 
qualify their religious beliefs in equivalent ways. 
 
Perhaps reflective believers do see a duty to decide right from wrong according to 
their religious and/or moral principles. But not all believers are reflective, and 
‘reflective’ can mean different things to different people. Whether reflective or not, 
believers exist who do not share James’s agnosticism about the content of divine 
imperatives – and might think such agnosticism misses the point of religious 
belief. The concern remains that religious apologetics can lead a believer to stifle 
her own conscience. JRH evades this by subscribing to a Cowperian divine 
mystery, but W2B does not mandate it. 
 
If the ‘God is sovereign’ alternative (i) stands, then James would permit beliefs like 
the expanded (4.11.1), trumping his tolerance imperative with potentially 
intolerable results. We should also remember the moral meta-principle of 
‘universality’. The Golden Rule and Kant’s Categorical Imperative for example 
both entail that whatever is right or wrong, permitted or forbidden, applies to all, 
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even if the exact domain of ‘all’ is undefined. For Singer, as for Hume, universality 
is implicit in moral discourse: 
 
In a dispute between members of a cohesive group of reasoning beings, the 
demand for a reason is a demand for a justification that can be accepted by 
the group as a whole. Thus the reason offered must be disinterested, at 
least to the extent of being equally acceptable to all. As David Hume put it, a 
person offering a moral justification must “depart from his private and 
particular situation and must choose a point of view common to him with 
others; he must move some universal principle of the human frame and 
touch a string to which all mankind have an accord and symphony.” (Hume, 
1777, 1902, 1970: Section IX, Part 1, p272; Singer, 2011:93) 
 
In our present context that universality implies that, if W2B allows James to 
believe in his sort of God, it should allow others to believe in theirs. This does not 
mean that if it is morally permissible to believe in a certain type of God then it is 
morally permissible to believe in other forms of God. But the rationale James uses 
to justify religious belief does not constrain the content of the belief. W2B applies 
not just to JRH but to any hypothesis forming part of a ‘genuine option that cannot 
by its nature be decided on intellectual grounds’ – which JRH would be an 
example of. His ‘tenderness and tolerance’ imperative is independent of W2B. If 
he bases his objection to a principle like CP on the claim that in his specific case, 
his own religious belief provides moral benefits which outweigh the potential moral 
benefit of conforming to CP, then although this might count against CP it would 
not count against EP4 because of EP4’s ‘conflicting moral imperative’ condition. 
But he seems to consider his generic W2B argument on its own a sound objection 
to CP. So we are not saying that if we assume it is permissible, for whatever 
reasons, for James to believe in his kind of God then we must assume it is 
permissible for anyone else to believe in their kind of God. We are arguing that if it 
is legitimate for James to use his generic W2B argument to justify his belief in his 
kind of God, then it should be legitimate for anyone else to use that same generic 
W2B argument to justify their belief in their kind of God. (Conversely: it may or 
may not be morally permissible to believe JRH, but if it is, the reason is not W2B.) 
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We would therefore advocate an explicit moral principle like EP4 to guard against 
over-belief with negative consequences, even if sometimes the principle, like 
perhaps all moral principles, will lead to moral dilemmas which cannot be resolved 
by reason alone. 
 
This however opens the possibility of another line of attack: could other moral 
principles do the same work as EP4; and if so why favour EP4? As this chapter 
primarily pits EP4 against a contrasting Jamesian position, we shall revisit 
James’s ‘sovereignty dilemma’ and see if Jamesian alternatives to EP4 can 
resolve it. 
 
Sovereignty dilemma revisited 
 
Our interpretation of James has generated a dilemma. Either (i) he is defending an 
individual’s right to hold religious beliefs which conflict with his own tolerance 
ethic.104 Or (ii) some combinations of religious belief components will fall outside 
the freedom he would grant. These combinations may not be universal across all 
religious belief, but they are common and familiar. Of special concern is when 
belief in a religious dimension to reality (‘God’ for convenience) incorporates belief 
in moral imperatives derived from that God, including the imperative to cede one’s 
moral sovereignty to the God one believes exists. 
 
One possible response to (i) is that our interpretation is unfair, and James’s 
position is rather that we are inevitably swimming in a sea of moral and existential 
choices so the legitimacy of belief only makes sense at the level of (moral) value. 
But then he could have made his case much quicker, without live hypotheses and 
genuine options. If his defence of our ‘right to adopt a believing attitude in religious 
matters’ (1896, 2000:198) was just that, in respect of a specific religious belief, it 
would be legitimate if it led to a better moral outcome than not believing, then he 
only need argue there are occasions when it is right to disobey CP, just as there 
are occasions when it is right to lie. EP4 recognises this. Also it is not obvious that 
                                                   
 
104 See p185ff. 
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when it is right to disobey CP would necessarily be when the individual is faced 
with a Jamesian genuine option.105 
 
Arguably, James’s treatment of live and dead hypotheses makes horn (i) even 
more problematic. He lets an individual believe a live hypothesis as an act of will if 
it forms part of an undecidable genuine option. But a hypothesis can be live as an 
indirect result of an act of will. So if there is nothing (including no conflicting 
evidence) to make the hypothesis dead, one or more actions of her ‘willing nature’ 
can indirectly make it live. She may not be able to make it live by direct volition, 
but could, by deliberately suppressing doubt and controlling her social interactions 
and intellectual exposure, nurture it into life. She could then legitimately believe it, 
as long as it forms part of a genuine option. 
 
So if we take horn (i), James would allow the individual to end up legitimately 
holding a set of descriptive and prescriptive beliefs with intolerant and repressive 
consequences, for example to persecute blasphemers, if that is what she believes 
her God commands. 
 
A critic might object that if the set of live hypotheses generates a dilemma – 
and/or supposedly legitimate beliefs with morally objectionable consequences – 
that would count as ‘intellectual grounds’ for non-belief. But believers who insist on 
holding intolerant and oppressive versions of hypothesis (4.11.1) are not obviously 
guilty of a logical contradiction or factual mistake. For example I believe a religious 
hypothesis in the form of (4.11.1) can have negative moral consequences which 
would be reason enough to reject it. This is because I see a supreme 
metaphysical belief fused with a supreme prescriptive belief as dangerous. But 
this is a moral view, not a theoretical position. A theist trusting her God’s 
                                                   
 
105 It could be claimed that on James’s overall position it is permissible to believe a genuine option 
provided that belief itself will not have clear negative moral consequences, whereas on EP4 it is only 
permissible to over-believe if there is a moral benefit. On the face of it this seems a distinction, with 
James’s position being more permissive. But, as mentioned previously (pp153–156), we should not 
make too much of the apparent difference between EP4’s requirement of a net moral benefit versus 
James’s requirement of no net moral harm. In exceptional circumstances EP4’s ‘conflicting and 
overriding moral imperative’ condition could be achieved purely by preserving an individual’s right to 
liberty where no harm is likely to be incurred by a third party. We need to remember the rationale for 
EP4, as that for CP, in avoiding the insidious and corrosive effects of over-belief in a social context, 
which James by comparison seems to downplay. From the perspective of EP4 and CP the 
circumstances when over-belief incurred no third-party risk would generally be seen as exceptional. 
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goodness may not share my concern. Had James also seen this fusion as 
dangerous he would have expressed W2B and/or JRH differently. 
 
We could perhaps loop round again and suggest this may reinforce James’s point 
since what lies at the bottom is a moral judgment, not a factual belief. But then 
James and EP4 are not in conflict, as EP4 excludes prescriptive beliefs. And 
besides, is James really saying it rests on a moral decision? His position seems 
more permissive than saying we are morally constrained as to acquiring and 
holding descriptive beliefs: that for example we should generally meet an 
evidential requirement, but there are circumstances when the possibility of net 
moral benefit overrides this imperative. 
 
James could argue he has been clear which horn he would take: 
 
I do not think that any one can accuse me of preaching reckless faith. I have 
preached the right of the individual to indulge his personal faith at his 
personal risk. I have discussed the kinds of risk; I have contended that none 
of us escape all of them; and I have only pleaded that it is better to face 
them open-eyed than to act as if we did not know them to be there. (1897, 
2000:195) 
 
But his approach to religious hypotheses is revealing: 
 
If religious hypotheses about the universe be in order at all, then the active 
faiths of individuals in them … are the experimental tests by which they are 
verified, and the only means by which their truth or falsehood can be 
wrought out. The truest scientific hypothesis is that which … ‘works’ best; 
and it can be no otherwise with religious hypotheses. Religious history 
proves that one hypothesis after another has worked ill, has crumbled at 
contact with a widening knowledge of the world, and has lapsed from the 
minds of men. Some articles of faith, however, have maintained themselves 
through every vicissitude …: it is for the ‘science of religions’ to tell us just 
which hypotheses these are. Meanwhile the freest competition of the various 
faiths with one another, and their openest application to life by their several 
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champions, are the most favorable conditions under which the survival of the 
fittest can proceed. … [I]t is only when they forget that they are hypotheses 
and put on rationalistic and authoritative pretensions, that our faiths do 
harm. The most interesting and valuable things about a man are his ideals 
and over-beliefs. (1897, 2000:196-7)   
 
So even if a hypothesis is believed, it stays a hypothesis. A religious hypothesis, 
like a scientific hypothesis, need only ‘work’. We should therefore be reassured 
that James’s own religious hypotheses would never ‘forget that they are 
hypotheses’. But what of hypotheses which do forget, and which include 
imperatives which (4.11.1) could include? Is it morally safe or sound to leave 
these and their ‘several champions’ to fight it out to see which get ‘verified’ and 
which ‘crumble’ or ‘lapse’? Ideals and over-beliefs can also be our most 
dangerous things, inflaming a survival of the fittest into a Thirty Years War. 
 
The concern is that, to be palatable, James’s doxastic permissiveness – 
considering W2B in isolation – must be constrained by other moral principles (for 
toleration, say, and against ‘rationalistic and authoritative pretensions’), which 
would then stop religious belief submitting to a ‘more perfect and more eternal… 
Thou’ (1896, 2000:216), an ‘infinite demander … with all-enveloping demands’ 
(1891, 2000:262) – which for James seems the whole point of religious belief. 
 
A critic might object that the moral optimism which JRH projects does not imply 
there cannot be moral assessment of religious claims. But James has two 
separate theses: W2B, leading to a conditional, but generic, doxastic 
permissiveness; and his specific JRH, which includes his moral optimism. JRH is 
an example of what he thinks an individual has the right to believe, but this does 
not limit what W2B would allow others to believe. JRH speaks of an ‘infinite 
demander … with all-enveloping demands’, but also incorporates agnosticism 
about what that infinite demander’s demands are as they would be ‘hidden from 
us’. But there is no necessity about that agnosticism: W2B would let another 
individual subscribe to another ‘infinite demander’ and not only think she knows its 
demands, but also make them sovereign over her own and everyone else’s moral 
values. We are not claiming anything leads to a situation where there cannot be 
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moral assessment of religious claims, but that W2B can let an individual believe 
there cannot be (individual, human, ‘finite’) moral assessment of religious claims. 
W2B does not seem to be a thesis which can be left unqualified.106 
 
And although James’s picture of natural selection among ‘hypotheses’ and ‘faiths’ 
seems not to reflect reality (where the ‘several champions’ can forget their 
hypotheses are only hypotheses) we must assume he intended his comments to 
address the real world. So if one is balancing risk that would be another reason to 
back a principle like EP4 against Jamesian permissiveness – which is not just 
about what hypotheses to consider, but about what and how to believe. 
 
He is, after all, asserting our right to ‘decide an option between propositions’ 
(1896, 2000:205), our ‘right to adopt a believing attitude in religious matters’ 
(1896, 2000:198), our ‘right to believe at our own risk any hypothesis that is live 
enough to tempt our will’ (1896, 2000:217). He hardly needs the length of his 
essay to argue our right to entertain a hypothesis, something merely ‘proposed to 
our belief’ (1896, 2000:199). [Emphases added]. Neither Clifford nor EP4 would 
deny this right. Perhaps therefore we should see his talk of hypotheses versus 
rationalistic faiths as distinguishing not between entertaining something and 
believing it but between fallible belief and dogmatism.107 
 
We will now set aside worries about apparent inconsistencies within James’s 
overall position, and evaluate two similar but related alternative moral principles,108 
both appropriately ‘Jamesian’ and ‘liberal’, to see if either or both could be as 
effective as EP4 in ensuring we avoid legitimising harmful prescriptive beliefs.109 
                                                   
 
106 In response to a potential ‘tu quoque’ we should point out that W2B is formulated to identify a 
distinct category of beliefs representing a principled exception to an evidence principle like CP, 
derived from James’s conception of a ‘genuine option’. Our objective has been to see if there is 
anything in W2B to threaten EP4, which we are offering as a candidate moral principle based on a 
modified wording of CP, and with a more restricted application than CP. The wording of EP4 already 
reflects some potential conflicts, but in practical applications EP4, like every other moral principle, 
will always encounter other conflicts because EP4, like most if not all moral principles, is not an 
absolute, in that it does not automatically override other moral principles. Our claim is simply that 
W2B is less successful than James seems to have thought in identifying a distinct category of beliefs 
representing a principled exception to a principle like CP. 
107 See also pp161–163. 
108 See p190. 
109 A critic could perhaps complain this is long overdue, and that there has all along been a 
reasonable and reasonably clear way to interpret James. This is that we are permitted to believe 
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Alternatives to an evidence principle 
 
We are taking it as given that intuitively immoral views can sometimes be 
supported by religious beliefs. One way to invalidate such views would be a 
principle like EP4. But we could instead try setting other moral principles against 
them. 
 
For example a Jamesian ‘tolerance principle’ (1902, 1960:489-90):110 
 
WJT One must always be tolerant of others’ beliefs which seem to 
contradict views of one’s own held on insufficient evidence. 
 
WJT is clearly socially contextualised. We could also though propose an equally 
Jamesian, non-socially contextualised, ‘fallibility principle’:111 
 
WJF It is always wrong to hold beliefs for which there is insufficient 
evidence dogmatically. 
 
We will now assess the effectiveness of these principles against someone who 
believes her moral beliefs represent the will of the God she believes exists and is 
the source of morality. 
 
A potential issue with both is that once you have made the leap into religious 
belief and then into believing your God supreme over your own moral conscience, 
you could feel justified in believing your God decides what counts as tolerance or 
dogmatism. This will not of course always apply: the concern though is whether 
                                                                                                                                             
 
either hypothesis in a genuine option, providing the resultant belief does not have clear negative 
moral consequences and is held non-dogmatically. It seems however at least equally reasonable to 
pursue, as we have done, the implications of a religious hypothesis which is part of that genuine 
option but which describes a divine source of moral law (‘infinite demander with all-enveloping 
demands’) with a different evaluation of what the positive and negative moral consequences of the 
resultant belief might be and which insists that that same resultant belief is not open to question. 
110 See p181. 
111 [T]he intellect, even with truth directly in its grasp, may have no infallible signal for knowing 
whether it be truth or no (1896, 2000:208). 
   196 
WJT or WJF could ever let through a belief the content of which could then 
neutralise either or both principles. 
 
Take WJT. If you believe your God is the supreme God, must you be tolerant of 
someone else saying their God is the supreme God? A lot will hinge on the exact 
meaning of ‘tolerance’. If you believe H could you be ‘tolerant’ of someone who 
believes not-H? Perhaps by not doing anything which would count as denying the 
other’s right to believe not-H? For example you should not vote to make the other 
person’s belief in not-H illegal, or persecute her for expressing her belief in not-H. 
But if you really believe your God exists and is the unique creator of the universe 
you cannot ‘tolerate’ another’s view that her God is the unique creator of the same 
universe, if this means holding two contradictory beliefs at the same time. 
 
And it might be hard to hold a principle of fallibility like WJF at the same time as a 
belief in a God claiming to be the infallible supreme being and creator of the 
universe. Not only must the God’s imperatives be subordinate to WJT and WJF, 
but the God cannot impose its own criteria of tolerance and dogmatism. 
 
For a more secular concern with WJF, there are times when the last thing you 
would want is a principle of fallibility. As you hurl yourself across a chasm would 
you want to remember you could be wrong or would you rather believe as 
dogmatically as possible that you will reach the other side? Indeed it might be 
psychologically impossible to reap the benefits of over-belief while staying 
nondogmatic. Compare this with EP4 where the justification for your over-belief is 
your conflicting and overriding moral imperative to stay alive – for your loved ones 
if not for yourself. 
 
James may not accept this implication of WJF as he uses the chasm story against 
Clifford.112 Having convinced himself that his leap will succeed James might cling 
to his conviction ‘as if it never could be reinterpretable or corrigible’ (1896, 
2000:207), with the cake he has just eaten still safe in his hand.113 His defence 
could be that it is a ‘genuine option’ and he was believing dogmatically at his ‘own 
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risk’. That in turn suggests an ‘own risk’ condition should be added to WJF if not 
WJT as well.114 
 
We come now to perhaps the most serious apparent weakness of WJT and WJF 
compared to a more explicit evidence principle. In their basic form they both 
largely ignore the social implications of Clifford’s justification for CP. Ostensibly we 
might appear to be just over-believing but inwardly exercising tolerance and 
fallibility. We therefore risk encouraging others to over-believe. 
 
You could of course hold both EP4 and WJT or WJF simultaneously, or indeed all 
three. They do not contradict each other. We are not arguing WJT and WJF are 
wrong, just that neither one nor both together seem powerful enough yet to 
replace EP4. Could we though make the case that having EP4 does not remove 
the rationale for WJT or WJF, as even obeying EP4 you could still end up holding 
an over-belief, arising from a conflicting and overriding moral imperative? You 
could for example be convinced, with no counter-evidence to suggest otherwise, 
that because of something in your make-up you need to believe a God exists in 
order to be the best person you can be. EP4 would then allow (indeed require) 
you to believe in your particular God.  
 
Perhaps WJF might then stop you holding your belief dogmatically, by 
encouraging you to be open to alternative ways of thinking which might lead you 
to re-evaluate your belief and/or your reasons for believing. But EP4 on its own 
should do this, as it only exonerates over-belief while the conflicting and overriding 
moral imperative applies. 
 
As far as WJT is concerned, there is little wrong with a general principle of 
tolerance, but again no particular reason to think EP4 incomplete without it. A 
justification someone holding EP4 might have for holding an over-belief in God is 
to be the best person she could be. This would typically entail conforming to other 
moral principles: tolerance, yes; but also love, justice and so on. 
 
                                                   
 
114 We will pick up on this later: p198. 
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Would WJT and/or WJF be as effective as EP4 against the potential negative 
consequences of over-belief in general and of religious over-belief in particular? 
This seems unlikely: if, that is, you broadly accept the Cliffordian social rationale 
for CP. If you do accept this, then you would in any case need to add James’s ‘at 
your own risk’ into the mix. 
 
We are approaching a position where the attempt to distinguish the practical 
consequences of adopting EP4 from the practical consequences of a Jamesian 
alternative gets difficult.115 Clifford emphasises the negative social consequences 
of over-belief while James downplays them. But (we must ask although it may be 
unanswerable) what if both were privy to the same sociological evidence and saw 
that evidence in the same way? 
 
We are characterising the Jamesian position as essentially liberal: stressing 
individual liberty but constrained by social impact. The contrasting Cliffordian 
position could be described as socially protectionist. In drafting EP4 we have 
modified this, as we have other aspects of CP, but without sacrificing its core 
content. 
 
The difference between James and Clifford/EP4 can be illustrated by what seem 
their respective motivations. James appears driven by a desire to preserve 
religious belief as a legitimate endeavour, Clifford by a desire to optimise 
epistemic behaviour and minimise the negative social consequences of endemic 
credulity. EP4 shares Clifford’s priority, but offset with a desire to maintain 
fairness. EP4 does not share James’s aim of preserving the legitimacy of religious 
belief, but it aims to be morally impregnable. The EP4 position would see no 
intrinsic value in religious belief itself has, but a person’s right to hold a religious 
belief if this is truly at her own risk could have an intrinsic value which any EP4 
‘verdict’ should reflect. 
 
It is possible therefore that a Jamesian and a proponent of EP4, faced with the 
same evidence concerning the consequences of doxastic behaviour and with the 
                                                   
 
115 Alluded to earlier p181. 
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same evaluation of that evidence, could in practice make the same judgments: the 
Jamesian from a desire to legitimise religious belief as long as it avoids negative 
consequences; the EP4-proponent from an imperative to promote good doxastic 
behaviour without restricting individual freedom unnecessarily, in areas where no 
harm will result or it is very unlikely that harm will result. It would not obviously 
defeat the purpose of EP4 if the doxastic liberty the Jamesian says you have a 
right to when any risk is truly only to yourself would count for EP4, all by itself, as 
a conflicting and overriding moral imperative. 
 
It is also worth noting that WJT and WJF are themselves worded as evidence 
principles of a sort. Like EP4 they both specify what should be done in respect of 
beliefs held on insufficient evidence. All three permit beliefs held on sufficient 
evidence without further condition. So both WJT and WJF, like EP4, presuppose a 
workable criterion of ‘sufficient evidence’ – which will be the subject of Chapter 5. 
 
The Jamesian cluster of WJT + WJF differs however from EP4 in their treatment 
of over-beliefs: 
 
WJT: Over-beliefs are legitimate as long as one is tolerant of others’ over-
beliefs which contradict them. 
 
WJF: Over-beliefs are legitimate as long as they are held on the assumption 
of fallibility, so not dogmatically. 
 
EP4 by comparison considers over-beliefs legitimate as long as they are 
necessitated by a conflicting and overriding moral imperative. 
 
Neither WJT nor WJF as currently worded addresses the potential social 
consequences of over-belief which EP4, following CP, targets in its focus on 
doxastic behaviour. To plug this gap we added the Jamesian condition of ‘at the 
believer’s own risk’. So we can now summarise an overall Jamesian position of 
conditional freedom: 
 
   200 
Over-beliefs are legitimate as long as the conditions of tolerance (WJT), 
fallibility (WJF) and ‘own risk’ are met. 
 
EP4 is currently expressed in terms of mitigated constraint, but could be recast in 
terms of freedom: 
 
Over-beliefs are legitimate as long as there is a net moral benefit in allowing 
yourself this freedom (and/or a net moral cost in not allowing yourself this 
freedom). 
 
EP4 effectively wraps up the three ‘Jamesian’ conditions in its single blanket moral 
condition. 
 
Now to reintroduce the Cliffordian ‘shared epistemic asset’ in the rationale for EP4 
and its focus on doxastic behaviour. Ostensibly the Jamesian stance does not 
accommodate this. To ensure equivalence we should therefore stipulate that the 
‘own risk’ condition incorporates this: to reflect the evident possibility that poor 
doxastic behaviour could have a negative impact on our shared epistemic asset. 
 
We mentioned earlier116 that, in a scenario where EP4’s conflicting and overriding 
moral imperative permitted an over-belief, it would be because it was obligatory. 
This contrasts with James’s ‘genuine option’, where the over-belief would be 
permitted but not obligatory. Our comparison between the Jamesian position and 
EP4 provides another explanation of this difference. EP4 presupposes a default 
duty to protect our shared epistemic asset. This means EP4 would exclude the 
freedom to choose between over-belief and disbelief, since in any context where 
disbelief would be permitted the over-belief alternative would not be open to us as, 
other things being equal, over-belief endangers our shared epistemic asset. 
 
With this exception we seem to have reached a position of almost equivalence. 
But we can still contrast the Jamesian stance with EP4 in that the Jamesian 
ultimately prioritises individual freedom whereas EP4 ultimately prioritises our 
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shared social epistemic asset. In some ways this mirrors a political choice 
between liberty and social security. In a political context individual freedom needs 
protection by the same social structures as can curtail it; and our shared epistemic 
asset plays a key role in holding those social structures together.117 And indeed if 
the choice between EP4 and a Jamesian position boils down to a moral dilemma 
then that in itself supports the case that EP4 qualifies as a bona fide moral 




We will first summarise where the previous section has brought us, and then set 
that in the context of Chapter 4 as a whole. 
 
Summary of previous section 
 
We introduced James’s religious hypothesis (JRH)118 as an example of what his 
will-to-believe thesis (W2B) would permit, not as the only thing it would permit. 
JRH, like our (4.1.1–3),119 has both descriptive and prescriptive components. 
 
We then evaluated his defence of religious belief like JRH as arising from a 
genuine option120 and therefore legitimate. We doubted to what extent the purely 
descriptive content of a hypothesis like JRH could qualify as belonging to a forced 
option, and thought it more plausible that its prescriptive content was what made a 
religious belief option momentous and therefore forced. In religious belief though 
the descriptive content can make the prescriptive content binding. In some 
scenarios this could lead to something approaching circularity,121 which we can 
avoid by applying a principle like EP4. 
 
JRH shares another familiar feature of religious belief, in that it characterises the 
posited God as a person122 rather than an impersonal entity. This is significant 
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because interpersonal contexts can introduce further doxastic duties favouring 
belief over disbelief. 
 
James insists however that religious belief is essentially private so at the 
believer’s ‘own risk’.123 This confronts Clifford’s rationale for CP based on the 
potential harm encouraged habits of credulity can cause. James’s counter-
proposal is the unique moral benefit religious belief can provide. We concluded 
that a debate between James and EP4 ultimately boils down to how to resolve a 
moral dilemma, which suggests the distinction between James and EP4 is more of 
stress than of principle. 
 
The next move however indicates a substantive contrast. This is what W2B could 
imply for the believer’s ‘moral sovereignty’:124 what if the believer believed her God 
insisted its imperatives superseded any other principles she might have; 
particularly when its imperatives were repressive or otherwise socially harmful? 
We concluded that James’s overall position appears inconsistent, in that W2B 
could allow an individual to hold religious beliefs which might trump one or more of 
James’s other stated principles, for example advocating tolerance. 
 
This however assumes all relevant parts of James’s stance on religious belief are 
intended to be consistent with each other and to be taken at face value. As the 
overall thrust of Chapter 4 is to test EP4 against James’s alternative position, we 
tried a more generous interpretation to see if his writings could provide alternative 
moral principles which might do EP4’s job, at least as well if not better. 
 
After revisiting the ‘sovereignty dilemma’125 we proposed two distinct but related 
principles, promoting tolerance and fallibility respectively.126 We concluded that an 
essentially Jamesian composite position could be constructed which operates 
almost as successfully as EP4, particularly if we include the Jamesian condition of 
‘at the believer’s own risk’. Although the Jamesian composite and EP4 will still 
have features revealing their different origins, the practical consequences could be 






   203 
virtually identical – particularly if we assume the same evidence of social 
consequences and the same evaluation of that evidence. 
 
Although the Jamesian position is fundamentally liberal while EP4 (following 
Clifford) is more social-protectionist, in a practical (and political) sense the 
originating values may be inseparable, as social structures need protection to 
guarantee individual liberty. 
 
Broader context and chapter conclusions 
 
Our overall conclusion is that James would probably reject EP4, but, assuming we 
can address its as yet undefined notion of ‘sufficient evidence’,127 EP4 should 
survive whatever he might throw at it. If his position on religious belief is 
incompatible with EP4, then the choice between them is a moral one. Nothing in 
his position invalidates EP4 as an independent moral principle, as EP4 is not an 
absolute over other principles. Although W2B asserts a domain of permission 
which EP4 denies, in the context of religious belief the only circumstances where 
his ‘right to believe’ would override the moral wrong of over-belief would be where 
other moral considerations make religious over-belief obligatory and therefore 
permitted. 
 
It might be objected that surely there are situations where both evidence and 
morality leave it open what to do. There are after all many ways to resolve a moral 
dilemma. But we are only talking here about deciding what and how to believe 
and, specifically, deciding which doxastic behaviours to nurture and which to avoid 
and discourage. We are not discussing moral dilemmas in general but 
circumstances in which adopting a principle like EP4 would systematically lead to 
a net moral loss. We can resolve moral dilemmas in many ways, but this chapter 
is about moral dilemmas specific to the acquisition and retention of descriptive 
religious beliefs. 
 
In saying any incompatibility between EP4 and Jamesian permissiveness comes 
down to a moral choice, we would claim EP4 as morally superior: equivalent to a 
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Singer or a Bentham judging an imperative to consider the potential net happiness 
of all sentient beings morally superior to an imperative considering only the 
potential net happiness of all humans. EP4 presupposes a moral context (‘If 
anything is morally wrong, then…’) where moral decisions and standpoints can be 
evaluated and compared against each other. We are claiming EP4 is morally 
superior to Jamesian permissiveness for all the reasons this chapter provides. We 
cannot however prove it is morally superior, but nor could we prove the 
Singer/Bentham verdict was morally superior to a purely anthropocentric 
alternative. 
 
We could give reasons in favour of Singer/Bentham, for example that sentient 
beings other than humans feel pain, but this may not convince anyone who did not 
care whether non-human sentient beings felt pain. The move from (generic) ‘allow 
religious over-belief’ to (more generic) ‘do not allow over-belief’ involves an 
increase of dimension: from seeing the issue as only impacting the individual to 
one addressing all potential social consequences. The move from (generic) 
‘consider potential net happiness of all humans’ to (more generic) ‘consider 
potential net happiness of all sentient beings’ involves an analogous expansion of 
dimension. But one could remain unmoved by this ‘expanding circle’.128 
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We began with Clifford’s principle: 
 
CP [I]t is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything 
upon insufficient evidence (1877, 1879:186). 
 
Clifford’s ‘anything’ though includes categorical prescriptive beliefs (for example 
moral beliefs), which we found compelling reasons to exclude.1  
 
So we modified CP and tested it against apparent counter-examples, from 
involuntary and innocuous over-beliefs to beliefs about the future and the past and 
beliefs about personal relationships.2 The final result was a more qualified and 
explicitly moral principle:3 
 
EP4 {If anything is morally wrong, then} it is [morally] wrong [within the 
category of descriptive belief] to believe anything [knowingly or 
irresponsibly] on insufficient evidence {in the absence of any 
conflicting and overriding moral imperative} [except when the 
unjustified believing is outside the believer’s voluntary control]. 
 
We then discussed James’s ‘defence of our right to adopt a believing attitude in 
religious matters’ (1896, 2000:198).4 Clifford did not provide a satisfactory account 
of ‘insufficient’ (or of ‘sufficient’) evidence,5 but we concluded that, as long as we 
can fill this gap, EP4 should withstand Jamesian attacks.6 James would probably 
consider this a ‘fool’s errand’ (Hall, 2011:82): 
 
                                                   
 
1 See pp43–73. We do not however need to exclude hypothetical or ‘prudential’ prescriptive beliefs: 
see pp44–46. 
2 See p74ff. 
3 p92. 
4 See p129ff. 
5 See p163. 
6 See p201ff. 
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No concrete test of what is really true has ever been agreed upon. … The 
much lauded objective evidence is never triumphantly there; it is a mere 
aspiration or Grensbegriff [sic]7 marking the infinitely remote ideal of our 
thinking life. To claim that certain truths now possess it, is simply to say that 
when you think them true and they are true, then their evidence is objective, 
otherwise it is not. But practically one’s conviction that the evidence one 
goes by is of the real objective brand, is only one more subjective opinion 
added to the lot. (James, 1896, 2000:207-208) 
 
James appears to conflate ‘objective’ with ‘conclusive’ evidence,8 so his complaint 
that Clifford regards ‘objective evidence’ as something guaranteeing ‘bottom-
certitude’ seems unfair. ‘Objective’ does not even appear in ‘The Ethics of Belief’: 
‘common property’9 is something different.10 But this chapter’s task is to find a 
suitable criterion of evidential sufficiency. 
 
Many explanations have been proposed of how evidence supports belief. Without 
space to review them all we will see what a leading candidate – Bayesianism – 
can offer. 
 
Bayesianism should be of particular interest because at least some versions offer 
prima facie support for a Jamesian kind of ‘voluntarism’ typically contrasted with 
‘evidentialist’ principles like EP4.11 Also as an explicitly moral principle EP4 
presupposes an evaluative context rather different from ones Bayesianism usually 
inhabits, with the latter’s focus on rationality, which for Bayesians requires 
conformance to the probability calculus. On the other hand Bayesianism has an 
evident quantitative rigour and intuitive plausibility particularly relating to changes 
in degree of belief. Our aim is not to critique Bayesianism, but see if it contributes 
                                                   
 
7 Limit or ideal notion. 
8 See p161. 
9 A chemist’s ‘result becomes common property, a right object of belief, which is a social affair and 
matter of public business.’ (1877, 1879:197) 
10 See also 5.6 Indefinite intersubjectivity p253ff. 
11 See Van Fraassen (1989:Chap. 7) for the development of how the Bayesian framework can be 
part of a sophisticated voluntarist epistemology. Van Fraassen does however describe himself as ‘a 
probabilist, though not a Bayesian’ in that he ‘do[es] not accept the Bayesian recipes for opinion 
change as rationally compelling’ (1989:175). 
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to an account of evidential sufficiency for EP4, without expecting it to provide all 
the answers. 
 
We first dig deeper into what kind of relationship a criterion of sufficient evidence 
could have with a principle like EP4, before expanding on EP4’s evaluative 
context in line with Clifford’s approach to belief. We then introduce Bayes’ Rule, 
and the way it quantifies how increasing evidence for (or against) a hypothesis 
supports an increased (or decreased) ‘personal probability’ – or ‘degree of belief’ 
or ‘credence’ – for that hypothesis.12 Applying Bayes’ Rule to a test case13 
introduces suggestions from different variants of Bayesianism as to the source of 
our initial credences (‘prior probabilities’), and what may constrain them. 
Bayesianism eventually helps us understand ‘insufficient’ evidence but not yet 
‘sufficient’ evidence.14 
 
We next ask if any normativity involved in a Bayesian approach comes just from 
conformance to the probability calculus or involves implicit acceptance of 
normative decision theory.15 We conclude that in the context of EP4 we can 
justifiably assume the latter. 
 
We then address the transition from high credence to full justified belief,16 and 
consider the idea of a quantitative threshold above which credence may count as 
belief. However issues arising from ‘lottery cases’17 cast doubt on how Bayesian 
‘imaginary gambles’ operate around this threshold. Qualitative differences in a 
believer’s context18 and in what a believer may have at stake19 also appear 
relevant to justified belief versus mere high credence. Both represent ways of 
factoring ‘practical interests’20 into apparently justified belief which are at least 
compatible with Bayesianism, particularly in our assumed context of normative 
decision theory. 
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A potential issue for EP4 though is whether considering individual practical 
interests is compatible with an evidence principle expressed in moral terms.21 Our 
suggested resolution is to extend the moral envelope to include those practical 
interests themselves: if we enlist practical interests to justify a belief then for EP4 
as a moral principle they should be the practical interests we (morally) ought to 
have, not just ones benefitting us as individuals.22 Bayesian ‘imaginary gambles’ 
can have stakes of social rather than purely personal utility. 
 
For EP4 as for Clifford, the practical interests we ought to have will include the 
preservation and enhancement of our shared social asset of knowledge and true 
belief. This helps neutralise the objection that the notion of practical interests 
could jar with the requirement of ‘objective’ evidence we would expect from a 
principle like EP4. 
 
The next step is to see if anything in Craig’s ‘state of nature’ epistemology can 
help us understand ‘sufficient evidence’, aligned with the ‘practical interest we 
ought to have’. Craig originates an ‘objectivised’ concept of knowledge in the idea 
of a ‘good informant … whatever the particular circumstances of the inquirer’ 
(1990, 1999:91). We argue that something very like this holds promise for the 
criterion of sufficient evidence which EP4 needs. 
 
5.2 How a criterion of sufficient evidence relates to EP4 
 
A moral principle like EP4 can be analysed into more than one component. The 
specifically moral ‘thou shalt/shalt not’ concerns the believing itself. On the face of 
it the criterion of evidential sufficiency does not itself need to be a moral 
component. To this extent EP4 resembles other moral principles. 
 
But the moral claim in ‘it is wrong to deceive’ is about the wrongness of deceiving, 
not about what counts as deception, which the moral claim presupposes. Similarly 
‘it is wrong to lie’ says it is wrong to say something false, but does not specify 
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what makes an utterance false. EP4 on the other hand does not just say it is 
wrong to hold or acquire an unjustified belief. It says that, exonerating conditions 
aside, it is wrong to believe except on sufficient evidence. 
 
Evidence itself can count as belief(s), if not knowledge. A condition of sufficient 
evidence includes that of consistency (coherence) between beliefs, and therefore 
has an element of self-reference. We will see how the Bayesian approach 
articulates this explicitly.23 
 
Contrasting ‘sufficient’ with ‘insufficient’ implies a judgment, and therefore a 
(potentially moral) requirement to exercise judgment. If the condition of sufficient 
evidence is at least partly about coherence between beliefs, then part of that 
sufficiency would be sufficient coherence. An agent could believe hypothesis H on 
insufficient evidence by failing to realise H was inconsistent with his other 
(evidential) beliefs E1-n. But he could also fail to acquire evidential beliefs E1-n, 
which might instead support not-H.24 Believing on insufficient evidence could 
involve either failing. To ensure he obeys EP4 he must exercise judgment about 
where to draw the line between ‘sufficient’ and ‘insufficient’ in both respects. 
 
Again we can compare other moral principles. To ensure you are not causing 
unnecessary suffering takes judgment about where suffering starts and stops. To 
avoid lying takes judgment about the difference between truth and falsehood. 
These judgments also incorporate judgment about how to apply judgment. If you 
think what you are doing might cause pain to another then you should decide as 
quickly as possible whether to stop or continue. 
 
Moral principles like EP4 seem therefore to be analysable into three components: 
 
(i) A moral ‘thou shalt/shalt not’. 
 
(ii) A non-moral ‘domain’ or subject matter (utterances in the case of lying; 
something like ‘sentience’ in the case of suffering; other (evidential) 
                                                   
 
23 See p219ff and p222ff. 
24 Expanded later in Bayesian context p227ff. 
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beliefs in the case of EP4). 
 
(iii) A moral requirement to exercise judgment in the context of domain (ii). 
 
An evidence principle could be thought to differ from other moral principles by 
concerning just the individual believer, and governing behaviour not directed 
towards others. Clifford however would disagree. We will review his reasons, 
which also apply to EP4. 
 
5.3 Social context of belief: 2  
 
Clifford stresses the social, and therefore moral, context of believing.25 One 
person’s beliefs and ways of believing only make sense in the context of other 
people’s beliefs and ways of believing. A community’s beliefs and ways of 
believing aggregate into an ‘heirloom’ (1877, 1879:182) which successive 
generations inherit, enhance, critique, modify and bequeath, helping ‘create the 
world in which posterity will live’. James expresses similar sentiments: 
 
Our fundamental ways of thinking about things are discoveries of 
exceedingly remote ancestors, which have been able to preserve 
themselves throughout the experience of all subsequent time. (1907, 
2000:Lecture 5) 
 
Clifford however sees socially normative implications. What and how we believe 
‘is ours not for ourselves, but for humanity’ (1877, 1879:183), because it helps 
‘bind men together’ and ‘strengthen and direct their common action’. Our duty to 
this social asset, and to others in respect of our shared custodianship, is ‘hard’ 
and shared by all.26 It entails a further shared duty to avoid the ‘savagery’ which a 
‘credulous’ society is prey to.27 The more we protect our shared epistemic asset 
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26 See p16. 
27 See p16. 
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and discourage credulity, the more we can rely on testimony.28 To believe what a 
person says, we need 
 
reasonable grounds for trusting his veracity, that he is really trying to speak 
the truth so far as he knows it; his knowledge, that he has had opportunities 
of knowing the truth about this matter; and his judgment, that he has made 
proper use of those opportunities in coming to the conclusion which he 
affirms. (1877, 1879:189) 
 
A scientist’s authority is valid because others ‘question it and verify it’, keeping 
‘alive among investigators the love of that which shall stand all possible tests’ 
(1877, 1879:196-8). But it is not only scientists who should question and verify. 
The ‘labours and struggles’ of our predecessors have bequeathed an ‘atmosphere 
of beliefs and conceptions’, of ‘forms and processes of thought’, allowing us to 
think and ‘breathe amid the various and complex circumstances’ of our lives 
(1877, 1879:199). It is ‘not only possible and right, but our bounden duty’ to ‘doubt 
and to test’ this inheritance. Again we see a parallel in James, but while James 
offers pragmatic advice to the individual (‘Retain, I pray you, this suspicion about 
common sense’ (1907, 2000:Lecture 5)), Clifford stresses social duty: 
 
[T]he main purpose of the tradition itself is to supply us with the means of 
asking questions, of testing and inquiring into things; [so] that if we misuse it, 
and take it as a collection of cut-and-dried statements, to be accepted 
without further inquiry, we are not only injuring ourselves here, but by 
refusing to do our part towards the building up of the fabric which shall be 
inherited by our children, we are tending to cut off ourselves and our race 
from the human line. (1877, 1879:199) 
 
The ‘simple rule’ is to use our inheritance as its ‘makers’ used it: ‘to ask further 
questions, to examine, to investigate’ (1877, 1879:203). We therefore pursue good 
inquiry as well as knowledge. Our shared asset contains not only facts and true or 
at least justified beliefs, but also ‘questions rightly asked’, conceptions which 
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‘enable us to ask further questions’, and ‘methods of answering questions’. Its 
‘very sacredness’ 
 
imposes upon us the duty and the responsibility of testing it, of purifying and 
enlarging it to the utmost of our power. He who makes use of its results to 
stifle his own doubts, or to hamper the inquiry of others, is guilty of a 
sacrilege which centuries shall never be able to blot out. (1877, 1879:205) 
 
CP can apply to an individual belief or act of believing. More generally it 
summarises our duties in respect of our shared ‘heirloom’ – which combines 
knowledge, true and/or justified beliefs, ways of questioning, and principles for its 
own onward critical custodianship. 
 
EP4 is more constrained and less universal than CP but equivalently 
contextualised, with ‘morally’ and ‘moral’ appearing three times in total. In theory a 
moral context need not imply a social context. But we are explicitly excluding that 
possibility. The rationale behind both CP and EP4 is the potential social 
consequences of evasion. So while EP4 can apply at the level of an atomic belief 
or act of believing (assuming these are possible), its scope also covers shared 
duties in respect of our shared epistemic legacy. 
 
We should remember this when discussing Bayesianism. The Bayesian believer is 
generally characterised as an ideally rational agent, where to be ‘rational’ is either 
to be merely coherent (in the sense of conforming to the probability calculus29) or 
to seek to maximise individual personal utility. The social and moral context 
presupposed by both EP4 and CP would seem prima facie more demanding than 
that of a collective of ideally rational Bayesian agents. 
 
One last preliminary point. CP and EP4 both address belief rather than 
knowledge, allowing us to avoid debates about when and how justified belief 
qualifies as knowledge. In some contexts however it will be convenient to drop into 
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‘knowledge’ language. Although not every justified belief qualifies as knowledge,30 
in general the sufficient evidence a justified belief needs is also what it needs to 
qualify as knowledge. ‘Knowledge’ language can therefore be a useful proxy for 
‘justified belief’ language, and will sometimes be used as such in what follows. But 
we are not rephrasing or extending EP4 to speak of knowledge rather than belief. 
 
5.4 Bayesian approaches 
 
We will not attempt a derivation of Bayes’ Rule31 and its founding principles. We 
will take these as given and see if they help clarify ‘sufficient’ and/or ‘insufficient’ 
evidence for EP4. 
 
Notions of evidential sufficiency or insufficiency are not strictly part of 
Bayesianism. But Bayes’ Rule does offer ‘a way to represent rational change in 
belief, in the light of new evidence’ (Hacking, 2001, 2009:171). Key Bayesian 
tenets are that a ‘degree of belief’ (‘credence’) is a subjective or personal 
probability,32 and as such must conform to axioms of the probability calculus or 
‘standard mathematics of probability’ (Strevens, 2005:2-3).33 The Bayesian 
account of rational change in belief rests on a ‘rule of conditionalization’34 
(Hacking, 2001, 2009:259). 
 
One way to apply the probability calculus to ‘personal degrees of belief’ is by 
representing them ‘numerically by using imaginary gambles’ (2001, 2009:150). A 
personal degree of belief can be expressed as a number between 0 and 1 
representing a personal probability or ‘betting rate’.35 
 
An actual or candidate belief (whatever degree of belief it is held at) is a 
‘hypothesis’ or a proposition: 
 
                                                   
 
30 Articulated further p264. 
31 To avoid ambiguity we will refer to “Bayes’ Rule” rather than “Bayes’ Theorem”: see Strevens 
(2005:4-5). 
32 Expanded later p226. 
33 The next subsection will unpack this conformance in the context of an example: p219ff. 
34 See p215, and also p223. 
35 Although ‘[b]elief is not the sort of thing that can be measured exactly’ (Hacking, 2001, 2009:155-
6). 
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When you think about your personal probability for a hypothesis, you do so 
relative to your background knowledge, beliefs, prejudices, and so on. 
(2001, 2009:172) 
 
A Bayesian sees a degree of belief (credence) as something you may have 
without necessarily being aware of its strength relative to your other credences. To 
make that relative strength evident, a Bayesian may appeal to an imaginary 
gamble where you are asked for a fair betting rate such that you would be equally 
happy to take either side of the bet. The following articulates your personal 
probability p that hypothesis H is true: 
 
If p is, in your opinion, the fair rate for betting on [H], then you should be 
indifferent between: 
 
A bet on [H] at rate p: you win (1 − p)($10) if [H is true]… 
 
A bet against [H] at rate (1 − p): you win p($10) if [H is 
false]…[Adapted from (Hacking, 2001, 2009:157)] 
 
If your personal probability that hypothesis H was true was p, and your personal 
probability that H was false was anything other than (1 – p), then a clever 
bookmaker could offer you a set of bets where you would be guaranteed to lose 
overall: a sure-loss (or ‘Dutch book’) contract.36 Your set of personal probabilities 
would fail to conform to the probability calculus, and if the bets were real ones you 
would be acting irrationally in terms of personal utility.37 
 
Your personal probabilities need not stay fixed for ever though: 
 
Unless you are truly prejudiced, new evidence should have some effect on 
what you believe – and on your personal probabilities. (2001, 2009:172) 
 
                                                   
 
36 See (Hacking, 2001, 2009:164-5). 
37 See also p249ff. 
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A Bayesian explains the relation between evidence and belief in terms of 
conditional probability – by calculating (estimating, representing) what your 
personal probability for a particular hypothesis would (or should) be if that 
evidence were true.38 
 
(5.1) below is a formulation of Bayes’ Rule. The effect of new evidence on an 
individual’s personal probability is expressed in relation to Hj, one of the 
hypotheses in a ‘partition’39 Hi (H1, H2, …, Hn): 
 







Pr(Hj) is the individual’s initial (prior) personal probability for the hypothesis 
Hj. 
 
E is the new evidence. 
 
Pr(E/Hj) is his probability for E, if Hj were true. (Known as the ‘likelihood’40 of 
hypothesis Hj in the light of evidence E.) 
 
Pr(Hi) is his initial (prior) personal probability for each competing hypothesis 
Hi. 
 
Pr(E/Hi) is his probability for E, if hypothesis Hi were true. 
 
Pr(Hj/E) is his posterior personal probability for Hj following evidence E. This 
follows the ‘rule of conditionalization’ which states that your ‘personal rate for 
betting on H, conditional on E, before you know that E is true’ should equal 
                                                   
 
38 This aligns with our working definition of ‘evidence’ from p62. 
39 A partition is ‘a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive hypotheses’ (Hacking, 2001, 2009:172). 
40 This term, coined by English statistician RA Fisher (1890-1962), can unfortunately lead to 
confusion since ‘probability’ and ‘likelihood’ are synonyms in ordinary English: see Hacking (2001, 
2009:167). 
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your ‘personal rate for betting on H … after you know that E is true’ 
(Hacking, 2001, 2009:258-9).41 
 
E confirms H for an individual if his posterior probability exceeds his prior 
probability. E disconfirms H if his posterior probability is lower than his prior 
probability. If E confirms H, it disconfirms not-H. 
 
Two individuals can start with very different prior probabilities (‘priors’) for a 
hypothesis, but as long as 
 
(i) their priors are not exactly 0 or exactly 1;42 
 
(ii) they experience the same successive cycles of confirming (or 
disconfirming) evidence; and 
 
(iii) they generally agree on the probabilities of getting the evidence given 
that hypothesis (‘likelihoods’); 
 
then they should converge towards the same eventual posterior probabilities. This 
is because the more iterations there are the less effect the difference between 
their priors will have on the eventual outcome.43 
 
Bayes’ Rule applied to a test case 
 
To relate the Bayesian approach to EP4 we will start with our: 
 
(1.3) I believe you are taking recreational drugs. 
 
Or as assertion: 
 
                                                   
 
41 Developed further p223ff. 
42 Whatever the values for Pr(E/Hi) in (5.1), if Pr(Hj) = 1 then Pr(Hj/E) can never be anything but 1, 
and if Pr(Hj) = 0 then Pr(Hj/E) can never be anything but 0. Both are simple consequences of the 
Bayes Rule equation. 
43 Hacking (2001, 2009:257) for example briefly discusses this ‘convergence theorem’. Also known 
as ‘washing out the priors’. 
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(1.3.1) You are taking recreational drugs. 
 
An obvious way to apply Bayes’ Rule (5.1) to beliefs and assertions like (1.3) and 
(1.3.1) is as a prescriptive principle. Later we will question the nature of that 
prescription,44 but assuming for now that (5.1) is the correct principle, we can ask: 
Have ‘I’ (the believer/asserter of (1.3)/(1.3.1)) applied (5.1) at all (implicitly or 
explicitly)? If so, have I applied it correctly? 
 
The partition will be hypothesis (1.3.1) plus the ‘null’ hypothesis: 
 
(1.3.1n) You are not taking recreational drugs. 
 
Should we interpret my degrees of belief in (1.3.1) and (1.3.1n) as prior or 
posterior probabilities? The test case says: 
 
(1.3.3) You are taking recreational drugs, but I have no supporting evidence. 
 
There could be evidence supporting (1.3.1n) though. I may have little or no 
evidence that a person I have never met is not taking drugs – other than what if 
anything I know or believe about base rates in the population(s) he belongs to.45 
But if, for present purposes, we assume I know the ‘you’ of (1.3.1) quite well,46 and 
I have no evidence you are taking drugs, then I would have at least some 
evidence you are not taking drugs. (I have never seen you accepting drugs but 
have seen you refusing them; your behaviour and appearance have never shown 
traits associated with drug use.) 
 
In Bayesian epistemology ‘prior’ and ‘posterior’ probabilities have specific 
definitions relative to a particular piece of evidence. Prior probability is the 
probability before the evidence comes in. Posterior probability is the probability 
after the evidence comes in and (by the ‘rule of conditionalization’) always equals 
the conditional probability assuming the evidence will come in. By definition not all 
                                                   
 
44 See p226ff. 
45 Conscious or unconscious selection of reference classes can be open to risks of eg racial or 
gender profiling: see p295.  
46 We will pick up this assumption later: p223. 
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priors can be posterior probabilities: we cannot conditionalise unless we have a 
prior, so we must begin somewhere. Prior and posterior probabilities only apply 
where credences change through Bayesian conditionalisation. (Any other way of 
giving a value to a credence is generally called ‘fixing’ a probability.) 
 
This brings us to the contrast between subjective and objective Bayesians, who 
differ over the kinds of constraints applicable to priors. 
 
All Bayesians see a prior or posterior probability as expressing an individual’s 
uncertainty, which may vary by individual. This applies both to the belief and to 
any imaginary gamble it may be compared with. For example you come to an 
unmarked fork in a path: 
 
If you toss a fair coin to decide which way to go, you must think that it is as 
probable that home is to the left, as that it is to the right. Your personal 
probability, for each fork, is ½. (Hacking, 2001, 2009:152) 
 
Here you are equally uncertain that home is to the left or that it is to the right; or 
that the coin will land heads or land tails. The Bayesian does not think your 
credence of 0.5 for heads represents an ‘objective’ probability any more than your 
credence of 0.5 that home is to the left does. Only one direction is correct. The 
coin will land either heads or tails. In theory you could be more certain about how 
it will land by knowing more about its aerodynamics and the way it was thrown. 
Your credence of 0.5 for heads arises from your ignorance about these details, 
plus your knowledge, belief or assumption that the coin and its thrower are fair. 
 
An extreme subjective Bayesian (Talbott, 2013:§4.2 F(a)) would say the only 
rational constraint on priors is conformance to the probability calculus. In our 
partition of (1.3.1) and (1.3.1n) the two priors must total 1. Otherwise the agent 
would be exposed to sure loss (‘Dutch Book’) contracts.47 Some Bayesians 
however like Howson and Urbach reject Dutch book arguments and regard the 
Bayesian ‘rules of epistemic probability [as] nothing but rules of logic’ (2006:51). 
                                                   
 
47 See p214. 
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While the mathematics underpinning Dutch book arguments is ‘unquestionable’, 
they see Bayesianism as purely a ‘theory of consistent probabilistic reasoning’ 
(2006:301). 
 
An extreme subjective Bayesian might even allow priors of 1 and 0 for (1.3.1) and 
(1.3.1n) respectively – or vice versa. Rationality would be purely a matter of 
probabilistic coherence, so these priors would be rational. 
 
Less extreme subjective Bayesians might agree the values must total 1, since 
they exhaust all possibilities, but allow them to be any value except 1 and 0, 
reserving these for logical certainties and logical impossibilities respectively. Such 
thinkers could plausibly argue there cannot be evidence against a logical certainty 
or for a logical impossibility. (1.3.1) and (1.3.1n) are neither. 
 
We should expand on ‘conformance to the probability calculus’. Part of the 
idealisation involved in the conception of an ideal Bayesian agent is that, if asked 
to estimate a prior for a particular hypothesis, the agent takes responsibility for 
every other related hypothesis he has a credence for, including hypotheses about 
how all those hypotheses connect logically. This means committing (or being 
prepared to commit) to quantified credences for all other hypotheses he might be 
entertaining which he sees as having logical connections with the hypothesis 
under consideration. Bayesian agents are taken to be ‘logically omniscient’. 
 
In the case of (1.3.1) and (1.3.1n) I might for example have many other beliefs 
about you and the categories (reference classes) you belong to. I might consider 
imaginary gambles in respect of all these related hypotheses, and on pain of 
irrationality I should ensure the combination of odds I would accept on all these 
gambles – including gambles on (1.3.1) and/or (1.3.1n) – would not incur sure 
losses. The ‘probabilistic coherence’ constraint therefore ensures the Bayesian 
approach considers a believer’s entire network of related beliefs. 
 
There may however be few or no related beliefs. The agent could in theory have a 
belief with few if any connections to other credences he is committed to: for 
example James’s ‘religious hypothesis’ (1896, 2000:214), in a partition 
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representing a ‘genuine option that cannot by its nature be decided on intellectual 
grounds’ (1896, 2000:205).48 James and a subjective Bayesian would both seem 
to permit a range of credences between 0 (or just over 0) and 1 (or just under 1).49 
 
An objective Bayesian though would see additional rational constraints on priors, 
for example the Principle of Indifference (Keynes, 1921:41ff), which Strevens 
(1998) words as: ‘in the absence of any known reason to assign two events 
differing probabilities, they ought to be assigned the same probability’ (1998:231). 
Supporters of the Indifference Principle might insist that, if a ball is drawn at 
random from an urn filled with unknown numbers of red and black balls and no 
balls of any other colour, the prior personal probability of it being black can only be 
0.5, because 0.5 is the only value which is ‘invariant with a change in label (“red” 
or “black”)’ (Talbott, 2013:§4.2 F(b)). This is because the agent would ‘have no 
information at all about which balls are red and which balls are black’. 
 
The coherence of this principle can however be questioned. Bertrand’s paradox 
returns (at least) three different answers (⅓, ½ and ¼) to the question: what is the 
probability that a chord drawn randomly in a circle is longer than the side of an 
equilateral triangle inscribed in that same circle? There seems nothing ambiguous 
about what the chord of a circle is or what its length is relative to the side of a 
triangle, and so the principle itself appears incoherent.50 
 
Strevens rejects the idea of a constraint on priors based on the Indifference 
Principle, ‘which takes us from symmetries in our knowledge–or more exactly, 
ignorance–to rational probabilities’. Instead he claims we actually use a ‘rule of 
inference that takes us from knowledge of physical symmetries to knowledge of 
actual physical probabilities’ (1998:232). 
 
But symmetry considerations may also, like the Indifference Principle, only apply 
in certain scenarios, and not provide a way to ground or constrain all personal 
probabilities. For example it is unlikely whether symmetry would constrain the 
                                                   
 
48 See p140ff. 
49 This scenario is considered in Appendix A3 p285ff. 
50 See Appendix A4 p289ff. 
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probability that general relativity is true or that a God exists. If the kind of 
principles which objective Bayesians identify or promote only apply to certain 
belief categories they would be little help in supporting EP4. 
 
There are other more complex ways in which objective Bayesians have sought to 
fix priors but it is beyond the scope of this work to discuss or even categorise them 
all. Suffice it to say, it is agreed that all have problems, like Bertrand’s paradox, or 
limitations of application like Strevens’ proposal. We will therefore confine our 
discussion to seeing if subjective Bayesianism can help in our articulation of EP4. 
 
Returning to (1.3.1) (‘You are taking recreational drugs’) and (1.3.1n) (‘You are not 
taking recreational drugs’) we might start with the idea that a (subjective) Bayesian 
would allow a very high value – say 0.99 – for my prior for (1.3.1), and 0.01 for 
(1.3.1n) – or vice versa. This is assuming the only rational constraints against 
these priors are that they cannot be 0 or 1 and they must total 1. 
 
From the perspective of EP4 and its need for a criterion of justified belief in terms 
of sufficient evidence, we can call this the ‘problem of the priors’: that a Bayesian 
agent might consider himself – justifiably according to Bayesianism – as having 
sufficient evidence for any hypothesis given appropriately chosen priors. But this 
theoretical freedom would imply my credences for (1.3.1) and (1.3.1n) can be 
insulated from all my other beliefs, including any beliefs I might have about your 
behaviour and about drug use base rates. 
 
A way to evade this ‘problem of the priors’ for the purposes of EP4 could therefore 
be to insist on considering those other background beliefs, despite (1.3.3) saying ‘I 
have no supporting evidence’ for belief (1.3.1). This would be in line with the duty 
to seek out evidence which EP4 seems to presuppose51 and which Clifford also 
claims.52 
 
We will therefore suggest some plausible starting assumptions, and construe 
‘evidence’ broadly enough to include other knowledge or beliefs I have which 
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might impact my credences for (1.3.1) and (1.3.1n). Perhaps originally I knew 
nothing about you but your age, gender and nationality. We will also assume I 
knew, or thought I knew, that (say) 50% of your demographic take drugs. We will 
take 50% as the highest possible value for (1.3.1). Anything higher could count as 
evidence supporting (1.3.1), which is ruled out. So I will set my priors for both 
(1.3.1) and (1.3.1n) at 0.5. 
 
As we are construing ‘evidence’ to include constraining background beliefs it is not 
strictly true that ‘I have no supporting evidence’ (1.3.3), since I do have some 
evidence. In this test case we are therefore reading ‘I have no evidence’ as ‘I have 
no evidence about you as an individual, only about base rates for the category or 
categories I think you belong to’.53 But this only works because of the numbers 
involved. If I knew you belonged to a subcategory where 99% took drugs, then it 
might be disingenuous to claim no supporting evidence for (1.3.3), rather than 
saying I lacked evidence that you were not in the 1%. We have assumed I know or 
believe that 50% of your demographic take drugs. If I have no further evidence 
about you, and can treat you as randomly selected from that demographic (‘fair 
coin’), then, assuming I am no more justified in thinking you belong to one subset 
of your demographic than another, then I would be no more justified in believing 
you take drugs (‘heads’) than not (‘tails’). But if the 50% moves to 99% then I 
would be more justified in believing you take drugs than not. 
 
My background beliefs about your age, gender and nationality, and relevant 
behavioural base rates in your demographic, would count as synchronic 
coherence constraints in relation to my prior of 0.5 for (1.3.1n): ‘synchronic’ 
because they apply at the same time as my prior for (1.3.1n). I would have 
credences in relation to all these hypotheses which are logically connected to 
(1.3.1n), so for the set of credences to be consistent my credence for (1.3.1n) 
must be a particular value, or at least within a particular range. 
 
                                                   
 
53 I may or may not have knowledge or beliefs about relevant base rates. Here we are assuming I 
do, to flesh out a plausible history of Bayesian updating prior to my belief that (1.3.1). 
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We can then factor in E, which is all the ‘new’ evidence I have about you – now I 
know you.54 Since, from (1.3.3), I have no evidence supporting my belief that 
(1.3.1), then what evidence I do have – including lack of evidence that you are 
hiding anything likely to support my belief that (1.3.1) – will support (1.3.1n). E will 
qualify as ‘new evidence’ in a cycle of Bayesian updating, so it will operate as a 
diachronic coherence constraint on my posterior probability: ‘diachronic’ because 
it applies across the updating, which comes after my original prior for (1.3.1n). 
 
In its simple form the ‘Dutch Book’ argument only supports synchronic 
coherence, as it applies to a set of logically related credences held at the same 
time. If the related credences are represented as personal probabilities, and 
therefore as personal ‘betting rates’, the set of credences must be arithmetically 
consistent so as to avoid exposure to sure-loss contracts.55 The eventual set of 
logically related credences will include some (including the initial prior) at time t1 
and some (including the believer’s credence(s) for the new evidence E when it 
exists) at a later time t2. Bayesian updating relies on this diachronic coherence, 
which itself rests on the ‘rule of conditionalization’ mentioned earlier:56 a rule 
which, according to Hacking, could be seen as either ‘an additional maxim or 
axiom of the Bayesian subjective approach’, or even  
 
as a moral rule. One should be true to one’s former self (unless one has 
undergone a radical conversion in one’s life and thought) (2001, 
2009:259).57 
 
These requirements for synchronic and diachronic coherence are in line with our 
earlier suggestion58 relating the condition of sufficient evidence to consistency 
between beliefs. We are also still aligned with our three-part generic analysis of 
moral principles59 into (i) a moral ‘thou shalt/shalt not’; (ii) a non-moral ‘domain’ or 
subject matter; and (iii) a moral requirement to exercise judgment in the context of 
                                                   
 
54 An explicit assumption: p217. 
55 But with additional assumptions the same rationale can apply to the updating of credences in 
response to new evidence. See eg Lewis (1999) and Teller (1973). 
56 p215. 
57 But see papers referenced in footnote 55 above for a different view. 
58 See p209. 
59 See p209 and p213. 
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(ii). In the case of EP4 a Bayesian might see the non-moral domain (ii) including 
credences expressed as personal probabilities and the axioms of the probability 
calculus. But a proponent of EP4 (or CP) would also see (ii) including our ‘shared 
epistemic asset’ or ‘heirloom’60 This is strictly speaking non-moral, but qualifies as 
a context in which a ‘moral requirement to exercise judgment’ (iii) could be 
appropriate. The shared epistemic asset necessarily persists through time, so 
necessarily has a ‘diachronic’ dimension. It is hard to see how it could survive if no 
one in a position to protect it saw a need to be true to his former self – particularly 
his epistemic and doxastic self. 
 
Returning to our iteration of Bayes’ Rule (5.1) and using its notation, we will call 
(1.3.1n) ‘Hj’ and (1.3.1) ‘Hk’. With a few additional assumptions, we can now 
estimate my posterior probability for Hj  (1.3.1n).  
 
We have already assumed: 
 
Pr(Hj) (= my prior for Hj (1.3.1n)) = 0.5. 
 
Pr(Hk) (= my prior for Hk (1.3.1)) = 0.5. 
 
We now assume: 
 
Pr(E/Hj) (= my probability for evidence E, if hypothesis Hj (1.3.1n) were true) 
= 0.6: 
 
As all the evidence is of you not taking drugs, my probability that this 
evidence would occur if you were not taking drugs would be quite high. 
 
Pr(E/Hk) (= my probability for evidence E, if hypothesis Hk (1.3.1) were true) 
= 0.2: 
 
                                                   
 
60 See p210ff. 
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My probability that this evidence would occur if you were taking drugs 
would be lower, although not zero, as you could be a skilful deceiver. 
The precise values do not matter, only that Pr(E/Hk) is considerably 
lower than Pr(E/Hj), and that this should be plausible – following from 
‘no supporting evidence’ explicit in (1.3.3). 
 
As partition Hi is just Hj (1.3.1n) plus Hk (1.3.1), (5.1) becomes: 
 
(5.1.1)  Pr(𝐻%/𝐸) 	 = 	
+,(-.)+,(//-.)
+,4-.5+,4/ -.⁄ 5	7	+,(-8)+,(/ -8⁄ )
 
 
= (0.5 x 0.6) ÷ ((0.5 x 0.6) + (0.5 x 0.2)) 
 
= 0.3 ÷ 0.4 
= 0.75  
 
So my posterior probability for Hk (1.3.1) = 1 – 0.75 = 0.25. If: 
 
(i) I continue believing you are taking drugs, with no supporting evidence 
and all available evidence supporting (1.3.1n); 
 
(ii) the assumptions we have made here are reasonable; 
 
(iii) 0.6 and 0.2 reflect my true personal probabilities for evidence E, 
assuming hypotheses Hj (1.3.1n) and Hk (1.3.1) were true respectively; 
and 
 
(iv) we presuppose the ‘rule of conditionalization’; 
 
then I am disobeying Bayes’ Rule. My belief would be irrational according to 
Bayesianism. My credences would not conform to the probability calculus, and if 
they were interpreted as gambles which I accepted I would be exposed to sure-
loss contracts. 
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We do not yet have an equivalent account of ‘sufficient evidence’, but this 
particular case does not need it. If I am to believe (1.3.1) or (1.3.1n) – rather than 
holding no belief either way – then I should believe (1.3.1n) which is better 
supported by evidence. This seems to fit our intuitions about what (and how) it is 
reasonable and right to believe. Applying EP4, I will be morally wrong to believe 
you are taking recreational drugs (1.3.1) because, given the assumed evidence, I 
should either withhold belief or believe you are not taking drugs (1.3.1n).61 That is 
all EP4 needs to reject (1.3.1). Neither CP nor EP4 insists I should believe 
(1.3.1n); only that I should not believe (1.3.1). 
 
Evidence and normativity 
 
It seems then that, as long as we assume a duty to get evidence, which would be 
outside Bayesianism proper, we can give a Bayesian account of why it would be 
wrong62 to believe someone is taking recreational drugs (1.3.1) without sufficient 
evidence. This is assuming also that it is correct to model credences as personal 
probabilities, to estimate the odds we would be prepared to accept for imaginary 
gambles based on the respective hypotheses. The prescription to use Bayes’ Rule 
would then derive from Dutch book arguments, such that if we did not apply it, or 
applied it incorrectly, we would irrationally compromise our personal utility by 
exposing ourselves to sure-loss contracts. 
 
The assumption that it is correct to model credences on betting strategies derives 
from the first tenet of Bayesianism, which, according to Strevens (2005:1-2) is that 
 
...the scientist’s epistemic attitude to any scientifically significant proposition 
is, or ought to be, exhausted by the subjective probability the scientist 
assigns to the proposition. A subjective probability is a number between zero 
and one that reflects in some sense the scientist’s confidence that the 
proposition is true [Emphasis added]. 
 
                                                   
 
61 Later we will question why I would be morally wrong to act against my self-interest (personal 
utility): see p249ff. 
62  A wrong of irrationality on the basis of personal utility, not a moral wrong: see p212 and p249ff. 
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He continues: 
  
To found its first tenet, Bayesianism must establish that it is plausible to 
suppose, or reasonable to require, that scientists have a subjective 
probability for every proposition that figures in their inquiry. Ramsey (1931) 
proposed that to have a subjective probability for a proposition is to have a 
certain complex disposition to act, a disposition that can be measured at 
least tolerably well in many cases by assessing betting behavior... 
[Emphasis added.] 
 
The two other tenets (conformance to the probability calculus and Bayes’ 
conditionalisation rule) are largely consequences or expansions of the first. To ‘be 
a Bayesian’ is to accept and apply all three tenets, which implies that the 
assumption (commitment, prescription) to ‘be a Bayesian’ is external to 
Bayesianism itself. It would be independent of any prescriptive consequences of 
the decision to model credences in such a way that they can be expressed as 
betting strategies, as it would be the prescription to do the modelling and accept 
the consequences. 
 
We should now enlarge on the assumed duty to get evidence, including the duty 
not to ignore available evidence. Even restricting ourselves to a purely scientific 
context, ‘available evidence’ could include: the results of the experiment we are 
doing; and/or the results of the experiment someone else is doing next door which 
we know about; and/or the results of an experiment happening in another country 
which we know nothing about; and/or the evidence which is ‘available’ in the 
sense that we could get it from an experiment we have not yet done; and/or the 
theoretically ‘available’ evidence we could get from an experiment which is 
currently practically impossible; … and so on. A decision to be Bayes rational 
seems to presuppose (or entail the need for) a practical approach to identifying 
the values to feed into Bayes’ Rule. 
 
We can only update credences in a Bayesian way if we make a reasonable effort 
to find evidence. If we have no evidence because we made no attempt to get any 
evidence, then we cannot determine posterior probabilities [Pr(H/E)] without any 
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evidence [E] to have ‘likelihoods’ [Pr(E/H)] about.63 We must therefore decide 
what is ‘reasonable’. For example we could claim publicly available evidence 
should be used wherever possible; and that care should be taken to decide what 
counts as evidence for what hypothesis. 
 
These considerations divide into issues of quality and issues of will. On the quality 
of evidence, relating the probability of evidence given a particular hypothesis to 
the posterior probability of that hypothesis implies the evidence itself is completely 
certain (probability 1). But we may want to update our personal probability on the 
basis of (say) a rumour we are reluctant to discount (Hacking, 2001, 2009:182). 
Jeffrey’s rule gives us a way to accommodate evidence which is less than certain 
by factoring in personal probabilities that the evidence is true and false 
respectively (Jeffrey, 1983; Hacking, 2001, 2009:183).64 
 
The question of will is more involved. In theory we can be Bayes rational without 
evidence, so without updating our degrees of belief. But Hacking describes 
Bayesianism as a model for ‘rational change in belief, in the light of new evidence’ 
(2001, 2009:171), and we should unpack what this ‘rationality’ could imply. 
 
As suggested above,65 one view sees Bayesianism as purely a ‘theory of 
consistent probabilistic reasoning’ 
 
in which the truth, rationality, objectivity, cogency or whatever of the 
premises, here prior probability assignments, are exogenous considerations, 
just as they are in deductive logic (Howson & Urbach, 2006:301). 
 
But our aim is to see if Bayesianism can help EP4 with an account of sufficient 
and/or insufficient evidence to justify belief, including the practical consequences 
of belief. It might therefore be appropriate (and in line with our assumed duty to 
get evidence) to consider an enriched Bayesianism within a context of normative 
                                                   
 
63 See p215. 
64 If evidence E is only a rumour (with Pr(E) = the probability that E is true and Pr(~E) = the 
probability that E is false) then the probability of hypothesis H in the light of the rumour that E = 
[Pr(H/E) x Pr(E)] + [Pr(H/~E) x Pr(~E)]. 
65 See p218. 
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decision theory, which is ‘about how decisions should be made in order to be 
rational’ (Hansson, 2005:6). This appears a plausible way to flesh out the 
‘rationality’ Hacking refers to. If rationality is about maximising expected personal 
utility then it would seem irrational to make no effort to get evidence to update our 
credences. If we see the rationale behind Bayesian updating as preventing 
exposure to sure-loss contracts – and therefore loss of personal utility – then 
refusing to consider or look for evidence66 could run the risk of losing bets which 
do not need to be lost and/or accepting bets at inappropriate odds – which could 
again entail loss of personal utility. Both could thwart the assumed aim of 
maximising personal utility. But an endless search for unattainable conclusive 
evidence would not maximise personal utility either. Hence the stipulation to make 
a ‘reasonable’ effort. There is a cost in seeking evidence, which should be 
contained to a ‘reasonable’ level.67 
 
We could also appeal to normative decision theory to justify decisions about what 
the potential evidence might be for a hypothesis, what potential evidence is 
possible, how we might get it, how much store to set by it, and what its quality 
might be. Then we could know in advance what potential evidence to look for, 
create the conditions for, and measure. In a straightforward context the most 
valuable potential evidence E will be where there is a high probability of getting E 
if hypothesis H is true, and a low probability of getting E if H is false. If we are 
Bayes rational we will see that will yield a higher posterior probability for H than 
before we had E.68 Such considerations suggest Bayesianism, in an assumed 
context of decision theory, is broadly in line with both CP and EP4. We will keep 
the context of normative decision theory as a plausible assumption for now, 
although it will need to be qualified significantly later.69 
 
This ‘enriched’ Bayesianism should help determine what credence to have for a 
hypothesis, in comparison with other hypotheses in a partition. It would certainly 
                                                   
 
66 Which is effectively a special case of deliberate ‘partisan’ selection of evidence to support chosen 
credences: see p287. 
67 See footnote 69 below. 
68 Because Pr(H/E) > Pr(H). 
69 We are touching here on Information Value Theory, which can of course be addressed more 
formally: for example Howard (1966). Eventually however we will be relying less on notions like this 
and more on a distinctively moral duty to preserve our shared epistemic asset: see p249ff. 
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help do this in a dynamic context, when net evidence increases or decreases over 
time. Considering how bad we are at statistical thinking, it can help us avoid false 
beliefs arising from base rate neglect: described as a ‘sharp violation of Bayes’ 
rule’ (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974:1124) and a ‘sin of representativeness’ 
(Kahneman, 2012:151).70 It will help us move (justifiably and therefore rationally) 
from ‘I believe that H’ to (say) ‘I don’t believe that H’ or ‘I’m not so sure about H’. 
But it does not yet give us a handle on when we can say ‘I believe that H’: when 
we have sufficient evidence, if this falls short of conclusive evidence. This is our 
next hurdle. The discussion will extend over a number of sections and cover 
different facets of justified belief. The first real attempt to draw the threads 




A first stab at a Bayesian criterion could be that evidence is sufficient when it 
takes our credence above a certain value and insufficient when our credence is 
below that value. 
 
But this encounters the ‘problem of the priors’:72 that on a strictly (subjective) 
Bayesian approach an agent could regard himself as having sufficient evidence 
for any hypothesis given appropriately chosen prior probabilities. The threshold 
could therefore be zero. 
 
Our counter-suggestion was that we are only interested in posterior probabilities – 
credences after at least some updating in relation to evidence. This would imply a 
duty to get and acknowledge evidence.73 Our modified proposal would then be 
that evidence is sufficient when it takes our credence above a certain threshold 
                                                   
 
70 For example being terrified after testing positive in a 99% reliable test for an illness affecting one in 
10,000 people (Hacking, 2001, 2009:73). The odds that you have the disease will only be a hundred 
to one against. Casscells et al (1978) asked 60 Harvard medical practitioners and medical students 
the question ‘If a test to detect a disease whose prevalence is 1/1000 has a false positive rate of 5 
per cent, what is the chance that a person found to have a positive result actually has the 
disease…?’ Only 18% gave the correct answer of 0.02, and 45% gave the very wrong answer of 
0.95. No wonder the growth of decision-support systems implementing Bayesian algorithms in 
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after a reasonable period of updating and insufficient if there has been little or no 
updating or our credence is below that threshold. We would need to explain 
though what counts as a reasonable amount of updating and what the threshold 
would be, as the following scenario attempts to illustrate. 
 
Imagine you have a bag labelled as containing a kilogram of pure salt. It is part of 
a shipment which someone claims to have adulterated by substituting 10% by 
weight of ground glass in some of the bags. You are seriously considering two 
hypotheses, which make up your partition: 
 
HP The bag contains pure salt. 
 
HA The bag has been adulterated with 10% ground glass. 
 
We will assume priors of 0.5 for each and ignore other potential hypotheses: the 
bag is all ground glass; the bag is 75% ground glass; the bag is full of potassium 
nitrate; etc. 
 
You shake the powder and take a sample of 10 grams. You dissolve the sample in 
water and filter it. There is no insoluble residue. You repeat a number of times. 
Each test is a Bayesian update cycle where you can revise your credences. After 
the first result your (subjective) credence for HP shoots up but only to, say, 0.95. 
You think you might have been careless in how you shook the powder and then 
took the sample, so if there was glass it could have all fallen to the bottom and got 
missed from your sample. Before the second test you mix the remaining 990 
grams more thoroughly. But you get the same result: no glass. With each test 
result your posterior probability for hypothesis HP gets closer to 1. But not quite 1. 
A diminishing but still positive chance remains that 100 grams of glass remain in 
the bag and by some freakish sequence of events your sampling keeps missing it. 
 
At iteration 90 only 100 grams remain. For HA to be true the remaining powder 
must all be ground glass. You test sample 91 and there is no insoluble residue. 
You now have conclusive evidence that HP is true: but you did not need Bayesian 
updating to tell you that. So what about after iteration 90, or 80, or 40, or 10? In 
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theory the remaining salt could have been mixed with 100 grams of glass. But 
despite this, when there were still 100 grams or more of powder in the bag at what 
point would we say we had sufficient evidence to believe HP? 
 
Although EP4 only refers to ‘insufficient evidence’ – to identify illegitimate beliefs – 
we still need a way to identify legitimate beliefs, a way to connect credence to 
justified full belief. If we were speaking of knowledge rather than justified belief74 
the equivalent question would be: at what point would we say we know HP was 
true? 
 
After iteration 90, in theory the remaining powder could be all glass (HA) but it is 
overwhelmingly probable that it is all salt (HP) – assuming these are the only live 
hypotheses. There seems a case for saying we know HP is true after iteration 90, 
but also a case for saying that, strictly speaking, we do not know. What line we 
take relates to the different risk consequences of each option. The probability that 
the last 100 grams are pure salt would be far higher than the probability of our 
being right in countless everyday cases where only the most hardened induction 
sceptic would claim not to know. But those who say we do not know after iteration 
90 might insist the last 100 grams could still be ground glass. 
 
The view that in a case like this we can say we justifiably believe HP at some 
iteration before 91 can be called a ‘threshold view’: that 
 
outright belief is belief to a degree higher than some threshold value x < 1: 
one believes that p (outright) if and only if Cr(p) >= x, where Cr(.) is one’s 
credence function. (Clarke, 2013:3) 
 
Clarke distinguishes this from a similar ‘rational belief’ variant which he calls75 the 
‘Lockean view’: that 
 
one is rational to believe p outright if and only if one is rational to have a 
degree of belief that p higher than some threshold value y. (2013:3) 
                                                   
 
74 See p212. 
75 Following Foley (1993). 
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We have already mentioned76 one issue with this: where do we set the threshold? 





The ‘lottery paradox’77 introduces a category of cases at the cusp of outright 
justified belief (or knowledge). Its ‘knowledge’ version can be summarised as 
follows. Imagine you have bought one of a million tickets in a lottery with only one 
eventual winner. It is overwhelmingly likely that yours is a losing ticket. But can 
you say you know this? Surely not, because if so you can also say you know all 
the other 999,999 ticket holders will also lose, including the eventual winner. But 
you cannot know this, because you cannot know something false. The problem 
though is that  
 
since there are few empirical facts you can be as certain of as that your 
ticket is a loser, the intuitive answer raises the worry that your empirical 
knowledge is exceedingly limited at best. (Douven, 2003:395) 
 
The ‘rational belief’ version of the paradox asks whether your belief that your ticket 
is a loser is rational. If it is, then it seems you could rationally believe the same of 
every other ticket – contradicting your knowledge that the lottery has a winner. But 
then it seems ‘there is precious little you can rationally believe’ (Douven, 
2003:395). 
 
According to Hawthorne the problem generalises such that the lottery itself can be 
removed: 
 
I am inclined to think that I know that I will be living in Syracuse for part of 
this summer. But … I am not inclined to think that I know whether or not I will 
be one of the unlucky people who, despite being apparently healthy, suffer a 
                                                   
 
76 p232. 
77 First described by Kyburg (1961:197-9). 
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fatal heart attack in the next week. … Indeed, I am just as unwilling to count 
myself as knowing about the heart attack as I am to count myself as 
knowing about the lottery…(2004:3)78  
 
Lottery cases can cast doubt on whether we can construe ‘sufficient evidence’ (for 
either knowledge or legitimate belief) in terms of a credence threshold short of 1. 
 
A lottery ticket holder may be more certain his ticket will lose than of his 
grandmother’s birthday.79 But he might say he knows his grandmother’s birthday 
is 3 August but not that he will lose the lottery. If he knows (or has no reason to 
doubt) the lottery is fair, then he knows he has a finite chance of winning, which is 
an integral part of knowing what a lottery is. 
 
If he did not know he had a finite chance of winning then it is debatable whether 
what he did would count as taking part in a lottery rather than, say, giving money 
away. Knowing he is taking part in a lottery, and therefore knowing he has a finite 
chance of winning, is incompatible with knowing he will lose, but compatible with 
knowing he will very probably lose. Yet even if, as a reflective individual, he is 
aware of his own epistemic fallibility, that is not in the same way an integral part of 
believing or knowing his grandmother’s birthday is 3 August. He can qualify as 
knowing his grandmother’s birthday whether or not he is aware of his epistemic 
fallibility. 
 
So a lottery ticket holder puzzled by being more certain of losing than about the 
date of his grandmother’s birthday may not be comparing like with like. Knowing 
he has a one-in-a-million chance of winning stops him saying he knows he will 
lose. But family birthdays are the kind of thing we generally say we know. We may 
or may not ask ourselves whether we are sure. If we did we might realise we are 
more certain of (say) our own birthdays than of our grandparents’. There may be 
more than a one-in-a-million chance we have got our grandmother’s birthday 
wrong, and we may or may not then replace ‘I know my grandmother’s birthday is 
3 August’ with (say) ‘I am almost certain my grandmother’s birthday is 3 August’. 
                                                   
 
78 This scenario is understood to derive originally from (Vogel, 1990). 
79 To use an example from Frankish (2009:79). 
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I would say without qualm that ‘I know my birthday is 6 May’. But after reflecting 
on the fallibility of all empirical knowledge I might acknowledge I could be wrong. 
Perhaps I had been swapped at birth and my real birthday was 5 May. But this 
would not make me replace ‘I know’ with ‘I think’. I would more likely stick to ‘I 
know’ while acknowledging the fallibility of all empirical knowledge. I may have 
good reasons for thinking the possibility of error extremely remote but not know 
how to be more certain. I could search in vain for evidence of a cover-up – 
because there was no cover-up or because it was so perfect. Even if I found 
apparent evidence that my birthday was 5 May how would I know this new 
evidence was genuine? Yet no matter how unlikely I thought it was that I was 
wrong about my birthday, if I thought it was possible (because of the fallibility of all 
empirical knowledge) and chose to give it a numerical probability, I could envisage 
a lottery with enough tickets that my chance of winning was even less. But my 
reluctance to say ‘I know I will lose this lottery’ would not make me retract ‘I know 
my birthday is 6 May’. Why the difference? 
 
The Bayesian approach allows personal credences to be modelled on imaginary 
gambles. To make this explicit we could construct a ‘no loss’ choice involving a 
random number generator displaying a number between 1 and n. Before the 
number displays I am asked to pick any ticket numbered between 1 and n, and 
choose between: 
 
(5.2.1) £1,000,000 if I am right about my birthday and I give up my ticket; or 
 
(5.2.2) £1,000,000 if the number I pick is not the number the generator 
displays. 
 
How high must n be before I choose (5.2.2)? Imagine my credence about my 
birthday was only 0.9, so I would have a 10% chance of being wrong. If n > 10 I 
should choose (5.2.2), as I would have a <10% chance of picking the ‘losing’ 
number. 
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Now consider the case where I say I know my birthday is 6 May with no reason to 
doubt it – other than the fallibility of all empirical knowledge. My credence would 
be far higher, but not quite 1. There will be some very high value of n where I 
would be agonisingly conflicted between (5.2.1) and (5.2.2), and above which my 
choice should be (5.2.2). 
 
So it seems an individual could have two beliefs with the same personal 
probability (1 – 1/n): one about his birthday which he would say was justified (and 
therefore held on sufficient evidence) and most likely also knowledge; and one 
about not picking the winning number which he would say was neither knowledge 
nor a belief held on sufficient evidence, but only a belief which was very probably 
true. The anomaly seems to have something to do with the policy of modelling 
credence on an imaginary gamble, a policy which might lead us to assume that a 
belief which is not about this kind of gamble can be treated as if it is. In the lottery 
case all the relevant possibilities are always salient but this is not so in the 
birthday case. There is a difference of context between the two cases. 
 
In the case of the bag of salt80 we were undecided whether a high credence short 
of 1 corresponded to ‘sufficient evidence’, and therefore what, short of conclusive 
evidence, would constitute sufficient evidence to justify believing the salt was 
unadulterated. There seem parallels between this case and a game of chance. In 
the scenario where testing has not yet reached the threshold for conclusive proof 
– up to and including iteration 90 – I may still have a tiny but non-zero credence 
that the salt was unadulterated. If I do not know I have not picked the winning 
ticket no matter how high n is in (5.2.2), then, strictly speaking, even at iteration 90 
perhaps I cannot say I know the bag is pure salt, and therefore cannot say I have 
sufficient evidence to believe hypothesis HP? I would then only have sufficient 
evidence to believe HP is very probably true. That does not seem irrational. 
 
But the two cases are not parallel. In (5.2.2), as long as we know the value of n, 
we can calculate the exact probabilities of picking (1/n) and not picking (1 – 1/n) 
the number the random number generator displays. We know one of the n tickets 
                                                   
 
80 See p232. 
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is the winner, but not whether that ticket is ours. In the case of the bag of salt we 
do not know whether the bag was adulterated or (if it was) how perfect the mixture 
was. The two cases display different uncertainties. 
 
Hawthorne’s (2004) ‘Syracuse’ example81 also seems like a ‘lottery’ case when we 
consider a large enough population. If (say) the lifetime risk of fatal heart attack in 
a healthy middle-aged male is around 2%, that means something like 0.02 ÷ 30 
(remaining years of life) ÷ 52 (weeks in a year) = 0.0000128 or 1 in 78,000. 
 
So we can ask whether each member of a population of 78,000 men knows he will 
still be alive next week. It is highly probable that at least one does not know that, 
because he will not be alive. (Or consider 10 out of 780,000 or 100 out of 7.8 
million. If those men cannot know, how can the others know?) 
 
But it takes a deliberate decision to see possible contingencies in this way. 
Normally if you say you will be somewhere at a particular time that is taken to 
mean you know, or at least believe, you will be there. Only if questioned might you 
start adding assumptions about not suffering a cardiac arrest. If such 
contingencies were quantified they may come to a higher probability than winning 
a lottery. In gambling contexts the uncertainty – and its significance – are explicitly 
to the fore, but in non-gambling contexts the uncertainty is only implicit or even 
suppressed. This seems key. 
 
There appears to be a tension between the ideas of ‘full belief’ and ‘credence’ 
where the latter is modelled on an imaginary gamble, particularly one involving 
transparent ‘fair odds’ derivable from physical symmetries.82 On the one hand it 
seems appropriate to allow a high credence just short of 1 to qualify as ‘full belief’. 
On the other hand ‘lottery’ cases in particular seem to expose differences between 
our intuitive understanding of ‘full belief’ (and therefore of knowledge) and the 
connotations and commitments which credences just shy of 1 would entail. 
 
                                                   
 
81 See p233. 
82 Not all gambles, imaginary or otherwise, involve physical symmetries. For example horse racing. 
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Just because a ticket-holder might never say he knows (and therefore never has 
sufficient evidence to believe) he will lose a lottery no matter how many tickets 
were issued, we cannot extrapolate from that that we would not say we know (or 
have sufficient evidence to believe) something just because we acknowledge 
sceptical epistemic doubts. On the surface lottery cases seem to show there can 
be no threshold value for a credence short of certainty. But lotteries are different 
from non-lottery cases because in a lottery all possibilities are made explicit and 
need to be explicitly entertained by the agent. In Hawthorne’s ‘Syracuse’ story83 
we see a shift from one type of case to the other. It is a shift in the relevant 
possibilities we consider: a shift in the context of assessment. 
 
This should not imply our intuitive notion of ‘full belief’ ignores exposure to risk. 
The issue seems to be in quantifying that risk. We want to see both full belief and 
knowledge as (sometimes if not always) ‘fallible’ (and therefore exposed to risk) 
without necessarily committing to any specific quantification of that fallibility (or 
risk). Perhaps more simply, we want a notion of ‘fallible knowledge’ which is not a 
contradiction in terms. We want to allow a belief to be both ‘supported by sufficient 
evidence’ and also ‘fallible’. 
 
There seems a connection between thought experiments about lotteries and heart 
attacks and the idea that personal certainty implies being prepared to stake any 
amount that your belief is true and/or die a horrible death if it is false. It is almost a 
reductio ad absurdum of the principle of seeing degrees of belief as personal 
probabilities, modelled on the odds we would accept for imaginary gambles. 
 
It would take a degree of courage (if not recklessness) to stake any amount 
including your life on even a necessary truth. In the context of an actual bet there 
is always a chance you might have misunderstood something: perhaps what you 
thought was a necessary truth was not in fact, or a word had changed its meaning 
without you knowing. In this context ‘horrible death’ means nothing unless it is a 
real one. So it must be a real bet, with something real at stake, not an academic 
exercise to calculate probabilities. It is therefore not clear that, if 
                                                   
 
83 p233. 
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to assign a probability of 1 to a proposition is to cease to contemplate the 




a person who gave [hypothesis] H probability 1 would be willing to accept a 
bet in which the person wins a penny if H is true, and dies a horrible death if 
H is false (Maher, 1993:133). 
 
We started with the suggestion that our belief that p is justified as long as our 
credence that p – understood in Bayesian terms – is at least as high as a certain 
threshold84 value, which can be less than 1. Our bag of salt discussion suggested 
it was at least plausible that justified belief did not require certainty. But the lottery 
case discussion leads to doubt whether a purely quantitative credence threshold 
can serve on its own as a criterion of justified belief, as we could hold two beliefs 
at the exact same credence value, one justified and the other not. 
 
Where a belief could clearly have supporting evidence (medical diagnosis; drug-
taking; sea-worthiness of ships; primate evolution) Bayesian modelling of 
credence on imaginary gambles seems to fit. So there seems little reason to deny 
our account of sufficient evidence for EP4 a Bayesian component. Beliefs like 
these will be subject to doubts relating to how complete or incomplete we think the 
evidence is. We can model this kind of uncertainty on the uncertainty involved 
when betting. 
 
But other factors also seem relevant to what level of evidence-based credence 
counts as justified belief, or indeed when high credence counts as full belief. 
These factors seem largely pragmatic ones relating to context and risk, for 
example whether the agent’s credence is about his chances of winning a fortune 
or dying a horrible death, or reflects the kinds of everyday certainty we enjoy when 
telling others our plans. 
                                                   
 
84 p230ff. 
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A thesis like this can be labelled ‘pragmatic encroachment’, and is typically 
expressed in terms of knowledge rather than justified belief: ‘A difference in 
pragmatic circumstances can constitute a difference in knowledge’ (Ichikawa & 
Steup, 2001, 2017). We will see if this helps our search for a criterion of evidential 
sufficiency.  
 
5.5 Pragmatic encroachment 
 
Stanley: What is at stake 
 
Stanley makes a case for pragmatic encroachment in respect of ‘what makes 
someone’s true belief a case of knowledge’ (2005:loc 19). He compares similar 
but not identical scenarios to assess whether we would intuitively describe them 
as knowledge. 
 
His first two both start: 
 
Hannah and her wife Sarah are driving home on a Friday afternoon. They 
plan to stop at the bank on the way home to deposit their paychecks. 
 
His ‘Low Stakes’ scenario continues: 
 
It is not important that they do so, as they have no impending bills. But as 
they drive past the bank, they notice that the lines inside are very long[.] ... 
Realizing that it isn’t very important that their paychecks are deposited right 
away, Hannah says, ‘I know the bank will be open tomorrow, since I was 
there just two weeks ago on Saturday morning. So we can deposit our 
paychecks tomorrow morning.’ 
 
‘High Stakes’ continues differently: 
 
Since they have an impending bill coming due, and very little in their 
account, it is very important that they deposit their paychecks by Saturday. 
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Hannah notes that she was at the bank two weeks before on a Saturday 
morning, and it was open. But, as Sarah points out, banks do change their 
hours. Hannah says, ‘I guess you’re right. I don’t know that the bank will be 
open tomorrow.’ (Stanley, 2005:loc 118-126) 
 
In both scenarios the focus is Hannah’s self-attribution of knowledge, or lack of it. 
Stanley has another case of self-attribution (‘Ignorant High Stakes’) and two where 
the attributor is not the subject: ‘Low Attributor–High Subject Stakes’ and ‘High 
Attributor–Low Subject Stakes’. All scenarios assume the bank will be open on 
Saturday; and, for our purposes, all can be recast into ‘justified belief’ language, 
by replacing ‘know’ with ‘have sufficient evidence to believe’. 
 
Stanley agrees with what he sees as our intuitive verdict, that only ‘Low Stakes’ 
has a correct attribution of knowledge.85 Knowledge is therefore ‘not just a matter 
of non-practical facts’ – concerning what evidence the subject has – ‘but is also a 
matter of how much is at stake’,86 which consists of ‘practical facts … about the 
costs of being right or wrong about one’s beliefs’ (2005:loc 143).87 
 
If what counts as knowledge – and, for our purposes, what counts as justified 
belief – for an agent can depend at least partly on what is at stake for that agent, 
then perhaps our criterion of evidential sufficiency for EP4 could be that level of 
evidence sufficient to justify taking the risk of holding the belief, in view of what the 
agent has at stake. As what is at stake can vary from one agent to another, so 
could the level of evidence sufficient to justify taking the risk of holding the belief. 
 
We have already argued for an ‘enriched’ Bayesianism embedded within 
normative decision theory.88 Could then ‘what is at stake’ for an individual be that 
individual’s maximised personal utility? Might Stanley’s identification of stake 
differences as a criterion of knowledge (or justified versus unjustified belief) then 
                                                   
 
85 Later we will consider the impact of a possible moral duty to prioritise a social stake over a purely 
personal stake: p249ff. 
86 A similar idea may have also been proposed by the Hellenistic sceptic Carneades (Thorsrud, 
undated:2(b)(v)). 
87 James can be seen as making a similar point in his distinction between knowing the truth and 
avoiding error: pp163–165. 
88 See p228. 
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be already implicit in how we are interpreting the Bayesian model, where personal 
utility can motivate the acceptance of odds in a ‘gamble’ on the truth value of a 
hypothesis? In Stanley’s scenarios personal utility would then re-enter to influence 
whether or not the agent should see the available evidence as sufficient to justify 
knowledge (or full belief). 
 
We could illustrate this with a cycle of Bayesian updating covering Low Stakes, 
High Stakes, and what we will call ‘Fair Stakes’ (not one of Stanley’s): 
 
Hypothesis H = The bank will be open Saturday morning. 
 
P(H) = Hannah’s prior probability for H = (say) 0.6. 
 
Therefore her P(~H) = 0.4. 
 
E = The bank was open two weeks ago on Saturday morning. 
 
Hannah’s P(E/H) = (say) 0.95. 
 
Hannah’s P(E/~H) = (say) 0.1. 
 
Her posterior probability P(H/E) calculates to 0.93, roughly 13:1. 
 
If Hannah’s priority were winning a bet (‘Fair Stakes’), she would be indifferent 
between accepting odds of 13:1 on that the bank will be open Saturday morning or 
13:1 against that it will not. But in both Low Stakes and High Stakes she wants the 
bank to be open on Saturday morning, not to win a bet; and in Low Stakes her 
concern that it might not be open on Saturday is trumped by her reluctance to 
spend time queuing on Friday. 
 
‘Fair Stakes’ could be seen as the Bayesian paradigm, where Hannah’s priority is 
to update her credence coherently to avoid exposure to sure-loss contracts. She 
could not say she knew the bank would be open on Saturday morning, because 
then she would not accept a bet at 13:1 against that it would be closed. 
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So although consideration of stake differences influencing attributions of 
knowledge or justified belief may not be implicit in Bayesianism itself, it does seem 
compatible with normative decision theory, which Bayesianism can be interpreted 
in terms of.89  In Low Stakes it seems rational for Hannah to take her 0.93 
posterior probability that the bank will be open next day as justification for her 
claim to full belief (or knowledge) that the bank will be open next day. But in both 
High Stakes and Fair Stakes it would not be rational for her to do this. 
 
Part of what it is to be an individual (person) is to be free to be different from other 
individuals, to have different priorities and interests. By contrast the ideally rational 
Bayesian agent is constrained to be universal: in the sense of using standard rules 
to update his credences, and therefore being prepared to place the same bets as 
any other individual would who shares his credences about the relevant 
hypotheses. We are not contrasting ‘universal’ rules for updating credences with 
individual initial credences: that applies in standard Bayesianism. The individual 
differences Stanley identifies are differences in behaviour or attitude on the basis 
of those credences: whether and when to bet; whether and when to claim 
knowledge or justified belief. 
 
Stanley’s cases are where the evidence threshold appropriate for an attribution of 
knowledge (or outright belief or justified belief) can vary from one agent to another 
depending on what the agent has at stake with respect to the relevant hypothesis. 
We should acknowledge that this could be problematic for a principle like EP4. A 
criterion of evidential sufficiency varying from agent to agent might seem too 
subjective and therefore risk trivialising EP4. We will need to address this 
shortly.90 
 
First though we will consider an alternative take on ‘pragmatic encroachment’. 
This is that credence itself could be influenced by pragmatic factors. 
 
                                                   
 
89 See p229. 
90 p252. 
   244 
Clarke: Degrees of belief vary by context 
 
Clarke advances the view that ‘[d]egrees of belief change from context to context, 
depending on the space of alternative possibilities’ (2013:1). ‘[O]ne’s credences in 
a particular context’ depend on the weightings one gives ‘to each of the 
possibilities one takes seriously in that context’: 
 
offering a bet [on a belief that p] means changing the context. When the 
practical importance of p changes, as it must when a bet is offered, the 
space of salient alternatives to p may also change. When I am offered a bet 
on p at very long odds and/or very high stakes, I am likely to worry more 
about whether p is true after all and consider a wider range of alternative 
possibilities. (2013:9) 
 
To be offered a life-threatening bet on what you had taken as a necessary truth 
changes the context from academic detachment to one where having explored a 
‘wider range of alternative possibilities’ you might start doubting your 
comprehension of necessary truths in general and of this one in particular. You 
might then come to a non-zero (if very low) probability that you will lose the bet, 
without necessarily altering your conviction that necessary truths have probability 
1. 
 
As part of the idealisation involved in the Bayesian modelling of credences on 
imaginary gambles we assume the agent is equally willing to take either side of 
the bet as long as the price is right. Your credence will be a measure of the odds 
you would accept whichever way you were betting: p on one side; (1 – p) on the 
other. But outside an idealisation like this the thought of being equally willing to 
accept, at any price, either side of ‘a bet in which [you win] a penny if H is true, 
and [die] a horrible death if H is false’ (Maher, 1993:133) makes little sense. In an 
idealised case a credence less than 1 for a tautology is irrational because it would 
expose you to sure-loss contracts. But in a real-life case it would arguably be at 
least as irrational, albeit for different reasons, to stake your life on any bet – 
including that of a tautology being true. 
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A ‘credence-sensitivist’ like Clarke acknowledges the ‘tight connection’ between 
credence and willingness to bet, but denies that ‘we can easily infer one’s 
willingness to bet in one context from one’s credences in another context’ 
(2013:10). 
 
Allowing for change of context could explain the difference between full (‘outright’, 
‘flat-out’) belief that p and being certain that p: 
 
being certain that p seems to require stability of opinion… If one is certain 
that p, then it must be difficult to move one to abandon belief in p. (2013:11) 
 
To say I am certain that p is to predict my belief will not change if my context 
changes – if for example I must express my belief that p to a more critical 
audience than expected. But this still does not commit me to having envisaged 
every possible change of context, including being invited to stake my life on the 
truth of p. 
 
Two people may therefore hold a belief that p at credence 1 in different ways. A 
may believe (outright) that p at credence 1, but be prone to revise that credence to 
a value less than 1 if the context of his belief changes and he becomes aware of a 
‘wider range of alternative possibilities’ than previously considered. B may be 
‘certain’ or ‘more certain’ that p (also at credence 1), and be less likely to reduce 
his credence even despite a change in context – perhaps because his range of 
possibilities was wide to begin with. 
 
This should not undermine Bayesianism. The ‘standard subjective Bayesian 
framework … deals with ideally rational agents’ (Clarke, 2013:2), for whom 
‘degree of belief 1 is maximally stable’ (2013:11): if one’s degree of belief for a 
hypothesis = 1 then there is ‘no way to update by conditionalisation’ to get a 
degree of belief less than 1.91  But if, with Clarke, we admit the impact of 
contextual change where human agents are concerned and allow ‘an agent’s 
degrees of belief [to] vary with features of context other than her evidence’, then a 
                                                   
 
91 See p216 and footnote 42. 
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degree of belief 1 can be influenced by a contextual factor to drop to a value less 
than 1. A degree of belief 1 may then not be ‘maximally stable’. 
 
We could see this flexibility as already implicit in subjective Bayesianism. We must 
always be able to adjust our credences for non-evidential reasons if we recognise 
possibilities we have excluded and now take seriously.92 
 
According to Clarke’s context-sensitive view of outright belief, 
 
to believe that p in a context C (characterized … by a set of possibilities) is 
to rule out all possibilities in C where p does not hold.93 (2013:11) 
 
This sort of context-dependence could however be as problematic for EP4 as 
Stanley’s ‘practical facts’. The ‘space of salient alternatives’ is not ‘evidence’. It 
could differ from agent to agent, and be subjective rather than objective. It might 
therefore seem incompatible with an evidence principle, which is another worry we 
will need to address.94 
 
Not only do they both seem equally problematic for EP4, we also have no other 
reason to take sides between subjective-sensitive invariantists like Stanley and 
contextualists like Clarke. More important is what they share: that factors other 
than evidence can play a role in fixing credences and/or motivating decision-
making on the basis of those credences. For our purposes we can combine the 




We have actually alluded to this idea before, in the relation between belief and 
action. Peirce describes the ‘essence of belief’ as the ‘establishment of a habit’ 
                                                   
 
92 Later we will consider a possible moral duty to include and take seriously possibilities we had 
previously excluded: p249ff. 
93 Ruling out ‘all possibilities in C where p does not hold’ would mean giving not-p zero probability – 
but only in context C. 
94 p252. 
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(1878, 1998:144) – ‘habit’ being short for ‘rule of action’ (1878, 1998:143).95 
Clifford maintains that to count as a belief there must be potential ‘influence upon 
the actions of him who holds it’ (1877, 1879:181) and that ‘no belief is real unless 
it guide our actions’ (1877, 1879:193).96 For James ‘belief is measured by action’ 
(1896, 2000:217 footnote); and he suggests another possible link by using 
examples of both belief and action in his tripartite analysis of ‘genuine options’.97 
 
Practical interest then provides an obvious link from belief to action. You might 
need two kinds of reason for accepting a belief – certainly where acceptance has 
an element of volition. One is your reason for thinking the belief is true. Another is 
your practical interest in an outcome: you need to accept the belief to use it as a 
basis for action, which would be the value of the belief for you. 
 
We have not yet unpacked ‘practical interest’, so we can currently interpret it in 
terms of ‘personal utility’ from normative decision theory.98 
 
For James an ‘option’ between hypotheses may be ‘trivial’ or ‘momentous’ (1896, 
2000:199-200) for the believer. Talk of practical interests appears to cover the 
same domain, but as a spectrum rather than a dichotomy. A possible qualm with 
James’s indulgence of over-beliefs arising from a ‘genuine option’ is that 
‘momentous’ seems arbitrary and subjective. Who decides if an option is 
momentous?99 It can only be the believer – who could be capricious, histrionic, 
obsessional. James’s example of religious belief and Stanley’s Low Stakes 
scenario are almost mirror images. James permits religious over-belief if (among 
other things) it arises from an option which is momentous for the believer (1896, 
2000:215-6). In Stanley’s Low Stakes however Hannah’s belief that the bank will 
be open tomorrow is legitimate (qualifying as knowledge in the original wording) 
because the ‘option’ is not momentous. The difference seems to be that James’s 
religious believer has an intense practical interest in the consequence of believing 
that what she wants to be the case actually is the case – that there is a God and 
                                                   
 
95 See p102. 
96 Also for Adler ‘belief’s everyday roles [are] prominently as guides to action’ (2002:11). 
97 See p143 and p168. 
98 See p226ff. 
99 See p174ff. 
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therefore she could (say) have a chance of eternal life. Low Stakes Hannah on the 
other hand has a negligible practical interest in the truth of the belief. Someone 
wired differently to James’s believer could see the religious option as equally 
momentous, but because of an intense High Stakes practical interest in the truth 
of the belief, rather than in the consequence of believing, any religious over-belief 
he had would presumably be illegitimate.100 
 
This suggests a way of addressing a scenario from Chapter 3: Meiland’s story 
about the wife faced with evidence of her husband’s affair.101 She clearly has a 
great deal at stake – the survival of her 15-year marriage. But her ‘high stakes’ 
seem to work like James’s religious believer’s to lower the required evidence 
threshold for believing in her husband’s innocence – which, other things being 
equal, we could assume would be more likely to preserve the marriage than 
believing in his guilt – rather than, as in Stanley’s ‘High Stakes’ scenario, to raise 
it: 
 
[H]er relationship of fifteen years standing to her husband shows that 
evidence alone (unless it is conclusive) should not determine belief 
(Meiland, 1980:22).102 
 
So ideas of pragmatic encroachment certainly seem aligned with previous 
elements of our discussion. However we must remember our goal is an account of 
sufficient evidence suitable for EP4. Unfortunately, not only have we been unable 
to quantify a credence level corresponding to justified belief, it now seems we 
must say that, depending on the believer’s context, practical interests can affect 
what counts as full or justified belief. 
 
The idea that different people presented with the same evidence could legitimately 
acquire or hold different beliefs would generally be viewed as a voluntarist but not 
                                                   
 
100 James would probably agree. 
101 p116ff. This scenario could also qualify for ‘moral encroachment’ treatment: see p295. 
102 The wife’s ‘high stakes’ could equally be described as raising the required evidence threshold for 
believing in her husband’s guilt. But this would be to focus on what she does not want, not on what 
she does want. 
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an evidentialist claim. Indeed Clifford’s moral language103 seems to presuppose at 
least an element of voluntarism. The more qualified wording of EP4 also allows for 
people holding different beliefs on the same evidence, or different people seeing 
the same evidence in different ways. For now we are assuming both are 
legitimate. A potential issue though is that letting practical interests influence what 
counts as sufficient evidence risks emptying EP4 of all content. 
 
Meiland’s story has an explicitly moral context, in that the wife is morally conflicted 
as to what to believe. Not all cases of believing have an obvious moral dimension 
of course. But we have consistently claimed EP4 to be a moral principle. Our next 
move will acknowledge this explicitly. 
 
Whose practical interest? Whose personal utility? 
 
Clifford condemned his ship owner for believing – however ‘sincerely’ (1877, 
1879:178) – on insufficient evidence. The ship owner would also run aground on 
EP4. But now construe sufficient versus insufficient evidence in Bayesian terms 
and model the ship owner’s relevant posterior probabilities as imaginary gambles 
along the lines of our test case about drug taking.104 His ‘sincere and comfortable 
conviction that his vessel was thoroughly safe and seaworthy’ (1877, 1879:177) 
might then appear irrational if we assume accompanying high credences for the 
propositions that the ship ‘was old, and not over-well built at the first’ and that ‘she 
had seen many seas and climes, and often had needed repairs’, and testimony 
that ‘possibly she was not seaworthy’. His combination of credences would not 
conform to the probability calculus, and if they were interpreted as gambles which 
he then accepted, he would be exposed to sure-loss contracts. 
 
Or consider the story in terms of the ‘enriched’ Bayesianism embedded in 
normative decision theory which we have argued for previously.105 If we assume 
fairly standard motivations, for example to minimise the risk of being wrong, then 
the ship owner ought to have collected some evidence – assuming the cost of 
                                                   
 
103 See p30. 
104 p216. 
105 p228. 
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getting evidence did not exceed the cost of being wrong. If he collected no 
evidence then he was in another way irrational. Except in exceptional 
circumstances, even just refusing to get any evidence seems in itself irrational in 
terms of normative decision theory, as the assumed aim to maximise personal 
utility would generally be thwarted by getting no evidence whatsoever.106 He could 
also be irrational if he has other non-epistemic interests, for example the welfare 
of his passengers, and does not weigh these properly. 
 
But the ship owner might have none of these interests. He might have no interest 
in the welfare of his passengers, and no particular interest in not being wrong. We 
could then argue that he has reached his decision in a way which is perfectly 
rational according to both decision theory and Bayesian thinking. 
 
So while the ship owner’s belief may be irrational if we model his credences on 
imaginary gambles, and make a set of assumptions which might be plausible in 
relation to other agents, in Clifford’s story he took a real gamble, and won: ‘he got 
his insurance-money when [the ship] went down in mid-ocean’ (1877, 1879:177-
8). His sin was in maximising his personal utility, not in failing to. Assuming he 
evaded prosecution for culpable homicide and/or insurance fraud (‘told no tales’), 
his practical interest was served by ignoring the evidence he had and not seeking 
any more. A metric of this kind of personal utility therefore seems inappropriate in 
an evidence principle like CP or EP4 expressed in moral terms. 
 
But we can construe ‘practical interest’ more broadly. Clifford’s overriding doxastic 
priority seems to be the cost of believing wrongly, in terms of the potential harm 
this can cause to the shared epistemic asset.107 So the preservation of knowledge 
as a shared social asset would be what is ‘at stake’ for him. CP and EP4 are 
worded in moral terms and presuppose a social context.108 In Bayesianism we can 
invent imaginary gambles to estimate degrees of belief. The stakes themselves 
are arbitrary, so could be of social rather than personal utility. For a criterion of 
                                                   
 
106 See p226ff. 
107 See in particular 5.3 Social context of belief: 2 p210ff. Clifford’s conception of the shared 
epistemic ‘heirloom’ was first introduced on p16. 
108 We are explicitly excluding the theoretical possibility of a moral context which is not a social 
context: see p212. 
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sufficient evidence for EP4 or CP a stake of maximised social utility – specifically 
the maximised value of the social asset of shared knowledge – fits better than a 
private jackpot. What is at stake is not at the level of the individual but at whatever 
level of community the individual sees himself sharing at and being a part of.109 
 
We could adapt (5.2.1–2)110 for example: 
 
(5.3.1) 50% drop in global warming if I am right about my birthday and I give 
up my ticket; or 
 
(5.3.2) 50% drop in global warming if the number I pick is not the number the 
generator displays. 
 
This comparison gamble has consequences beyond (5.2.1–2). Although still no-
loss bets, my judgments about my degree of belief now have social and moral 
significance. 
 
Why should I care about global warming? But we could equally ask: why should I 
care about maximised personal utility? In a sense the second question answers 
itself, as my personal utility is by definition what I care about. The utility values in 
the imaginary gamble have no pre-assigned content. They are just quantified 
items which the Bayesian agent happens to value. It may be more intuitive to 
construe credence updates in terms of potential debits and credits in a personal 
bank account. But the Bayesian agent need not be the account holder. He just 
needs to value any gain or loss. And a decision to prioritise personal gain has no 
less moral significance than a decision to prioritise protecting our shared 
environment or our shared epistemic asset. 
 
This should not back us into circularity. EP4’s moral requirement for sufficient 
evidence to support belief does not force us to stipulate the criterion in completely 
non-moral terms. It would be circular if the criterion was ‘a level of evidence 
sufficient for the belief to avoid the charge of being [morally] wrong’. But we are 
                                                   
 
109 See Singer (2011), which expands on οἰκείωσις, a theme of Hierocles and other Stoics. 
110 See p235. 
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not saying that. We are still trying to construe ‘sufficient’ and ‘insufficient’ evidence 
in generally Bayesian terms, but wanting to see the utility ‘currency’ as something 
shared and social rather than merely personal. If that implies a moral judgment 
that the Bayesian agent must prioritise shared social utility, so be it. A currency of 
purely individual utility equally implies a moral judgment that the Bayesian agent 
may prioritise that. 
 
So a stake of maximised social utility – particularly in relation to the shared 
epistemic asset – seems at least permissible as a currency for the imaginary 
gambles which can be used to quantify credences in Bayesian updating. It would 
also make sense as a potential factor when an individual decides (or 
acknowledges) his ‘context’ – and therefore his ‘range of alternative possibilities’ 
(Clarke, 2013:9).111 If my context can change when invited to stake my life on the 
truth of a belief, it can change when seeing my potential over-belief contributing to 
‘pestilence’, ‘plague’ or ‘savagery’ (Clifford, 1877, 1879:184-6). We might also 
rethink the attribution of knowledge or justified belief in Stanley’s ‘Low Stakes’ 
scenario (2005:loc 119)112 – which presupposes we only need consider a stake of 
personal utility. 
 
We said earlier that practical interest in the sense of either ‘context’ (Clarke)113 or 
‘what is at stake’ (Stanley)114 introduces non-evidential, and possibly subjective 
rather than objective, considerations into legitimate belief. This risked trivialising a 
principle which should be grounded in ‘objective’ evidence. But we are now 
proposing a normative (and universalised) perspective by introducing the practical 
interest we ought to have, which is to preserve, protect and enhance our shared 
epistemic asset. The ‘sufficient evidence’ which we need as a criterion for justified 
belief might then manage to escape the charge of ‘subjectivity’. 
 
We have not yet said much to justify the idea that we ought to have this shared 
practical interest, so this is what the next section will attempt. 
 




113 See p246. 
114 See p240. 
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5.6 Indefinite intersubjectivity 
 
The normative notion of ‘the practical interest we ought to have’ is essentially 
Clifford’s: our duty to preserve, protect and enhance our shared epistemic asset. 
This asset would at any moment be a compound of knowledge and true beliefs, 
plus credences, guidelines and so on; and although EP4 talks of belief rather than 
knowledge we will again find it helpful to articulate some of our ideas by 
considering knowledge as well as belief.115 Someone obeying EP4 would want to 
ensure his beliefs are as justified as they would need to be to qualify as 
knowledge, and avoid beliefs whenever possible which do not count as 
knowledge. In general, he would want to have the true belief that p because he 
wants to be in the position of knowing that p.116 
 
Shared facts and the ethics of belief 
 
Comparing ‘knowledge’ language with ‘belief’ language suggests a link between 
the concept of knowledge (versus mere true belief) and the kind of context where 
truths need to be shared. This is not to imply true beliefs are never shared, or that 
this never matters. But there is a sense in which the full value of shared true 
beliefs is only realised when they count as knowledge. 
 
‘I believe that p’ and ‘S believes that p’ relate to the individual and his attitude 
towards actual or possible states of affairs which may or may not be true. Beliefs 
about actual or possible states of affairs may refer to a truth shared with others. 
But if ‘know’ is factive117 then ‘I know that p’ and ‘S knows that p’ make direct 
claims about that shared truth. S1 saying ‘I believe that p’ and S2 who believes that 
p may be sharing the same attitude to proposition p: they are both holding p to be 
                                                   
 
115 See p212.  
116 Although the focus here is on shared beliefs and knowledge in the context of a shared epistemic 
asset, it appears at least congruent with approaches which take knowledge (rather than just truth) to 
be the aim of belief, for example ‘since the claim of full belief is to the truth of its content, a belief 
satisfies that claim only if it amounts to knowledge’ (Adler, 2002:7) and ‘knowledge is the standard 
against which beliefs are compared to see whether they count as justified’ (Bird, 2007:84). See also 
Williamson (2000) and McHugh (2011). 
117 The claim that ‘know’ is factive has not gone unchallenged: eg (Hazlett, 2010). But we are talking 
in the context of a community's interpersonal interaction with its shared stock of knowledge and true 
beliefs, where it seems safe to assume the general usage of 'knowledge' language is such that 
'know' is seen as factive. 
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true. But the truth of ‘I believe that p’ or ‘S2 believes that p’ does not entail the truth 
of p as do the truth of ‘I know that p’ and ‘S2 knows that p’.118 And if p is true then p 
is a truth shared between S1 and S2, and shareable with others. 
 
This might be purely an implication of the factiveness of knowledge, but it is an 
important one to draw out. Of course even a false shared belief is shareable. But a 
false shared belief is not a shared truth. The factiveness of knowledge guarantees 
that what is shared is shared truth. Two people holding the same true belief are 
sharing the same proposition, which happens to be true, but they are not sharing it 
in the knowledge that it is a truth. 
 
This may be a tiny facet of Clifford’s shared epistemic asset – which in his eyes 
has social and interpersonal importance, both in its composite utility value and in 
how it helps to ‘bind men together, and to strengthen and direct their common 
action’ (1877, 1879:183). But it is a tiny step in the right direction, which we have 
not made while we keep belief isolated from knowledge. Clifford’s ethics of belief 
takes as axiomatic a shared goal to acquire and enhance knowledge as a shared 
asset. True belief is part of that shared asset, but its value is only fully realised 
when it qualifies as knowledge. It is only when a shared true belief counts as 
knowledge that it is shared in the knowledge that it is truth. Otherwise it is just the 
belief that it is true which is shared. 
 
An important justification for a moral dimension to how we acquire, maintain, 
confirm, modify and reject our beliefs is the roles these play in how our shared 
knowledge base is created and enhanced. Clifford sees us having a shared duty 
to protect and develop this asset, similar to our shared duty to protect and develop 
the bonds of trust holding our communities together. Essentially the same 
assumption underpins EP4, from which perspective one who shares the benefits 
of the epistemic asset without sharing custodianship is a kind of cheat.119 
 
This leads naturally into the concept of an epistemic community, that community 
which contributes to, and enjoys the benefits of, the epistemic asset which its 
                                                   
 
118 See p264. 
119 See also Appendix A3 p288. 
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members share. We can see this community from at least two perspectives. We 
could see it as an already established ‘club’ which individuals can choose whether 
or not to join. An individual could do an evaluation to see if the epistemic duties of 
membership are worth the epistemic benefits. An honest and morally blameless 
individual could decide not to join, as long as he does not ‘cheat’ by enjoying 
benefits without reciprocating any duties. 
 
The ship owner would be one such cheat, assuming he made at least some use of 
the knowledge and skills of whatever communities he belongs to. It would be hard 
to imagine him surviving in business without doing so. He is therefore immoral at 
least twice over. He is criminally negligent of his passengers’ safety, and profits 
from their misfortune. But he is also an epistemic cheat: not helping preserve and 
protect the shared epistemic asset from which he benefits. 
 
But we can also see an epistemic community from another perspective, from 
which the ship owner is not just a cheat but his doxastic negligence endangers the 
very concept of knowledge itself. From this perspective we could argue that 
without the shared practical interest there can be no epistemic community and 
therefore no knowledge or belief at all. 
 
To flesh this out we will call on Edward Craig’s ‘state-of-nature theory’ (1990, 
1999:10) of knowledge. Belief may not aspire to be knowledge by definition, but 
Clifford is saying (and EP4 agrees) that we ought to believe in this way. Which 
suggests that an account of evidential sufficiency for knowledge might help us 
towards an account of evidential sufficiency for belief suitable for EP4. 
 
Craig’s ‘good informant’ 
 
Craig explores what he sees as the conditions and presuppositions for knowledge 
behaviour and knowledge language in the context of the kind of community where 
such behaviour and language can take hold, including 
 
what the concept of knowledge does for us, what its role in our life might be, 
and … what a concept having that role would be like… (1990, 1999:2) 
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His initial summary is that the concept of knowledge is used to ‘flag approved 
sources of information’ (1990, 1999:11). Because 
 
[h]uman beings need true beliefs … to guide their actions to a successful 
outcome … they need sources of information that will lead them to believe 
truths. (1990, 1999:11) 
 
Humans ‘act as informants for each other’, so have ‘an interest in evaluating 
sources of information’. 
 
‘Informant’ is a key role for Craig. Its complement is ‘inquirer’: ‘someone seeking 
information on the point whether or not p’ (1990, 1999:12). The inquirer will want 
an informant with respect to p such that both: 
 




If he tells us that p, we shall thereupon believe that p. (1990, 1999:13) 
 
This is because ‘we do not just want to have truths enunciated in our presence’ 
but ‘to be brought to believe them’. 
 
Craig starts not with human needs but with a rather more simple and ‘individualist’ 
creature’s. A barnacle for example has ‘a certain need’ so wants ‘something 
which, there and then, will satisfy the need’ – food, say – while having ‘no cause to 
distinguish … the presence of food, its own capacity to be nourished by that food, 
[and] its own capacity to detect the food and reach it’ (1990, 1999:82-3). 
 
Moving up the intelligence scale we see this ‘primitive holism’ start to ‘fragment’ 
(1990, 1999:83), with the ability to distinguish, say, ‘food here, soon’ from ‘food 
there, soon’: different situations calling for ‘different strategies’. Increasing 
socialisation and language use add further layers of sophistication. Others may be 
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‘better … at recognising food’ or ‘may be able to use substances as food which it 
cannot’. The picture develops of 
 
natural pressures driving thought away from the totally subjectivist stance, 
the pure here and now for me as I am here and now … [towards ideas of] 
the satisfaction of a need at other times and other places … [and of] 
recognitional and behavioural (and maybe digestive) capabilities other than 
those I have here and now, and hence of an object which can in the right 
circumstances satisfy such need whilst … coming nowhere near to meeting 
the wholly subjectivised conditions from which our thought experiment 
began. (1990, 1999:83-4) 
 
A critic might suspect an unwarranted ‘just-so story’. But Craig is not offering an 
evolutionary theory of how the concept of knowledge actually developed. His claim 
is instead that  
 
the core of the concept of knowledge is an outcome of certain very general 
facts about the human situation[.] … Given those facts, and a modicum of 
self-conscious awareness, the concept will appear; and for the same 
reasons as caused it to appear, it will then stay. (1990, 1999:10) 
 
Among these facts are that humans are living, sentient, intelligent and 
intercommunicating social beings whose survival depends on the satisfaction of 
needs which can be met in a variety of ways at different levels of cost and risk, 
and whose shared languages incorporate shared concepts which have arisen in 
response to necessity.  
 
Craig’s next move is to ‘explain why we have objectivised concepts’ (1990, 
1999:84). He sees ‘objectivisation’ (1990, 1999:82) as a ‘general principle’ which 
is ‘widely involved in concept-formation’. His initial example is the concept of a 
chair, which starts from a purely subjective interest in ‘something I can now sit on’ 
(1990, 1999:84). In beings such as ourselves this will lead to an interest in ‘objects 
I could sit on if [or when] I wanted to’ and then in ‘hearing the opinions of others as 
to where there are objects which I can sit on if I want to’; and eventually the 
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concept of something which is, in abstraction from what any particular 
person wants at any particular time or place [etc] simply suitable for sitting 
on 
 
– all the while moving towards greater and greater ‘objectivisation’. Craig claims 
his account 
 
need not presuppose that the wholly egocentric, ‘subjectivised’ thought from 
which it began actually exists or existed … only that if it exists, at any time, 
or in any individual, it will develop in the direction of objectivisation. 
 
He next applies this thinking to the ‘situation of the inquirer and the concept of the 
good informant’, again starting at the ‘most subjective’ extreme. If I am seeking 
information as to whether or not p, I will want an informant who is satisfactory for 
my purposes, ‘here and now, with my present beliefs and capacities for receiving 
information’: someone who is 
 
(1) accessible to me; 
 
(2) recognisable by me as likely to be right about p – in the sense of 
possessing a ‘property which correlates well with being right about p’ 
(1990, 1999:85); 
 
(3) ‘as likely to be right about p as my concerns require’; and 
 
(4) able to communicate with me. 
 
Craig then considers various ways in which these four conditions can fail, still 
viewed from the ‘subjective’ perspective of an individual inquirer. In respect of 
condition (1) the informant may not be immediately accessible, or not accessible 
at all. Different ways of failing condition (2) may depend on the inquirer’s specific 
attributes of, say, ‘sensory acuity, intellectual ability, theoretical background; [or] 
spatial position or bodily orientation’. So whether an inquirer (subjectively) rates 
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someone a good informant can depend on many features of the inquirer’s 
situation and his relationship with the informant (1990, 1999:87). 
 
Now consider a range of different inquirers: all with ‘the same problem – how to 
come by the truth whether p’, but with different ways of trying to solve it depending 
on their individual needs and circumstances. Most importantly 
 
these individuals form a community, and are in some degree at least helpful 
to others and responsive to their needs. And even if I, as one of the 
community, am not so inclined, I shall still need an appreciation of their point 
of view if I am to be any good at getting them to help me. From such facts 
arise a pressure towards the formation of ‘objectivised’ concepts, concepts 
which separate … the common core from the multitude of accretions due to 
particular persons, and so varying with them. (1990, 1999:87-8) 
 
I will for example hope ‘that others will on occasion recommend informants to me’ 
(1990, 1999:88) – because there will be others who, in respect of condition (2), 
 
can detect properties of the informant which I cannot detect, … or have 
more knowledge than I have of which properties correlate well with being 
right on the topic at issue. 
 
As objectivisation proceeds the requirements to be met by a good informant fare 
differently. The accessibility (1), detectability (2) and communication (4) conditions 
will diminish as potential attributes of an objectivised concept of a good informant. 
Not because they no longer matter to the inquirer, but they qualify not as part of 
the objectivised concept of a good informant but as logistical features of each 
individual inquirer’s context, and will differ depending on the circumstances and 
attributes of each inquirer. Both the number and variety of ways in which they can 
be met will increase as objectivisation proceeds. 
 
Increasing objectivisation will also affect condition (3), about the informant being 
‘as likely to be right about p as my concerns require’ (1990, 1999:85). But 
removing individual inquirers’ characteristics makes condition (3) more rather than 
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less stringent, edging us ‘towards the idea of … a good informant as to whether p 
whatever the particular circumstances of the inquirer’ (1990, 1999:91): for 
example how important it is for him to get to the truth, and what is his attitude to 
risk. This condition therefore differs from the other three by relating to the content 
and quality of what the informant can impart, not the logistical details of the 
inquirer’s circumstances. 
 
To illustrate Craig’s ‘principle of objectivisation’ in action we will offer an example 
which is not one of his and which deliberately avoids any ‘historical’ or 
‘developmental’ aspect. It does however follow Craig by starting at the ‘most 
subjective’ extreme. 
 
Imagine I am a neurologist and S1 is my patient or experimental subject. I ask S1 
to hold ice in his right hand while I fill two buckets A and B from the cold tap. I ask 
S1 to drop the ice, put his right hand in bucket A and his left in B, and then tell me 
if the water is the same temperature in both. S1 says: 
 
(p) The water in A is warmer than the water in B. 
 
In this scenario S1 would be as ‘right about p as my concerns require’ – because 
my (very specific, therefore purely ‘subjective’) concern as a neurologist is to test 
S1 for normal sensory function. Had my concerns been different, say I had wanted 
to know if both buckets had been filled at the same time from the same tap, S1’s 
statement that p would have been uninformative: it is indeed false. In those 
circumstances S1 would not be a good informant. 
 
Moving towards greater ‘objectivisation’ we now expand the number and range of 
possible inquirers. S1 would not count as a good informant in the circumstances of 
a range of actual or potential inquirers about whom we might have no idea why 
they would be interested in S1’s response to the question, and no idea what else 
they know or believe which might lead them to be informed or misled by what S1 
says. 
 
To meet more ‘objectivised’ criteria another informant (S2) might answer with the 
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water temperatures of each bucket. Or he could refuse to hold ice in his right hand 
before putting it in the water; or he could change p to ‘The water in A feels warmer 
than the water in B’; or qualify it with ‘…but I had been holding ice in my right 
hand’. An S2 able to inform an indeterminate range of people in a broader and 
ultimately indefinite variety of circumstances about how the two buckets compared 
would be a more universally valuable informant than the original S1. He would be 
one the community would be more likely to recommend as a ‘good informant’. 
 
Here we are not concerned with whether S2 gained the belief by means of a 
reliable process, although he very probably did. Our focus is not on how S2 came 
by his belief but on the range of actual or potential inquirers likely to be interested 
in what S2 could inform them of. 
 
We can interpret the story in terms of ‘sufficient’ and ‘insufficient’ evidence. The 
original S1 has some evidence (the water in A feels warmer than the water in B) 
but this is insufficient for us to say either that S1 knows the water in A is warmer 
than the water in B or that S1’s belief that the water in A is warmer than the water 
in B is justified. A ‘better’ informant like S2 might dip a thermometer in each bucket 
and report that the temperature is the same: we would probably say S2 does know 
– and therefore that his evidence is sufficient to justify his (true) belief – that the 
water in both buckets is the same temperature. 
 
According to Craig’s account we identify one who ‘knows that p’ as one who not 
only holds the true belief that p but is also someone we would recommend – and 
who ‘recommends himself’ (1990, 1999:88) – as ‘a good informant as to whether p 
whatever the particular circumstances of the inquirer’ (1990, 1999:91).120 
 
Craig’s account sheds useful light on scepticism. The further we move towards 
greater ‘objectivisation’ the less we can assume about the nature, capacities and 
needs of the potential inquirer. In my own individual (therefore ‘subjective’) case 
my informant needs to be ‘as likely to be right about p as my concerns require’. 
But the further we move from ‘my concerns’ to an increasingly objective ‘anyone’s 
                                                   
 
120 For possible relevance to ‘moral encroachment’ cases see p295. 
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concerns’ the further we will 
 
shift towards adopting a high value for the likelihood [to be right about p] 
required before we are willing to recommend an informant. For the 
conditions under which we recommend informants will not, in general, be 
ones in which the recommender is sufficiently aware of the concerns for 
which the informant and his information are needed. This fact will push the 
required standard up to such a level that the recommender may responsibly 
issue his recommendation whilst knowing nothing of them, that is to say, to a 
level that the recommender may reasonably take to be high enough to 
satisfy all, or all practical, purposes. Our use of ‘knows’ … marks the 
attainment of that level. (Craig, 1990, 1999:98). [Emphasis added.] 
 
A radical sceptic would insist on certainty so the level would need to satisfy ‘all’ 
purposes. In theory a potential inquirer could be a Cartesian doubter demanding 
an informant who would still be right about p even if an evil genius were 
manipulating all relevant sensory experiences. A ‘fully-objectivised-but-still-
practical’ stance on the other hand would settle for a level high enough to satisfy 
‘all practical’ purposes: 
 
In everyday practice we happily bandy the word ‘know’ about without having 
to feel that our chances of being wrong are literally zero… (1990, 1999:102) 
 
We therefore see two potential vanishing points at the end of Craig’s ‘road of 
objectivisation’  (1990, 1999:91) leading to knowledge. There is the theoretical 
extreme of ‘absolute certainty’ conceived to satisfy a Cartesian sceptic; and the 
fully-objectivised-but-still-practical extreme. We do not have to see the latter as 
imperfect or second best, even if its context is where the probability of a belief 
being true might be less than 1. We will seek a less quantitative way to delineate 
these two extremes. 
 
The sceptical stance leads to something like solipsism. But Craig’s account 
evades this, by committing us to what we might call ‘intersubjectivity’: a community 
of interacting individuals with at least some shared interests and values, and who 
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acknowledge and assume each other’s subjectivity. Otherwise there is nothing to 
motivate the demand for a ‘good informant’. At its most objectivised extreme the 
demand could be for an informant ‘good’ enough to satisfy a Cartesian doubter. 
But this pushes us into a contradiction. We must imagine a context where a 
‘recommender may responsibly issue his recommendation whilst knowing nothing’ 
about the ‘concerns’ of an indeterminate set of potential inquirers – including a 
Cartesian sceptic. But a sceptic could doubt the reality of both the informant and 
the context of recommendation and demand which has summoned the sceptic into 
existence to serve as part of the criterion for the informant’s possession of 
knowledge. 
 
Craig’s account does not claim to disprove scepticism. But it sidesteps it by 
positioning the sceptical stance as inappropriate. We cannot follow his ‘road of 
objectivisation’ to the vanishing point of theoretical scepticism – because his road 
cannot enter a region which forbids intersubjectivity. 
 
Adopting Craig’s account therefore commits us to intersubjectivity. But EP4 itself 
also presupposes intersubjectivity. Earlier we mentioned the ‘shared dimension’ to 
justified belief in a social and intersubjective context, such that the ‘true value of 
shared true beliefs is only realised when they count as knowledge’.121 This is 
because Clifford’s ethics of belief, the spirit of which EP4 shares, assumes a 
shared goal to acquire and enhance knowledge as a shared asset, and key to this 
is how we acquire, maintain, confirm, modify and reject our beliefs. 
 
To guarantee that S’s true belief that p qualifies as part of our shared epistemic 
asset – that is, as knowledge – ‘the reason(s) S has for believing that p would 
need to be valid for others’ who share that asset. This does not commit us to 
specifying what the justifying mechanism might be which would make those 
reasons ‘valid for others’. Following Craig’s ‘principle of objectivisation’, we can 
expand those ‘others’ into an indefinite range of others, with an indefinite range of 
concerns, constituting an epistemic community of inter-communicating conscious 
beings. Our second, ‘practical’, vanishing point becomes an extreme of indefinite 
                                                   
 
121 p253. 
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intersubjectivity. 
 
This chapter’s objective was to get to a criterion of sufficient evidence for justified 
belief. So far we have arrived at Craig’s criterion for something (proposition, belief, 
utterance) to count as knowledge. An informant would count as knowing that p if 
he not only holds the true belief that p but is also someone we would recommend, 
and who ‘recommends himself’ (1990, 1999:88) – for ‘all practical purposes’ 
(1990, 1999:98) – as ‘a good informant as to whether p whatever the particular 
circumstances of the inquirer’ (1990, 1999:91). The level of evidential sufficiency 
for knowledge would be the level at and above which this would be true. Can the 
same criterion apply to justified belief? 
 
A criterion of sufficient evidence for EP4 
 
A key difference between belief and knowledge is that knowledge implies truth 
whereas belief does not. Someone making a first-person knowledge claim is 
implicitly making a first-person claim to truth: 
 
‘I know that p’ ⊃ p 
 
Someone making a third-person knowledge claim is also implicitly making a first-
person claim to truth:122 
 
‘S knows that p’ ⊃ p 
 
But there is no implicit truth claim in a third-person belief claim: 
 
‘S believes that p’ ⊅ p 
 
Whether there is an implicit truth claim in a first-person belief claim will depend on 
how we interpret that first-person belief claim. ‘I believe that p’ can be true while p 
is false. So to that extent  
                                                   
 
122 However a third-person report of a first-person knowledge claim would not imply a first-person 
claim to truth: ‘S says, “I know that p”’ ⊅ p. 
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‘I believe that p’ ⊅ p  
 
Even though from a first-person perspective I cannot claim both that ‘I believe that 
p’ and ‘p is false’ without committing Moore’s paradox,123 knowledge and justified 
belief still differ in that knowledge implies truth whereas even justified belief does 
not. This is despite the fact that ‘justified’ for us now implies a justification 
sufficient for the belief to qualify for inclusion in the shared epistemic asset. We 
are not saying ‘I justifiably believe that p’ is equivalent to ‘I know that p’: no matter 
how justified I am in believing that p, p could still be false, whereas if I know that p 
then p cannot be false. 
 
Craig’s ‘state-of-nature’ theory gives us a criterion of ‘sufficient evidence’ for 
knowledge:  
 
A level of evidence sufficient to support the level of justification required to 
be ‘a good informant … whatever the particular circumstances of the 
inquirer’ (1990, 1999:91) 
 
If the evidential justification for belief is such that the belief qualifies for inclusion in 
the shared epistemic asset – that is as knowledge – then, in theory at least, the 
same criterion should apply to justified belief. 
 
We can ask why anyone would want to be an indefinitely ‘good informant’, why 
anyone should value, promote, facilitate and generally be a part of that 
‘intersubjectivity’. This question should not arise for Craig, for whom the idea of an 
indefinitely ‘good informant’ is what explains the objectivised concept of 
knowledge. This is not in itself a moral concept – which is not to say he sees his 
state-of-nature account of knowledge devoid of moral implications: 
 
 [T]he two facts that human life is social, and that the members of a human 
society have differing capacities and perspectives, make it obligatory to form 
                                                   
 
123 See p28. 
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the separate conceptions of the state of the object [in this context, 
knowledge], which is invariant with respect to different individuals, and the 
states of the ‘consumers’ of the object, which are not. We are in the same 
area here as are those ethical theorists who point out the social advantages 
of adopting moral principles which prescind from facts specific to individuals. 
(1990, 1999:90)124 
 
Our focus though is belief, so our question is: why should anyone want his beliefs 
to be justified sufficiently so as to qualify for inclusion in the shared epistemic 
asset? We would argue it is that same shared objective of social utility – and 
specifically the maximised value of the social asset of shared knowledge – which 
EP4 presupposes. 
 
An immediate potential objection is that our proposed criterion appears too 
stringent to apply to every belief. At times we may reasonably expect an agent to 
have this level of evidential justification, but can it apply across the board? Our 
response is to remember once again that EP4 is a moral principle and like all 
moral principles requires the exercise of judgment. 
 
It is not hard to invent scenarios where it would be virtually impossible to avoid, 
say, ‘stealing’ or ‘harming an innocent person’ without detailed context-specific 
knowledge few agents could be expected to possess: how were you to know a 
child had deliberately left that coin on the pavement as part of a game, or that the 
person you went to shake hands with suffered from acute haphephobia? The 
criterion must therefore be seen as having an aspirational, ‘wherever possible’, 
element – appropriate in the context of a moral principle like EP4. We would be 
guided in our judgment by our shared practical interest in the preservation of our 
shared epistemic asset because, if Craig is right, without that shared practical 
interest we might have no epistemic community and therefore no knowledge or 
belief at all. 
 
                                                   
 
124 This also seems to be a similar area to the moral meta-principle of ‘universality’: p188. 
   267 
So we should also be able to address another previous complaint,125 that practical 
interest introduces non-evidential, and possibly subjective, considerations into 
legitimate belief – ostensibly at odds with a principle based on a criterion of 
sufficient evidence. Practical interest may explain why we actually do adjust our 
credences depending on the ‘space of salient alternatives’ (Clarke, 2013:9) our 
context makes us take seriously;126 or why our everyday attributions of knowledge 
(or justified belief) do sometimes reflect ‘how much is at stake’ (Stanley, 2005:loc 
143) for ourselves and others.127 But EP4 states that, subject to caveats and 
qualifications, it is morally wrong to acquire or hold a descriptive belief without 
sufficient evidence, regardless of what we, with all our imperfections, actually find 
ourselves doing. So a hard line would be to say that practical interest must fall 
away as being too agent-relative to play any part in EP4. 
 
But an alternative line would be that all that has to fall away is the agent relativity, 
as this is what provides the variable component. The shared objective of social 
utility – and specifically the promotion and protection of our shared epistemic 
asset – is now the ‘practical interest’ we ought to have and which ought to guide 
our epistemic behaviour. This seems plausible both as the context we ought to 
see ourselves in if we are to obey EP4, and the stake we should not risk by 
disobeying it. In practical terms the ‘hard’ and ‘alternative’ lines come to the same 
thing, as both remove the individual agent as a determinant of what qualifies as 
sufficient evidence, replaced by a universalised, socially-oriented imperative which 




This chapter’s goal was a criterion of evidential sufficiency suitable for EP4,128 
which we have now reached. This is: 
 
                                                   
 
125 See p252. 
126 See p244ff. 
127 See p240ff. 
128 p206. 
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Wherever possible, a level of evidence sufficient to support the level of 
justification required to be ‘a good informant … whatever the particular 
circumstances of the inquirer’ (Craig, 1990, 1999:91) 
 
In terms of our three-part analysis129 of moral principles in general, this addresses 
both the (not completely non-moral) ‘domain’ (ii) and the moral requirement to 
exercise judgment (iii) in respect of that domain. 
 
The concept of the shared epistemic asset130 underpinning both CP and EP4 ends 
up doing much of the heavy lifting in relation to our eventual criterion. But first we 
tried to see how far we could get without it, considering Bayesian131 accounts of 
the relation between evidence and belief. 
 
Bayesianism sees degree of belief as a personal probability which can be 
modelled as the betting rate an individual would accept as fair in an imaginary 
gamble.132 An initial challenge was the ‘problem of the priors’,133 to which our 
response was to consider only credences after at least one update cycle. We 
therefore assumed a duty to get evidence and to take that evidence seriously.134 
This made sense if we adopted an ‘enriched’ Bayesianism considered within 
normative decision theory,135 which also explained both the normative aspect of 
Bayesianism (‘why be a Bayesian?’) and the currency of personal utility which 
Bayesian imaginary gambles could be denominated in. 
 
Although evidential sufficiency and insufficiency are not strictly part of 
Bayesianism, this does not make Bayesianism irrelevant to EP4. Bayesianism 
goes a long way towards explaining ‘good practice’ in our doxastic behaviour in 
support of decision-making under risk, particularly in respect of the relation 
between degrees of belief and evidential support and the avoidance of doxastic 
fallacies – even to the extent of outsourcing decision-making to mechanised 
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Bayesian algorithms in crucial medical or engineering contexts.136 It also suggests 
an interpretation of insufficient evidence applicable in some contexts, which would 
be where an agent’s posterior probability for a hypothesis following at least one 
update cycle is less than that of its negation.137 
 
We need something much stronger than this however: a criterion of sufficient 
evidence short of conclusive evidence, as conclusive evidence needs no Bayesian 
explanation.138 
 
We considered the idea of a threshold.139 But apart from the obvious issue of 
deciding and agreeing its numerical level, the mere concept of a threshold seems 
unworkable on its own. ‘Lottery’ cases140 show we could have two beliefs at the 
exact same personal probability, one we would say we justifiably believe (or even 
know), and the other we would say is only very probably true. 
 
To address this we considered two different approaches to ‘pragmatic 
encroachment’.141 Both appeared to explain facets of everyday epistemic 
language, and also aligned with our assumed ‘enriched’ Bayesianism embedded 
in normative decision theory: the ‘practical interest’ motivating ‘pragmatic 
encroachment’ seeming equivalent to the ‘personal utility’ representing the stakes 
of the ‘imaginary gambles’ which Bayesian credences can be illustrated as. 
 
But a conception of practical interest restricted to personal utility seems 
inappropriately agent-relative for an EP4 expressed in moral terms. This is 
particularly evident when relating our developing notion of evidential sufficiency to, 
for example, Clifford’s ship owner story.142 From the perspective of personal utility, 
the ship owner’s interest was served by believing as he did, not by withholding 
belief on insufficient evidence. 
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For the purposes of EP4 therefore there seems every reason to invite back into 
our account the dual conception of our shared epistemic asset and our shared 
responsibilities to that asset. This transforms the ‘practical interest’ in pragmatic 
encroachment into the ‘practical interest we ought to have’, which then provides 
an explanation for our duty to get evidence and take evidence seriously, and for 
the ‘utility’ currency denominating the stakes of Bayesian imaginary gambles. 
 
It remained to make some inroad into justifying why we should have this shared 
practical interest (without trying to derive an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’143) and then to 
factor in a criterion of evidential sufficiency for belief. For both we enlisted the help 
of Craig’s ‘state-of-nature’ theory of knowledge.144 Although the shared epistemic 
asset accommodates both true belief and prescriptive principles for its own 
onward custodianship, its core is knowledge. So key to how we honour our duty to 
preserve, protect and develop our shared asset is how we aim to ensure our 
beliefs could qualify as knowledge. 
 
Craig offers a definition of knowledge in terms of the requirements of a ‘good 
informant … whatever the particular circumstances of the inquirer’ (1990, 1999:91) 
as an explanation of how the concept of knowledge arose, not as a suggestion of 
what (morally) ought to be the case. With EP4 however we are in explicitly 
normative territory: the ‘ought’ in respect of belief is that our doxastic behaviour 
should be such that our beliefs qualify for inclusion in the shared epistemic asset. 
It is not that our beliefs must be identical to knowledge – knowledge and belief 
cannot be the same thing – but that our beliefs should be as justified as our 
knowledge. Our eventual criterion145 is therefore: 
 
Wherever possible, a level of evidence sufficient to support the level of 
justification required to be ‘a good informant … whatever the particular 
circumstances of the inquirer’ (Craig, 1990, 1999:91) 
 
                                                   
 
143 See for example pp62–72. 
144 p255ff. 
145 p264ff. 
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The imperative to be a ‘good informant’ commits us to intersubjectivity, allowing us 
to navigate around radical scepticism and avoid consigning virtually all our beliefs 
to a black hole of solipsism. 
 
We mentioned146 the risk that our search for a criterion of sufficient evidence could 
end in a trivial and/or circular formula like ‘a level of evidence sufficient for the 
belief to avoid the charge of being [morally] wrong’. Ours however is effectively: ‘a 
level of evidence sufficient for the belief to qualify for inclusion in the shared 
epistemic asset – ideally as knowledge’. This is neither circular nor trivial. By 
applying this criterion we discharge our duty to preserve, protect and develop our 
shared epistemic asset. It incorporates a moral demand to universalise what we 
recognise as our relevant epistemic context and our legitimate practical interest,147 
and thereby avoids the problematic agent-relativity implicit in individual practical 
interest.148 And that same moral demand to universalise149 drives why we would 
even care about the ‘particular circumstances’ and ‘concerns’ of our fellow 
‘inquirers’.150 
 
To the complaint that our criterion is too stringent to apply to all beliefs within the 
scope of EP4 we respond that as EP4 is a moral principle the criterion is ultimately 
aspirational. However that aspiration is in practice non-negotiable to the extent 
that the very possibility of knowledge and belief requires the existence of an 
epistemic community, which in turn requires our shared practical interest in 
preserving our shared epistemic asset.151 We could therefore see this as a 
minimum criterion for avoiding insufficient evidence: which would be to ensure we 
do not form beliefs in such a way as to undermine our epistemic community.152 





149 See p188. 
150 p265. 
151 See p266. 
152 The question might remain whether Craig’s concept of a ‘good informant … whatever the 
particular circumstances of the inquirer’ (1990, 1999:91) should be interpreted in a contextualist or 
invariantist way when understood as providing an account of sufficient evidence. Hawthorne’s 
(2004:3) ‘Syracuse’ case (see p233) for example suggests we have shifting standards in the way we 
apply the concept of knowledge: would Craig’s ‘good informant’ be happy to say he knows that (i) he 
will be in Syracuse next summer but not know that (ii) he will not die of a heart attack in the interim, 
even though (i) implies (ii)? But what is key for EP4 is that it provides a clear and unshifting standard 
of insufficient evidence given our common interest in protecting our shared epistemic asset. 
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This dissertation was prompted by the suspicion that, despite weaknesses, 
Clifford’s principle (CP) had got something fundamentally right.153 The aim was to 
tease out what that something might be. 
 
CP is expressed in universal, absolutist terms: 
 
…it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon 
insufficient evidence (1877, 1879:186) 
 
These expose it to attacks which a more restricted, qualified evidence principle 
might resist. 
 
We gave two distinct but related reasons for excluding prescriptive beliefs. One 
was the challenge of explaining how evidence can support purely prescriptive 
beliefs.154 The other was that applying the principle to prescriptive beliefs seemed 
incoherent – and not just because, if it was adopted it would be as a prescriptive 
belief, an evidence principle would have to presuppose itself in order to obey 
itself.155 
 
We then explored the idea of an evidence principle restricted to descriptive beliefs. 
A series of potential objections, clarifications and qualifications156 culminated in:157 
 
EP4 {If anything is morally wrong, then} it is [morally] wrong [within the 
category of descriptive belief] to believe anything [knowingly or 
irresponsibly] on insufficient evidence {in the absence of any 
conflicting and overriding moral imperative} [except when the 
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unjustified believing is outside the believer’s voluntary control]. 
 
This makes explicit what CP left implicit: that it is a morally prescriptive principle. It 
therefore differs from a conceptual or ‘intrinsic’ ethics of belief like, say, Adler’s 
(2002).158 But even a conceptual requirement for sufficient evidence will generate 
expectations in a social, and therefore moral, context;159 and Adler himself admits 
an ‘ethical grounding’ to the condition of ‘full awareness’ which underpins his 
account (Adler, 2002:9).160 
 
We then tested EP4 against James’s very different focus on the conditions for 
legitimate over-belief in general and religious over-belief in particular.161 
 
Contrasting moral positions are notoriously hard to prove or disprove. 
Complicating the case of James versus EP4 is a clash between two different 
existential perspectives and orientations. James prioritises individual liberty,162 
whereas EP4, like CP, foregrounds the social and communal consequences of 
epistemic behaviour.163 If EP4 does not conquer, it seems at least to survive 
unscathed.164 
 
The final step was to articulate how evidence can be sufficient to justify belief.165 
We summarised this at the end of the previous chapter166 so only need repeat the 
eventual criterion: 
 
Wherever possible, a level of evidence sufficient to support the level of 
justification required to be ‘a good informant … whatever the particular 
circumstances of the inquirer’ (Craig, 1990, 1999:91) 
 
  
                                                   
 
158 See p24ff. 
159 p35ff. 
160 p38ff. 
161 p129ff, particularly p140ff. 
162 Eg p181ff. 
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6.2 Status of the principle 
 
Our eventual criterion of evidential sufficiency is consistent with the social and 
moral orientation of EP4, and expands it into something which could be 
recommended to guide responsible epistemic behaviour. But recommended as 
what? What kind of thing is EP4? What is its status? 
 
Its status is likely to be linked to the potential reasons we might have for holding 
and applying it. If for example EP4 was an empirical generalisation empirical 
evidence would count among its reasons for acceptance. If intended as an 
epistemological principle, perhaps a guideline in the methodology or good practice 
of belief, it might rest on a utilitarian cost-benefit analysis. If proposed as a 
synthetic a priori principle like Kant’s Categorical Imperative we might expect a 
supporting deductive argument.167  
 
We have positioned EP4 throughout as a moral imperative like ‘thou shalt not lie’, 
so the reasons for holding it may exclude, or go beyond, empirical evidence. 
Indeed those reasons may be difficult or even impossible to state outside an over-
arching meta-ethical position. 
 
If so we might not expect EP4 to appeal universally, but it could be seen as 
aligned with, say, utilitarianism, Kantianism or Golden Rule theory. EP4 
presupposes not just morality itself, but also the individual’s duty to preserve her 
moral sovereignty.168 
 
It does not completely outlaw religious belief. But it provides a framework for 
evaluating religious belief, so as to filter out negative and potentially dangerous 
consequences – for example when repressive prescriptive beliefs get bolted onto 
descriptive metaphysical over-beliefs.169 It would therefore clash with divine 
command theory which, at least in principle, presupposes legitimate over-belief in 
the existence of a divine source of binding moral imperatives. 
                                                   
 
167 But see Appendix A5.1 Transcendental argument below p292. 
168 p185ff. 
169 p136. 
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A positive conclusion is that we have not found a convincing reason for dismissing 
EP4. It is not incoherent in itself, nor does it conflict with other commonly accepted 
moral principles, for example about not lying, deceiving or hurting the innocent. (At 
the level of an individual action different principles considered in isolation may 
recommend conflicting decisions – for example it may be impossible in a particular 
context to tell the truth or obey EP4 without hurting someone’s feelings – but this 
applies to all moral principles.170) 
 
On the other hand we have not established any conclusive reason why you must 
hold EP4 – if for example you saw no value in shared social utility, and therefore 
no benefit in protecting and enhancing the social asset of shared knowledge. But 
again in this respect EP4 does not compare unfavourably with other familiar moral 
principles. 
  
                                                   
 
170 p22. 
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Appendix A1 | Clifford on the evolution of conscience 
 
In ‘Right and Wrong: The Scientific Ground of Their Distinction’ (1875, 1879) 
Clifford asks: 
 
‘What is the best conscience? Or what ought I to think right?’ (1875, 
1879:170) 
 
This question, he thinks, 
 
resolve[s] itself into a question about the purpose or function of the 
conscience—why we have got it, and what it is good for  (1875, 1879:166). 
 
His functional approach licenses him to hop between a moral ‘ought’ and an ‘is’ of 
evolutionary explanation. Inspired by Darwin’s Descent of Man (1871) he 
conjectures that human conscience 
 
has been evolved and preserved because it is useful to the tribe or 
community in the struggle for existence against other tribes, and against the 
environment as a whole. The function of conscience is the preservation of 
the tribe as a tribe. And we shall rightly train our consciences if we learn to 
approve those actions which tend to the advantage of the community in the 
struggle for existence. (1875, 1879:167) 
 
Following Aristotle’s definition of an organism as ‘that in which the part exists for 
the sake of the whole’, where ‘the shape and nature of the part are determined by 
the wants of the whole’, he continues: 
 
Society is [such] an organism, and man in society is part of an organism 
according to this definition, in so far as some portion of the nature of man is 
what it is for the sake of the whole—society. Now conscience is such a 
portion of the nature of man, and its function is the preservation of society in 
the struggle for existence. (1875, 1879:168-9) 
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Clifford takes natural selection to operate at the level of the individual and at the 
level of the ‘tribes, clans, families, nations, towns’ (1875, 1879:169) he belongs to. 
Accordingly, 
 
for the purpose of the conscience the word community at any time will mean 
a group of that size and nature which is being selected or not selected for 
survival as a whole. Selection may be going on at the same time among 
many different kinds of groups. And ultimately the moral sense will be 
composed of various portions relating to various groups, the function or 
purpose of each portion being the advantage of that group to which it relates 
in the struggle for existence. (1875, 1879:169-70) 
 
This only partially answers our question about the ‘best conscience’ – in the sense 
of what is most advantageous in the struggle for existence. We cannot even 
answer at the level of the individual organism ‘because the organism grows in 
consequence of the struggle, and develops new wants while it is satisfying the old 
ones’. However ‘right is an affair of the community, and must not be referred to 
anything else’, because ‘[t]he first principle of natural ethics … is the sole and 
supreme allegiance of conscience to the community’ (1875, 1879:171-2): 
 
there are no self-regarding virtues properly so called; those qualities which 
tend to the advantage and preservation of the individual being only morally 
right in so far as they make him a more useful citizen. 
 
Clifford endorses utilitarianism to the extent that it ‘explicitly sets forth the 
community as the object of moral allegiance’ (1875, 1879:173) but rejects its 
classic definition of ‘the end of right action’ as the ‘greatest happiness of the 
greatest number’: 
 
My happiness is of no use to the community except in so far as it makes me 
a more efficient citizen; that is to say, it is rightly desired as a means and not 
as an end. The end may be described as the greatest efficiency of all 
citizens as such. No doubt happiness will in the long run accrue to the 
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community as a consequence of right conduct; but the right is determined 
independently of the happiness… 
 
Clifford’s ultimate position seems to be therefore that the ‘best conscience’ (‘moral 
sense’) for an individual is what best achieves its ‘purpose or function’ – which is 
to promote survival at the level of his community. There appear to be four potential 
issues with this. 
 
The first Clifford acknowledges: an individual may belong to ‘many different kinds 
of groups’. His response seems to be that the broader the group, the higher the 
priority: 
 
[P]art of the nature of a smaller group may be what it is for the sake of a 
larger group to which it belongs; and then we may speak of the function of 
the smaller group. … [And] we may say that the function of the family is to 
promote the advantage of the nation or larger society… (1875, 1879:170) 
 
The second is a potential implication of Clifford’s position. We will take an 
evolutionary explanation of moral worth to identify what is right with what promotes 
the survival of the group the individual belongs to. By extension we can then 
identify what is right with what promotes the survival of the fittest members of the 
group at the expense of the least fit: other things being equal, this would promote 
the survival of the group in competition with other groups. But this could 
encourage measures significantly more brutal than Clifford’s Poor Law policy.171 
For example Herbert Spencer, whom Clifford admired,172 rubbished the idea of 
finding work for the unemployed: ‘poor-law’ theories asserting ‘a man’s right to a 
maintenance, and … to have work provided for him’ were ‘erroneous’ (1851:315). 
Better for nature to take its course: 
 
[Predators] not only remove from herbivorous herds individuals past their 
prime, but also weed out the sickly, the malformed, and the least fleet or 
                                                   
 
171 See p55. 
172 Eg: …Mr. Herbert Spencer, who has done so much for the whole doctrine of evolution and for all 
that is connected with it… (Clifford, 1877, 1879:281) 
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powerful. By the aid of which purifying process … the maintenance of a 
constitution completely adapted to surrounding conditions, and therefore 
most productive of happiness, is ensured. (1851:322) 
 
This ‘progress’ holds throughout nature’s ‘higher creation’, with its ‘consummation’ 
in humans, where the same  
 
felicity-pursuing law … never swerves for the avoidance of partial and 
temporary suffering. The poverty of the incapable, the distresses that come 
upon the imprudent, the starvation of the idle, and … shoulderings aside of 
the weak by the strong … are the decrees of a large, far-seeing … 
beneficence which brings to early graves the children of diseased parents, 
and singles out the low-spirited, the intemperate, and the debilitated as the 
victims of an epidemic. (1851:322-3) 
 
The third issue arises from a more dispassionate analysis of natural selection: 
‘survival of the fittest’ is profoundly tautologous, since evolutionary fitness is purely 
a measure of survival. What survives, and what promotes survival, depends on 
context. In some contexts increased fertility promotes survival; in others over-
breeding leads to extinction. Some contexts favour increased complexity 
(‘progress’); others favour regression to simpler, even degenerate, states. The 
only ‘excellence’ which favours evolutionary survival is excellence at survival. 
 
Linking moral worth to survival is therefore problematic. If what is right for an 
individual is what promotes the survival of the group the individual belongs to, 
there can be no ‘right’ to arbitrate between two ‘right’ individuals from competing 
groups A and B. That is unless – and this seems to be Clifford’s view – favouring 
what is ‘right’ for group A over what is ‘right’ for group B better promotes the 
survival of the group which groups A and B both belong to. 
  
The fourth issue is the seemingly unwarranted assumptions linking ‘is’ to ‘ought’. 
Spencer appears to treat evolutionary ‘progress’ as both a fact about the living 
world, if not the universe as a whole, and a moral target towards which conscious 
endeavour should be directed. Clifford does something similar, but with the 
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survival imperative. He seems to assume the sense of obligation we happen to 
experience as part of our evolutionary survival kit (‘is’) can explain and justify our 
actual obligation (‘ought’).173 But this assumption is equally unwarranted, because 
we can always ask if we ought to feel the sense of obligation we happen to feel. 
With this assumption we could reduce morally prescriptive beliefs to hypothetical 
prudential beliefs, with hidden antecedents like ‘if you want [the group you belong 
to] to win in the survival of the fittest, then…’. We have seen174 that hypothetical 
prudential beliefs can be reworded as descriptive beliefs without significant loss of 
meaning. This could be why Clifford is happy to apply his principle to prescriptive 
beliefs – indeed to moral beliefs. However he seems to equate an evolutionary 
account of our sense of obligation (‘is’) with a justification of our actual obligation 
(‘ought’), giving him an unwarranted licence to treat morally prescriptive beliefs as 
hypothetical prudential beliefs. But this route is not open to us, as the beliefs which 
worry us are categorical prescriptive beliefs, which by definition cannot be 




                                                   
 
173 See p55. 
174 p44ff. 
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Appendix A2 | Bayes’ Rule, evidence and prescriptive 
beliefs 
 
Chapter 2175 argued that a prescriptive belief may not be the sort of thing which 
could have supporting evidence. This was one of the reasons for excluding 
prescriptive beliefs from EP4. In this Appendix we will explore another possible 
reason for excluding prescriptive beliefs from EP4, based on how Bayes’ Rule 
interprets the relationship between evidence and hypotheses, which we were not 
in a position to discuss in Chapter 2. 
 
Consider this descriptive hypothesis: 
 
Hd = ‘The latest common ancestor of bonobos and humans was more recent 
than the latest common ancestor of gorillas and humans.’ 
 
Our evidence could be: 
 
Ed = ‘Humans and bonobos have 99% of DNA in common, whereas humans 
and gorillas have 96% of DNA in common.’ 
 
Chapter 2 used an ‘initial working definition’ of evidence: 
 
… statement s counts as evidence for a belief that p if s is true and s 
provides objective reasons for thinking p is true or is likely to be true.176 
 
Chapter 5 then used Bayes’ Rule to enrich the relationship between evidence and 
belief by introducing the probability of Ed if Hd were true = Pr(Ed/Hd). 
 
Our background knowledge of evolution and genetics would lead us to assess 
Pr(Ed/Hd) as fairly high – certainly higher than if the percentages were reversed. 
More importantly it seems an expression we could evaluate, however imprecisely. 
If I was asked how likely it would be that humans and bonobos shared more DNA 
                                                   
 
175 See p46ff. 
176 p62. 
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than humans and gorillas did, given that bonobos and humans shared a more 
recent common ancestor than gorillas and humans did, I might balk at an exact 
quantification. But I would understand the question, and be confident that Ed would 
be far more likely than if the percentages of shared DNA were the other way 
round. 
 
Now consider a prescriptive hypothesis Hp, with proposed supporting evidence Ep: 
 
Hp = ‘Children should not be subjected to corporal punishment.’ 
 
Ep = ‘Out of two equal populations of adults, one of which (sample A) had 
been subjected to corporal punishment as children while the other (sample 
B) had not, the incidence of individuals convicted of crimes of violence in 
sample A was three times that in sample B.’ 
 
Against our initial working definition Ep might seem to qualify as evidence for Hp. If 
I think Hp is something which could be true or false then the truth of Ep may be a 
reason for holding Hp as true (as the truth of Ed may be a reason for holding Hd as 
true). 
 
But if we try to assess the degree to which Ep supports Hp by using Bayes’ Rule 
we would need a value for Pr(Ep/Hp), the probability of Ep if Hp were true. But this 
seems obscure. If I was asked how likely I thought it was that the incidence of 
violent crimes committed by a sample of adults subjected to corporal punishment 
as children was three times that of an equivalent sample of adults not subjected to 
corporal punishment as children, given that children should not be subjected to 
corporal punishment, I am not sure I would understand the question. It would 
seem back to front, as if the questioner meant to ask how confident I would be in 
thinking that children should not be subjected to corporal punishment, given those 
relative rates of criminal activity, but muddled her words up. 
 
Assuming we can talk of the ‘truth’ of a prescriptive hypothesis like Hp, its ‘truth’ 
does not give us a reason for expecting Ep to be true – in the way the truth of Hd 
does give us a reason for expecting Ed to be true. This is not to deny that a more 
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general descriptive hypothesis may be both a reason for holding prescriptive belief 
Hp and a reason for expecting Ep to be true, for example: 
 
Hgd = ‘Children subjected to corporal punishment are more likely to display 
aggressive behaviour in later life’. 
 
So assuming the Bayesian conception of conditional probability is sound, this 
seems to give extra support to the idea that prescriptive beliefs are not the sort of 
thing that can be supported by evidence. 
 
Compare now a (descriptive) utilitarian hypothesis: 
 
Hu = ‘Subjecting children to corporal punishment reduces rather than 
maximises net human happiness.’ 
 
The equivalent probability of Ep if Hu were true = Pr(Ep/Hu). 
 
The expression Pr(Ep/Hu) seems as coherent as Pr(Ed/Hd), and we might assess 
the probability of Ep given the truth of Hu as quite high, especially if we add 
additional descriptive assumptions relating the incidence of violent crimes to net 
human happiness. 
 
A utilitarian might see a factual claim like Hu as justifying a prescriptive claim like 
Hp. But a utilitarian claiming the ‘truth’ of Hp gives her a reason for expecting Ep to 
be true would have to see Hp and Hu as identical in propositional content – a 
rather more controversial claim. 
 
For completeness consider a hypothetical prescription: 
 
Hhp = ‘If you want to avoid criminality, then children should not be subjected 
to corporal punishment’ 
 
If we apply the same evidence statement Ep then the probability of Ep if Hhp were 
true = Pr(Ep/Hhp). This also seems coherent, unlike Pr(Ep/Hp). This is because the 
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overall content of Hhp is descriptive rather than prescriptive, making a descriptive 
claim about what achieves or causes what. It is like ‘If you want your plants to live, 
you should water them’, which has descriptive content equivalent to, say, ‘Plants 
will live only if they are watered’.177 
 
A hypothetical prescriptive belief like ‘If you want your plants to live, you should 
water them’ is not the kind of prescriptive belief excluded from EP4, as clearly it 
can have supporting evidence. But a categorical prescriptive belief like Hp is 
excluded. 
 
Assuming the Bayesian approach is sound, the asymmetry discussed here looks 
like another reason for thinking (categorical) prescriptive beliefs cannot have 
supporting evidence – at least in the straightforward way descriptive beliefs can. 
  
                                                   
 
177 See also 2.2 Hypothetical prescriptive beliefs, pp44–46. 
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Appendix A3 | EP4 and subjective Bayesian 
permissiveness 
 
EP4 departs from standard Bayesian positions in two important respects. Chapter 
5 covered the prescribed currency of shared social utility, particularly in relation to 
shared duties towards our shared epistemic asset, rather than leaving ‘personal 
utility’ unqualified.178 Another big difference is that a subjective Bayesian would 
(like James) allow far more permissiveness over beliefs and credences than our 
now contextualised EP4 would permit. 
 
We will consider two scenarios. Both are where someone has a high credence for 
a hypothesis even though there appears no evidence (or insufficient evidence) for 
it. Both could be seen as legitimate from a subjective Bayesian perspective. 
However they fare differently against EP4. 
 
 (A3.1) ‘Maverick’: The evidentially unsupported or under-supported 
hypothesis is logically connected to many other hypotheses but the 
individual has a consistent set of credences for the whole set. Some or 
all of these credences may well be very different from most other 
people’s. 
 
Examples could include the belief that the world is flat,179 or that the 
Apollo moon landings were a hoax.180 In the Apollo case related 
hypotheses might include generally accepted ones about the contents 
and behaviour of the solar system; supporting ‘conspiracy’ hypotheses 
about NASA and the Nixon administration; and rejected ‘official’ 
explanations for apparent photographic anomalies like missing stars 
and the rippling flag. 
 
(A3.2) ‘Free floating’: The evidentially unsupported or under-supported 
hypothesis is logically connected with very few if any other 
                                                   
 
178 See p249ff. 
179 See eg http://www.theflatearthsociety.org/cms/index.php. Accessed 12 May 2016. 
180 See eg https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moon_landing_conspiracy_theories. Accessed 12 May 2016. 
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hypotheses. Again the set of credences is consistent, but this time it is 
because the set is very small and unrelated to most other hypotheses 
which the individual may have evidentially supported credences for. 
 
An example could be James’s ‘religious hypothesis’ (1896, 2000:214) 
which he sees as legitimate if it arises from a ‘genuine option that 
cannot by its nature be decided on intellectual grounds’ (1896, 
2000:205). 
 
The ‘maverick’ individual in (A3.1) may not necessarily be disobeying EP4. He can 
claim some evidence, and could have appropriately high credences for supporting 
hypotheses offering explanations for apparent counter-evidence suggesting that, 
say, the earth is spherical or that chemical analysis of Apollo moon rocks suggests 
a lunar source. To hold an unorthodox belief or set of beliefs is not to disobey EP4 
– otherwise EP4 would stand in the way of much scientific progress. Sincere flat-
earthers and Apollo hoax theorists could no doubt justifiably claim they are not 
knowingly or irresponsibly believing on insufficient evidence, which EP4 forbids. 
Bayesian agents may be assumed to be logically omniscient181 but EP4 does not 
impose it as a requirement. 
 
But the maverick may not be so innocent. If he was genuinely aware of a balanced 
cross-section of available evidence and as a result knew or believed the evidence 
for his ‘maverick’ belief was insufficient, but insisted on holding the requisite 
credence values for a set of logically related hypotheses including the maverick 
hypothesis, then he would be disobeying EP4. Measured against EP4 he would 
be behaving irresponsibly with respect to belief (and as such endangering or 
devaluing the shared social asset of knowledge), even though a subjective 
Bayesian might say his high credence is legitimate because none of his related 
(possibly also ‘maverick’) credences constrained it to a lower value. 
 
There is however no contradiction between being (i) licensed to have a certain 
credence from a subjective Bayesian point of view, where the avoided penalty for 
                                                   
 
181 See p219. 
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an incorrect (ie inconsistent) credence is to lose out in terms of personal utility 
specifically related to sure-loss contracts in respect of any imaginary gambles 
used to quantify credences; and being (ii) morally blameworthy for holding a 
certain belief or believing in a certain way (including having a particular credence 
for a hypothesis) where such behaviour could endanger or devalue the shared 
epistemic asset.182 You could be blameworthy under (ii) for availing yourself of the 
‘epistemic licence’ granted under (i). 
 
It may be that, in relation to the total set of evidence the agent chose to consider, 
his high credence for the maverick hypothesis was coherent against possible 
synchronic constraints set by logically related credences. If these credences are 
translated into imaginary gambles, the agent would not be exposing himself to 
sure losses. So even if the utility ‘currency’ were shared social utility, there would 
be no risk of a ‘Dutch Book’ loss. However deliberate ‘partisan’ selection of 
evidence to support chosen credences does not let the agent off the hook. In the 
broader context of normative decision theory in relation to epistemic behaviour, 
refusing to consider or look for any evidence is a special case of deliberate 
partisan selection of evidence183 – which could expose the agent to the risk of 
losing bets which do not need to be lost and/or accepting bets at inappropriate 
odds. Such bets could risk loss of utility: which for EP4 we are quantifying in the 
currency of shared social value, and specifically that of a shared epistemic asset. 
 
A similar argument applies in the case of (A3.2). From a subjective Bayesian 
perspective an agent may be licensed to hold, or have a high credence for, a 
specific ‘free-floating’ belief unconnected with any other credences which might 
otherwise constitute an inconsistent set and therefore expose the believer to sure-
loss contracts in respect of imaginary gambles. But the agent may still be morally 
blameworthy by believing irresponsibly, and therefore not protecting the shared 
epistemic asset. 
                                                   
 
182 Even from a perspective of purely individual personal utility, there is no contradiction between (i) 
and (iii) losing out in terms of personal utility as a result of believing something which turns out to be 
false. The maverick could for example hold a credence of .95 for the hypothesis that on New Year’s 
Day he will be able to fly, while ensuring that any other credences he holds for logically related 
hypotheses do not expose him to sure-loss contracts in respect of relevant imaginary gambles. On 
the first of January he launches himself off a roof and breaks his neck. 
183 See footnote 63 p229. 
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In both cases the agent could be accused of ‘cheating’: taking a free ride.184 As a 
member of the epistemic community he would benefit from the shared epistemic 
asset, while asserting his freedom to endanger or undermine it by fostering 
credulity and gullibility as a result of believing on inadequate evidence. 
 
Depending on the precise details of the story, the beliefs of Xhosa prophetess 
Nongqawuse which led to the 1856-7 mass destruction of crops and cattle185 could 
qualify as either ‘maverick’ or ‘free-floating’. Either way the shared epistemic asset 
of agricultural wisdom, from which Nongqawuse and those who spread her 
prophecies presumably benefited all their lives up to this point, was tragically 
compromised and overturned. 
 
  
                                                   
 
184 See p254. 
185 See eg (Wikipedia, 2016). There are some parallels with Clifford’s story about the ‘medicine-man 
in Central Africa’ (1877, 1879:200) 
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Appendix A4 | Bertrand’s paradox 
 
Bertrand’s paradox (Bertrand, 1889) can be illustrated like this: 
 
Consider an equilateral triangle ABC inside a circle. 
Draw a chord XY at random. What is the probability 
that chord XY is longer than the side of triangle 
ABC? 
 
The question seems to have (at least) three different 
answers, depending on how we randomly draw chord XY. 
We could for example select random points on the circumference; or randomly 
centre the chord on a randomly selected diameter; or randomly select the mid-
point of the chord. 
 
A4.1 Three possible answers 
 
A4.1.1 Random points on the circumference 
 
Randomly select point X on the circumference to be one 
end of the chord. Draw equilateral triangle ABC inside 
the circle such that one of its vertices (say A) coincides 
with point X. The other end of the chord (Y) must be on 
one of three arcs AB, BC and CA. Because all three 
arcs are the same length it should be equally probable 
for Y to fall somewhere on arc AB or somewhere on arc 
BC or somewhere on arc CA. If, as in chord XY1, Y falls 
on either arc AB or arc CA, the chord will be shorter than the side of the triangle. If 
Y falls on arc BC, as in chord XY2, the chord will be longer than the side of the 
triangle. It is therefore twice as probable that the chord is shorter than that it is 
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A4.1.2 Randomly centred on randomly selected diameter 
 
Randomly select a diameter AD. Draw equilateral triangle 
ABC inside the circle such that base BC is perpendicular to 
diameter AD. Then draw another circle inside triangle ABC. 
(This is the incircle of triangle ABC, whereas the original 
outer circle is the circumcircle.)  Randomly select a point on 
diameter AD as the midpoint of chord XY also 
perpendicular to AD. If the chord overlaps the incircle (as in 
X1Y1) it will be longer than BC (the side of the triangle). If 
the chord does not overlap the incircle (as in X2Y2) it will be shorter than BC. 
 
For any equilateral triangle the radius of its circumcircle is twice the radius of its 
incircle. So the probability that chord XY (eg X1Y1) overlaps the incircle (and is 
therefore longer than the side of the triangle) equals the probability that chord XY 
(eg X2Y2) does not overlap the incircle (and is therefore shorter than the side of 
the triangle). Hence the probability that chord XY is longer than the side of triangle 
ABC is ½. 
 
A4.1.3 Randomly selected midpoint 
 
Consider the same equilateral triangle ABC with its 
circumcircle and incircle. Randomly select points within 
the circumcircle. Treat each point as the midpoint Z of a 
chord XY. A subset of these points will, like Z1, be within 
the incircle. They will be midpoints of chords like X1Y1 
which are longer than the side of triangle ABC. The rest of 
the points will, like Z2, be outside the incircle, and be 
midpoints of chords like X2Y2 which are shorter than the 
side of triangle ABC. 
 
The radius r1 of the incircle of equilateral triangle ABC is half the radius r2 of the 
circumcircle. Therefore the area of the incircle (πr12) is a quarter the area of the 
circumcircle (πr22). The probability of any midpoint Z being inside the incircle 
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rather than outside it is therefore ¼. Hence the probability that any chord XY is 




The three scenarios A4.1.1–3 above seem to show that the ‘randomly selected’ 
chord XY can be seen as a member of (and therefore randomly selected from) 
three different sets, based on the indefinite division of the circle’s circumference, 
diameter and area respectively. Each set yields a different probability for the chord 
being longer than the side of the triangle: ⅓, ½ and ¼ respectively. We cannot fix 
the probability in relation to the randomly selected chord without knowing which 
indefinite set it is randomly selected from, and therefore which randomising 
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Appendix A5 | Future directions 
 
This dissertation could not explore every direction it wanted to, so below are 
suggestions for future work. 
 
A5.1 Transcendental argument 
 
Features of EP4 and its context suggest there might be a potential Kantian-style 
‘transcendental’ argument for EP4 – although it may not be a purely deductive 
one. Lack of space restricts us to a mere sketch of what it could entail. 
 
It would be an argument in support of EP4 itself, drawing on the justification for the 
proposed criterion of sufficient evidence,186 and revolving around the shared 
epistemic asset of knowledge and justified belief. On our interpretation Craig’s 
account of knowledge (and therefore, we argued, of justified belief187) 
presupposes a context of community and intersubjectivity: interacting individuals 
with shared interests and values, acknowledging and assuming each other’s 
subjectivity. We would need to argue that that context of community and 
intersubjectivity requires and rests on the community members’ shared epistemic 
asset. Without a shared body of knowledge and justified belief the community 
members might struggle to interact sufficiently so as to acknowledge each other’s 
subjectivities and understand and acknowledge each other’s claims to knowledge 
and justified belief. 
 
Assuming this move can be made, then for knowledge and justified belief to be 
possible – for ‘all practical’ purposes (Craig, 1990, 1999:98) at least – we must 
presuppose a shared epistemic asset. For that shared epistemic asset to survive, 
members of the community must, in turn, have a shared practical interest in its 
survival. Their awareness of shared practical interest would manifest as shared 
recognition of shared duties to ensure the survival of their shared epistemic asset. 
 
                                                   
 
186 See p266. 
187 See p262. 
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On a day-to-day level these shared duties would include, for example, taking 
responsibility for the implications of what and how one believes, and whether one 
is doing so in ‘full awareness’ (Adler, 2002:9).188 And as a measure of how shared 
their practical interests are they should share a broadly similar understanding of 
what ‘all practical’ purposes entail.189 
 
A5.2 Scientific revolutions 
 
When distinguishing between descriptive and prescriptive beliefs there is a 
temptation to claim scientific belief as a paradigm case of descriptive belief, and 
scientific evidence as an exemplar of supporting evidence. Within the realm of 
purely descriptive beliefs we would want to compare a descriptive belief which 
seems to pass CP or EP4 by having adequate supporting evidence with one 
which fails to. We might therefore want to offer scientific belief as a standard of 
successful descriptive belief. 
 
However the relationship between evidence and scientific belief may not prove 
unproblematic. For example during transitions (revolutions) in scientific belief there 
can be disagreement as to what counts as evidence, how evidence bears on 
statements of scientific theory, and how one should infer those statements from 
the evidence.190 The disagreement could be seen as a clash between different 
methodological beliefs – therefore between different (non-moral) second-order 
prescriptive beliefs. If those prescriptive beliefs fall outside EP4, what justification 
would we have for choosing one rather than another? 
 
The issue of underdetermination of theory by evidence merits much lengthier 
discussion than space here would allow. Future work would try to clarify exactly 
how and why a principle like EP4 expressed in moral language might be exposed 
by considerations of underdetermination and how it might be defended. 
 
  
                                                   
 
188 See p35ff. 
189 See p262. 
190 Mentioned p63. 
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A5.3 Moral revolutions 
 
‘Moral revolutions’ are another potential loose end, illustrated by the following 
thought experiment. A relatively happy but closed community are united in their 
shared over-beliefs about the nature and wishes of a particular pantheon: the 
Norse Æsir, say. It is a context where ‘the only reason for belief is that everybody 
has believed the thing for so long that it must be true’ (Clifford, 1877, 1879:200). 
Continued social cohesion may however depend on continued shared over-belief. 
This is not to rule out the possibility that even better times may follow from 
eventual loss of belief, but only after an interval of social disintegration and 
suffering. 
 
The ‘closed community’ has implications for the interpretation of ‘indefinite 
intersubjectivity’191 and ‘indefinitely good informant’192 in Chapter 5. The individual 
members of the community may see a ‘good informant’ as one who describes 
natural phenomena in terms of the actions of Odin, Thor and Freyja. But ‘indefinite 
intersubjectivity’ implies projecting outside the community – into possibly alien 
circumstances and concerns which community members might never envisage. 
 
Two immediate responses come to mind. The simpler is that this scenario may not 
challenge EP4, because of its ‘conflicting and overriding moral imperative’ caveat. 
The overriding moral imperative may not be to preserve the existing status quo 
come what may. But we might entertain an imperative to limit collateral damage by 
adopting careful, creative and gradualist ways to promote transition to more 
evidence-based belief. 
 
A more complex response might explore whether a principle like EP4 relies on a 
particular social context. It could be a luxury which only ‘enlightened’ liberal 
democracies can enjoy or even contemplate. 
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A5.4 Moral encroachment 
 
There has been much recent debate on ‘moral encroachment’, defined by Rimu 
(2019b:10) as the thesis that ‘the epistemic justification of our beliefs can be 
determined, in part, by the moral demands of our situation, i.e., the moral stakes’. 
Example literature includes Basu (2019a), Basu (2019b), Bollinger (2018), 
Gardiner (2018), Moss (2018) and Schroeder (2018), many of which employ test 
cases involving possible racial profiling. Basu (2019a) gives the example of a 
‘supposedly rational racist’ waiter called Spencer who is ‘tired of constantly being 
called a racist’ whenever he believes of a particular black diner that he will tip 
worse than the average white diner, based on his knowledge of ‘studies that show 
that on average black diners tip substantially less than white diners.’ 
 
Because moral encroachment can be considered at least analogous to pragmatic 
encroachment, which we have discussed in the articulation of EP4 as a moral 
principle, it would be valuable to check if anything in the moral encroachment 
literature might lead us to revise our treatment of EP4. 
 
At first sight though our transformation of the ‘practical interest’ of pragmatic 
encroachment into the ‘practical interest we (morally) ought to have’ means our 
account should already be sufficiently resourced to ensure that beliefs which are 
cases of high ‘moral stakes’ call for an appropriately high level of evidential 
support. So in the particular context of potential racial profiling our incorporation of 
Craig’s ‘good informant as to whether p whatever the particular circumstances of 
the inquirer’ (1990, 1999:91) should accommodate inquirers who may for example 
correctly insist that the informant fully appreciates both the range of reference 
classes a potential target of racial profiling may belong to and the ‘harms and 
wrongs that accompany being racially profiled’ (Basu, 2019b). Spencer does not 
after all know what tip he will get until the diner pays the bill, and he will probably 
never know why the diner tipped the way he did. 
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